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Preface
This thesis deals with a significant portion of the most important fragments of Antisthenes.  
The closest companion of Socrates, Antisthenes was himself a major thinker and far-famed 
writer of the late fifth and early fourth centuries BC.  A prolific author and an enormously 
influential figure in the fields of literature and ethical philosophy, the size of Antisthenes' 
output was matched only by his extraordinary creativity.  As a result, in antiquity he 
enjoyed a stellar reputation.  In modern times however, due largely to the inaccessibility of 
the fragments, he has been almost entirely neglected.  As a collection, Antisthenes' 
fragments had never been translated in any modern language until 2011 (Spanish), had 
never been the subject of a commentary, nor, it turns out, had they even been edited with 
due care.
Therefore, at the outset of this dissertation project, the intention was to produce an edition 
of all of Antisthenes' fragments, with translations, commentary and an introductory study.  
The first step was then to edit all the texts and produce translations.  During this phase past 
editions of Antisthenes' fragments, and the best texts from which his fragments are sourced, 
were all consulted.  It was surprising to discover how many fragments were untranslatable 
in the state they are printed in existing editions.  Many required emendation to make sense 
of them, and in the process thirteen fragments were added to the corpus, and a further 
three fragments were significantly extended.  It would be fair to say that while Antisthenes 
has occasionally been edited, he seems rarely ever to have been read.
Once all of the fragments had been edited and translated, and the commentary was under 
way, it gradually became apparent that a full edition would turn out to be well beyond the 
acceptable length for a dissertation at The University of Sydney.  Antisthenes was just so 
interesting and there was so much to say about his work that a decision had to be made to 
narrow the focus onto a naturally discrete portion of the fragments.  Therefore it was 
decided to work on all the literary fragments (other than the Ajax & Odysseus, which had 
been discussed in detail in my previous dissertation: Kennedy 2011).  The literary 
fragments are those that are not specifically philosophical and which show Antisthenes 
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contribution to Greek literary history.  These fragments are in any case some of the most 
interesting, as they display Antisthenes' extraordinary variety and versatility.  And to date, 
compared with his more philosophical fragments, they have been the most neglected.  The 
literary fragments really throw positive light on all of Antisthenes' work and reveal pretty 
clearly that he needs a complete rethinking.
It follows that a major goal of this thesis will be to demonstrate that Antisthenes, as a 
thinker, was at least as much a literary as he was a philosophical figure.  Also, to show that 
in so far as Antisthenes was a philosophical figure, he was a Socratic through and through, 
holding ethical values consistent with the elite class he kept company with, and 
undeserving of his reputation as a founder of Cynicism.  That reputation he only acquired 
in later antiquity, and yet it remains mostly unchallenged in modern scholarship.  In 
demonstrating that Antisthenes was an important literary figure, this thesis will show that 
he played a seminal role in a range of literary innovations, including (but not limited to): 
the portrayal of character in prose writing; the development of dialogue form; and the 
deployment of a systematic method of literary criticism.  In fact, a case can be made that 
Antisthenes was the first Greek writer of prose fiction.  The genre of fiction he wrote, and 
which he used as a vehicle to convey his entire ethical programme, was dialogue.  Amongst 
other innovations, he wrote dialogues interpreting Homer, and he deployed a greater 
variety of strategies in his dialogues than any of his contemporaries – e.g. including 
mythical characters and including himself as speakers.  Antisthenes' great innovativeness, 
which others built on, was no doubt a contributing factor prompting ancient critics to level 
accusations of plagiarism against authors such as Plato and Aeschines of Sphettus.
In short, Antisthenes was a Socratic philosopher and a major literary figure in his day, 
whose genre of choice was prose fiction, and more specifically prose dialogues.  
Antisthenes was known in antiquity as the equal of writers such as Plato and Xenophon 
and all of his work was part of a consistent and coherent programme.  His thoughts 
therefore should not be considered as detached, discrete objects, and his achievements and 
contribution to literature and ethical philosophy should not be regarded as mere stepping-
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stones to understanding someone else's thought.  While Antisthenes was naturally a 
participant in the discourses of his time, his leading and innovative contributions to 
literature deserve to be considered in their own right.  The intention is that this dissertation 
will provide a major step in that direction.
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INTRODUCTION
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1   BIOGRAPHY OF ANTISTHENES
1.i   Antisthenes' Reputation in Antiquity and Today
In antiquity, Antisthenes enjoyed an outstanding reputation as a thinker and as a prose 
stylist. Ancient critics considered Antisthenes to be the equal of the best prose writers of the 
Classical period.  The number of Antisthenes' works, and the scope of their topics was 
remarkable – Diogenes Laertius attributes over 70 titles to him (6.15-18).   Though the verity 
of all of the titles of Antisthenes' works is uncertain (see discussion below, ch. 6), they 
include such diverse subject matter as: literary criticism, ethopoiia, prosopography, logic, 
ethics, epistemology, ontology, and theology.  All, it will be argued in this dissertation, were 
presented in dialogue form.  The quantity, and the range of topics he reportedly wrote on, is 
rivalled only by Aristotle (46 works: DL 5.13) and Democritus (68 works: DL 9.13).  
Antisthenes was in fact criticised in antiquity for writing too much on every kind of 
subject.1  This was one reaction to his prodigious literary output, which included 
experimentation with a wide range of topics. 
In terms of reputation, the ancients most regularly discussed Antisthenes as a peer of Plato 
and Xenophon.  The quality of his prose was also compared favourably with other late fifth 
century writers including Demosthenes, Thucydides, and Critias.  For example,  
Phyrnichus (late 2nd c. AD), himself a famous ancient grammarian, rhetorician and admirer 
of style, rated Antisthenes as one of the finest exponents of the pure Attic style along with 
Plato and Demosthenes (CD10).2  Fronto (1st half 2nd c. AD) compares lesser authors 
unfavourably against the trio of Plato, Xenophon and Antisthenes.3  The rhetorician and 
literary critic Longinus (3rd c. AD) groups Plato, Xenophon and Antisthenes together as 
writers of exacting skill.4  Epictetus (mid 1st c. AD) mentions Antisthenes, Plato and 
Xenophon as writers of great reputation.5  The emperor Julian (mid 4th c. AD) discusses 
1 Timon, early 3rd c. BC, DL 6.18 = DC 2, SSR 41, PPF F37.
2 See Fragment Numbering on p. 10 for the system of fragment classification.
3 ad M. Antonin. imp. De eloquentia 2.16 = SSR 47.
4 Ars Rhet. F 48.190-207 = DC 11, SSR 48.
5 Arr. Epic. Dis. 2.17.35 = SSR 46.
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Xenophon, Antisthenes and Plato together, as they all employ myth in discussions of ethical 
theory (MD14-16).  Theopompus, a fourth century BC contemporary, actually claims Plato 
plagiarised prior dialogues of Antisthenes in a number of instances (SD1 and commentary). 
In a similar vein Persaeus lists three dialogues, which he says Aeschines plagiarised from 
Antisthenes (CD6 and commentary).
In contrast to the reputation Antisthenes enjoyed in antiquity, nowadays he is almost 
entirely neglected.  In the history of modern scholarship there have only been six editions 
and less than half a dozen monographs dedicated to Antisthenes.  His fragments were first 
translated and published in a modern language only in 2011.6  When he receives mention it 
is usually for the wrong reasons: in his capacity as the putative founder of Cynicism, or as a 
'minor rhetorician'.  Though he is often referred to as the founder of Cynicism, or at least as 
the first of the Cynics, this reputation is misconceived as demonstrated below in chapter 2.i. 
Antisthenes' connection with rhetoric seems to stem originally from Diogenes Laertius who 
first reported, in the early third century AD, that Antisthenes was initially a student of 
Gorgias (6.1).  This label has stuck.  As a result, one place Antisthenes does get mentioned 
in modern times is in handbooks on rhetoric, however, even then he usually receives little 
more than a mere mention,7 if in fact he is mentioned at all.8
One reason this connection between Antisthenes and rhetoric has persisted into modern 
times is because his largest surviving text, the Ajax & Odysseus, is usually categorised as a 
rhetorical piece.  There are around 330 extant fragments (including testimonia) for 
Antisthenes, many of which consist of only one line or a few lines (including 13 added to 
the corpus by this dissertation).9  The Ajax & Odysseus however, is a few pages long.  The 
work is usually presented as two separate fragments, i.e. an Ajax and an Odysseus.  They are 
clearly two parts of the same work, however, because Odysseus responds in his speech to 
6 I.e. Spanish, Mársico (2011); and now an edition in English by Prince (2015).
7 E.g. Russell (1983), Easterling (1985), Schiappa (1994), Poulakos (1995), Johnstone (1996), Usher (1999), 
Worthington (2007).
8 Not mentioned in e.g. Kennedy (1994), Yunis (1996), Jost (2004), Habinek (2005).
9 CD14e, CD14f, TH14f, TH14j, TH14l, TH14m, TH14n, TH14o, Sy8; plus TH13d, TH14g, TH14h, TH14i 
which are also added by Prince 2015.
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specific points made by Ajax.  The speeches certainly appear to be complete.  So the 
likelihood is that this work is complete as it is.  Though another possibility is that the 
speeches are key elements extracted from a larger dialogue.  
In essence the Ajax & Odysseus is a pair of speeches crafted notionally on behalf of the 
heroes, mounting arguments as to why they respectively deserve to be awarded the arms of 
Achilles.  The setting is assimilated to a courtroom environment with an Athenian-style 
democratic jury even though the audience is made up of Greek soldiers.  In short, Ajax in 
his speech is characterised as a traditional aristocrat who bridles when compelled to answer 
to a democratic court consisting of base soldiery.  He is a man of action, not words.  By 
contrast, Odysseus is characterised as a man who offers no objections to being called upon 
to defend himself in a court composed of men of lower station.  In fact, he shows sophistic 
flair for manipulating the sentiments of his mass audience.10  
Even though the Ajax & Odysseus is Antisthenes' longest surviving work by some margin, it 
has attracted very little scholarly attention.  This is not entirely surprising given that until 
1992 (Goulet-Cazé, in French) there was no continuous translation available in any 
language.11  In as much as the speeches have been studied, they have generally been 
considered 'epideictic' or 'display' speeches that present ideal versions of opposing 
arguments (cf. summary of such views in Kennedy 2011, 27).  This is almost certainly not 
the case however, and they seem rather to be a daring and original experiment in ethopoiia, 
or characterisation (33-46). 
In summary, whereas in antiquity Antisthenes had a reputation as a prose stylist the equal 
of any of his contemporaries, and a writer of dialogues whom others readily imitated, in 
modern times he receives the most fleeting notice as a minor (and apparently ineffective) 
rhetorician and as the founder of Cynicism – both reputations which he scarcely deserves.
10 For a full discussion see Kennedy 2011, esp. ch. 1-2.
11 There was an earlier non-continuous, annotated translation offered by Rankin (1986, 155-171), and 
continuous English translations have since appeared in Gagarin & Woodruff (1995, 167-72), Kennedy 
(2011, 11-20), and Boys-Stones & Rowe (2013, 23-7).
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1.ii   Literature Review
In modern scholarship Antisthenes has been very largely ignored.  This stands in stark 
contrast to the stellar reputation he enjoyed in antiquity (see ch. 1.i).  It is hard to imagine 
the sensation that the discovery of 100 pages of Critias or Protagoras might create.  We 
actually have this much of Antisthenes and yet his fragments have received very little 
attention.  It seems extraordinary that a writer who preceded Plato, and for whom we have 
more fragments than Protagoras, has been either ignored or lightly brushed aside.  It is an 
inexplicable paradox.  The texts as they have been edited are very often untranslatable, and 
this probably helps to explain why translations have not often been attempted. 
A survey of the scholarly literature relating to Antisthenes will reveal that there has been an 
interesting shift over time in both the geographical locus and the scholarly focus of 
Antisthenic studies.  Broadly speaking, from the early eighteenth up until the mid 
twentieth century the major output of works on Antisthenes came from the German-
speaking world.  Throughout that time Antisthenic studies formed a sub-field of Socratic 
studies.  That is, most scholars only studied Antisthenes as a means of gaining a truer 
understanding of Socrates, i.e. an understanding that was nuanced in respect to 'Plato's 
Socrates' and 'Xenophon's Socrates'.  After a lull during the third quarter of the twentieth 
century, when very little was written about Antisthenes, the period from the mid 1980s up 
to the present has seen a geographic shift, and now the study of Antisthenes is dominated 
by Italian scholars.  Rather than viewing Antisthenes as a Socratic, they principally see him 
as a Cynic philosopher and study him as such.  French scholars have also produced a 
sprinkling of works from the mid nineteenth century onwards, and curiously they focus 
largely on Antisthenes as a rhetorician.
The English speaking world is apparently just beginning to recognise Antisthenes and to 
start thinking about him.
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Editions
There have been six editions of the fragments of Antisthenes and also a collection in 
translation.  
The first collection, Antisthenis fragmenta, was brought out by August G. Winckelmann in 
1842.  Though a major step forward in terms of recognising Antisthenes as an author 
worthy of consideration in his own right, biographical testimonia were omitted, and for the 
most part only the bare fragments were printed with very brief notes appearing on 
occasional fragments.  In 1867 Friedrich W.A. Mullach reprinted Winckelmann's fragments 
along with a Latin translation in the second volume of his Fragmenta Philosophorum 
Graecorum.
For a 1932 Ghent dissertation Jean Humblé produced a new edition, Antisthenes' fragmenten, 
which was never published.12  This work incorporated the previously neglected 
biographical testimonia, textual comments, and a translation into Dutch. The fragments 
were divided (somewhat arbitrarily) into four groupings: 1. biographical testimonies and 
anecdotes; 2. testimonies on the works (including DL's catalogue); 3. fragments; 4. dubia 
(including the Ajax & Odysseus).  Only one brief extract 'Antisthenica' (1934), of nine pages 
in length, was ever published. 
In the second half of the twentieth century there were two further editions produced by 
Italian editors, and these have no doubt contributed in a very meaningful way to a gradual 
resurgence of interest in Antisthenes in recent years.  In 1966 Fernanda Declava Caizzi 
produced a slim volume, Antisthenis Fragmenta, which represented the fullest edition of 
fragments yet published.  She reorganised the fragments into two parts of five and two 
chapters respectively as follows. Part One: a. Catalogue of works (DL); b. Testimonia on the 
works; c. Declamations (i.e. Ajax and Odysseus); d. Fragments from certain works; e. 
Fragments from uncertain works. Part Two: a. Biographical notes; b. Anecdotes.  The 
edition lacked an apparatus, though it did include brief notes on most of the fragments, 
commenting on certain textual issues, parallel passages, select scholarship, and so on.
12 Known of through Patzer's discussion (1970) 35.
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In 1983 Gabriele Giannantoni produced a four volume edition, Socraticorum Reliquiae, which 
included fragments of all of the Socratics – Antisthenes among them.  The edition contained 
numerous errors.  A second edition titled Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae was issued in 
1990.  The new edition repeated the errors of the first, but added one or two authors who 
were glaring omissions from, e.g. Aeschines of Sphettus, but did not include Socrates as the 
title suggested it might.  In terms of Antisthenes, this work contained the fullest edition yet 
of his fragments, which once again were given a new arrangement.  Many related 
fragments, printed separately in previous editions, were here merged into large mega-
fragments.  In terms of organisation of the fragments, first the biographical testimonia are 
printed under various subheadings, then the rest of the fragments follow, mostly 
speculatively grouped according to the titles listed by Diogenes Laertius.  This edition has a 
partial apparatus that follows a convention of its own.  Variant readings and emendations 
are printed for select fragments, though the sources of the texts and/or corrections are often 
not clear, and some texts for which one would really hope to see an apparatus, e.g. papyrus 
fragments, lack one altogether.13
Though not actually an edition, a landmark in the study of Antisthenes was achieved by 
Claudia Mársico in 2011 with the publication of 321 fragments of Antisthenes in Spanish 
translation,14 thus representing the first translation available in a modern language.  The 
arrangement of the fragments generally followed Giannantoni's (1990) organisation, though 
related fragments Giannantoni had clumped together as mega-fragments were separated 
back out by Mársico. 
Concurrent with the completion of this dissertation Susan Prince (2015) put forth a new 
edition with English translation: Antisthenes of Athens: Texts, translations, and commentary.15  
This volume is a major landmark in Antisthenic studies – it weighs in at 774 pages – making 
available for the first time in any language a version that includes apparatus, translations, 
13 For further comments on Giannantoni's infelicitous approach to editing the texts see Slings (1996).
14 Published along with fragments of Phaedo of Elis, Aeschines of Sphettus, and Simon the Shoemaker, as: 
Los Filósofos Socráticos, Testimonios y Fragmentos II: Antístenes, Fedón, Esquines y Simón.
15 Actually available early 2016.
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bibliography, and commentary.  The edition also adds around 20 new fragments to the 
collection (this dissertation adds 4 of the same ones, plus another 9).  Prince has been 
thinking about Antisthenes for an extended period of time16 and she assembles all of the 
past opinions on various fragments.  She states at the outset that she will be cautious in 
advancing her own views (6), and yet she makes numerous astute observations.  A few of 
these observations are duplicated to some extent in this work, but on several very 
fundamental issues opposing views are put forward here.  For example, Prince sees a close 
connection between Antisthenes' ideas and Cynicism, and views the mutable Odysseus as a 
sort of ethical hero for Antisthenes.  This dissertation rejects any connection between 
Antisthenes and Cynicism and finds Odysseus to be one of Antisthenes' models for 
portraying what was ethically going wrong with the world.
Antisthenic Studies17 
Against the general trend of neglect, Antisthenes did receive attention as a figure worthy of 
study in his own right from scholars in early eighteenth century Saxony.  In 1724 Gottlob 
Ludovicus Richter of Jena produced his 34 page Dissertatio historico-philosophica de vita, 
moribus ac placitis Antisthenis Cynici.  For the most part this consisted of a translation into 
Latin of Diogenes Laertius' 'Life of Antisthenes', citing related passages from other authors 
along the way.  A second work produced along similar lines, titled Programma de Antisthene 
Cynico, was put out four years later in 1728 by Ludwig Christian Crell, a professor at 
Leipzig.  These works were a major step towards recognising Antisthenes as worthy of 
independent study.  Neither of them, however, challenged the orthodoxy that Antisthenes 
was the first of the Cynics, as asserted by Diogenes Laertius' philosophical genealogy.
The next work dedicated to Antisthenes would not appear for over a century.  In the period 
up to and slightly beyond that time, a number of volumes on the history of philosophy 
16 From the early 1990s judging by her comment on the first page that her 1997 dissertation was on 
Antisthenes.
17 For the history of Antisthenic studies up to the 1960s, particularly for identifying now-obscure works of 
German origin, Andreas Patzer (1970, 16-44) was heavily consulted.  He provides a very full survey, 
including items that only add to the understanding of the study of Antisthenes in a relatively minor way. 
For those in search of such detail he may still usefully be referred to.
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began to engage with Antisthenes in a more insightful manner.  Though he was continually 
evaluated as a counterpoint to Plato, rather than in his own right, effort was applied to 
distinguishing and assessing spheres of his thought such as ethics, dialectic, and physics.   
Scholars from Saxony, Prussia and other Germanic states continued to lead the way.  Broad 
works that included Antisthenes' ideas in their discussions of philosophy were put forth 
with the titles Geschichte der Philosophie – one each by Wilhelm G. Tennemann (1799) and 
Friedrich Schleiermacher (1839) – Die Philosophie der Griechen – one each by Heinrich Ritter 
(1830) and Eduard Zeller (1846), and Grundiß der Geschichte der Philosophie by Friedrich 
Überweg (1863). 
In the mid 19th century three monographs on Antisthenes appeared.  Two studies in Latin 
were produced by Ferdinand Dickey (1841), De Antisthenis Socratici vita et doctrina, and 
Adolf Müller (1860), De Antisthenis Cynici vita et scriptis.  Charles Chappuis' French 
language Antisthène of 1854 was notable for being the first piece of scholarship on 
Antisthenes produced outside the German speaking world.  Chappuis offered a detailed 
discussion of Antisthenes' philosophical fragments and carried out a systematic comparison 
of Antisthenes' opinions with those of Diogenes of Sinope and various other Cynic 
philosophers. 
The late nineteenth century and the first decade or so of the twentieth century saw the 
apogee of Antisthenic studies, with the publication of a series of works.  The most notable 
trend in this period was the effort to find allusions to Antisthenes in other writers – 
particularly, of course, in Plato and Xenophon, but also in authors such as Isocrates.  The 
first major contribution was Friedrich Schleiermacher's three volume Platons Werke, (1804-
1828, 3rd 1856-61), which found connections to Antisthenes in multiple works of Plato that 
range, in terms of plausibility, from high to none at all.  Other contributions included Karl 
Barlen's Antisthenes und Plato (1881), and Karl Urban's Über die Erwähnungen der Philosophie 
des Antisthenes in den Platonischen Schriften (1882).   
This period of research was particularly productive.  Many indirect references to 
Antisthenes were identified, some of which almost certainly included discussions of his 
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theories, while others bordered on the fanciful, with scholars attempting to virtually 
recreate works of Antisthenes from other authors.  Ferdinand Dümmler, in a series of 
works, De Antisthenis logica (1881), Antisthenica (1901), Akademika (1889), and 'Zum Herakles 
des Antisthenes' (1891), variously attempted reconstructions of Antisthenes' texts and 
speculations about his philosophical intentions – some of them a little wild.  Karl Joël, Der 
echte und der xenophontische Socrates (1893-1901) set out to separate the real Socrates from 
Xenophon's version.  A fair part of this work was an attempt to prove the extent to which 
Xenophon relied upon Antisthenes.  He later added more discussion, along the same lines, 
in his Geschichte der antiken Philosophie (1921).  It is important to note that in most of the 
works from this period the primary interest of the authors was in building a more accurate 
portrait of Socrates, rather than an interest in Antisthenes for his own sake.
Other authors from the same period carried out more cautious reconstructions and 
interpretations of groups of Antisthenes' fragments.  For example, using Aeschines 
Socraticus as their starting point were Paul Natorp (1892), 'Aischines' Aspasia', and 
Heinrich Dittmar (1912) 'Aischines von Sphettos'.  Other related contributions include 
Franz Susemihl, 'Der Idealstaat des Antisthenes und die Dialoge Archelaos, Kyros und 
Herakles' (1887) and 'Die Aspasia des Antisthenes' (1900), as well as Eduard Norden's 'Über 
einige Schriften des Antisthenes' (1893).
Though over the last century whole decades have passed with very little, if any, scholarly 
interest being shown in Antisthenes, a few monographs have nevertheless appeared.  
Hubert Kesters dissertation (1935) Antisthène. De la dialectique. Étude critique et exégétique sur 
le XXVIe Discours de Thémistius made a case that Themistius' thirty-sixth speech was 
reworked from an original of Antisthenes, but he later backed away from that theory and 
proposed instead that it was the work of an unknown Socratic (1959 & 1965).  Kathleen 
Chrimes (1948) in The Respublica Lacedaemoniorum ascribed to Xenophon, daringly proposed 
Antisthenes as the author of the work normally attributed to Xenophon.
Around the middle of the twentienth century a handful of studies focussed on Antisthenes 
appeared.  In 1948 Farrand Sayre published, 'Antisthenes the Socratic', a short assessment 
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of Antisthenes' life and the likelihood that he was connected to Cyncism.  Remarkably he 
concluded that there was no connection, but unremarkably these findings were generally 
ignored by subsequent scholars.  Then, ahead of her 1966 edition of the fragments, 
Fernanda Decleva Caizzi brought out 'Antistene' in 1964, which presented an overview of 
various aspects of Antisthenes' philosophy and writing, generally against background 
assumptions that he was a rhetorician and a proto-Cynic.  Vincenzo Di Benedetto (1966) 
made some very astute deductions about Porphyry's Antisthenic scholia in 'Tracce di 
Antistene in Alcuni Scoli all' “Odissea”.'  
A major contribution to the study of Antisthenes was made in 1970 when Andreas Patzer 
published the first half of his Heidelberg dissertation titled Antisthenes der Sokratiker: Das 
literarische Werk und die Philosophie dargestellt am Katalog der Schriften.18  As the title suggests 
Patzer realised that Antisthenes was a Socratic rather than a Cynic, and a literary figure as 
well as a philosophical one.  Patzer makes a large number of valuable observations on the 
texts he discusses, including suggesting several important emendations.  His work on 
Diogenes Laertius' catalogue is seminal (photocopies of three of the manuscripts are 
included at the back of the volume).  He also provides an extremely thorough summary of 
Antisthenic studies up to the mid 1960s of around 30 pages in length (16-44).  In spite of all 
this, as for generations of German scholars before him, Patzer's particular interest is not in 
Antisthenes per se, but rather in Socrates.  He thus sees Antisthenes' work as a neglected 
area of Socratic studies and sets out to reconsider and re-evaluate Antisthenes in order to 
allow him to build a better understanding of the 'der historische Sokrates' (13).  
The two decades following Patzer's illuminating study saw a virtual hiatus in Antisthenic 
studies.  Italian scholars produced the occasional article.  In 1977 Fernanda Decleva Caizzi 
wrote 'La tradizione antistenico-cinica in Epitteto', exploring Epictetus for traces of 
Antisthenes' supposed brand of Cynicism.  Then in 1987 Vincenza Celluprica published 
'Antistene: Logico o Sofista?' and Gabriella Focardi brought out 'Antistene Declamatore: 
L'Aiace e L'Ulisse, alle Origine della Retorica Greca' – these studies respectively weighing 
18 The second half was never published.
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up Antisthenes as a minor sophist and rhetorician.  In France, nine members of the Centre 
de Recherche Philologique, published (1986) 'Antisthène: sophistique et cynisme', which 
considered Antisthenes' thought purely from the testimony of Aristotle and Diogenes 
Laertius.  In the German speaking world Klaus Döring showed that Antisthenes was a 
Socratic rather than a sophist in (1985) 'Antisthenes: Sophist oder Sokratiker?'
The lone voice in the English speaking world in this period was H. David Rankin.  He 
published a series of articles discussing aspects of Antisthenes philosophy: 'Antisthenes a 
“Near-Logician”?' (1970), 'Irony and Logic: The ἀντιλέγειν paradox and Antisthenes' 
purpose' (1974), 'Ouk estin antilegein' (1981), Sophists, Socratics, and Cynics (1983), and 
culminating in 1986 with one of only two monographs ever published in English on 
Antisthenes: Anthisthenes (sic) Sokratikos.  In this last book he discusses a wide range of 
fragments and makes an attempt to locate Antisthenes in fourth century philosophical 
discourse.  In all his discussions Rankin considers Antisthenes from a philosophical rather 
than a literary standpoint, and considers Antisthenes to be a proto-Cynic.  He was 
apparently unaware of the work of Patzer (1970, see above).
Recent decades have seen renewed interest in Antisthenes and an increase in publications, 
which are, in general, focussed on his perceived role as the founder of Cynicism.  The 
second English language monograph, Antisthenes of Athens, published in 2001 by Luis 
Navia, returns to the early 18th century Saxon approach to Antisthenes – i.e. it is an 
extended exposition of Diogenes Laertius' 'Life of Antisthenes'.  It only engages with other 
extant fragments of Antisthenes' thought in passing and makes merely a mention of the 
major complete fragment, the Ajax & Odysseus, without offering a word of discussion.19  
Navia's principle interest is Cynicism and this book seems to be an elaborate afterthought 
or appendix to his earlier book Diogenes of Sinope: The Man in the Tub (1998).  Given his other 
earlier titles The Philosophy of Cynicism (1995) and Classical Cynicism (1996) it is 
19 The Ajax & Odysseus has attracted focussed attention from a handful of scholars who, for the most part, 
have tried to use it as a way to understand aspects of Antisthenes' (Cynic) philosophy, e.g. Goulet-Cazé 
1992, Sier 1996, Eucken 1997, Mazzara 2014, Prince 2014.
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disappointing, but not entirely surprising, that Navia uncritically reproduces Diogenes 
Laertius' placement of Antisthenes as the founder of the Cynic movement. 
The Italian scholar Aldo Brancacci has devoted a good deal of time and attention to 
Antisthenes.  His first related publication was the 1990 monograph: Oikeios Logos: La filosofia  
del linguaggio di Antistene (republished in French as Antisthène. Le discours propre – Paris, 
2005).  Brancacci is first and foremost a philosopher and this volume is a closely argued 
investigation of Antisthenes' philosophical views, including his approach to education, use 
of language, focus on paideia, proper use of names, and his attack on Plato.  Brancacci has 
continued to publish articles and book chapters investigating  Antisthenes' philosophy – 
1985-6, 1993, 2003, 2005, 2011, 2013, and 2015.
As well as her aforementioned recent edition of Antisthenes' texts, Susan Prince has 
produced chapters for collections, including 'Socrates, Antisthenes, and the Cynics' (2006), 
and 'Words of Representation and Words of Action in the Speech of Antisthenes’ Ajax' 
(2014).  This last piece comes from a landmark publication of a compilation of twelve essays 
devoted to Antisthenes – the first of its kind: Antisthenica Cynica Socratica. Mathésis, 9, ed. 
Vladislav Suvák, Prague.  In accordance with the usual tradition, the contributions 
uniformly approach Antisthenes as a philosopher rather than a literary figure; but 
nonetheless it represents an important step in Antisthenic studies.
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1.iii   Life of Antisthenes
The 'Life of Antisthenes' must necessarily be stitched together from diverse fragments.  One 
source that is less fragmentary is Xenophon's Symposion, which paints a detailed and 
coherent portrait of Antisthenes' character and life-style, and thus it is leant upon quite 
heavily in some areas of the following discussion.
A   Birth and death
Antisthenes20 was probably born in Athens sometime before 451/50 and lived to sometime 
after 366/365.  His mother was foreign but from the evidence available his citizenship was 
never called into question, suggesting he was born before Pericles' citizenship law of 451/50 
(see section C below).  In any case, he was old enough to win distinction at the Battle of 
Tanagra in 426,21 and he was still alive to comment on the Battle of Leuctra of 371.22  When 
discussing the events of the year 366/5, Diodorus Siculus mentions the notable men of 
Athens who were active in that period, and lists Antisthenes among them.23  Thus it is 
reasonable to assume 365 as a terminus post quem for the end of his life. There are no known 
later mentions of Antisthenes.  A Renaissance era source states that he lived to 70,24 but this 
figure is clearly too low if the dates above, limiting either end of his life, are accurate.  
Rather it seems that he must have lived to around 85 years of age.  One source suggests that 
Antisthenes died of 'wasting from difficulty urinating'.25  
B   Athenian father
Antisthenes' father, also named Antisthenes,26 was an Athenian citizen.  One testimonium 
records that Antisthenes played down his own social status by claiming that his father was 
20 Kirchner PA 1188.
21 DL 6.1 = DC 123, SSR 3. The Battle of Tanagra, Th. 3.91 (not to be confused with the more famous Battle 
of Tanagra of 457, Th. 1.107).
22 Plu. Lyc. 30 = DC 171, SSR 10.
23 DS 15.76 = DC 140.
24 Eudociae violarium 96 Flach = DC 141. The Violarium of 'Eudocia' was written shortly after 1543 by Jacob 
Diassorinos and Constantine Palaiokappas, although it relied on earlier sources.
25 Scholia on Lucian de parasito sive artem esse parasiticam 57; = DC 144, SSR 36.  The scholiast writes 
'φθινήσαντας' beside Antisthenes' name as an abbreviation for 'ἀπὸ δυσουρίας φθινήσαντας' in Lucian 
ad loc. 
26 DL 6.1 = DC 122a, SSR 1.
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a salt-fish merchant.27  Possibly lending credence to this claim is the report that Antisthenes 
himself lived at the port of Peiraeus.28  Clearly, however, whatever his father's occupation, it 
provided the family with reasonable means.  It is reported that when Socrates was 
discussing Antisthenes' parentage, he described Antisthenes as 'high-born' or 'noble' 
(γενναῖος).29  Consistent with being born to a moneyed family, Antisthenes claimed 
expertise in wrestling,30 a leisurely pursuit restricted to those who were at least relatively 
wealthy and thus who did not need to work every hour of the day to provide subsistence.  
As noted, Antisthenes also fought and distinguished himself at the battle of Tanagra in 426.  
At the time, if he was born prior to Pericles citizenship law of 451/50 he must have been a 
young man of around 25 or so years of age, meaning that his father was able to provide the 
money to fit him out in hoplite arms and armour.
C   Foreign mother
According to our sources Antisthenes' mother was foreign – usually said to be Thracian, 
though sometimes Phrygian.31  One of these sources is Socrates, who is reported saying that 
had Antisthenes 'been born of two Athenians he would not be so noble (γενναῖος)'.32  
Certainly Antisthenes himself showed contempt for those of pure Attic blood.33  Having a 
Thracian mother suggests that his father had the status and financial wherewithal to attract 
such a match from abroad.  Athenian men had a tendency to contract marriages with 
wealthy foreign women – and particularly Thracians – to build alliances that granted them, 
27 Eustathius in Hom. Il. 6.211 = SSR 6; Bion (3rd c. BC) claims a very similar parentage for himself, viz. that 
his father was a salt-fish merchant and wiped his nose on his sleeve, even using the same line of Homer 
to close his statement, Il. 6.211 (DL 4.46).  It has been noted that Diogenes Laertius' life of Bion is highly 
fictionalised – largely imitating the life of Diogenes of Sinope (Moles 2012, 243).  So it is likely that Bion 
was either knowingly quoting a famous line of Antisthenes to imitate the pedigree of such a famous 
associate of Socrates, or that the same anecdote was attached to his patchwork 'life' at a later date. 
28 DL 6.2 = DC 128a, SSR 12.
29 DL 2.31 = DC 124, SSR 3; & DL 6.1 = DC 123, SSR 3.
30 DL 6.4 = DC 145, SSR 3.
31 Non-Athenian: DL 6.1 = DC 123, SSR 3; DL 6.4 = DC 145, SSR 3; Gnom. Vat. 743 n. 10; = DC 146, SSR 5.  
Thracian: Sen. Constant. 18.5 = DC 122C, SSR 2; DL 6.1 = DC 122A, SSR 1;  DL 2.31; = DC 124, SSR 3; 
Epiph. Adv. haeres. 3.26 Diels Dox. Graec. 591 = DC 122D, SSR 1; Suda s.v. Ἀντισθένης = DC 122B, SSR 1; 
Eudoc. viol. 96, p. 55 = SSR 1.  Phrygian: Plu. De Exhilio 17, 607a = SSR 2; Clem. Al. Strom. 1.15 66.1 = SSR 2.
32 DL 6.1 = DC 123, SSR 3; cf. DL 2.31 = DC 124, SSR 3.
33 He said of them: 'they were no more well-born than snails and locusts' (DL 6.1 = DC 123, SSR 8); noted by 
Irwin 2015a, 84.
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not only large dowries and access to Thracian resources, but also the freedom to exercise 
and display aristocratic status in a way that would be condemned in democratic Athens.34  
Cimon and Themistocles are high profile examples of aristocratic Athenians born to 
Thracian mothers (Plu. Cim. 4.1, Plu. Them. 1.1-2).  Pericles' citizenship law of 451/50 
required both parents to be Athenian in order for male progeny of the marriage to be 
considered citizens.  The law was probably aimed, at least in part, at denying citizenship to 
the (elite) offspring of marriages with foreign women, and was perhaps specifically aimed 
at granting Pericles political advantage over Cimon, who was a product of such a union 
himself and recently returned from exile (Irwin 2015b, 81-3 & 99).  The law was vigorously 
enforced and effective as far as we know.  This is demonstrated by the great lengths Pericles 
himself had to go to in 429 in order to get his son by his foreign mistress, Aspasia, 
legitimised (Plu. Per. 37), and also by the manner in which almost 5,000 Athenians born to 
foreign mothers were not only disenfranchised, but seized and sold into slavery as a result 
of prosecutions arising from the law (Plu. Per. 37.3-4).35
Elizabeth Irwin mounts a persuasive case that, in fact, Antisthenes himself was an 
illegitimate nothos who was affected by Pericles' law, and it was this that excluded him from 
political life and prompted his harsh criticism of the democracy (2015b, esp. 90-93).  
Naming a son after his father was 'much less common' than naming him after one of his 
grandfathers, uncles, and so on (Matthews 2012, 1022).  So by analogy with Pericles son of 
Pericles (Plu. Per. 27) his name in itself perhaps offers circumstantial evidence that he was a 
nothos.  However, there is no direct evidence that Antisthenes' status as a citizen was ever 
called into question and there is no record of him being called a nothos.  He is referred to by 
Diogenes Laertius as 'Antisthenes the Athenian',36 and when Phaedo lists the 'native 
(Athenians)' (ἐπιχώριοι) and foreigners present at Socrates death, he lists Antisthenes as a 
native.  The fact that Antisthenes served at the battle Tanagra in 42637 may also offer 
34 For a full account see Sears 2013, esp. ch. 5.
35 For a survey of the evidence regarding the law's effectiveness see Patterson 1981, 140-7. 
36 DL 6.1 = DC 122A, SSR 1; cf. Suda Ἀντίσθενης s.v. = DC 122B, SSR 1; Epiph. Adv. haeres. 9.3 = DC 122D, 
SSR 1.
37 Thuc. 3.91.  On occasions where Thucydides knew non-standard troops were used, he (at least 
sometimes) mentions it, e.g. 3,000 µέτοικοι hoplites at the attack on Megaris in 431 (2.31).
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evidence that he enjoyed citizen status, as he was probably a hoplite and hoplites tended to 
be soldier-citizens – although the evidence for this is, admittedly, incomplete and 
inconclusive.38  In the absence of conclusive evidence, it remains a likelihood that he was 
born prior to the enactment of Pericles' law.  In which case he would have been an 
uncommon case of a son named after his father and a man who – following Socrates' 
example – willingly excluded himself from a role in public life that would have taken him 
away from philosophy and involved consorting with base men (for his own ideology see 
ch. 2.ii section A).  The reports that Antisthenes' mother was a barbarian were no doubt 
aimed at slurring his character and, if he was born before Pericles' citizenship law came into 
effect, his reputation could be tarnished by association; the 'expressive function' of such 
laws creates prejudice against those who, for example, would have been impacted if the 
laws were applied earlier (Irwin 2015b, 81 n. 30).  
D   Closest companion of Socrates
Antisthenes was the closest companion of Socrates, reportedly never leaving his side,39 and 
ready to engage in dialogue at a moment's notice.40  He walked five miles every day to 
Athens from his home in Peiraeus to listen to Socrates.41  Athenaeus observed that in 
Antisthenes' writings Socrates is the only person who retains his reputation as a good 
advisor, respectable teacher, and so on (Ath. 5.220e).  In Xenophon's Symposion Antisthenes 
is portrayed as the most prominent person present next to Socrates.42   
In the Socratic milieu, as constructed by Plato, Socrates was ever circulating among the 
ranks of the most wealthy and influential Athenians.  Though Plato does not mention 
Antisthenes' presence, except at Socrates' death,43 judging by the evidence from Xenophon, 
and indeed from Antisthenes himself, Antisthenes was likely in Socrates' company most or 
all of the time.  This supposition is borne out by the portrayal given in Xenophon's 
38 For the connection between citizen status and serving as a hoplite see e.g. Thomas 1979; though the 
status of nothoi is in this regard is entirely unclear.
39 X. Mem. 3.11.17 = SSR 14.
40 X. Mem. 2.5.1-3.
41 DL 6.2 = DC 128A, SSR 12.
42 Noted by Sayre 1948, 238; cf. Rankin 1986, 20.
43 Pl. Phd. 59b =  DC 132A, SSR 20.
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Symposion, where Socrates and Antisthenes are attending a banquet together at the house of 
Callias and display great familiarity with one another.  In one amusing instance, when 
Socrates asks Antisthenes if he has a passion for anyone, he replies: 'By the gods, I do have a 
passion, very much so: it's you!'44  Socrates teases in reply that Antisthenes is only 
infatuated with his good looks and not with his soul.45  After Socrates' death, Antisthenes is 
said to have been responsible for the exile of Anytus and the execution of Meletus, two of 
the accusers at Socrates' trial.46
E   Reportedly student of Gorgias 
There is a claim that Antisthenes was a student of Gorgias the rhetorician.  The claim 
appears in Diogenes Laertius,47 who offers no source for his information (which he often 
does elsewhere), and following suit the Suda reports that Antisthenes was a rhetorician then 
a Socratic.48  It is entirely possible that Antisthenes, as a young man, attended some lessons 
from Gorgias, just as Isocrates and Alcidamas are reported to have done.49  If he had, there 
is no reason to assume that this contact had any lasting impression on his intellectual 
outlook.  And in reality, if he really was a student, the impact seems to have been entirely 
negative, judging by the fact that Antisthenes is reported to have launched an attack on 
Gorgias in his Archelaus, and on all the demagogues of Athens in his Statesman (CD3).  It is 
also possible that the claim that Antisthenes was a student of Gorgias was completely 
spurious, perhaps originating from Platonists aiming to discredit him.  If Platonists (and 
Neoplatonists after them) wanted 'real' philosophy to start with Socrates and Plato, it 
would be in their interests to present Antisthenes as somehow 'pre-philosophy', and 
painting him as a rhetorician would go some way toward that end.
44 X. Smp. 8.4 = SSR 14.
45 X. Smp. 8.6 = SSR 14.
46 DL 6.9-10 = DC 133, SSR 21.
47 DL 6.1 = DC 125, SSR 11; cf. Eudoc. viol. 96.
48 Suda s.v. Ἀντισθένης = DC 126, SSR 11.
49 Isocrates: Quint. Inst. 3.1.13 = Arist. F 130 Rose.  Isocrates & Alcidamas: Suda s.v. Γοργίας.
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F   As a teacher
Antisthenes is not reported to have started an academy or school in the style of younger 
contemporaries such as Plato and Isocrates.  Though there is anecdotal evidence that he 
was a teacher offering classes after a fashion.  In one account Antisthenes tells a young 
student, apparently about to attend his classes, that all he will need is 'a new book a new 
pencil and a new writing tablet (implying new intelligence)' – which also implies that 
Antisthenes did not ask the student for a fee (ED3).  He tells one acquaintance (or student), 
who lost his (lecture) notes that he should have inscribed them in his soul and not on 
paper.50  There is also an anecdote that he 'conversed at the Cynosarges (White Dog) 
gymnasium not far from the gates.'51  This seems to imply that he had a regular place to 
hold discourse, however, it seems possible that this story was developed later by Cynics 
trying to make a connection to Antisthenes by virtue of the gymnasium's name.  
The rest of the anecdotal tradition about Antisthenes' teaching is indeed confused and 
contradictory, and mostly seems to have been constructed at a later date to make his 
character fit his created role as the 'first of the Cynics'.  Thus, there are a number of late 
anecdotes reporting that Antisthenes harshly beat or even drove off students and potential 
students,52 and another tradition asserting that he never accepted students at all,53 apart 
from Diogenes of Sinope who persisted until Antisthenes relented and accepted him.54  
Then there is a more plausible story that Antisthenes had followers but advised them to 
become students with him of Socrates.55  The fact that, in reality, he garnered a reasonable 
following is demonstrated by Aristotle who refers to Antisthenes' adherents as 
50 DL 6.5 = DC 188, SSR 168.
51 DL 6.13 = DC 136a, SSR 22.
52 DL 6.4 = DC 184, SSR 169, & DC 185, SSR 169.
53 DL 6.21 = DC 138A.
54 DL 6.21 = DC 138a, Ael. VH 10.16 = DC 138b, Jer. Adv. Iovinian. 2.14.345 = DC 138c, Eus. PE 15.13.6-8 816b-
c = DC 138d, SSR 139, Suda s.v. Ἀντισθένης = DC 138e, Sch. on Luc. Vit. Auct. 7 = DC 138f, D.Chr. 8.1 = 
DC 139.
55 DL 6.2 = DC 128A, SSR 12.
29
'Antisthenians'.56  Though from this reference it is not clear if these were direct students, or 
those influenced by Antisthenes' writings, or both.  
G   Relationship to Callias and other aristocrats
The relationship between Antisthenes and Callias is represented as an extremely congenial 
one by Xenophon,57 who has Socrates say that Antisthenes arranged for Callias and 
Prodicus to meet, believing their association would be profitable for both.58  Antisthenes 
served at the Battle of Tanagra where Callias' father, Hipponicus, was one of the two 
commanders.59  Callias' birth year is estimated to be 450,60 much the same as Antisthenes', 
so possibly their acquaintance started while serving together at the Battle of Tanagra and/or 
in other campaigns.  In light of Antisthenes' associations such as this, and in keeping with 
his status as the son of a middling to wealthy family, Antisthenes held aristocratic and anti-
democratic values common among the elites with whom he kept company (see further ch. 
2.ii). 
H   Character
A glance through Antisthenes' surviving fragments reveals that he had a fairly dry, acerbic 
wit, and that he enjoyed making provocative and unexpected statements in order to make a 
point.  In terms of character, Xenophon described Antisthenes as 'the most agreeable of men 
in conversation and the most temperate in everything else'.61  In Xenophon's Symposion 
Socrates praises Antisthenes' desire and ability for making matches between men who 
would likely profit from each other's company, as in the case of Callias and Prodicus.62  By 
contrast, another associate of Socrates, Aristippus of Cyrene, is said to have 'mocked 
Antisthenes continually on account of his extreme harshness'.63  This last accusation may 
56 οἱ Ἀντισθενέιοι, Met. 1043b = DC 44A, SSR 150; Aristotle's commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias 
similarly applies 'Antisthenians' to Antisthenes' followers (On Arist. Met. 1043b = DC 44B, SSR 150).
57 See for example: X. Sym. 4.1-6 = DC 120, SSR 83; 4.45 = DC 117, SSR 82; 6.5 = DC 159, SSR 101.
58 X. Smp. 4.62; = DC 107, SSR 13.
59 In 426 a force led by Hipponicus son of Callias and Eurymedon son of Thucles defeated the men of 
Tanagra and some Thebans aiding them (Th. 3.91).
60 Davies APF 7826 Kallias (III) X., p. 263.
61 DL 6.15 = DC 135, SSR 22.
62 X. Smp. 4.56-64; = DC 107, SSR 13.
63 Suda s.v. Ἀρίστιππος = DC 155.
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have been due to Antisthenes' uncompromising approach to interlocution.  He was 
evidently a skilled conversationalist and Theopompus praises his skill at manoeuvring 
anyone at all to come to the conclusions he desired (SD3).  This suggests that Antisthenes 
actually had essential characteristics in common with the Platonic Socrates.  
I   Cross-examination
Supporting Theopompus' assessment of Antisthenes' conversational abilities is Xenophon's 
portrait of Antisthenes in his Symposion (which Theopompus also refers to).  In the 
conversations Xenophon records it is shown that it was Antisthenes rather than Socrates 
who was the master of ἔλεγχος, or cross-examination.  He rises to cross-examine any 
person who makes a statement he is dubious about64 and actually cross-examines Socrates 
himself at one point, asking him why if, as Socrates says, women can be taught anything, he 
does not then educate his wife Xanthippe, 'the most difficult woman not just of this 
generation, but of all generations past and yet to come' (2.10).  Callias even makes a joke of 
Antisthenes' tendency to interrogate one and all, and muses about what the aulos 
accompaniment (αὔληµα) should be when he starts cross-examining one of the 
symposiasts.  Antisthenes suggests surigmos (συριγµός) would be appropriate (6.5), which 
either means 'shrill piping' on the suringx a set of shepherd's or 'pan' pipes, or 
metaphorically it could mean 'hissing' in the manner of a derisive audience.65  This suggests 
that Callias is comparing Antisthenes' cross-examinations to a comic agōn, or contest, which 
were probably regularly accompanied by piping (Csapo & Slater 1995, 332).  Perhaps 
Callias used this comparison due to the comic befuddlement of the person being cross-
examined combined with the inevitable and complete victory of the protagonist, 
Antisthenes.
64 E.g. Callias at 3.4 and 4.2-3, Niceratos at 3.6.
65 Cf. Csapo & Slater 1995, 290 & 303-4.
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J   Antisthenes a model for Plato's Socrates?
In the case of Antisthenes' prowess at cross-examination, it appears that Plato's literary 
representation of Socrates incorporated traits that originally belonged to the historic 
Antisthenes.  There is more evidence to support this conjecture.  
In Xenophon's Symposion Antisthenes makes no attempt to conceal his contempt for 
rhapsodes, and suggests that there is no group of men who are sillier (TH10).  In a similar 
manner, in Plato's Ion, Socrates demonstrates to the rhapsode Ion that he in fact has no real 
knowledge or comprehension about the material he recites, but receives it through divine 
inspiration (533d-536d), a point Ion himself finally ends up conceding (542a).  
Yet in Xenophon's Symposion when Antisthenes is pressing Nikeratos to admit that his pride 
in being able to recite Homer is ill-judged, Socrates interrupts saying Nikeratos is different 
to the rhapsodes because he paid a lot of money to men who taught him αἱ ὑπονοίαι, 'the 
underlying or hidden meanings' (3.5-6).  It seems in this case that Socrates was coming to 
Nikeratos' aid to save him from further cross-examination and embarrassment.  This is a 
stark contrast with Plato's representation of Socrates who in the Phaedros describes 
allegorical explanations (such as rhapsodes offer) as τὰ ἀλλότρια, 'irrelevant matters' 
(229e), and in Republic states that Homer's verses concerning the affairs of the gods should 
not be admitted to the city οὔτ᾽ ἐν ὑπονοίας πεποιηµένας οὔτε ἄνευ ὑπονοιῶν, 'either 
written in hidden meanings or without hidden meanings' (378d).    It could be argued that 
in Xenophon Socrates was merely being ironical, but there is other evidence to suggest that 
the he genuinely believed that Homer was worth knowing, so long as one understood the 
underlying or hidden meanings.  In the Memorabilia Socrates is depicted questioning a man 
who had just been selected as general, and he employs passages of Homer to test the 
fellow's suitability, with no apparent irony (3.2.1-4).  In fact, in this passage, Socrates 
appears to believe that Homer contains perfectly valid leadership examples that may be 
applied to real life.  
From the evidence in Xenophon it appears that Socrates' ability at cross-examination and 
the hostility he displayed towards rhapsodes throughout Plato's dialogues may actually 
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have been prominent characteristics of Antisthenes that Plato appropriated to the dramatic 
persona of his Socrates.
K   Life-style
Several surviving anecdotes claim that Antisthenes lived a reasonably austere life-style that 
even verged on destitution.  It seems that this aspect was (over) developed in a later period 
in order to make Antisthenes a more suitable model to serve as the first of the Cynics.  (The 
notion that Antisthenes actually had anything directly to do with Cynicism is dealt with in 
chapter 2.i).  By the fourth century AD, wild claims were being made that Antisthenes 
threw money away66 and lived in filth and squalor.67  Nevertheless, Antisthenes' self-
description in Xenophon's Symposion confirms that he was content to live with just enough 
to satisfy his day-to-day needs.68  He is also reported making some strong statements 
cautioning against the ethical dangers posed by pleasures and by living in luxury,69 and 
seems to have taken pride in living simply and doing his own chores.70  There are a series of 
related anecdotes that have Socrates mildly goading Antisthenes for priding himself on 
wearing clothes with holes in them.71  As already noted, however, none of these aspects of 
Antisthenes' restrained living prevented him from keeping aristocratic company, or from 
partaking of banquets when the occasion arose.
66 Jer. Ep. 66.8.3; SSR 83.
67 Isid. Ep. 3.154; = SSR 115.
68 X. Smp. 4.34-44 = DC 117, SSR 82.
69 See full discussion in ch. 2.ii.
70 E.g. carrying a dried fish for himself through the agora (Plu. Praec. geren. reipub. 15, 811B = DC 193, SSR 
100); and washing his own vegetables (Gramm. Lat. 6 Keil = DC 194).
71 Ael. VH 9.35 = DC 148A, SSR 16;  DL 2.36 & 6.8 = DC 148b, SSR 15.
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2   ANTISTHENES' IDEOLOGY
2.i   Antisthenes a Cynic?
This chapter will provide an examination of the claimed connection between Antisthenes 
and Cynicism.
A   Modern association of Antisthenes to Cynicism
In modern times there is a general scholarly consensus along the lines that Antisthenes was 
a 'proto-Cynic', 'the first of the Cynics', or that 'Cynicism started with Antisthenes'.72  What 
is more, the assumption is that this had been the view throughout antiquity.  In his volume 
Classical Cynicism, Navia states that 'Antisthenes' importance as the originator of Cynicism 
has been affirmed in numerous works, and Diogenes Laertius' statement that it was indeed 
with Antisthenes that Cynicism came into being (6.2) has been accepted by many classical 
scholars and historians of philosophy' (1996, 38-9).  Navia makes it clear that he accepts this 
view himself.  Branham & Goulet-Cazé, in their introduction to The Cynics, claim: 
'Throughout antiquity Antisthenes was considered the founder of Cynicism' (1996, 6).  They 
themselves also consider him to have been very closely tied to Cynicism, though with the 
role of 'an important forerunner of the movement (rather than a founder)' (7).  
Modern scholars have particularly detected evidence of Antisthenes' proto-Cynic views in 
his Ajax & Odysseus.  Rankin states that Antisthenes' Odysseus, in particular, is 
representative of the 'Protocynic views of Antisthenes' (1986, 154), and in a similar vein 
Stanford claims that Antisthenes' depiction of Odysseus was 'from the point of view of a 
proto-Cynic' (1968, 99).  Engels thinks Antisthenes may have been trying to present 
Odysseus 'as a prefiguration of a Cynic hero' (1998, 96).  Prince feels the work reveals 
72 There have been a handful of notable dissenters to this consensus:  Wilamowitz rejected a connection 
between Antisthenes and Cyncism (1919, 1.259-60);  Dudley opened his A History of Cynicism with a short 
chapter on Antisthenes – showing the incompatibility of his thought with Cynicism (1937, 1-16); in 1948 
Sayre put forward a brief statement on Antisthenes' Socratic credentials; most recently Tsouna 
McKirahan (1994) asserted Antisthenes' Socratic nature and questioned his connection to Cynicism.  But 
these views have been stated in isolation and, for the most part, passed over.
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'aspects of his proto-Cynic ethics and program for self-improvement' (2006, 83) and 'it is 
hard to doubt that the Homeric Odysseus was a hero for Antisthenes' (2015, 201).
B   Ancient view of Antisthenes' philosophy
An examination of the evidence reveals that, throughout antiquity, for the most part, 
Antisthenes was not known as a Cynic, but was actually known as a Socratic.  The notion 
that he was connected to Cynicism first emerged only centuries after his death.  Dionysius 
of Halicarnassus (late 1st c. BC) calls Antisthenes, Critias, and Xenophon 'Socratics'.73  
Plutarch also refers to Antisthenes as 'the Socratic' in a discussion including Plato and 
Aeschines.74  The emperor Julian, when critiquing a talk given by Heracleios the Cynic, 
discusses the use of myth in writing by Antisthenes, Plato, and Xenophon (MD14-16), and 
he refers specifically to Antisthenes as 'the Socratic'.75  Even Diogenes Laertius (who caused 
centuries of confusion by going on to discuss Antisthenes 'among the Cynics') states: 'Of 
those who succeeded him (Socrates) and were called Socratics the most important leaders 
were Plato, Xenophon, and Antisthenes' (2.47).  
But by the middle of the fourth century AD we find Epiphanius stating that 'He 
(Antisthenes) was first Socratic, then Cynic'.76  How this curious transformation came about 
is clearly worthy of further investigation.
C   Emergence of the sect or school of Cynicism
As late as 200 BC it seems that Cynicism had not yet emerged as an independent 
philosophical school of thought or sect.  Around that time Hippobotus wrote a περὶ 
αἱρέσεων (About Philosophical Sects or Schools, DL 1.19).  In it he listed nine known 
philosophical sects or schools: Megarian, Eretrian, Cyrenaic, Epicurean, Annicerean, 
Theodorean, Zenonian or Stoic, Old Academic, Peripatetic.  But he neither knew of nor 
reported on any Cynic sect.   The earliest extant usage of the term κυνισµός to refer to 
73 Σωκρατικοί, Thuc. 51 = DC 9, SSR 49.
74 Ἀντισθένης ὁ Σωκρατικός, Lyc. 30.7 = DC 171, SSR 10.
75 Ἀντισθένης ὁ Σωκρατικὸς, MD14.
76 Adv. haer. 3.26 Diels Dox. Graeci 591 = DC 122D, SSR 1.
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'Cynicism' is from around 150 BC by Apollodorus of Seleucia.77  Around a century later 
Cicero mentions the 'Cynici', who by that time were clearly a distinct group recognisable by 
their doctrines and/or way of life, even if not a 'school' per se (De or. 3.61-2).  
Cynicism is defined by the Suda as follows (s.v., n. 2711)
Κυνισµός· αἵρεσις φιλοσόφων. ὁ δὲ ὁρισµὸς αὐτοῦ σύντοµος ἐπ' ἀρετὴν ὁδός. τέλος δὲ τοῦ 
κυνισµοῦ τὸ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν, ὡς Διογένης καὶ Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεύς. ἤρεσκε δ' αὐτοῖς λιτῶς βιοῦν, 
αὐτάρκεσι χρωµένοις σιτίοις, πλούτου καὶ δόξης καὶ εὐγενείας καταφρονεῖν. ἔνιοι δὲ βοτάναις 
καὶ ὕδατι ψυχρῷ ἐχρῶντο σκέπαις τε ταῖς τυχούσαις καὶ πίθοις καὶ ἔφασκον θεοῦ µὲν ἴδιον 
εἶναι τὸ µηδενὸς δεῖσθαι, τῶν δὲ θεῷ ὁµοίων τὸ ὀλίγων χρῄζειν. ἀρέσκει δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν 
ἀρετὴν διδακτὴν εἶναι καὶ ἀναπόβλητον. 
Cynicism: A school of philosophy.  Its motto is: 'Short-cut to excellence'.  The goal of the Cynic is to 
live according to excellence, as did Diogenes and Zeno of Citium. And they instruct to live 
frugally, using food sufficient to support oneself, and despising wealth and reputation and high 
birth.  And some utilise plants for food and cold water and whatever shelter they happen on, even 
large jars, and they used to say that it is a specific characteristic of god to need nothing, and of men 
similar to god to want little.  And they instruct that excellence is teachable and unloseable.
D   Philosophical figures connected to Cynicism
Around the turn of the millennia, Philo of Alexandria and Strabo are found making use of 
the term κυνικός, to mean 'Cynic' – in both cases when referring to Diogenes of Sinope (see 
list below).  These are the first known references to a specific person in connection with 
Cynicism. 
Following is a list compiled from extant sources of the earliest uses of 'κυνικ-' root words, 
when used to mean 'Cynic' and not 'dog-like' (e.g. as an insult), detailing which authors 
used them, and about whom. 
Philo of Alexandria c. AD 1 Diogenes of Sinope (Quod. Omn. Prob. 121-4, 
Plant. 151)
Strabo c. AD 1 Diogenes of Sinope (12.3.11.50)
Plutarch c. AD 100 Diogenes of Sinope (Alex. 65.2, et al.)
Crates of Thebes (Mor. 69c)
Didymus (Mor. 413a)
Metrokles (Mor. 468a)
77 F 17 SVF 3.261 =  DL 7.121, SSR 136.
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Thrasyllos (Mor. 182e, 551e)
Favorinus c. AD 125 Diogenes of Sinope (F 112 Barigazzi)
Galen c. AD 175 Diogenes of Sinope (De loc. aff. Bk 6, 8.419.6)
Theagnes (De meth. med. Bk 14, 10.909.15)
Lucian c. AD 175 Crates of Thebes (Gall. 20)
Alkidimas (Symp. 12, 16)
Herophilos (Icar. 16)
Demetrios (Ind. 19, Salt. 63)
Proteos (Ind. 14, Peregr. 29)
Athenaeus c. AD 200 Crates of Thebes (10.422c, 13.591b)
Menippos (1.32e, 14.629f, 14.664e)
Meleagros (11.502c)
Sphodrios (4.162b)
Clement of Alexandria c. AD 200 Antisthenes (Prot. 6.71.1)
Diogenes Laertius c. AD 225 Antisthenes (6.1, et al.)
As can be seen, after Diogenes of Sinope is first called a Cynic around the beginning of the 
first century AD, for the next couple of centuries he continues to be the most commonly 
mentioned name, along with Crates of Thebes.  Finally, in the early third century AD, the 
earliest surviving association of Antisthenes with the term 'Cynic' is made by Clement of 
Alexandria.  Clement uses the term, however, to reject Antisthenes' connection to Cynicism.  
He writes: 'For indeed Antisthenes formulated this non-Cynical (οὐ Κυνικόν) thought, 
seeing as he was a pupil of Socrates'.78  The fact that Clement felt compelled to emphasise 
that Antisthenes' thought was 'non-Cynical' must have been a reaction against others who 
were asserting a connection between Antisthenes and Cynicism.  Clearly there was 
controversy surrounding this issue and this fact is further demonstrated by an earlier 
comment from Oenomaos, himself a Cynic philosopher active around AD 125.  He states: 
'Cynicism is neither Antisthenism nor Diogenism' (apud Jul. Or. 6.187c).  This shows that 
Oenomaos was aware of other people who were imputing some sort of role for Antisthenes 
in the founding of Cynicism, but that he rejected such an association.  
78 Protr. 6.71.1 = DC 40b, SSR 181.
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E   How Antisthenes came to be connected to Cynicism
Since authors such as Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Plutarch, and even Diogenes Laertius 
himself, had all described Antisthenes as Socratic, and well informed writers such as 
Clement of Alexandria and Oenomaos the Cynic refuted any connection between 
Antisthenes and Cynicism, how then did the two come to be almost inextricably linked?  
The succinct explanation is provided by this valuable passage from Cicero (De or. 3.61-2):79
Nam cum essent plures orti fere a Socrate, quod ex illius variis et diversis et in omnem partem 
diffusis disputationibus alius aliud apprehenderat, proseminatae sunt quasi familiae dissentientes 
inter se et multum disiunctae et dispares, cum tamen omnes se philosophi Socraticos et dici vellent 
et esse arbitrarentur.  Ac primo ab ipso Platone Aristoteles et Xenocrates, quorum alter 
Peripateticorum, alter Academiae nomen obtinuit, deinde ab Antisthene, qui patientiam et 
duritiam in Socratico sermone maxime adamarat, Cynici primum, deinde Stoici.
For, because of the many schools that had virtually originated from Socrates, since, from his 
various and diverse discussions, ranging in all directions, with one student seizing on one aspect, 
and another on another, there were generated, just like families dissenting among themselves, 
schools greatly separated and unalike, and yet all philosophers desired to be called 'Socratic' and 
thought of themselves as such.  And firstly, from Plato himself, came Aristotle and Xenocrates, of 
whom the former acquired the name of 'Peripatetic' school, the latter acquired the name of 
'Academy', then from Antisthenes, who especially admired the persistence and rigour in Socrates' 
discussion, came first the Cynics, then the Stoics.
Here Cicero clearly identifies the desire of all philosophers to be able to trace their 
philosophical lineage back to Socrates and thus to be called 'Socratic'.  Because Antisthenes 
admired the persistence and rigour of Socrates, the Cynics and then the Stoics found him to 
be a natural link allowing them to connect back to Socrates.  Although Cicero notes this 
connection, he himself certainly did not consider Antisthenes to be a Cynic.  This can be 
seen from his own comments in other works.  On the one hand, he had read and was an 
admirer of Antisthenes' works: 'The Κυρσᾶς pleased me as did the other works of 
Antisthenes' (CD5).  But on the other, he made scathing remarks about the Cynics and 
Cynicism: 'We should give no heed to the Cynics – or to some Stoics who are practically 
Cynics' (Off. 1.128); and 'Certainly the Cynics' whole system of philosophy must be rejected, 
for it is inimical to moral sensibility, and without moral sensibility nothing can be upright, 
nothing morally good' (Off. 1.148).80  
79 Noted by Sayre 1948, 240.
80 These comments noted by Sayre 1948, 242.
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F   Antisthenes' appeal for the Cynics
Accepting Cicero's assertion that all philosophers wanted to trace their intellectual 
genealogy back to Socrates, it is worth mentioning why the Cynics might have found 
Antisthenes appealing as the link.  Following are some ancient comments on the nature of 
Cynicism.  Diogenes Laertius reports that the Cynics advise 'living frugally, eating food 
only for nourishment, and wearing a single garment.  Wealth and high birth they despise.  
Some are vegetarians and drink only cold water and are content with any kind of shelter'.81  
He also writes that the Cynics 'do away with Logic and Physics and devote their whole 
attention to Ethics' (6.103) and that 'their motto is: “Live in accordance with excellence”' (τὸ 
κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ζῆν, 104).  In his Ethics, Apollodorus of Seleucia (c. 150 BC) states that 
Cynicism (κυνισµόν) is the 'short cut to excellence' (σύντοµον ἐπ᾽ ἀρετὴν ὁδόν).82   
It is easy to see why the Cynics felt that Antisthenes was the most suitable of the Socratics 
to provide them with a link back to Socrates, when it is understood that Antisthenes 
himself was heavily preoccupied with ἀρετή, excellence, which was a central tenet of his 
entire ethical programme (see ch. 2.ii below).  He also despised superfluous luxury, as well 
as wantonness and greed.  However, far from rejecting all pleasures for an austere ascetic 
life-style, as did the Cynics, in Xenophon's Symposion Antisthenes describes himself taking 
pleasure from eating, drinking and having sex to the point of satisfying his requirements 
for each.83  Furthermore, he in no way looked down upon reputation and high birth – in fact 
the very opposite was the case.
G   Antisthenes a vital link in Diogenes Laertius' Cynic and Stoic Successions
Continuing to bear in mind Cicero's assertion that all philosophers wanted to claim descent 
from Socrates, as well as the ethical attractiveness of Antisthenes to certain schools of 
thought, here are the successions of Cynic and Stoic philosophers as compiled by Diogenes 
Laertius:
81 DL 6.104 = Suda s.v. Κυνισµός 2712.
82 F 17 SVF 3.261 = DL 7.121, SSR 136; cf. Plu. Amat. 759d, Galen Anim. Pecc. Dign. 3, Suda s.v.  Κυνισµός 
2711, 2712.
83 X. Smp. 4.37-8 = DC 117, SSR 82.
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Cynic succession Stoic succession
(Socrates)
Antisthenes
Diogenes of Sinope
Monimus
Onesicratus
Crates of Thebes → Crates of Thebes
Metrocles Zeno
Hipparchia Ariston
Menippus Herillus
Menidemus Dionysius
Cleanthes
Spaerus
Chrysippos
Looking at these successions it is evident that Antisthenes provides a vital link back to 
Socrates for both the Cynics and the Stoics.  The Stoics claim descent from Socrates through 
their founder Zeno's connection to Crates of Thebes in the Cynic succession, then back up 
to Socrates.  The desire of Zeno and the Stoics to make a connection to Socrates, in the 
manner described by Cicero, is noted by Philodemos in his discussion of Zeno and the 
origins of Stoicism (Περὶ τῶν Στωικῶν, Pap. Herc. 339 11.1-6):84
. . . . . | τὴν ἀρχὴ[ν µετὰ] Ἀντι-
σ]θένους καὶ Διογένους συνέσ-
τη, διὸ καὶ Σωκρατικοὶ καλεῖσ-
θαι θέ[λ]ουσιν.
µετὰ conj. Kenn.
At first he (Zeno) aligned himself with Antisthenes and Diogenes, as a result of which they (the 
Stoics) also wished to be called Socratics.
It is by now becoming quite apparent that Antisthenes was not involved with instigating 
Cynicism, let alone founding the school, but rather later philosophers retrospectively 
84 In Crönert 1906, 58 = SSR 138.
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designated him as their philosophical forebear because he had qualities that they wanted to 
emulate and, most importantly, because he offered them a link directly back to Socrates.
Further suggesting the late and spurious nature of Antisthenes' connection to Cynicism is 
evidence from a number of fourth century BC authors.  Aristotle, in his Rhetoric, used the 
term 'the Dog' (ὁ Κύων) to describe Diogenes of Sinope (Rhet. 3.10.7) – κύων being the word 
from which κυνικός 'dog-like', which came to mean 'Cynic', is derived.  When discussing 
Antisthenes, however, Aristotle refers to him only as 'Antisthenes'.  And when discussing 
Antisthenes' followers in the Metaphysics he refers to them simply as 'Antisthenians'.85  The 
earliest Cynic writings were by Onesicratus and Crates of Thebes.  Both were writing in the 
late 4th century BC and so were contemporaries of Diogenes of Sinope and near 
contemporaries of Antisthenes.  In their extant fragments neither of them is reported 
mentioning Antisthenes86 but both are reported mentioning Diogenes of Sinope.87
Upon closer inspection, it appears that even Diogenes Laertius, who is largely credited (or 
blamed) with installing Antisthenes at the head of the Cynic succession, did not himself 
consider Antisthenes to be a Cynic.  His text has just been (mis)read that way ever since.  
Consider the following passage from his 'Life of Socrates' (DL 2.47 my emphasis):
τῶν δὲ διαδεξαµένων αὐτὸν τῶν λεγοµένων Σωκρατικῶν οἱ κορυφαιότατοι µὲν Πλάτων, 
Ξενοφῶν, Ἀντισθένης: τῶν δὲ φεροµένων δέκα οἱ διασηµότατοι τέσσαρες, Αἰσχίνης, Φαίδων, 
Εὐκλείδης, Ἀρίστιππος. λεκτέον δὲ πρῶτον περὶ Ξενοφῶντος, εἶτα περὶ Ἀντισθένους ἐν τοῖς 
κυνικοῖς, ἔπειτα περὶ τῶν Σωκρατικῶν, εἶθ᾽ οὕτω περὶ Πλάτωνος, ἐπεὶ κατάρχει τῶν δέκα 
αἱρέσεων καὶ τὴν πρώτην Ἀκαδηµείαν αὐτὸς συνεστήσατο.
Of those who succeeded him (Socrates) and were called Socratics, the most important leaders were 
Plato, Xenophon, Antisthenes.  And of the ten (traditionally) reported, the four most eminent are 
Aeschines, Phaedon, Euclides, Aristippus.  We must speak first about Xenophon, then about 
Antisthenes among the Cynics, afterwards about the Socratics, and so then about Plato, since he 
began the ten schools and personally founded the first Academy.
So Diogenes does not call Antisthenes a Cynic, but rather he knows that Antisthenes was a 
Socratic and refers to him as such.  However because he is compiling a list of philosophical 
successions, and he is clearly aware that the Cynics and Stoics themselves claim their 
85 οἱ Ἀντισθενείοι, Met. 1043b = DC 44A, SSR 150.
86 Noted by Dudley 1937, 2.
87 E.g. Onesicritus Plu. Alex. 65.2 = Strabo 15.1.65; Crates DL 6.93.
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Socratic heritage through Antisthenes, he goes ahead and discusses Antisthenes 'among the 
Cynics'.  In doing so, however, he no more claims that Antisthenes is a Cynic than he claims 
Plato to be a Cynic.  The effects of Diogenes' decision to place Antisthenes at the head of the 
Cynic succession are still being felt in a very real way to this day.88
H   Was Antisthenes dog-like?
As already mentioned, in the Greek 'Cynic' quite literally means 'dog-like'.  Cynics were 
also often referred to simply as 'dogs'.  As well as Aristotle referring to Diogenes of Sinope 
as 'the Dog' (ὁ Κύων Rhet. 3.10.7), Cercidas of Megalopolis (3rd c. BC, DL 6.77) and Plato did 
the same – in the latter instance Diogenes himself is said to have concurred with the 
description (DL 6.40).  It seems well stated by Liddell, Scott and Jones, that from Homeric 
times calling someone 'dog' was a reproach 'to denote shamelessness or audacity' (s.v. II).  
This fits extremely well with the image we have of Diogenes of Sinope, living in a pithos jar 
(DL 6.23), spitting in peoples' faces (DL 6.32), urinating on people (DL 6.46), masturbating 
in public (DL 6.69), and despising noble birth and good reputation (DL6.72).  Due to his 
shameless behaviour he was very often called 'dog' by a succession of people in addition to 
the philosophers listed above (DL 6.55, 60, 61).  A number of times he also described himself 
as a dog (DL 6.33, 45, 60, 61).  It was said that an image of a dog in Parian marble was 
placed on his grave (DL 6.78).  
In contrast to Diogenes of Sinope, there are no known references to Antisthenes as 'dog' 
before Diogenes Laertius wrote that he had a nickname ἁπλοκύων, 'simple-dog' (DL 6.13).  
Recalling that Diogenes is also the earliest extant author to assert Antisthenes' positive 
association with Cynicism, it is likely that this is a very late comment.  As Dudley observed, 
there is not one 'anecdote or apophthegm in which Antisthenes figures as a κύων' (1937, 5).  
Antisthenes also habitually associated with Socrates and his aristocrat circle of friends, and 
praised noble birth on many occasions (see next chapter).  The manner in which Diogenes 
of Sinope conducted his life demonstrated that he lacked a sense of shame by indulging in 
activities that most self-respecting Greeks would have shunned.  A sense of shame then was 
88 See, for example, comments from Navia at the top of this chapter.
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incompatible with being a Cynic, particularly in the early period.89  Antisthenes on the other 
hand had a very strong sense of shame and took a dim view of shameful acts.  He plainly 
stated 'good deeds are noble, base deeds are shameful'.90  When he heard that the Athenians 
had raised an uproar in the theatre at the line: 'What is a shameful deed if its doers do not 
think so?,' Antisthenes adjusted the line to read: 'A shameful deed is a shameful deed, 
whether one think so or no' (TH1).
I   Did Antisthenes teach Diogenes of Sinope?
Considering the almost iron-clad connection in accounts of the Cynic tradition between 
Antisthenes and Diogenes of Sinope, it is surprising to discover that the two probably never 
met.  Apart from the fact that their outlooks on life were almost irreconcilably different, the 
conclusion that they did not know one another can be largely drawn from some fortuitous 
numismatic evidence.
One of the historical acts that Diogenes is famous for is for defacing the currency in his 
native Sinope.  Diogenes Laertius offers an extended narrative of this episode, including 
reporting that: 'Diogenes says about himself in his Pordalus that he defaced 
(παραχαράξαι)91 the money. … When he was discovered, some say he was expelled, while 
others say he was afraid and left voluntarily' (DL 6.20-21).  
There is extraordinary numismatic evidence to corroborate this story.  Diogenes' father was 
Hikesios, a banker (τραπεζίτης) who was in charge of the public currency in Sinope 
(δηµοσία ἡ τραπέζης DL 6.20).  A substantial number of Sinopean coins have been found 
from the period 362-31092 that are not of Sinopean manufacture but instead are poorly made 
imitations, with Aramaic legends, of unreliable weight, and produced elsewhere in the 
Satrapy of Cappadocia.  A remarkable 60 per cent of these coins have been struck with a 
89 Dudley 1937, 5; including his translation of a scholion on Aristotle explaining four reasons for the name 
Cynic being applied (Brandis p. 23 col. 1.40 - col. 2.21).
90 τἀγαθὰ καλά, τὰ κακὰ αἰσχρά DL 6.11 = DC 73, SSR 134.
91 Bywater (published and commented on by Milne) offers a thorough analysis of the possible meanings of 
παραχαράττειν, which is useful, though contra the conclusions here – Milne saw Diogenes as 
metaphorically defacing the 'political currency' (Bywater & Milne 1940, 10-12).
92 362 BC is the date of the death of the Datames, Satrap of Cappadocia for the Persians, which coincided 
with the cessation of currency issued in his name.
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chisel to deface them and put them out of circulation.93  Among the good Sinopean coins 
from this period are a number bearing the name 'Hikes(ios)'.94
The conclusion that may be drawn is that Diogenes defaced the coins, not as an act of 
vandalism, but to protect the integrity of the native coinage issued by his father.
After Diogenes was discovered he left Sinope and went to Athens.  This was probably 
around 350-40 but certainly not earlier than 362.
Antisthenes probably died soon after 365.
J   Founder of Cynicism?
Identifying the real founder of Cynicism is beyond the scope of this work, and was a 
difficult task even for ancient authors who had an interest in philosophy.  The emperor 
Julian, in a work addressed to 'The Uneducated Cynics', states (Or. 6.187c):
Indeed it is not easy to discover the founder to whom we should first attribute it (Cynic 
philosophy), even if some suppose that this role belongs to Antisthenes and Diogenes.
93 See for example Waddington 1904, Pl. XXIV, 26-32, 34, 36-7, Pl. XXV, 1-5, 7.
94 Waddington 1904, 187 & Pl. XXV, 16; discussed by Seltman 1938, 121, who first made this connection.  At 
least half a dozen of these coins have sold at recent auctions, searchable online; e.g. a similar coin 
(pictured) dated by the auctioneers to c. 330 BC: 
https://www.vcoins.com/en/stores/sergey_nechayev_ancient_coins/200/product/paphlagonia_sinope_330
_bc_silver_drachm_ikesi_nymph__seaeagle/563141/Default.aspx
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Julian goes on to make clear in this passage, and elsewhere, that he viewed Antisthenes as 
Socratic and saw no connection between him and Cynicism.
From the earlier discussion Diogenes, 'the dog', of Sinope certainly seems a strong 
candidate for the role of spiritual 'founder' of Cynicism.  He was the one most referred to by 
ancient authors as a Cynic in the list above.  Yet Julian's comment above seems to imply that 
he, at least, doubts that connection.
A clue as to the identity of another potential intellectual founder of Cynicism is revealed by 
this fragment of Menander (c. 315 BC; PCG Did. F 1 = DL 6.93):95  
Συµπεριπατήσεις γὰρ τρίβων᾽ ἔχουσ᾽ ἐµοί, 
ὥσπερ Κράτητι τῷ κυνικῷ ποθ᾽ ἡ γυνή.
Wearing a threadbare robe you will go about with me,
as once his wife went with the dog-like Crates.
As noted in the discussion above, Crates of Thebes provided a crucial link back to Socrates 
for both the Cynics and the Stoics.  Like Diogenes he received several early mentions by 
ancient authors as a Cynic.  Thus Crates, with his epithet 'dog-like' (later meaning 'Cynic'), 
seems another worthy potential contender for the position of founder, or at least 
philosophical forerunner, of Cynicism.  Certainly either Diogenes or Crates are well suited 
to the role, whereas Antisthenes is entirely unsuited.
K   Antisthenes was not a Cynic
To conclude this chapter, it can be securely stated that Antisthenes was not a Cynic, nor did 
he have anything to do with the founding of Cynicism as a philosophy or school of thought. 
Later Cynic and Stoic philosophers attempted to make Antisthenes fit a proto-Cynic mould 
because they possessed a teleological drive for doing so.  That is, they all wanted to be able 
to trace their philosophical genealogy back to Socrates, the 'Father of Philosophy', as it 
were; and Antisthenes appeared the most compatible of Socrates' direct disciples to allow 
them to make the connection.  But in reality Antisthenes' philosophy and ethics were a far 
95 Noted by Dudley 1937, 6.
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cry from those of the Cynics, as the next chapter will demonstrate, and he probably never 
even met Diogenes of Sinope, considered to stand next after him in the Cynic succession.
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2.ii   Antisthenes' Philosophy of Excellence and Justice
A   Ideological Values
As discussed in the biographical sketch in chapter 1.iii, Antisthenes was from a family of 
financial means and Socrates described him as 'high-born' or 'noble' (γενναῖος).  
Antisthenes was an expert wrestler and, like Socrates, he won distinction in battle.  He also 
moved in the same social circles as Socrates, which meant habitually associating with 
leisured aristocrats.  Far from rejecting high birth, as did the Cynics, Antisthenes shared the 
views of his class.  Thus he frequently praised nobility and high-birth and, as often, 
castigated baseness and, by implication, democracy.
Antisthenes particularly saw danger in base, or lower class men gaining political power.  In 
his typically acerbic fashion he commented: 'As it is dangerous to give a dagger to a 
madman, so it is to give power to a base man (µοχθηρός)'.96  On the same theme he said: 'it 
is paradoxical to extract the weeds from the corn and in war to remove the unfit soldiers, 
but in government not to dismiss the base men (πονηροί)'.97  He said (via Cyrus) that the 
most essential knowledge is 'to unlearn base things (τὰ κακά, CD13a-c).'  The following 
statement demonstrates the almost unlimited threat he perceived base men posing: 'city-
states will come to destruction, when the men who hold sway are unable to distinguish the 
base men (φαύλοι) from the noble men (σπουδαῖοι)'.98  
After the fashion of this last statement Antisthenes made a number of other remarks 
contrasting noble men and deeds with base men and deeds.  For example he stated: 'Noble 
deeds are good, base deeds are shameful (τἀγαθὰ καλά, τὰ κακὰ αἰσχρά).  Consider all 
base acts (πονηρά) to be alien'.99  Note that here he specifically rejects base deeds on the 
grounds that they are 'shameful'.  As this is not merely tautology, it indicates that the 
sociological values meant by 'base' are very much in play here.  As well as extolling things 
noble, this fragment offers further evidence of the incompatibility of Antisthenes' outlook 
96 Ps.-Max. Conf. Loci Comm. 9.78 Phillips / 9.561 Migne PG 91.781 = DC 105, SSR 76.
97 DL 6.6 = DC 104, SSR 73.
98 DL 6.5 = Ps.-Max. Conf. Loci Comm. 9.77 Phillips / 9.561 Migne = DC 103, SSR 71.
99 Diocles in DL 6.12 = DC 73, SSR 134.
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with the Cynics, who had no sense of shame.  In a couple of other fragments Antisthenes is 
found directly praising noble men: 'a noble man deserves to be loved (ἀξιέραστος ὁ 
ἀγαθός)' and 'noble/excellent men (σπουδαῖοι) are loved'.100  The following comment sums 
up his views on class particularly well: 'It is better to be one of a few noble men (ἀγαθοί) 
fighting against all the base men (κακοί), than one of many base men (κακοί) fighting 
against a few noble men (ἀγαθοί)'.101 
As a natural extension of his elitist stance, Antisthenes shared in the laconizing tendency of 
the old aristocracy of Athens, who were inclined to look with admiration at Sparta and 
contempt at Athens.  Cimon is a prime example.  Described by Plutarch as a 'Sparta-lover' 
(φιλολάκων, Cim. 16.1, Per. 9.4) and a 'demos-hater' (µισόδηµον, Per. 9.4), Cimon was 
Sparta's proxenos, or special representative, in Athens (Per. 29.2), he rebuked the Athenians 
for not being like Spartans (Cim. 16.3), and named his son Lakedaemonios (Cim. 16.1).  In a 
similar vein Antisthenes made caustically witty remarks about his compatriots, for 
example: 
When the Athenians would aggrandise themselves on the fact that they were earthborn, he poured 
scorn on them, saying that they were no more well-born (εὐγενεστέροι) than snails and locusts'.102  
He used to advise the Athenians to vote that donkeys are horses.  When they thought that this was 
absurd, he said 'Yet men become generals from among you who have not been educated (µηδὲν 
µαθόντες), but were merely elected.'103 
Aristophanes sent up the associates of Socrates for being infatuated with the Spartans (Av. 
1280-3) and Antisthenes was of this Socratic disposition.  He unfavourably and humorously 
compared the Athenians to the Spartans: 'Going from Athens to Sparta is to go from the 
women's rooms to the men's quarters.'104  Regarding styles of speaking, he stated: 
'excellence is brief in speech (βραχύλογος), but baseness (κακία) is speech without 
bounds.'105  Evidently βραχύλογος is synonymous with laconic.  Not surprisingly 
100 Both from Diocles in DL 6.12 = DC 79, SSR 134.
101 Diocles in DL 6.12 = DC 71, SSR 134.
102 DL 6.1 = DC 123, SSR 8.
103 DL 6.8 = DC 169, SSR 72. 
104 Theon Progym. 5 p. 104.15–105.6 = DC 195, SSR 7.
105 Gnom. Vat. 743 n.12 = DC 86, SSR 104; cf. Ps.-Caec. Balb. Cod. Monacensis 27.2 Wölfflin 29 = DC 87, SSR 
104.
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βραχυλογία (brevity of speech) is a trait widely attributed to the Spartans, especially by 
Athenian elites, from the fifth century onwards.  Perhaps the most memorable portrayal of 
Spartan terseness is found in Herodotus, where the Spartans critique the Samians' speech 
because they used four words where two would have sufficed (3.46.1-2).  By contrast, 
'speech without bounds' brings to mind rhetoric and Athenian orators, a breed of men who 
especially drew Antisthenes' ire.  
B   Views on Rhetoric
Antisthenes wrote dialogues condemning orators and demagogues.  His Archelaus launches 
an attack against 'Gorgias the orator' and his The Statesman attacks 'all the demagogues in 
Athens' (CD3).  In the latter dialogue it seems possible that Antisthenes crafted a scathing 
character sketch of demagogues in the style of his attacks on flatterers (MD9-13 and 
commentary).  In another fragment, Antisthenes is found drawing an unflattering likeness 
of the orator, Kephisodotos (Sy1).  When someone asked Antisthenes 'What should I teach 
my son?', he replied 'If he is destined to live with the gods, philosophy, but if he is destined 
to live with men, rhetoric' (MD2).  In other words: 'Only teach your son rhetoric if you have 
no aspirations for him above consorting with base humanity.  Otherwise you should teach 
him philosophy.'  The following comment reveals Antisthenes disdain for sophistic 
argumentation in general: 'One must stop a person who is arguing, not by arguing in 
return, but by teaching him.  For one would not attempt to cure a madman by being mad in 
return.'106
C   The σοφός and the value of νοῦς and φρόνησις
An interesting theme in Antisthenes' writing is the esteem in which he held the wise man, 
the σοφός, and the emphasis he placed on intellectual capacity as described by νοῦς, 
intelligence, and φρόνησις, good sense.
The following fragments convey Antisthenes' view of the σοφός.  'To the wise man nothing 
is unfamiliar or inaccessible.'107  'The wise man is self-sufficient; for everything of everyone 
106 Stob. 2.2.15 = DC 65, SSR 174.
107 Diocles in DL 6.12 = DC 81, SSR 134.
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else's is his.'108  'The wise man deserves to be loved, [and is blameless], and is a friend to a 
like man, and entrusts nothing to fortune.'109  This next comment may have been partly an 
attack on Pericles' citizenship law: 'The wise man will marry for the gratification of 
producing children, entering into union with the most suitably formed women.  And he 
will also love passionately; for the wise man alone knows whom he should love.'110  So the 
wise man will choose his wife because of her physical characteristics – probably 
attractiveness, childbearing ability, and noble birth/character – not because she is 
Athenian.111  Finally there is this excerpt, likely from a passage of dialogue: 'When a tyrant 
asked why in the world the wealthy do not go to visit the wise men, but vice versa, he 
(Antisthenes) said “Because the wise men know what they need to maintain life, but the 
former (wealthy) men do not know, since they spend all their time worrying about money 
rather than wisdom.”'112 
Antisthenes seems to have viewed intelligence and good sense as vital to the make up of a 
wise and good man.  As well as providing a foundation for proper philosophical 
understanding, they provided defence against hostile influences.   Fragment MD11 
mentions both qualities: 'Antisthenes used to say, that courtesans pray that all good things 
come to their lovers, except intelligence (νοῦς) and good sense (φρόνησις); and thus also 
pray the flatterers for those with whom they associate.'
From the surviving fragments it appears that νοῦς was the characteristic most necessary for 
active philosophical investigation.  Chrysippus reports an amusing comment of 
Antisthenes' that 'one must possess intelligence or a halter.'113  An indication of the purpose 
of having intelligence is revealed by ED3: 'When a young lad from Pontus was about to 
become his student and enquired as to what he needed, he (Antisthenes) said “a new book 
and a new pencil and a new writing tablet,” implying “intelligence”', 'βιβλιαρίου καινοῦ 
108 DL 6.11 = DC 80, SSR 134.
109 DL 6.105 = DC 23, SSR 99. 
110 DL 6.11 = DC 115, SSR 58.
111 Irwin 2015b, 91.
112 Gnom. Vat. 743 n. 6 = DC 183, SSR 166; cf. a similar anecdote attributed to Aristippus at DL 2.69.
113 Chrysippus in Plu. Mor. 1039e = DC 67, SSR 105.
50
καὶ γραφείου καινοῦ καὶ πινακιδίου καινοῦ,' τὸν νοῦν παρεµφαίνων (there is a pun on 
καινοῦ which sounds simultaneously like 'new' as well as 'and intelligence').  Thus, by 
Antisthenes' reckoning, the key requirement for learning philosophy was νοῦς.  
Anaxagoras, originally admired by Socrates (xxx ref.), was nicknamed Νοῦς according to 
Plutarch (Per. xxx) and no doubt this emphasised the value of this quality to Socrates' 
students, e.g. Antisthenes.114  Clay has noted that Plato's works make clear that: 'Quickness 
to learn and the capacity to retain what is learned are the main requirements of the 
philosophical nature.'115  It seems that on this point Plato's views were very much in 
alignment with those of Antisthenes.  
A word with currency in the wider intellectual discourse, φρόνησις was used by Pericles in 
the speech attributed to him by Thucydides (xxx).  For Antisthenes this the quality that 
provided imperviousness against corrupting external forces.  Thus he said: 'Good sense is 
the most secure fortification; for it never falls in ruins nor is it betrayed.'116  One of his works 
in Diogenes Laertius' catalogue is: Heracles, or, Concerning Good Sense and Strength (6.18).  In 
a related vein he made this ethically loaded statement: 'It was to this that Antisthenes was 
giving his attention when he said that a good man is difficult to carry.  For as foolishness is 
unsubstantial and floats about, <so> good sense is firmly fixed and unswerving and has an 
unshakeable gravity.'117  This last statement relates directly to a key component in the 
ideology of the old aristocracy, which held that flightiness and changeability are qualities of 
base men (and so the demos), while steadiness and intransigence are inherent qualities of the 
nobly born (see full discussion in the commentary on TH12 33-4, παλίµβολον τὸ τοῦ 
ἤθους, πολυµετάβολον, ἄστατον).  Thus with his views stated here on φρόνησις, 
Antisthenes is not only working within that ideological framework, but is actively 
reinforcing the structure.
114 Liz Irwin helpfully drew this to my attention.
115 1994 38; and a list of relevant passages at 38 n.33 - Chrm. 159e, Meno 88b, Rep. 6.486c-487a & 494b, Leg. 4, 
709e.
116 Diocles in DL 6.13 = DC 88, SSR 134.
117 εἰς ταῦτα δ᾽ ἀπιδὼν Ἀντισθένης δυσβάστακτον εἶπεν εἶναι τὸν ἀστεῖον· ὡς γὰρ ἡ ἀφροσύνη κοῦφον 
καὶ φερόµενον, οὕτως  ἡ φρόνησις ἐρηρεισµένον καὶ ἀκλινὲς καὶ βάρος ἔχον ἀσάλευτον; Philo 
Quod Omnis Probus Liber Sit 28 Cohn-Reiter 1915 6.8-9 = DC 91, SSR 106.
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D   Overindulgence and Pleasure
A significant portion of Antisthenes' fragments caution against the dangers of over 
indulgence, and especially against pleasure.  No doubt this part of his ethics was one of the 
major attractions that led Cynic philosophers to imagine Antisthenes as a founder of 
Cynicism.  Comments in this category show Antisthenes' customary wit:  'To a man 
praising luxury Antisthenes said “May the children of your enemies live in luxury”.'118 
Regarding overeating: 'When Antisthenes was asked “What is a festival?” he answered “An 
incitement to gluttony”.'119  And this amusing comment, preserved in Athenaeus: 'They are 
releasing themselves from life by such eating!'120  
Several of Antisthenes' comments about pleasure make it clear that it was the ethical 
implications of experiencing pleasure that he was concerned with.  In this regard pleasure 
(ἡδονή) is the natural, dichotomous opponent of hard work (πόνος), a topic Antisthenes 
wrote dialogues discussing and praising (CD7 & commentary).  Detienne discusses this 
dichotomy and sets out the 'philosophicoreligious' conception of the left hand path 
representing Hēdonē, and situated on the Plain of Lēthē, along with Oblivion and Night, 
which stands opposed to the right hand path representing Ponos, on the Plain of Alētheia, 
along with Memory and Light (1996, 126-8).  
Diogenes Laertius reports that Antisthenes frequently said, 'I would rather be crazy than be 
pleasured.'121  It may be discerned from other fragments, however, that his comment here is 
referring to pleasure for its own sake.  That he was not opposed to pleasure per se, can be 
seen from the following fragment: 'Antisthenes, when stating “pleasure is a good thing”, 
added “unregretted (pleasure)”.'122  Further revealing the ethical nature of his views on 
pleasure is the comment: 'one must pursue pleasures that follow hard work, but not 
118 DL 6.8 = DC 179, SSR 114.
119 Ps.-Max. Conf. Loci Com. 27.26./26. Ihm = DC 163, SSR 116.
120 Ath. 4.157b = DC 165, SSR 133.
121 DL 6.3 = DC 108a, SSR 122; cf. DC 108b-f, SSR 122 and DC 109b, SSR 123.
122 Ath.12.513a = DC 110, SSR 127.
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pleasures that precede hard work.'123  The corrupting influence that Antisthenes saw 
pleasure working on base people and on women generally is noted by Clement:124
I approve of Antisthenes' statement: 
'I would shoot down Aphrodite (i.e. sexual gratification) with arrows if I caught her, because she 
has utterly destroyed many of our noble women.'
And he says that sexual desire is a flaw of nature, being overwhelmed by which the base-spirited 
(κακοδαίµονες) call the disease a god (i.e. Eros).  For he (Antisthenes) shows that the less 
educated are overwhelmed by these things through ignorance of pleasure, which one must not 
strive after, even if it is called a god – that is to say even if it happens to be granted by God for the 
necessity of procreation of children.
E   Justice and Excellence, following Socrates 
As discussed in chapter 1.iii and 2.i, Antisthenes was the closest companion of Socrates and, 
not surprisingly, was considered a Socratic philosopher by the better informed ancient 
authors.  In one revealing comment, Cicero almost implies that he thinks Antisthenes' 
thought is synonymous with that of Socrates.125
An malumus Epicurum imitari? qui multa praeclare saepe dicit; quam enim sibi constanter 
convenienterque dicat, non laborat. laudat tenuem victum. philosophi id quidem, sed si Socrates 
aut Antisthenes diceret, non is qui finem bonorum voluptatem esse dixerit. 
Or do we prefer to imitate Epicurus?  Who, while he is often splendid with many of the things he 
says, does not in fact trouble himself to speak as consistently and coherently as possible.  He 
praises the sparing way of life.  That is a philosophical thing to say, but only if a Socrates or 
Antisthenes says it, not someone who has stated that pleasure is the ultimate good (i.e. Epicurus).
Clearly Cicero saw a great deal of compatibility between Antisthenes' and Socrates' 
philosophical outlooks to pair them in this way.  It is thus worth examining Socrates' 
personal philosophical principals to see how they resonate with Antisthenes'.
Plato's Apology is generally considered to be one of his early works, and one which perhaps 
gives a more straight forward depiction of Socrates, and what he actually said, than some 
later works wherein Plato's own ideas and opinions seem to dominate.  In the Apology 
Socrates makes very clear what values are most important to him.  The first of these is 
justice.  xxx Socrates makes a significant number of references to justice, judges, and 
123 Stob. 3.29.65 = DC 113, SSR 126.
124  Clem.Al., Strom. 2.20.107.2 = DC 109a, SSR 123; cf. Theod., Graec. Aff. Cur. 3.53 = DC 109b, SSR 123.
125 Tusc. 5.9.26 = SSR 121
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judging.  He speaks of the importance of being 'just' (δίκαιος), both in regard to himself and 
others (including the judges) eight times (17c, 18a, 28b, 32c, e, 35c, 41a, 42a).  Among 
numerous other uses of words for judges and judging, he discusses the excellence (ἀρετή) 
of a judge (δικαστής), i.e. 'to tell the truth' (18a), and the obligation for a judge to carry out 
his duties in accordance with the laws and not with favours (35c).  He also recounts his 
personal record of refusing to do anything unjust, either when urged to by the crowd at the 
time of the assembly condemning the generals from the Battle of Arginusae (32c), or when 
ordered to by the tyrants when they wanted him to arrest Leon of Salamis (32d).  
Implicated with justice, but even more important to Socrates, was excellence – ἀρετή.  In 
the Apology he describes himself as talking about excellence every day (38a). At three 
different points Socrates urges his fellow citizens to strive for excellence before any other 
things (29e, 30b, 31b).  At the end of the Apology Socrates tells the assembly that after he dies 
he wants them also to urge his own sons to strive for excellence above all else (41e).  For 
Socrates excellence was the principal concern.
Like Socrates, Antisthenes believed that justice was of critical value.  Accordingly it was a 
favoured topic among the works listed in DL's catalogue; there we find a Protreptic Dialogue  
on Justice and Courage in three books,126 a Concerning Law or Concerning Nobility and Justice,127 
and a Concerning Injustice and Impiety.128  Antisthenes urged people to 'esteem a just man (ὁ 
δίκαιος) more than a family member'129 and to 'make allies those who are strong spirited 
and at the same time just (δίκαιοι)'.130  He also said: 'those who desire to be immortal must 
live piously and justly (δικαίως)'.131  Antisthenes' most complete statement about justice is 
recorded by Xenophon in his Symposion:132 
'Then,' he (Callias) said, 'I will tell you what I most take pride in.  I think I am capable of making 
men better.'  
126 Περὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας προτρεπτικὸς πρῶτος, δεύτερος, τρίτος.
127 Περὶ νόµου ἢ περὶ καλοῦ καὶ δικαίου.
128 Περὶ ἀδικίας καὶ ἀσεβείας.
129 Diocles in DL 6.12 = DC 74, SSR 134.
130 Diocles in DL 6.12 = DC 79, SSR 134.
131 DL 6.5 = DC 75, SSR 176.
132 Smp. 3.4 = SSR 78.
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And Antisthenes said 'by teaching them some handicraft, or teaching them nobility 
(καλοκἀγαθία)?'  
'If nobility is justice (δικαιοσύνη).'  
'Yes it is by Zeus,' said Antisthenes, 'absolutely indisputably.  Since there are times when bravery 
and cleverness seem to be harmful both to friends and to the city, but justice (δικαιοσύνη) does not 
mingle with injustice in any instance whatsoever.'
In similar fashion to Socrates, Antisthenes also had a special concern with excellence, as 
revealed by his statement that 'excellence is sufficient in itself for happiness (εὐδαιµονία), 
since it requires nothing except the strength of a Socrates.'133  He further stated: 'excellence 
is a weapon (ὅπλον) that cannot be taken away,'134 and 'neither a symposion without 
concord nor wealth without excellence are pleasing.'135  He also made this very interesting 
assertion: 'excellence is the same for a man and a woman.'136  This statement recalls Socrates' 
observation in Xenophon's Symposion (2.9) that a woman's nature (φύσις) was in no way 
inferior to that of a man – it lacked only resolve and physical strength (γνώµη καὶ ἰσχύς). 
In the discussion above (section A), it was noted that Antisthenes said 'excellence is brief in 
speech' (βραχύλογος).137  Interestingly, Plato's Socrates had a very similar opinion about 
length of speech.  Socrates knew Protagoras was equally capable of lengthy discourse or 
great concision and urged him to employ brevity of speech (βραχυλογία) in their 
conversation (Prt. 335a). In very similar fashion, he called upon Gorgias to display his skill 
at βραχυλογία and save his µακρολογία for some other time (Grg. 449c).  Socrates also 
spoke highly approvingly of βραχυλογία as being a trait typical of even the most ordinary 
of Spartans (Prt. 342d-e).  In a related vein, revealing the aristocratic bent of his 
interpretation of excellence and reinforcing his disregard for oratory, Antisthenes stated 
that 'excellence is a matter of deeds, and it does not require excessive amounts of words or 
learning.'138   
133 DL 6.11 = DC 70, SSR 134.
134 Diocles in DL 6.12 = DC 71, SSR 134.
135 Stob. 3.1.28 = DC 93, SSR 125.
136 Diocles in DL 6.12 = DC 72, SSR 134.
137 Gnom. Vat. 743 n.12 = DC 86, SSR 104.
138 DL 6.11 = DC 70, SSR 134.
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There are a couple of fragments that show that Antisthenes' viewed 'the wise man' (section 
C above) as having a natural tendency and instinct for acting with excellence.  He stated: 'if 
a wise man does something, he executes it with all his excellence (i.e. to the best of his 
ability)' (TH6).  Contrasting with his condemnation of base men being involved in politics, 
he also said: 'the wise man (σοφός) will engage in public life (πολιτεύσεσθαι), not 
according to the established laws, but rather according to the law of excellence.'139  Aristotle 
discusses at some length men of outstanding virtue and the difficulty, or even the injustice, 
of trying to legislate to control them.140
But if there is any one man so greatly distinguished in outstanding excellence, or more than one 
but not enough to be able to make up a complete state, so that the excellence of all other men and 
their political ability is not comparable with that of the men mentioned, if they are several, or if 
one, with his alone, it is no longer proper to count these exceptional men a part of the state; for 
they will be treated unjustly if deemed worthy of equal status, being so widely unequal in 
excellence and in their political ability: since such a man will naturally be as a god among men.  
Hence it is clear that legislation also must necessarily be concerned with persons who are equal in 
birth and in ability, but there can be no law dealing with such men as those described, for they are 
themselves a law; indeed a man would be ridiculous if he tried to legislate for them, for probably 
they would say what in the story of Antisthenes the lions said when the hares made speeches in 
the assembly and demanded that all should have equality.
141
Aristotle does not elaborate on what the Antisthenes' lions said.  This observation of 
Antisthenes must have been so well known from his writing that it did not need 
repeating.142   Nonetheless, the context in which Aristotle presents the story in this passage 
makes it clear that Antisthenes held men who were pre-eminent in excellence in the same 
sort of esteem as Aristotle himself.
Clearly Antisthenes was not the only follower of Socrates to focus on justice and excellence.  
Aeschines was said by Lysias to have made many lofty (σεµνοί) speeches about justice and 
excellence.143  
139 DL 6.11 = DC 101, SSR 134.
140 Pol. 1284a5-17 = DC 100, SSR 68.
141 Generally following Rackham's Loeb translation.
142 Coraës and Halm provided exempli gratia a speculative reconstruction in Greek (aes. fab. 241, viz. trans. 
'your words are good O hares, but lack claws and teeth such as we have'), which has misled a long list of 
scholars into believing that it was an authentic fable – van Dijk catalogues them (1997, 322 n. 61) and  
includes Rankin 1986, 140; Decleva Caizzi could also be added to the list (see her note on DC 100).
143 Lys. fr. 1 Carey = Ath. 612b.
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F   Antisthenes' works focussed on Justice and Excellence
The following dialogues (discussed in detail in the commentary) reveal further the form of 
Antisthenes' philosophy of excellence and justice.
Heracles in dialogues with Prometheus and Chiron (MD1-6)
This group of fragments are all drawn from dialogues concerned with excellence, and that 
featured Heracles – either as a named interlocutor, or in the title of the work. 
MD1a-c are three translations of a fragment wherein Prometheus is recommending to 
Heracles a philosophy by which he should live his life. The fragment is found in a work by 
Themistius, the original title of which must have been περὶ ἀρετῆς, 'Concerning 
Excellence'.144  The text immediately prior to this fragment is a passage specifically 
discussing excellence, and then this passage of Antisthenes is adduced as evidence to 
support the argument.
Fragments MD3-5 are from a dialogue entitled Heracles and contain some of Antisthenes' 
assertions about excellence.  MD4 and MD5 both contain Antisthenes' comment that 
'excellence is teachable (διδακτή).'  MD5 also contains the additional statement that 'nobly-
born men (εὐγενεῖς) and excellent men (ἐνάρετοι) are one and the same'.  Making clear the 
programmatic importance of excellence in Antisthenes' philosophy, in MD3 he asserts: 'the 
goal of life is to live in accordance with excellence.'
MD6a-d are four versions of a fragment featuring Chiron and Heracles conversing.  In 
MD6b we learn that 'they were speaking about excellence, and what is more about the 
tendance of excellence.'
In MD6a-c the justice of Chiron is mentioned, MD6a-b stating that in justice he surpassed 
all men.  It is possible that Antisthenes' fragment, mentioned above (in section E), 'Those 
who desire to be immortal, must live piously and justly', was originally part of this 
dialogue, and another pronouncement from Chiron to Heracles. 
144 The surviving version is in Syriac and Alberto Rigolio –  translator of a forthcoming edition in English – 
has informed me by correspondence that the direct translation of the Syriac is 'excellence'.
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Odysseus
TH13b contains a fascinating commentary from Antisthenes regarding the way in which 
excellence relates to the attainment of immortality.   This starts with the overarching 
statement that immortality would come 'from deeds of the kind that normally confer 
immortality.  Such things should come from excellence' (9-10).  This is entirely consistent 
with Antisthenes' statement, noted above, that 'excellence is a matter of deeds.'  Conversely, 
by carrying out deeds that were not excellent – such as accepting Calypso's offer and 
abandoning his family and his home-coming – Odysseus would have 'lost his excellence' 
(11-12) and also 'lost both the immortality of his soul and his path up to the gods' (12-13).
The Suitors
Antisthenes gives very interesting treatment to Penelope's suitors, showing clearly that in 
his view they belonged to that class of men who possessed a natural and disproportionately 
large share of excellence, viz. high-born men.
In one passage, TH13c (10-12), Antisthenes presents a quote from the Odyssey, which he 
notes the suitors 'often stated'.  There the suitors claim that they could have fittingly wed 
other women, but sought Penelope instead 'for the sake of her excellence' (Od. 2.206-7). 
In another passage, from TH14n, Antisthenes discusses the fact that the suitors would not 
have referred to themselves as the hyperphialoi unless it were a positive attribute, 'since they 
would not have spoken ill of themselves' (32).  In the same passage he concludes that the 
term hyperphialoi is used of men who are 'surpassing in terms of excellence' (οἱ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν 
διαφέροντες, 30-1).  Apollonius Sophistes, from whose Lexicon Homericum the text of 
TH14n is extracted, endorses the positive view the Suitors held of themselves, both by 
presenting this fragment of Antisthenes, and by starting his entry for Hyperphialoi with the 
simple definition 'excelling' (ὑπερήφανοι).
At no stage does Antisthenes query the Suitors' excellence.  This is consistent with his 
general view of aristocratic blood being tied to excellence.  In his Heracles, as discussed 
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above, he clearly stated that 'nobly-born men and excellent men are one and the same' 
(MD5).  The Suitors are examples of men who link all these qualities – they are hyperphialoi 
and have excellence and noble-birth.  All are largely equivalent in Antisthenes' thinking.
The Cyclopes
Fragments TH14a-n contain Antisthenes' discussions about the Cyclopes, including 
especially the fact that they were referred to as hyperphialoi.  According to Antisthenes the 
Cyclopes were also noble: 'they did not have need of themis (right) or nomos (law) to 
discover the noble (καλός) way of doing things – since they were noble (ἀγαθοί)' (TH14l 3-
5).  Recall that Antisthenes also said 'the wise man will engage in public life, not according 
to the established laws, but rather according to the law of excellence.'145  The Cyclopes are 
explicitly stated to be hyperphialoi and and possess nobility, and this implies that – like the 
Suitors – they also possessed inherent excellence.
In TH14e and TH14f Antisthenes discusses the great justice (δικαιοσύνην) of the Cyclopes.  
Ajax & Odysseus
Antisthenes' Ajax in his Ajax & Odysseus (text Appendix A) embodies the philosophies that 
were important to Antisthenes.  Ajax speaks consistently about justice.  He mentions the  
unlikelihood of receiving justice (δίκη) from his judges (1.5), and also threatens the 'justice' 
those judges will receive from him if they deliver an incorrect verdict (8.6).  He uses the 
word for 'judge' (δικαστής) twice (1.5, 7.2), and the verb 'to judge' (δικάζειν) seven times 
(1.1, 1.5, 4.3, 7.6, 8.4, 8.6 x2).  In addition, he twice uses another word for 'judge' (κριτής) 
(7.1, 8.7), and the related verb 'to judge' (κρίνειν) a further four times (4.3, 4.6, 7.3, 7.4).    
What concerns Ajax more than anything else, however, and what he harangues his jury 
about three times, is the importance of properly conducting 'the discrimination of 
excellence' (περὶ ἀρετῆς κρίνειν, 4.2, 4.5, 7.2).  Ajax also continually makes a strong case for 
the priority of deeds and actions in comparison to words or arguments (1.4, 7, 7.3, 4, 7, 8.2).  
145 DL 6.11 = DC 101, SSR 134.
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The speech that Ajax offers therefore portrays him as possessing an ethical position that 
resonates in a direct and significant manner with Antisthenes himself. 
Considering this point, and the significant correlation that existed between the stated 
philosophies of Antisthenes and Socrates, it is fascinating to find that in Plato's Apology 
Socrates compares himself to Ajax.  Socrates, when musing about the afterlife and 
anticipating meeting former heroes who have died, says: 'I personally should find the life 
there wonderful, when I met Palamedes or Ajax, the son of Telamon, or any other men of 
old who lost their lives through an unjust judgement, and compared my life with theirs' 
(41ab).
G   Conclusion
Antisthenes clearly believed that it was preferable to pursue excellence above all other 
considerations – with justice being a secondary, but also critical ethical value.  His view of 
excellence is entirely consistent with the traditional aristocratic outlook that holds that a 
small minority of the population possess an innate and inherently large share of excellence. 
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2.iii   Antisthenes and Protagoras
Protagoras' relativism was a key late fifth century event.  His famous dictum that 'man is 
the measure of all things'146 meant in essence that each person's truth, viz. the way they 
perceive the world, is valid for them.  The idea that truth is relative to each man, who has 
his own truth that is real for him, was an ideological grounding for a brand of 
individualism that had not previously existed.  Protagoras was the leading intellectual 
exponent of this idea, however, his contribution was part of a wider discourse.  Herodotus, 
for example, states that each nation believes their own customs to be by far the best, and in 
support reports Pindar's maxim 'nomos is king' (3.38).
Protagoras was an older contemporary of Antisthenes.  In some areas he was an antecedent 
to Antisthenes, who engaged with his discourse.  Some of his ideas Antisthenes set himself 
against, but some basic premises he adopted.
A   Epistemological relativism versus ethical absolutism 
Protagoras' statement 'man is the measure of all things, of the things that are, that they 
exist, and the things that are not, that they do not exist',147 was elaborated by other ancient 
authors.  Sextus says that effectively this means that 'man is the standard of judgement 
(κριτήριον) of all things' (DK 80 A 14).  In Plato's Theatetus Socrates provides a defence on 
behalf of Protagoras of this theory, and though it probably includes some distortions – 
being written much later and presented by Plato as part of his agenda – it effectively serves 
as an explication of Protagoras' position.  Following are the most pertinent highlights – 
Socrates is speaking as if he were Protagoras.
166c If you are able, refute that perceptions are not personal to each of us, or, if they are personal, 
refute that what appears would not 'become' – or if one must specify 'existence', would not 'exist' – 
for that man alone to whom it appears.
166d For I assert that the truth is as I have written: each of us is the measure of what is and of what 
is not, yet one man differs vastly from another in just this: that some things both exist and appear 
to one man, but other things to another man.
146 DK 80 B 1.
147 DK 80 B 1.
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166e Remember what we were saying earlier, that to the sick man the food he eats appears and is 
bitter, but to the healthy man the opposite appears and is the case.
167b Thus also in education a change must be made from another state into a better one.  But the 
physician creates the change by means of drugs, while the professor (σοφιστής) does it by means 
of words.  And at any rate no one has ever made anyone who previously thought false think true.  
Since it is not possible to think things that do not exist, or to think any things other than those 
which one is experiencing; and these things are always true.  But I believe that when a man whose 
soul is in a poor state (πονηρά), and thinking thoughts akin to that condition, is made good 
(χρηστή), he then thinks other thoughts to that state; which appearance some men, by their lack of 
experience, call 'true', but which I call 'better' than the others, but not at all 'truer'.
167c Whatever seems just and noble to each city, is just and noble for that city, as long as it 
considers it to be so.
It is likely that Protagoras' controversial observation about the gods – viz. that he had no 
way of knowing about their existence or nature – was also primarily epistemological (DK 80 
B 4).148  According to Protagoras, every person's knowledge and reality is built up of what 
they experience first hand.  Because Protagoras had no way of personally experiencing the 
gods he had no way of knowing anything about them.  He does not deny their existence, he 
simply does not know.
Antisthenes accepts the notion that people think and perceive differently and he explores 
these tropoi in his writing by portraying characters employing idiosyncratic speech.  His 
Ajax & Odysseus is the fullest extant example of this.149  Set in an Athenian courtroom-style 
setting, before a 'jury' of common soldiery, Ajax and Odysseus each make a speech as to 
why they deserve to receive the Arms of Achilles.  Throughout his speech Ajax is 
characterised as a terse, indignant, and intransigent aristocrat.  He feels insulted at even 
being obliged to plead his case before a jury of base men and he refuses to adjust his style of 
speaking in any way.  He accuses Odysseus of being a shameless character who is prepared 
to do or say anything to get what he wants.  Ajax concedes that Odysseus will probably be 
persuasive in convincing the jury.  Odysseus on the other hand speaks for twice as long, 
builds rapport with his judges, and argues persuasively.  He argues so persuasively in fact 
148 Farrar 1989, 50-1; cf. Mansfeld 1981, 42.
149 For a full discussion of Antisthenes' contrasting characterisations of Ajax and Odysseus see Kennedy 
2011, pp. 38-45.
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that most modern commentators see Odysseus as the 'winner' of the debate and also, 
therefore, as a kind of champion of Antisthenes' supposed 'proto-Cynic' outlook.150  
In reality Ajax is the consistent and 'true' participant in the debate from Antisthenes' 
perspective.151  Although he knows that Odysseus' character is different, and creates a 
portrait of him that brilliantly portrays ethopoiia, Antisthenes' judgement of him is that he 
is 'wrong' or 'false'.  Antisthenes knows that characters are different, but he is against the 
relativist view.  He takes an absolutist ethical stance, and so in his eyes 'what is shameful is 
shameful' (TH1) however people 'relatively' think.
Plato was also concerned to show a range of idiosyncratic characters and elements and then 
to engage them with his philosophy.  Plato specifically rejects Protagoras' dictum regarding 
relativism in the Laws where the Athenian Stranger declares that god (θεός) will be the 
'measure of all things' rather than any 'man' (716c).  Plato in fact had a conservative, 
absolutist stance on moral and ethical issues that was more or less equivalent to 
Antisthenes'.  In the Cratylus Socrates asks Hermogenes if Protagoras' dictum is true: 'that 
man is the measure of all things – that as things seem to me, so they actually are for me, and 
as they seem to you, so they are for you', or if rather 'things have some steadfastness of 
reality (βεβαιότητα τῆς οὐσίας) of their own' (385e-386a = DK 80 A 13).  Hermogenes 
completely rejects Protagoras' doctrine and in the subsequent conversation asserts that 
certain men are inherently 'very bad' (πάνυ πονηροί), and some very few others 'very 
good' (πάνυ χρηστοί, 386b).  Socrates concludes that things actually do have a steadfast 
reality of their own that does not vary (386d-e).  These views are completely concordant 
with Antisthenes' own views and Antisthenes was probably Plato's antecedent in this area.  
'Correcting' Euripides, Antisthenes wrote (TH1):
αἰσχρὸν τὸ γ᾽ αἰσχρόν, κἂν δοκῇ κἂν µὴ δοκῇ. 
What is shameful is shameful, whether one thinks so or no.
It is not surprising to find Plato's Socrates expressing a very similar view (Euthd. 301b): 
150 Kennedy 2011, 62-4.
151 For the similarities in outlook between Antisthenes himself and his Ajax see the discussion in chapter 2.ii 
above under 'Ajax & Odysseus'.
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Σωκ: οὐ τὸ καλὸν καλόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν αἰσχρόν;
Soc: Is not what is noble noble, and what is shameful shameful?
B   Two opposing arguments on every issue / contradiction is impossible
Protagoras stated that 'on every matter there are two arguments opposed to each other' (DK 
80 B 6a), and he is also named by Aristotle as the originator of the practice of 'making the 
weaker argument stronger' (DK 80 B 6b).  Antisthenes on the other hand believed that each 
thing had its own proper account, the only account by which it could properly be 
described.  Any deviation from that proper account would no longer be speaking about that 
thing itself.  Therefore he contended that contradiction is impossible, and speaking 
falsehood nearly so – since to speak a false account would in effect be to speak about 
nothing at all.152  Antisthenes advised that: 'One must stop a person who is contradicting, 
not by contradicting him, but by teaching him.  For one would not attempt to cure a 
madman by being mad in return.'153
Diogenes Laertius claimed that the argument of Antisthenes, that contradiction is 
impossible, was actually first used by Protagoras 'as Plato says in Euthydemus'.154  Plato did 
not actually say that, however.  What he actually said (via Socrates) was: regarding the 
argument that contradiction is impossible, 'Protagoras and his followers (or the followers of 
Protagoras) made great use of it as did others from an earlier time.'155  Diels prints both the 
passage from Diogenes and from Plato as 'A' testimonia, but not as 'B' fragments.  The 
designation οἱ ἀµφὶ Πρωταγόραν, 'Protagoras and his followers', is likely Plato's 
roundabout, and probably denigratory, way of referring to Antisthenes, who like Socrates, 
almost certainly spent a reasonable amount of time in Protagoras' company.156 
152 Arist. Metaph. 1024b25-1025a2 = DC 47a, SSR 152; cf. Alex. Aphr. in Metaph. 1024b26 Bonitz = DC 47b, 
SSR 152;  Ascl. in Metaph. 1024b25 = SSR 153;  Arist. Top. 104b19-21 = DC 47c, SSR 153;  Alex. Aphr. in Top.  
104b19 = SSR 153; Proclus in Plato's Cratylus c.37 Pasquali 1908 = DC 49, SSR 155; Isoc. Hel. 1 = SSR 156; 
DL 3.35 = DC 36, SSR 148.
153 Stob. 2.2.15 = DC 65, SSR 174: οὐκ ἀντιλέγοντα δεῖ τὸν ἀντιλέγοντα παύειν, ἀλλὰ  διδάσκοντα· οὐδὲ 
γὰρ τὸν µαινόµενον ἀντιµαινόµενός τις ἰᾶται. 
154 DL 9.53 = DK 80 A 1 53, DC 48, SSR 154.
155 286c = DK 80 A 19: οἱ ἀµφὶ Πρωταγόραν σφόδρα ἐχρῶντο αὐτῷ καὶ οἱ ἔτι παλαιότεροι.
156 Kerferd 1981, 88-92, makes a case that the 'contradiction is impossible' doctrine is originally Protagoras', 
and compatible with the two opposing arguments theory; but contra see Farrar 1989, 65-66.
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It has been noted that of three of the major literary Socratics – Antisthenes, Plato, and 
Xenophon – Plato goes to great pains not to mention the other two.157  Antisthenes is only 
named once by Plato, as being present on the day of Socrates' execution (Phd. 59b), but 
Xenophon is never mentioned at all.  Xenophon mentions Plato only once, in passing, as the 
brother of Glaucon (Mem. 2.6.1). When Xenophon lists the young men who associated with 
Socrates because they wanted to become gentlemen (καλοί τε κἀγαθοί γενόµενοι) he does 
not mention Plato (Mem. 1.2.48).  Antisthenes seems never to have mentioned Plato directly 
at all.  There are only a few anecdotes including the two of them, and the dialogue Sathōn, 
which possibly featured a lewd alter-ego of Plato in the title role (CD4-6).  Antisthenes 
probably had no reason to mention Plato, as he himself was an older associates of Socrates 
while Plato was a comparatively young man, and not considered by him to be a direct or 
important disciple of Socrates.
Aristotle names Antisthenes as the originator of the argument that contradiction is 
impossible, in both the Metaphysics and the Topics.158  He never mentions Protagoras in 
connection with this argument, and nor does Isocrates, Asclepius, or Alexander of 
Aphrodisias, who all discuss it.  It seems quite certain that Plato knew full well, as did the 
other ancient writers, that the argument was Antisthenes', but he chose to refer to 
Antisthenes by the collective 'Protagoras and his followers' to avoid directly acknowledging 
Antisthenes – his originality in developing the thesis or even his name – and to indirectly 
slight him by associating him in the minds of well informed readers with Protagoras and 
hence sophistry.  
C   Education
Antisthenes seems to have shared some of Protagoras' views about education.  Protagoras 
is reported as claiming that he was able to teach men to be better men (Pl. Prt. 318a = DK 80 
A 6) and was able to make what is beneficial to men in any particular case actually appear 
to be the just course (Tht. 167d = DK 80 A 21a).  He is also reported by Plato to have claimed 
157 Clay 1994, 26-7.
158 Metaph. 1024b25-1025a2 = DC 47a, SSR 152; Top. 104b19-21 = DC 47c, SSR 153.
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that excellence is teachable and to have attempted to prove that was the case (Prot. 320bc).159 
Antisthenes, similarly, stated that 'excellence is teachable' (MD4 & MD5).  The Platonic 
Socrates, by contrast, argues that excellence cannot be taught, and uses Pericles as an 
example – he was unable to pass on his excellence to his sons and they were left to pick it 
up if they could, by chance, on their own (Prot. 319e-320a; cf. 320b, 361a-c).
Antisthenes may have engaged with another of Protagoras' ideas.  Protagoras spoke about 
the crown of fame:  'Toil and work and instruction and education and wisdom are the 
crown of fame, which is woven from the flowers of an eloquent tongue and set on the head 
of those who love it.'160  Antisthenes 'when asked by someone “What sort of crown is 
finest?” replied “The one for education.”'161
They may have also shared ideas about education affecting, or being stored in, the soul.  
Protagoras stated: 'Education does not take root in the soul unless one goes deep' (DK 80 B 
11).  When an acquaintance was complaining to Antisthenes that he had lost his notes, 
Antisthenes said: 'You should have inscribed these things in your soul and not on paper.'162
159 And see discussion in Farrar 1989, 79-81.
160 DK 80 B 12 – translated from a German translation of the original Syriac.
161 Stob. 2.31.33 = DC 172, SSR 162.
162 DL 6.5 = DC 188, SSR 168.
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3   ANTISTHENES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ETHOPOIIA
This chapter will discuss the development of character portraits and the representation of 
ethopoiia in prose, and Antisthenes' contributions to both. 
A   Character portraits
Did Antisthenes have a role to play in the development of character portraits of the sort that 
Theophrastus became famous for with his Characters or Character Types?  Diggle provides a 
reasonably thorough summary of the antecedents of Theophrastus who created character 
sketches – Homer, Semonides, Herodotus, Plato, and Aristotle all receive mention (2004, 5-
6).  Aristophanes seems a slightly glaring omission from the list.163  Diggle goes on to state: 
'Aristotle provides the seed from which Theophrastus' descriptions grow.  He often 
indicates, in abstract and general terms, the circumstances or behaviour which are 
associated with each virtue and vice' (7).  It appears that Diggle has overlooked a crucial 
contribution to this genre made by Antisthenes.
Antisthenes' fragments MD9-13 deal with flatterers and flattery.  MD10 is particularly 
interesting for the purposes of this discussion.  In this fragment, after offering a likeness of 
rich but uneducated men, Antisthenes provides a brief description of flatterers, starting: 
'flatterers, who are the sort of men who (οἵτινες) … '.  This is precisely how Theophrastus 
starts out every one of his character sketches.  They each commence: 'The x-character is the 
sort of man who … (τοιοῦτός/τοιόσδε τις οἷος)'.  The generalising characterisations that 
Theophrastus then goes on to provide are presented in just the same style as the one 
Antisthenes provides for flatterers: 'who, if they encounter people after they have 
consumed all their possessions, pass them by pretending not to know them'.  Several of 
Antisthenes' other comments about flatterers in this group of fragments may have been part 
of that same generalising character portrait.  A dialogue of Antisthenes', The Statesman, 
which contained 'an invective against all the demagogues in Athens' (CD3) may also have 
consisted in part or in whole of a scathing, generalising characterisation of politicians.  
163 See further Ussher 1977, esp. 75-9.
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Diogenes Laertius lists a work of Antisthenes' titled Περὶ λέξεως ἢ περὶ χαρακτήρων, 
Concerning Diction, or, Concerning Character Types (6.15)164 that demonstrates his interest in 
the ways styles of speech convey character (see further discussion below in section C). 
Regarding the development of character sketches, Diggle states: 'Theophrastus locates his 
characters in a specific time and place. The place is Athens.  And it is an Athens whose daily 
life he recreates for us in dozens of dramatic pictures and incidents.  If we look elsewhere 
for such scenes and such people, we shall not find them (until we come to the Mimes of 
Herodas) except on the comic stage' (2004, 8).  From fragment MD10, however, it is pretty 
clear that Antisthenes was attempting something of very much the same kind as 
Theophrastus only at least a half a century earlier.  But, as is most often the case, 
Antisthenes' creative and original contribution to yet another genre has been overlooked.
B   Beginnings of ethopoiia
Producing a seemingly natural style of characterisation through use of language was 
termed 'ethopoiia' (ἠθοποιΐα) by ancient critics such as Dionysius of Halicarnassus.  
Thucydides is one prose author who lent speakers giving speeches a certain degree of 
characterisation by the style of delivery; the Spartans, for example, are generally depicted 
as terse and reticent (Francis 1993).  The individual generally credited with developing 
ethopoiia, however, is Lysias.
Lysias
Lysias, with a career probably commencing in 403 (Jebb 1893, i.150), developed a 
naturalistic style of oratory, which retained considerable 'force and power' while employing 
'ordinary and regular words' (DH Lys. 3) and 'everyday language' (DH Dem. 2).  He is 
particularly famed for his ability to dramatise character in his speeches (Jebb 1893, i.156).  
He supplied customers with speeches for the law courts that when delivered gave the 
impression of being their own words, while at the same time conveying a consistent 
164 Giannantoni 1990, IV nota 25 pp. 240-1 gives a summary of various scholarly opinions arguing over the 
possible meaning, and even the authenticity, of the title.
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character, even if it was one that differed from their own (Jebb 1893, i.159, 163).  Dionysius 
of Halicarnassus was familiar with around 200 speeches of Lysias' (Lys. 17) and was 'quite 
incapable of finding one individual' who is 'lacking ethopoiia or lifeless' (ἀνηθοποίητον 
οὔτε ἄψυχον, Lys. 8).
Dionysius attributes Lysias' ability to portray ethopoiia to his 'excellence' at manifesting 
'thought, diction, and composition' (διάνοια, λέξις, σύνθεσις) in his speeches (Lys. 8).  In 
other words, a combination of the thoughts and the choice of words in order to reflect the 
character of the person who is to be created and conveyed.  Dionysius goes on to add that 
an important adjunct to ethopoiia was 'appropriateness' (τὸ πρέπον), which was Lysias' 
ability to match an appropriate style to the speaker, the audience, and the subject matter:  
'For the characters differ from each other in age, family background, education, occupation, 
way of life, and in other regards' (Lys. 9). 
There have only ever been two modern discussions in English on the use of ethopoiia in 
literary works, both focussing on Lysias (Devries 1892, Usher 1965).  Jebb, in his still 
excellent work on Attic orators, also devotes three pages to discussing Lysias' development 
and utilisation of ethopoiia (1893, 173-6).  Devries in his Ethopoiia, a study of character 
types, considers only the works of Lysias, who he feels 'excels all others' (1892, 13).  By 
contrast to Dionysius (above), Usher finds character to be portrayed inconsistently by 
Lysias – he can find it only in 1, 3, 7, 10, 16, 19, 24, 31 & 32 (1965, 101-16).  He concludes: 
'Character-portrayal is thus far from being common to all the speeches of Lysias' (119).  
Usher also discusses the word ethopoiia itself and states: 'None of the arguments adduced 
by Jebb, Devries and others in favour of its meaning “individual characterisation” is 
convincing'.  Rather he thinks it can mean no more than 'moral tone' (1965, 99 n. 2).165  It 
appears that Usher may have subsequently changed his mind on this point, however, as in 
a more recent book, when discussing a case of 'ethopoiia', he elaborates by describing it as 
'portrayal of the speaker's character' (1999, 310).  Carey, though, notices a difference 
between Dionysius' and modern scholars' use of the term 'ethopoiia'.  In line with Usher's 
165 A position with which Todd agrees (2000, 7).
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earlier position, that it is not 'individual characterisation', he thinks Dionysius' use of it was 
limited to 'moral tone', whereas modern scholars mean Lysias' 'extensive use of “dramatic” 
character' (1989, 10).
Even though there is some uncertainty as to what Dionysius meant by ethopoiia it is clear 
that Lysias was producing individualising speech bound by ethical and rhetorical 
constraints. He was trying to demonstrate the way an individual of a specific social 
position, driven by certain thoughts and values, would speak and act.  In as much as 
ethopoiia specifically for speech writing has been considered, Lysias is credited with 
conceiving it.  In particular he is known for specialising in the development of the 
appropriate characterisation to appeal to jurors presiding over various sorts of forensic 
cases.  
C   Antisthenes and ethopoiia
Antisthenes was undoubtedly interested in character and how it is manifested.  A work of 
his listed by Diogenes Laertius, Περὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν φυσιογνωµονικός, Concerning the 
Sophists: a Physiognomy, (DL 6.16) is possibly a discussion of the sophists' ideas about 
physiognomy.166  Boys-Stones notes that this is the first extant instance of physiognomy 
receiving a philosophical interpretation in the ancient world (2007, 23).  
There is ample evidence to suggest that Antisthenes was also interested in portraying 
ethopoiia.  Another title listed against his name is Περὶ λέξεως ἢ περὶ χαρακτήρων, 
Concerning Diction, or, Concerning Character Types (DL 6.15), which has already been touched 
on above under Character portraits.  Given Antisthenes' interest in delineating character, here 
λέξις has been translated 'diction' or 'style of speaking' (LSJ I.2), viz. the choice and use of 
words in speech, and particularly as those words chosen and used to contribute to the 
building of differing character portraits.  The word χαρακτήρ167 in the sense used here 
originally meant 'stamp', or 'impress', such as made on coins and seals (LSJ II.1).  This 
166 And not as Tsouna (1998) surmises, a treatise that 'probably attacked the physiognomical diagnoses 
attempted by the sophists' (181); the preposition περί does not normally have an adversarial meaning.
167 Diggle 2004, 4-5, provides a useful summary of the relevant ancient texts and modern scholarship 
relating to χαρακτήρ.
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meaning was extended to mean an indelible, and recognisable, characteristic 'stamped' on 
certain people (LSJ II.3), thought to be visible, in particular, on those of noble birth (e.g. E. 
Hec. 379-80).  Then it came to mean 'character', but more in the sense of a 'character type' 
than 'individual nature' (LSJ II.4).  
Antisthenes use of the word probably lies, semantically, somewhere between the last two 
meanings.  His interest in physiognomy shows that he thought character was outwardly 
manifested, and his sympathy for old aristocratic values suggests that he would have 
believed noble character to be recognisable on those of noble birth.  His portrayal of 
Odysseus in his Ajax & Odysseus, discussed below, demonstrates that he also felt character 
types other than old aristocrats could be outwardly recognised – by their bearing, their 
actions, and particularly by their mode of speaking.  A fragment of Menander uses 
χαρακτήρ with the same sense: 'the “character” of a man is recognised from his speech'.168  
So Περὶ λέξεως ἢ περὶ χαρακτήρων seems to be concerned with different 'character types' 
and the way they were demonstrated and/or recognisable by their 'style of speech'.  
Confirmation of this is suggested by this title's arrangement in Diogenes' catalogue of 
Antisthenes' works.  The very next titles listed after Περὶ λέξεως ἢ περὶ χαρακτήρων 
(discussed above) are Αἴας ἢ Αἴαντος λόγος and Ὀδυσσεὺς ἢ περὶ Ὀδυσσέως (6.15, 
treated in this thesis as one work, the Ajax & Odysseus).  The fact that these speeches are 
largely an exercise in ethopoiia (discussed below) suggests that they were intended 
specifically to demonstrate the 'diction' and 'character types' referred to in the Περὶ λέξεως 
ἢ περὶ χαρακτήρων, and it is therefore likely that they are the demonstrative portion, and 
possibly the subtitle, of the same work.
Odysseus' Polytropia
There are a number of other Antisthenes fragments wherein the speakers display ethopoiia, 
and interestingly Odysseus figures in all of them.  Two speakers in fragment TH12 are 
discussing Homer's description of Odysseus as polytropos (many mannered), as well as the 
168 ἀνδρὸς χαρακτὴρ ἐκ λόγου γνωρίζεται, PCG F 72.
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definition of polytropia (many modes) more generally.  The first speaker condemns 
Odysseus, pointing out that Homer did not describe Achilles, Ajax, or Nestor as polytropos, 
but instead as 'sincere' (ἁπλόος, 7) or 'wise' (σοφός, 8).  The second speaker, however, 
defends Odysseus and offers a long-winded and convoluted argument as to why polytropia 
is actually a positive attribute.  The second speaker is clearly exemplifying polytropia by his 
mode of discourse – he is himself polytropic.  This is surely an ironical characterisation of a 
deceptive polytropic position by a Socrates or his like and intended to display the ethopoiia 
of a person adopting such a position.
In fragments TH13a-d Odysseus is characterised by Antisthenes as a clever, smooth-talker 
prepared to say and do whatever it takes to get what he wants (similar to Antisthenes' 
depiction of him in the Ajax & Odysseus).  Odysseus did not trust Calypso's offer of 
immortality because he suspected her of lying.  We are probably meant to infer that 
Odysseus is clever, and a liar himself, and thus he suspects everyone else of lying too.  Also, 
he does not tell the Phaeacians his true motivations, but rather he tells them what he thinks 
will expedite his journey home.  So by his own behaviour, at every turn, he displays 
ethopoiia.  At the end of TH13d it is observed that Odysseus' behaviour – i.e. not believing 
Calypso, but not disclosing that fact to the Phaeacians – 'showed the constitution of his 
character' (αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἤθους σύστασιν).  That is, it revealed his polytropic nature.
Ajax & Odysseus169
In an insightful comment regarding the Ajax & Odysseus, George Kennedy suggests that 'it 
is possible that Antisthenes is trying to illustrate something like ethopoiia, the 
manifestation of personality in a speech, a subject which was clearly of contemporary 
interest' (1963, 172).170  This certainly seems to be the case.
169 The following comments are largely a summary of a much fuller discussion at Kennedy 2011, 37-46.
170 Contrarily, Eucken, the only other modern author who mentions ethopoiia in relation to the Ajax & 
Odysseus, sees the speeches as a philosophical battle evincing Stoic virtues and asserts that the speeches: 
'are distinguished not by their '”Ethopoiia”, but rather by their logical character' (Unterschieden sind sie 
nicht durch Ethopoiie, sondern durch ihren logischen Charakter; 1997, 271). 
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In his speech, Ajax is characterised as an old-style aristocrat who refuses to yield to, or even 
slightly bend to conform with, the democratic court made up of common men whom he is 
confronted with.  He is awkward and uncomfortable with the entire set-up and is 
unabashedly haughty and threatening.  He continuously addresses his judges as if they are 
completely beneath him and evidently views his inherent virtues as beyond their lowly 
comprehension.  Ajax also regularly espouses values consistent with his aristocratic rank 
including the importance of excellence (ἀρετή), the value of a glorious reputation, and the 
need to avoid shame.  And he has an impulsive urge to reject anyone and anything 
smacking of cowardice.  His use of sarcasm and his haughty aristocratic incredulity add 
further nuance to his character.  Ajax's characterisation is not subtle, but rather by a 
consistently delineated aristocratic outlook it conveys ethopoiia in a convincing manner.  
By contrast, Odysseus is characterised as a man who offers no objections to being called 
upon to defend himself in a court composed of men of lower station.  He shows himself 
adept at handling the courtroom situation and one way he does this is by speaking for 
twice as long as Ajax.  Odysseus adopts the pragmatically opportunistic ethics that 
traditional Athenian aristocrats ascribed to the demos, and so also to the demagogues who 
courted the demos.  He is unconcerned about glory or shame and is focussed purely on what 
he needs to do to expediently complete any mission he is faced with.  He patronisingly 
rejects Ajax's old fashioned views and approach to battle as stupid and pointless.  Once 
again, Odysseus' ethopoiia is displayed by the distinct and consistently portrayed values 
and attitudes that Antisthenes develops for him.
It seems certain that these neglected pieces of Antisthenes' are demonstration speeches, but 
intended to show character types or portraits rather than any sort of well-crafted argument. 
The speeches both fail to deliver a convincing case, and in fact the one ascribed to Ajax 
must be considered a spectacular failure in terms of 'winning' the argument.  Instead they 
demonstrate a deep interest in understanding and representing the way others think and 
act, and therefore they are examples of ethopoiia.   No doubt Lysias developed ethopoiia for 
efficacious speeches in a legal environment.  It seems however that Antisthenes was also 
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thinking about and developing ethology for speeches at the same time or possibly earlier.   
He certainly seems to have been the first to write counter-productive ethological speeches.  
One modern critic discussing 'character' in ancient literature commented: 'Strikingly absent 
from the ancient thought-world is the interest in unique individuality and the subjective 
viewpoint which figures in modern western thinking about character' (Gill 2012, 317).  Yet 
showing the subjective viewpoints (of character types, if not unique individuals) appears to 
be precisely the sort of thing that Antisthenes was interested in and attempting to portray.
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4   ANTISTHENES AND THE BIRTH OF DIALOGUE
4.i   The Development of Socratic Dialogue
The sudden emergence and development of prose dialogue in the late fifth and early fourth 
centuries was a major literary event.  Before that time dialogue had been restricted to poetic 
compositions – predominantly portrayed in drama and occasionally in epic.  The 
development of prose dialogue and the particular use Antisthenes put it to will be explored 
here.
A   Dialogic versus monologic discourse
Mikhail Bakhtin in Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics (1984) provides a very useful theoretical 
explanation as to what dialogic discourse offers over a monologic approach.  In essence, a 
monologic artistic representation does not recognise others' thoughts or ideas (79) and a 
monologistic philosophical approach excludes the possibility of genuine intellectual 
interaction (81).  Thus, within the confines of any author's monologistic world 'someone 
else's idea cannot be represented.  It is either assimilated, or polemically repudiated, or 
ceases to be an idea' (84-5).
Bakhtin argues that someone's ideas can only live and develop in a dialogic relationship 
with other consciousnesses (87-88): 
The idea lives not in one person's isolated individual consciousness – if it remains there only, it 
degenerates and dies.  The idea begins to live, that is, to take shape, to develop, to find and renew 
its verbal expression, to give birth to new ideas, only when it enters into genuine dialogic 
relationships with other ideas, with the ideas of others.  Human thought becomes genuine 
thought, that is, an idea, only under conditions of living contact with another and alien thought, a 
thought embodied in someone else's voice, that is, in someone else's consciousness expressed in 
discourse.  At that point of contact between voice-consciousnesses the idea is born and lives.
Thus an idea is by nature dialogic and only takes shape in a discourse with one or more 
other voices hearing and answering it from other positions (88).
Bakhtin also thought that the 'Socratic method of dialogically revealing the truth' was 
naturally suited to being presented as 'a dialogue written down and framed by a story' 
(109).  Underpinning the genre of Socratic dialogue was the notion that truth and human 
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thinking about truth are dialogic at a fundamental level.  Bakhtin sums this up: 'Truth is not 
born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people 
collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction' (110).
This style of 'search for truth' is very evident in Plato's earlier works where dialogic 
communication was the structure depended upon to find truthful answers.  Many of them 
are aporetic, implying that the dialogues were designed to be continued.  Bakhtin notes, 
however, that in Plato's later work Socrates has been transformed into a 'teacher' who 
monologistically expounds 'dogmatic worldviews,' and that ultimately the genre of Socratic 
dialogue 'degenerated completely into a question-and-answer form for training neophytes' 
(110).
B   Definition of Socratic logoi
Lack of ancient definitions for prose forms
Isocrates observes that the 'genres of works composed in prose are not fewer than those 
composed with metre.'171  And yet classifying and naming them was a problem, and one 
that Aristotle comments on regarding Socratic logoi:
Poetics 1 1447a28-1447b10
The (mimetic) art which uses either bare language (λόγοι ψιλοί, i.e. prose) or metrical forms (whether 
combinations of these, or some one class of metres) remains so far unnamed.  For we have no common 
name to give to the mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus and to Socratic logoi.'
Nor was there adequate nomenclature to apply to the composers of prose works, who 
might variously be called a λογογράφος, λογοποιός, and even a σοφιστής, for lack of a 
more convenient term (Ford 2010, 232).
Speaker making an ethical choice
Precisely what Aristotle meant on the two occasions he wrote 'Socratic logoi' (Σωκρατικοὶ 
λόγοι) has been a topic of much conjecture, with some translators wanting to take λόγοι as 
'dialogues' or even to emend the text so.  The relevant passage mentioning 'Socratic logoi' 
171 Antidosis 45: τρόποι τῶν λόγων εἰσὶν οὐκ ἐλάττους ἢ τῶν µετὰ µέτρου ποιηµάτων. 
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from Poetics 1 is quoted above.  Following is the text of the other instance from the Rhetoric, 
as well as two other texts from Poetics relied upon for this discussion: 
Rhetoric 3 1417a21-30:
And the (forensic) narrative must express moral character (ἠθική), and in fact it will be so, if we 
know what effects this.  One thing to make clear is the moral choice (προαίρεσις); for character 
(ἦθος) is as this (moral choice) is; and as the moral choice is, thus is the fulfilment/outcome 
(τέλος).  For this reason mathematical logoi have no moral character, because they do not have a 
moral choice;  since they have no 'for the sake of.'  But the Socratic logoi do have; for they discuss 
such questions.  
Poetics 6 1450b8-12
Character (ἦθος) is that which reveals moral choice – that is, when otherwise unclear, what kinds 
of things a person chooses or rejects – which is why speeches in which there is nothing at all that 
the speaker chooses or rejects contain no character.
Poetics 2 1447b30-1448a5
Since mimetic artists represent people in action, and the latter should be either noble or base 
(σπουδαῖοι ἢ φαῦλοι) – for characters almost always align with just these types, as it is through 
vice and virtue that the characters of all men vary – they can represent people better than the level 
of ourselves, worse than that, or much the same.
These texts are central to the decisive interpretation and discussion of this topic by Andrew 
Ford in his 2010 article 'ΣΩΚΡΑΤΙΚΟΙ ΛΟΓΟΙ in Aristotle and Fourth-Century Theories of 
Genre'.  Using these texts, Ford has convincingly demonstrated that Aristotle considered 
the Socratic logoi to be mimetic not just because they portrayed people talking but rather 
because the speakers in these logoi choose a particular ethical position (2010, 230).  Hence 
they represent 'moral character in action' because 'character is revealed by the kind of thing 
preferred', and as the passage from Poetics 6 states, 'speeches in which there is nothing at all 
that the speaker chooses or rejects contain no character' (229).  In the passage from the 
Rhetoric Aristotle specifically contrasts Socratic logoi with mathematical logoi, which lack a 
moral choice, and therefore also lack character (230).  This also explains why Socratic logoi 
include a range of forms other than dialogue – e.g. apologia and memorabilia – because for 
a logos to be Socratic 'the essential was that it show ethical choice through speech in persona' 
(230).
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From this Ford also deduces that Socratic logoi are so called 'because Socrates was noted for 
eliciting such ethical commitments in conversation' and thus calling them 'Socratic' would 
have differentiated these logoi from others of that time such as Aesopic or Sybaritic ones 
(230).  So a Socratic logos would not necessarily feature Socrates.  The important factor was 
that the person or persons speaking were portrayed as making an ethical choice or showing 
an ethical preference.
Question & answer, ethopoiia and diction, and stylishness
A valuable mid second-century AD text by Albinus, Eisagōgē, or Introduction, explains what 
elements he thought necessary to constitute a philosophical dialogue.  The dialogues 
should contain question-and-answer sequences, speakers displaying appropriate ethopoiia 
and diction, and they should be stylishly written.172  Albinus was specifically introducing 
Plato's dialogues.  His insights, however, apply equally well to any Socratic dialogues, and 
for the most part (discounting only the question-and-answer element) to any Socratic logoi, 
whether dialogues or not.  The texts are useful enough, and short enough, to reproduce in 
full.  In this first passage Albinus seems to be citing someone else's definition, probably that 
of his teacher, Gaius, whose lectures on Plato this text was likely introducing.173
Eisagōgē 1.15-17 Hermann p. 147 = DL 3.48
τί ποτ᾽ ἔστιν ὁ διάλογος; 'ἔστι τοίνυν οὐδὲν ἄλλο τι ἢ λόγος ἐξ ἐρωτήσεως καὶ ἀποκρίσεως 
συκκείµενος περί τινος τῶν πολιτικῶν καὶ φιλοσόφων πραγµάτων, µετὰ τῆς πρεπούσης 
ἠθοποιΐας τῶν παραλαµβανοµένων προσώπων καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὴν λέξιν παρασκευῆς.'
What then is a dialogue? 'It is a logos composed from question-and-answer on a political and 
philosophical topic, with the befitting ethopoiia of the individuals taking part, and with befitting 
arrangement in terms of their diction.'
172 Ford 2010,  emphasises this last point and brought the text of Albinus to my attention.
173 Reis 1999, 131.
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In this second passage Albinus breaks up the definition and expands on each section.
Eisagōgē 2.11-18 Hermann p. 148.
ἴδιον τοῦ διαλόγου ἐρωτήσεις καὶ ἀποκρίσεις· ὅθεν 'ὁ λόγος ἐξ ἐρωτήσεως καὶ ἀποκρίσεως ' 
εἶναι λέγεται. τὸ δὲ 'περί τινος τῶν φιλοσόφων καὶ πολιτικῶν πραγµάτων' πρόσκειται, διότι 
οἰκείαν εἶναι δεῖ τὴν ὑποκειµένην ὕλην τῷ διαλόγῳ· αὕτη δέ ἐστιν ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ φιλόσοφος. 
ὡς γὰρ τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ καὶ ὅλως τῇ ποιήσει οἰκεία ὕλη ὑποβέβληται τῶν µύθων, οὕτως τῷ 
διαλόγῳ ἡ φιλόσοφος. τουτέστι τὰ πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν. τὸ δὲ 'µετὰ τῆς πρεπούσης ἠθοποιΐας 
τῶν παραλαµβανοµένων προσώπων,' διότι διαφόρων ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὄντων κατὰ  τὸν βίον, 
τῶν µὲν φιλοσόφων, τῶν δὲ σοφιστικῶν, τὰ οἰκεῖα ἤθη δεῖ ἑκάστῳ ἀνατιθέναι, τῷ µὲν 
φιλοσόφῳ τὸ γενναῖον καὶ τὸ ἁπλοῦν καὶ τὸ φιλάληθες, τῷ δὲ σοφιστικῷ τὸ ποικίλον καὶ τὸ 
παλίµβολον καὶ τὸ φιλόδοξον, τῷ δὲ ἰδιωτικῷ τὸ οἰκεῖον. ἐπὶ τούτοις φησὶ καὶ 'τῆς κατὰ τὴν 
λέξιν παρα σκευῆς·' καὶ µάλα εἰκότως· ὡς γὰρ τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ καὶ τῇ κωµῳδίᾳ τὸ οἰκεῖον µέτρον 
δεῖ παρεῖναι καὶ τῇ λεγοµένῃ ἱστορίᾳ τὸ πλάσµα, οὕτως καὶ τῷ διαλόγῳ τὴν οἰκείαν λέξιν καὶ 
σύνθεσιν, ἔχουσαν τὸ Ἀττικόν, τὸ εὔχαρι, τὸ ἀπέριττον, τὸ ἀνενδεές.
1 suppl. Kenn. καὶ ἀποκρίσεως      6 suppl. Kenn. κατὰ
Questions and answers are a specific property of a dialogue; whence it is said to be 'a logos from 
question-and-answer;' and the expression 'on a political and philosophical topic' is added, because 
it is necessary for the subject matter to be suitable for a dialogue; and this (suitable subject matter) 
is political and philosophical. For as the subject matter of muthoi is suitable for tragedy and poetry 
in general, so is the philosophical suitable for dialogue; that is, the things that pertain to 
philosophy.  And the expression 'with the befitting ethopoiia of the individuals taking part,' since 
as they differ in speech according to their mode of life – some of them being philosophers, and 
others sophists – one must assign to each their own proper character; to the philosopher, nobility, 
honesty, and love of truth; but to the sophist, craftiness, shiftiness, and love of reputation; and to 
the private individual his own proper character.  Added to this, he states also: 'of the arrangement 
in terms of their diction;' and rightly so. For as its own proper metre ought to be applied to 
tragedy and comedy, and the proper style to what is called history, so ought its own proper diction 
and composition be applied to dialogue – viz. possessing Attic style, cultivation, concision, 
sufficiency.
Socrates of course is famous, from his portrayal in many works of Plato, for asking 
questions of his interlocutors – and the earliest extant portrayal of him in this questioning 
mode is found in Aristophanes (see discussion below).  So of the Socratic logoi that were 
dialogues, question-and-answer was a key component.  
Ford has identified ethopoiia as the crucial element that helped set Socratic logoi apart from 
otherwise similar sophistic ones.  Whereas the opposed speeches of the Dissoi Logoi and 
Antiphon's Tetralogies were anonymous, Socratic logoi had clearly delineated personae (Ford 
2008, 42).  As discussed above, they also showed characters in the process of taking ethical 
positions.  This was a key element of the ethopoiia they displayed.  
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At the end of the second text printed above Albinus states that a dialogue (and we can also 
read 'Socratic logos') should be Atticising and cultivated – showing concision and 
sufficiency.  This elevated style was clearly an essential element of Socratic logoi.  Lysias 
comments on the lofty (σεµνοί) style of Aeschines' speeches,174 and Plato's work is praised 
by Aristotle for the same reason (Pol. 1265a11).175  Cicero commends the style of all the 
Socratic authors (Off. 1.29.104):176
iocandi genus … elegans, urbanum, ingeniosum, facetum, quo genere non modum Plautus noster 
et Atticorum antiqua comoedia, sed etiam philosophorum Socraticorum libri referti sunt.
A mode of eloquence … [that is] elegant, urbane, fanciful, and witty, a mode that informs not only 
our Roman Plautus and the Old Comedy of Attica, but which fills the books of the Socratic 
philosophers.
In summary, Socratic dialogues included question-and-answer, and Socratic logoi more 
generally portrayed characters with well suited ethopoiia and diction, and they were 
stylishly written.
Target audience
Much of poetry, be it epic, tragedy, or comedy, was produced for public consumption.  The 
same was the case for prose forms such as political and legal speeches.  For these latter 
forms the publicly available teachers, the sophists, specialised in training people to 
compose and deliver persuasive speeches.  They also, for themselves, produced public 
demonstration speeches with which to 'wow' the public, and presumably to drum up 
business.  Gorgias, for example, when part of an embassy from Leontini in 427  (Th. 3.86.3) 
spoke before the Athenian assembly and is said to have 'astounded' them (κατεπλήξατο, 
DH Lys. 3; cf. Pl. Hp.Ma. 282b), and by his elaborate use of rhetorical devices he 'amazed' 
them (ἐξέπληξε, DS 12.53.3f).  By contrast 'Socratics stick to producing texts for private 
reading; they have no interest in addressing the mass public on its terms.' (Ford 2008, 38).
174 Lys. fr. 1 Carey = Ath. 612b.
175 Noted by Ford 2010, 231.
176 As cited by Clay 1994, 41.
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C   Precursors of Socratic logoi writers
Tragedy
Tragedy was very much the precursor for Socratic logoi in almost every way.  The fact that 
the two genres were competing to occupy the same intellectual and ethical territory, at least 
in Plato's mind, is made clear by the section in the Republic 10 where he posits an 'ancient 
battle' between poetry and philosophy (607b).  When Aristotle enumerates four kinds of 
tragedy, 'ethical' (ἠθική) is one of the categories (Po. 1455b32-35).  Particularly in later 
tragedies by Sophocles and Euripides the protagonists are displayed with fitting ethopoiia 
and diction, and they are regularly put into positions in which they display their ethical 
colours.  One of the only real differences between tragedy and Socratic logoi is that tragedy 
is in metre.  Even the Socratic question-and-answer sequences (not common even to all 
Socratic logoi) find parallels in certain passages of stichomythia (e.g. S. Ant. 39-48, 548-555).  
Sophocles' Philoctetes is an excellent example of a tragedy with an ethical theme throughout, 
as the noble but naïve Neoptolemus starts out under the influence of the devious and 
dispassionate Odysseus, but escapes his clutches after being moved by compassion for the 
suffering of the flawed but companionable Philoctetes.177
Sophron
Sophron wrote men's and women's mimes in prose.  Though apparently his writing 
contained certain rhythmical and metrical elements,178 Aristotle did not consider them to be 
poetry as is clear from a fragment of his lost work On Poets: 'Then should we deny that the 
so-called 'mimes' of Sophron, even though they are not in metre, are logoi and mimesis?'179 
177 Hawkins 1999 offers a stellar discussion of the ethical manoeuvrings within the play, along with 
references to much relevant bibliography (337-57); for a wide-ranging discussion of ethics in Greek 
tragedy and philosophy in general, see Nussbaum's The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek 
Tragedy and Philosophy (1986, revised 2001).
178 κῶλα, Sch. in Greg. Nanz. p. 120 = PCG T 19)
179 Ath. 11.505c = fr. 72 Rose, PCG T 3.
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The Suda confirms that Sophron wrote in prose (καταλογάδην) in the Doric dialect,180 and 
that his writing was in prose is also the conclusion of Sophron's most recent editor.181  
Clearly Sophron's style of characterising individual men and women in a lively and vivid 
fashion had something in common with the writings of Socratic logoi.  Tradition has it that 
Sophron's work both pleased Plato and influenced his dialogues.  Duris of Samos (third 
century BC) says that Plato 'had Sophron's mimes constantly in his hands.'182  From 
Diogenes Laertius we receive the report that Plato was responsible for bringing the mimes 
of Sophron from Sicily to Athens and that he even slept with them under his pillow.  More 
importantly though, Diogenes said it was from these works that Plato first portrayed 
character in Sophron's style (ἠθοποιῆσαι πρὸς αὐτόν).183  In a similar vein Olympiodorus 
says that Plato very much enjoyed Aristophanes and Sophron, 'from whom he received aid 
in the mimesis of individuals in his dialogues.'184  In as many words, a papyrus fragment 
says that it was the 'dramatic element of his dialogues' (τὸ δραµατικὸν τῶν διαλόγων) that 
Plato got from Sophron.185
Herodotus
Herodotus' work includes scores of speeches.186  He also displays familiarity with and 
willingness to employ certain language and forms of late fifth century argumentation.187 
The section that comes closest to being a Socratic logos is the so-called 'Constitutional 
Debate' (3.80-2).  In this set piece Otanes, Megabyzus, and Darius argue for the merits 
respectively of democracy, oligarchy, and monarchy.  A certain amount of character is 
granted to the participants immediately by the fact that they are named, rather than 
180 Suda σ 893 = PCG T 1.
181 Hordern 2004, 15-16.
182 Ath. 11.504b = FGrH 76 F 72, PCG T 5.
183 DL 3.18 = PCG T 6.
184 παρ᾽ ὧν τὴν µίµησιν τῶν προσώπων ἐν τοῖς διαλόγοις ὠφελήθη; Olymp. Vita Plat. 3 = PCG T 8; cf. 
Anon. Proleg. in Plat. 3 = PCG T 9.
185 Pap. Ox. 3219 = PCG T 4; and see the excellent discussion of the papyrus, as well as the other testimonia 
mentioned above, in Haslam 1972.
186 According to Lang (1984) over 400 speeches of which around 100 are 10 lines or more in length; 
exhaustively categorised and tabulated at 82-149.
187 Thomas gives a summary of the vocabulary and relevant passages (2000, 266-7). 
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anonymous, participants and each of them had played a greater or lesser role in the 
Histories up to that point.188  The participants offer well-crafted arguments that give 
plausible versions of the points of view from each position.  As the discussion progresses, 
subsequent speakers pick up and respond to points made by the prior speaker(s).  Otanes 
for democracy and Darius for monarchy speak the longest.  Megabyzus on behalf of 
oligarchy speaks for about half as long.  This in itself seems to be displaying an aspect of 
ethopoiia.  Democratic orators in particular were accused by traditional elites of speaking 
far too much, and kings could quite conceivably fall into this category also.  Well bred men 
though, such as Spartans and oligarchs, know when to stop (see further ch. 2.ii section A).  
The preference for one form of government over another also implies making an ethical 
choice.  Thus, many of the elements of Socratic logoi are present.  The style of debate is in 
fact highly reminiscent of Antisthenes' Ajax & Odysseus in which Odysseus speaks after 
Ajax, speaks for twice as long, and responds to points that Ajax has made.
Thucydides
Thucydides produces speeches of various kind throughout his history, including Pericles' 
famous 'Funeral Oration' in book 2, and a number of paired speeches in debates between 
ambassadors of different nations and, in the case of the 'Mytilenian Debate' of book 3, 
between Athenian politicians.  These speeches have most of the elements required of 
Socratic logoi.  They are stylish, show appropriate diction, and, as Macleod has observed, 
'the speakers have a character, at least in so far as they impinge on events,' adding that 
Thucydides 'makes manifest Athenian imperialism through the mouths of Pericles, Cleon, 
Alcibiades and the rest' (1974, 386).
Thucydides' so-called 'Melian Dialogue' in book 5 goes a step further by including the 
question-and-answer element found in Socratic dialogues.  The Athenians specifically 
instruct the Melians that they are not to make one speech delivered all at once, but instead 
they should interject at any point the Athenians make a statement that seems unsatisfactory 
188 Darius and Otanes especially, Megabyzus had received one prior mention as a trusted companion of 
Darius (3.70).
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(5.85; cf. Macleod 1974, 387).  This assimilation of the cut and thrust of dialogue is highly 
reminiscent of the style of dialectic employed by Plato's Socrates and this style of 
questioning seems to have been one of Antisthenes' defining traits (discussed in ch. 1.iii 
section I).  The Athenians' insistence on leaving aside long speeches in favour of short 
question-and-answer style dialogue particularly recalls Socrates' insistence that Gorgias 
and Protagoras accept similar conditions in his discussions with them (Pl. Grg. 449c, Prt. 
335a).  In the situation with the Melians, this style of discourse gives the Athenians the 
controlling position in the discussion, just as it gave Socrates control in his conversations 
with the sophists.  The Athenians set the agenda over the course of the dialogue, raising 
points of their choosing and then refuting the Melians' objections one after another.  The 
discussion even takes place in private, like a Socratic dialogue, rather than before a larger 
audience such as was the case with political or legal oratory delivered at assemblies of 
citizens.  In an interesting and persuasive article Boyarin makes a case that Thucydides is 
specifically attempting to show that 'Socratic' style dialogue (contrary to the nature of true 
dialogic communication described by Bakhtin) is suited to elite, and even tyrannical, 
expressions of power.  This is the opposite of oratory, which is the style of discourse 
associated with democratic debate.189  Thucydides after all inserts only one dialogue into his 
work, the result of which is horrific destruction for the Melians.  In the 'Mytilenian Debate' 
on the other hand, long rhetorical antithetical speeches are employed by Cleon and 
Diodotos, the outcome of which is that the demos arrive at a just decision and the 
Mytilenians are reprieved from destruction.190  
This reading obviously assumes a tacit, albeit not uncritical, level of support from 
Thucydides for democratic Athens.  So while clearly not a card-carrying democrat himself, 
Thucydides openly admired democratic leaders such as Pericles, as well as certain aspects 
of the élan displayed by the demos in the face of various challenges and disasters.  If this 
reading is accepted then the 'Melian Dialogue' shows Thucydides reacting against and 
189 Boyarin 2012, esp. 66-71; for further discussion of rhetoric as a democratic form of discourse see Farrar's 
chapter on Protagoras (1989, 44-98).
190 Boyarin 2012, esp. 72-79.
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condemning dialectical dialogue of a sophistic type that is only speciously aimed at 
exploring and assessing another's ideas.  The type of dialogue in fact which the Platonic 
Socrates is often displayed employing.  This then suggests the possibility that there may 
have been examples of such dialogue in writing.  Thucydides himself says that he went into 
exile from Athens in 424 for 20 years (5.26.5).   So he may have witnessed such Socratic 
dialogical exchanges beforehand in person.  But perhaps early Socratic writings of the 
question-and-answer type had already begun circulating in the period 424-404.
Aristophanes
Aristophanes is included here, not only because he depicts people speaking colloquially 
and with recognisable character, but because he characterises Socrates and includes 
passages of question-and-answer dialogue in Clouds, one of them featuring Socrates 
himself.191  The followers of Socrates are mocked in the Birds as Spartan-imitating, long-
haired, and 'Socratising' (σωκρατεῖν, 1280-4).  A clue to what exactly 'Socratising' might be 
is given in another reference to Socrates in Frogs where the chorus say how pleasant it is not 
to be seated beside 'babbling' (λαλεῖν) Socrates (1491-2) adding: 'To hang around killing 
time in pretentious conversation and hairsplitting twaddle is the mark of a man who's lost 
his mind' (1496-9).192   
In Clouds the chorus leader calls on Socrates, before taking on Strespiades as a student, to 
'agitate his mind and test his intelligence' (476-7), following which Socrates precedes to ask 
him questions (478-88):
Soc. Now then, describe for me your own characteristics; when I know what they are, on that 
basis I can apply to you the latest plans of attack.
Strep. How's that?  Are you thinking of besieging me?  Good heavens!
Soc. No, I just want to ask you a few questions (βραχέα σου πυθέσθαι).  For instance, do you 
have a good memory?
Strep. Yes and no, by Zeus: if I'm owed something, it's good, but if I'm the hapless debtor, it's 
bad.
191 The three Aristophanic references here are noted in Clay's excellent discussion 1994, esp. 37-9.
192 Henderson's Loeb translation for this and the following passage of Aristophanes.
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Soc. Well, is there eloquence in your nature?
Strep. Eloquence, no; fraudulence, yes.
Soc. Then how will you manage to learn?
Strep. Don't worry, I'll do fine.
So in this passage we have Socrates characterised and testing a potential student.  Clay 
comments that the style of questioning corresponds with representations of Socrates' 
'conversations rendered by the Socratics who wrote later' (1994, 38; my emphasis).  It seems 
more likely, however, that Aristophanes was imitating the style of conversation he 
encountered in earlier, or at least contemporary, Socratic writing.  If Aristophanes had 
written first, it is unlikely that a Socratic writer would have imitated this style of presenting 
Socrates that contributed to his condemnation and death.  So it makes more sense to 
understand that Aristophanes was parodying the format for portraying Socrates that was 
already established.  The Clouds was first produced in 423, then partially revised 
somewhere between 420 and 417, but probably never put on stage again (Dover 1968, 80-
98).  So sometime between 423 and 417, or earlier, it seems highly likely that at least one 
Socratic writer was depicting Socrates in dialogue in a manner that allowed Aristophanes to 
parody him.  Antisthenes is the only Socratic we know of who would have been old 
enough, then in his late 20s or early 30s, to be that writer.
It is also worth noting, that like Thucydides, Aristophanes seems to be reacting against a 
form of Socratic dialogue that is really Socratic bullying, and only speciously consensual.  
In Clouds, more so than Socrates himself, it is his students, Strepsiades and his son 
Pheidippides, who are the most outrageous and out of control when engaging in 'dialogue' 
in order to outwit opponents.  They use aggression and devious word-twisting to get the 
better of interlocutors.  In conversations with his creditors Strepsiades uses a combination 
of tricky definitions, crafty verbal manoeuvring, and even physical bullying – all of which 
he learnt from the play's Socrates – in an attempt to wriggle out of paying his debts (1221-
1302).  Later his son Pheidippides uses a similar set of strategies to justify giving 
Strepsiades himself (and potentially his mother) a beating (1321-1475).  
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It it is significant that it is the students who most overtly employ Socrates' methods for 
consensual bullying.  This depiction of Socrates' students may even have been intended as 
an uncomplimentary reference to the harshness of Socrates' genuine associates and 
students – such as Alcibiades and Antisthenes.  In particular, it has been noted that the 
Clouds' Pheidippides has much in common with the historical Alcibiades – lisp, penchant 
for argument, etc. (Vickers 1999, 269-70).  As already discussed, Antisthenes had a 
reputation for acerbity and for being an irresistible cross-examiner (ch. 1.iii, section H and 
I).  Aristophanes would have made this sort of comparison between Socrates' real life 
students and those in the Clouds with particular cleverness if he was also basing his 
characterisations on the texts of one of those real life students such as Alcibiades and 
Antisthenes.  It seems that Gomperz may have been on the right track when he commented: 
'The historical Socrates stands, among all the Socratics, the closest to Antisthenes' (1924, 
419).193  Certainly the Xenophontic Socrates from the Symposion and the Memorabilia is a far 
more congenial and good natured individual than the combative version we find in Plato.  
It therefore seems a possibility that Antisthenes' bullying style influenced not only 
Aristophanes' but also Plato's portrayal of Socrates.
D   First Socratic dialogue writers
Inventors of Socratic Dialogue
Ancient authors have offered five candidates as the inventor of Socratic dialogues:194  
Alexamenos of Teos (or Styra or Tenos); Epicharmus of Syracuse; Simon the shoemaker; 
Xenophon; and Zeno of Elea.  Following is a summary and assessment of the ancient 
testimony on each:
1. Alexamenos of Styra or Teos or Tenos.  Athenaeus states (505bc) that Plato did not 
invent the genre of mimetic dialogues but rather that Alexamenos of Teos was the 
first to do so, as asserted by Nicias of Nicaea (1st c. BC/AD ?, FHG 4.464) and Sotion 
193 'Der geschichtliche Sokrates steht, unter allen Sokratikern, dem Antisthenes am nächsten.'
194 The five were gathered from the discussion of Clay 1994, 23-47, who touches on all of them.
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(early 2nd c. BC, fr. 14 Wehrli). Athenaeus goes on (505c) to quote the fragment of 
Aristotle's On Poets (fr. 72 Rose): 
οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ἐµµέτρους τοὺς καλουµένους Σωφρονος µίµους µὴ φῶµεν εἶναι λόγους καὶ 
µιµήσεις ἢ τοὺς Ἀλεξαµενοῦ τοῦ Τηίου τοὺς πρώτους γραφέντας τῶν Σοωρακικῶν 
διαλόγων;
Then should we deny that the so-called 'mimes' of Sophron, even though they are not in metre, 
are logoi and mimesis?  Or that the works of Alexamenus of Teos, the first written of the Socratic 
dialogues (are logoi and mimesis)?'195   
To prove his point, Athenaeus says (505c): 'Thus the very learned Aristotle expressly 
declares that Alexamenos wrote dialogues before Plato.'  Athenaeus' statement, 
however, that the 'first' Socratic dialogues were written by Alexamenos seems to be 
an inference from this comment of Aristotle that he wrote 'before Plato' – so not 
necessarily first.
Diogenes Laertius gives a variation of the same fragment (3.48): 'But Aristotle, in the 
first book of his On Poets, says that it was Alexamenos of Styra or Teos (who was first 
to write dialogues) as says Favorinus in Memorabilia (fr. 55 Am).'
The final variation comes from a papyrus find:196 'for Aristotle is not to be believed 
when he says in his malice against Plato, in book one of On Poetry (vult 'On Poets'), 
that dramatic dialogues (δραµατικοὶ διαλόγοι) had been written even before Plato 
by Alexamenos of Tenos.' (POxy. 3219 fr. 1, trans. Haslam). 
Alexamenos, though he is otherwise an enigma, based on Aristotle's testimony he 
probably made a contribution to the development of dramatic dialogues.  In all the 
variations of Aristotle's claim he is given some sort of primacy over Plato, whether it 
be that he was earlier writing 'Socratic (i.e. ethical)197 dialogues', or 'dramatic 
195 There is (understandably) a great deal of controversy about this fragment and various scholars have 
wanted to emend πρώτους to πρότερον and διαλόγων to διαλόγους, i.e. to make it read 'Alexamenos 
wrote dialogues before the Socratic ones'; another proposed emendation of  διαλόγων to λόγων would 
bring the terminology in line with all of Aristotle's other mentions of Socratic logoi (these controversies  
are all discussed by Ford, along with bibliography, 2010, 225-6).
196 The style and content of the fragments suggest that they are possibly from a monograph concerning 
Plato and his dialogues, written sometime between the third century BC and the second century AD 
(Haslam 1972, 34).
197 By the definition of Socratic logoi from section D above.
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dialogues'.  Athenaeus, however, knows independent testimony from Sotion and 
Nicias of Nicaea that though Plato wrote 'mimetic dialogues' (διαλόγοι µιµητικῶς), 
he was not the inventor of the genre, which suggests that it is more likely the 
dramatic and imitative dialogic form that Plato was influenced by (as in the case of 
Sophron), rather than any ethical element.  Apart from these fragments Alexamenos 
is unknown.  
2. Epicharmus of Syracuse (late sixth and early fifth century).198  Diogenes Laertius 
reports the evidence cited by Alkimos of Sicily, a fourth century historian, in order to 
prove that elements of Platonic doctrine and dialogic form were imitated from 
Epicharmus – this includes discussions of the doctrine concerned as well as passages 
of dialogue.199
The evidence on Epicharmus is scanty, though perhaps he was another Sicilian 
author who influenced Plato.  Diogenes is able to produce a few pages of Alkimos' 
evidence to suggest so.
3. Simon the shoemaker. Diogenes Laertius tells us that when Socrates came and 
conversed in Simon's workshop Simon used to make notes of all that he could 
remember. 'Thus people call his dialogues “leathern” (σκυτικοί),' says Diogenes, 
who lists 33 dialogues and adds: 'He was the first, they say, to set down as 
conversations (? διαλέχθη) the Socratic logoi' (2.122-3).
Simon the shoemaker is a fascinating case and receives his own chapter from 
Diogenes who reports the titles of 30 of his works, but otherwise he is scarcely 
known.  In Diogenes' chapter on Phaedo the Simon is one of two titles stated to be 
genuine and either Phaedo or Aeschines is supposed to have written a 'Shoemakers 
Logoi' (σκυτικοὶ λογοί, 2.105).   Plutarch has a reference to Socrates sitting beside 
198 Judging by Aristotle's statement that he is a much earlier poet than Chionides and Magnes (Po. 1447a33-
4) who were active in Athens in the 480s and 470s.
199 DL 3.9-17 = FGrH 560 F 6, DK 23 B 1-6; Clay 1994, 36 n. 29 provides a round up of the scholarship on 
Alkimos and Epicharmus; but cf. Dover 2003, 532 who doubts the verity of Alkimos' testimony 
particularly because he finds it incredible that Epicharmus would be using such Platonic and Attic 
expressions as: 'πάνυ µὲν οὖν, “yes, no doubt”'; which seem reasonable doubts.
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Simon (Mor. 776b).  Diogenes also reports that Pericles undertook to support Simon 
and bade him come to his side, but Simon declined, refusing to sell his 'free speech' 
(2.123). Simon receives a few other scattered mentions from later or apocryphal 
sources.200 Though several modern philosophers have strenuously denied that Simon 
was even an actual person,201 his historicity seems confirmed by the discovery of a 
shoemaker's shop in the Athenian agora with a cup base found just outside inscribed 
'Simon's'.202   All the other circumstantial evidence for Simon's existence and 
association with Socrates is gathered and discussed by Sellars.203  
Not a single fragment from Simon remains to us.  So though the balance of evidence 
suggests that he was an historical person who had an association with Socrates, 
whether or not he truly recorded some form of Socratic logoi, or even dialogoi, is 
unknowable.  It seems possible that the story of Simon has been used as a fly-on-the-
wall theory to give the air of a first hand account to the writers producing 
'Shoemakers' logoi,' and perhaps also to explain the origin of certain 'knowledge' 
regarding Socrates' life that is not preserved elsewhere.  Shoemakers' shops were 
good places for lazy chatterers to pass the time.  The shoemaker in general was 
commonly used as the standard example of an Attic craftsman – for example 
shoemakers are referred to several times by Aristophanes and numerous times by 
Plato.
4. Xenophon.  Diogenes Laertius elsewhere takes Xenophon's Memorabilia to be the first 
publication of transcripts of Socrates' conversations: 'He was the first to take notes of 
the things Socrates said and to pass it on to people, under the title of Memorabilia' 
(2.48).
The likelihood that Xenophon was the first dialogue writer can probably be 
discounted.  Xenophon was a much younger man than Socratics such as Antisthenes, 
200 For some references see SSR VI B 87-92, but Sellars catalogues several others 2003, 207 n.3.
201 See examples at Sellars 2003, 207 n.2.
202 Camp 1986, 145-7; cf. Thompson 1960, 234-240. 
203 2003, esp. 206-9.
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and it is generally assumed – in the face of no evidence to the contrary – that he 
wrote later than authors such as Antisthenes, Aeschines, and Plato.  And Xenophon 
himself frankly admits in his Apology that he is not the first on that topic: 'others have 
written about this' (1.1).
5. Zeno of Elea.  The final candidate offered by Diogenes Laertius: 'They say that Zeno 
of Elea was first to write dialogues' (3.48).  
There is no other evidence that Zeno of Elea wrote dialogues and Diogenes may be 
extrapolating this claim from Zeno's renowned prowess at argumentation. 
Elsewhere Diogenes himself reports a statement of Aristotle that 'Zeno was the 
inventor of dialectic (διαλεκτικῆς) as Empedocles was of rhetoric' (9.25 = DK 29 A 1 
& A 10).  It seems more plausible that he played a role in inventing dialectic than 
dialogue.
E   Evidence of dialogic structure in Antisthenes' writing
The following is a preliminary summary of the evidence that most, if not all, of Antisthenes' 
writing was in dialogue.  The evidence for them being dialogic is discussed fully in the 
relevant commentary for each fragment.  It is worth noting to begin with that Antisthenes is 
only ever described as writing 'dialogues' and not any other kind of text.204  The ancient 
testimonia in the 'Dialogica Varia' section refer to the following eight works specifically as 
'dialogues': Little Cyrus, Lesser Heracles, Alcibiades, Truth, Exhortations, Sathōn, The Statesman, 
Archelaus.  Another Socratic author, Aeschines, is said by Lysias to have 'made speeches' 
(λέγοντα λόγους, Lys. fr. 1 Carey = Ath. 612b) but the same is not reported about 
Antisthenes.
The dialogicity of Antisthenes' oeuvre has generally been lost on most of scholarship.  This 
is probably mainly because of misconceptions regarding his largest extant piece, the Ajax & 
Odysseus.  The speeches given by Ajax and Odysseus have mistakenly been understood as 
separate monologues produced as some sort of rhetorical exercise.  In reality they are 
204 SD1, SD2, CD1, CD2, CD3, CD4a-c, CD6.
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clearly presented in a dialogic relationship with each other: Ajax anticipates and responds 
to the things he imagines Odysseus will say and do (Aj. 1.3, 3.5, 6.4-5); and Odysseus picks 
up on and responds to Ajax's arguments (Od. 3.5-8, 4.5, 5.5, 6.1, 6.4, 11.1-2).  It is clearly one 
work depicting competing ideologies engaged in dialogue with each other – on the one 
hand Ajax representing traditional aristocratic values, and on the other Odysseus 
representing demagogues and the demos.
That Antisthenes wrote Socratic dialogues is attested by Panaetius (SD2) and four 
fragments (SD4, SD6, SD7, and Sy9) preserve direct speech from Socrates.  SD4 is a piece 
of dialogue depicting Socrates discussing Alcibiades' prize for valour with an unknown 
stranger.  It contains typical dialogic elements such as a vocative ὦ ξένε and imperative 
εὐφήµει and a conversational particle γε.  Fragment SD6 also preserves a passage of direct 
speech from Socrates, this time apparently in dialogue with Antisthenes.  Certainly 
Antisthenes seems to have featured himself in other dialogues.  Fragments ED1-6 all feature 
Antisthenes speaking in the first person with (or regarding) youths who are apparently his 
students, potential students, and/or love interests.  The final fragment featuring Socrates, 
Sy9, has him discussing wine cups in what is evidently a sympotic setting.  
There is the tantalising possibility that TH1 preserves a line of Antisthenic dialogue 
featuring Plato.  The line is attributed to Antisthenes' by Plutarch, but another author, 
Selenos, cites the same line being delivered in direct speech by Plato.  Thus, just possibly, this 
is a line given by Antisthenes to Plato in a dialogue, perhaps the unflattering version of 
Plato from the Sathōn, in which Plato's alter-ego seems to have played the main character 
(CD4a-c).
Antisthenes also wrote dialogues featuring mythical figures and a passage of direct speech 
survives with Prometheus addressing Heracles in MD1a-c.  Heracles appears again in 
MD6a-b where he is described as 'conversing' (ὁµιλοῦντες/loquentes) with Chiron in 
Antisthenes' Heracles, which is described in CD6 and CD7 as a dialogue.  Heracles himself  
delivers a line of dialogue in direct speech in MD7, and MD9 has another line from him, 
this time in reported speech.
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It seems most likely that Antisthenes' discussions of tragedy and Homer were all presented 
in dialogue format.  The discussion about Odysseus' polytropia in TH12 depicts two 
speakers putting forward opposing points of view and they use a range of particles and 
expressions (6 οὔκουν, 8 οὐ µὰ Δία, 14 τί οὖν; ἆρα γε, 16 µήποτε).  Some free use of 
grammatical structure in TH13c (about Calypso and Odysseus) seems to represent someone 
speaking in a dialogue.  The text has µὲν γάρ (4) followed by a µέν (5) and a further µὲν 
γάρ (6) without an answering δέ.  It is as though the speaker interrupts himself mid-
explanation, in order to provide additional information needed as context for what he is 
about to say next, and then continues with his original train of thought.  The group of 
fragments containing discussion of the Homeric Cyclopes (TH14a-o) contain clues that all 
the material has been extracted from what was originally dialogue.  This includes direct 
questions (TH14b 3-6) rhetorical questions (TH14a 1-2, 2-6, 7-8), a compressed section of 
dialogue (TH14a 9-13), and a second person imperative σκόπει (TH14j 2-3) apparently 
directly quoted from a dialogue.
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4.ii   Antisthenes as Dialogue Writer
A   Antisthenes' chronological relationship to the other Socratics
Antisthenes was around 20-25 years older than Socratics such as Plato, Xenophon, 
Aeschines, and Aristippus, the first two of whom were certainly born in the late 420s and 
the latter two almost certainly.  Antisthenes was a close friend of Socrates, rather than a 
young student, and this is how Xenophon represents him, both throughout the Symposion, 
and in the Memorabilia where we find Socrates respectfully consulting Antisthenes when 
conversing before younger students (2.5.1-3).  Chronology thus supports the idea that 
Antisthenes was also one of the earliest Socratic writers, or even the very earliest, and there 
is circumstantial evidence to suggest that ancient authors considered something like this to 
be the case.  When Dionysius of Halicarnassus mentions the foremost Socratics he lists 
them: Critias, Antisthenes, and Xenophon.205  In this case the order of the names may be an 
indication of the chronological order in which Dionysius believed that they were writing.  
Antisthenes and Aeschines each wrote three dialogues with the titles Cyrus, Heracles, and 
Alcibiades, and Persaeus accused Aeschines of plagiarising his versions from Antisthenes 
(CD6).  Similarly, Theopompus claimed that Plato had plagiarised Antisthenes in several 
cases (SD1).  Charges of plagiarism were never levelled at Antisthenes himself, however, 
which further suggests that he was known to be writing earlier than the other Socratics.  
Plato also hints at there being Socratic writers active prior to Socrates' death and prior to 
himself.  In the Apology he has Socrates make a prediction: 'There will be more men 
examining/criticising you (οἱ ἐλέγχοντες), whom up to now I have restrained, though you 
didn't realise it.  And they will be harsher, in as much as they are younger, and you will be 
more vexed' (39cd).  Rutherford has made the quite reasonable deduction that this 'would 
seem to imply that the Apology was not the first example of Socratic literature, that indeed 
Plato himself was not alone or even the first.' (1995, 44).
205 DH De Thuc. 51.941 = DC 9, SSR 49; Dionysius may exclude Plato because sees him as a category on his 
own.
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B   Antisthenes role in the birth of dialogue
The low esteem that Antisthenes is currently held in as a writer of dialogue is made clear by 
his lack of prominence in three recent collections of essays on ancient dialogue.  In the most 
recent, volume, although Antisthenes' name does not appear in the index, he does at least 
receive attention from one contributor.206   Another earlier volume notes Antisthenes once,207 
and a major collection from 2013 includes no discussion of Antisthenes' works, or even a 
single mention of his name.208  The following investigation will set out to demonstrate that 
this neglect is in no way justified.
As has been argued, Antisthenes was almost certainly one of the earliest writers of Socratic 
logoi, and his works, such as they remain, and reports on his works, display all the qualities 
ancient critics ascribed to Socratic logoi – viz. question-and-answer, ethopoiia, appropriate 
diction, and stylish writing.  
Antisthenes was known for his predilection for questioning the statements and ethical 
positions of those in his company.209  Theopompus states that it is clear 'from his writings' 
that Antisthenes 'was skilful, especially at leading on absolutely anyone at all to conclusions 
for his own advantage by means of smooth discourse' (SD3).  So in Antisthenes' writings 
that are now lost there must have existed passages that depicted Antisthenes (and probably 
Socrates and others) using question-and-answer conversation to manoeuvre around their 
interlocutors.  There is perhaps a tantalising hint of this sort of dialogue preserved in 
MD1a-c where Prometheus is rebuking Heracles and using ethical argumentation to 
persuade him to the right course of life.  
Ethopoiia was discussed in chapter 3.  Clearly, for Antisthenes a major focus of his writing 
was to give his speakers well defined ethopoiia, including appropriate diction.  His 
writings that survive well enough to permit judgement are highly crafted, ingenious, and 
regularly witty.
206 Dubel & Gotteland 2015, wherein Irwin (2015a) cites Antisthenes several times.
207 Goldhill 2008, 44 (Antisthenes mentioned by Ford 2008).
208 Föllinger & Müller 2013. 
209 See especially Xenophon's Symposion and the discussion in ch. 1.iii section I.
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Evidently the dialogic form had such central importance for Antisthenes that he thought his 
greatest philosophical achievement was the ability to engage in dialogue with himself.  
When asked what advantage he had gained from philosophy, he said: 'The power to hold 
conversation with myself.'210  Bakhtin renders this 'the ability to communicate dialogically 
with one's self' (1984, 120).  Long argues that Plato was making a similar case in the 
Republic, that in the absence of interlocutors a philosopher could engage in dialogue within 
himself (2008, 54-5).  Antisthenes' emphasis on the value of this internal dialogue seems to 
provide important background to the priority fourth century philosophers – especially 
Aristotle – gave to rational and syllogistic thought processes.
C   Antisthenes' Socratic logoi
Antisthenes was predominantly, or solely, writing dialogue, as was argued at the end of the 
previous chapter.  Antisthenes' Socratic logoi displayed an impressive creative range, and 
included dialogues featuring Socrates, contemporary figures, mythical figures, as well as 
Antisthenes himself.  Some dialogues included literary criticism, and some may have been 
political in nature and even have incorporated a constitutional debate.
Antisthenes wrote dialogues with Socrates as a speaker as did all the early Socratic authors, 
including Aeschines, Plato and Xenophon.  One of Antisthenes' fragments is especially 
interesting because it has Socrates speaking to Antisthenes (SD6).  Theopompus implies 
that Antisthenes wrote himself, rather persuasively, into his own dialogues (SD3).  It seems 
quite possible that all of Antisthenes' Socratic dialogues, sensu stricto, featured Antisthenes 
himself as an interlocutor with his closest friend and companion.  These dialogues were 
perhaps set like historical dramas in a naturalistic and realistic setting, professing to recall 
many instances of the conversations the two had actually held together, thus lending 
authorial authority and credibility to his works.  If so, this would be similar to the 
representation of Antisthenes by Xenophon in his Symposion, where Antisthenes is Socrates' 
most frequent interlocutor.  Also in the Memorabilia Xenophon portrays Antisthenes as 
never away from Socrates' side (3.11.17) and always ready to engage with him as an 
210 τὸ δύνασθαι ἑαυτῷ ὁµιλεῖν; DL 6.6 = DC 177, SSR 100.
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interlocutor at a moment's notice (2.5.1-3).  Interestingly, Xenophon is the only other one of 
the 'genuine' Socratic dialogue writers (as estimated by Panaetius, SD2) to have included 
himself in a dialogue with Socrates (X. Mem. 1.3.8-13).  It is most likely that Antisthenes' 
dialogues were his model for doing so.  Cicero reveals that Aristotle also wrote one or more 
dialogues featuring himself as the primary interlocutor and to whom the other roles were 
subordinated.  Cicero admits that he followed this 'Aristotelian pattern' (Ἀριστοτέλειον 
morem) in his own dialogues (Epist. ad Att. 13.19.4 = SB 326).  Aristotle himself was possibly 
following an earlier technique of Antisthenes'
A number of sympotic fragments (Sy1-10) may all belong to Antisthenes' Socratic 
dialogues.  One (Sy9) has Socrates speaking and most of the others are argued in the 
commentary to be related.  When commenting on the symposion in the era of the Socratic 
dialogue Bakhtin writes (1984, 120): 
Dialogic banquet discourse possessed special privileges (originally of the cultic sort): the right to a 
certain license, ease and familiarity, to a certain frankness, to eccentricity, ambivalence; that is, the 
combination in discourse of praise and abuse, of the serious and the comic.  The symposion is by 
nature a purely carnivalistic genre.  
Antisthenes' sympotic fragments seem to fall very much into this genre of 'dialogic banquet 
discourse' defined by Bakhtin.  Plato and Xenophon also each wrote a Symposion, however, 
it appears that the nature of Antisthenes' dialogue was even more light-hearted and playful, 
with the symposiasts engaging in good-natured banter as well as participating in various 
games.  It also appears that both Plato and Xenophon made reference to, and imitated 
aspects of Antisthenes' earlier work.  Several of the sympotic fragments seem to be part of a 
cycle of competitive encomia offered by symposiasts to the simple objects surrounding 
them at the drinking party – including salt, piss-pots, bombulioi, wine, and water.   Isocrates, 
in an ethical, philosophical context, critiques writers who wasted their talents writing on 
such frivolous topics as salt and bombulioi (see further in commentary).  Plato seems to have 
taken Antisthenes' version of the symposion and 'improved' it by having the symposiasts 
offer encomia to Eros rather than the petty objects Antisthenes' symposiasts chose to praise. 
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Eryximachos is probably referring to this dialogue when in recommending competitive 
encomia to his fellow symposiasts he says (Pl. Smp. 177bc):
I happened upon a certain book in which salt was wonderfully praised for its usefulness, and you 
could see many other such things extolled therein.  There has been so much exertion made over 
such piffling matters, but not one man to this day has undertaken to make a fitting hymn to Eros.
In Xenophon's Symposion, in a similar vein to Plato's work, Socrates says to his fellow 
symposiasts that as good as the hired entertainers are, it would be a shame if they did not 
give some thought to benefiting each other (3.2).  He then suggests that they each in turn 
declare what they think is most worth knowing about (3.3).  The symposiasts then proceed 
to do just that.  This whole literary genre of setting out to speak on a given topic, one after 
another, in a sympotic setting may have started with Antisthenes, before it was 'improved' 
upon by Plato and Xenophon, and continued to be imitated hundreds of years later by 
Lucian with his Encomion to the House Fly. 
A further category of Antisthenes' dialogues seems to have included himself as a speaker – 
in these he is portrayed addressing, or discussing, various youths (ED1-6).  In at least one of 
the fragments (ED6) the youth is a love interest of Antisthenes', and in another two (ED3-4) 
the youths are prospective students who may or may not have also been love interests.  
Hence, as a group, the fragments are tentatively categorised in this collection as 'Erotic'.  
The persona-type, the erotic philosopher, characterises the Platonic Socrates in many 
dialogues and one wonders if it is a type Plato borrowed from Antisthenes' self-portraiture 
rather than the real Socrates.  Xenophon is possibly playing on this image when he has 
Antisthenes declare how exceedingly in love he is with Socrates (Smp. 8.4).
The fragments from mythic dialogues (MD1a-16) are remarkable primarily because they 
are so original – few writers of philosophical dialogues are known to have attempted the 
composition of similar dialogues.  The closest examples of something similar are Prodicus' 
story of 'The Choice of Heracles' recounted by Xenophon (Mem. 2.1.21-34) and the Trojan 
Dialogue by Hippias of Elis in which Nestor makes a speech to Neoptolemus as to how to 
gain a good reputation (DK 86 A2).  The dialogues by the direct students of Socrates were 
called 'Socratic' by the ancients, not just because they were ethical (cf. ch. 4.i section B), but 
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because they also generally featured Socrates himself.   The surviving content of these 
mythic fragments is pure Antisthenic ethics.  We see Prometheus dispensing advice to 
Heracles on how best to conduct life (MD1a-c) and related fragments from a dialogue 
entitled Heracles are concerned about excellence (MD3-5).  Fragments MD6a-d, also from a 
dialogue entitled Heracles (possibly the same one) have Heracles again 'conversing about 
excellence', this time with Chiron.  
Antisthenes also presented his literary critical discussions via dialogues – the extant 
fragments deal primarily with Homer (TH4-14), and the remainder with tragedy (TH1-3).  
From the fragments that remain it is impossible to determine if whole dialogues centred 
around literary criticism or if that was only one element of broader discussions.  The 
fragments do reveal that Antisthenes had a structured methodology for approaching 
literary criticism (see ch. 5), and show that this field of discussion was aimed at advancing 
his ethical programme – as was all of his work.  Several elements of these discussions seem 
likely to have influenced later writers.  For example, Antisthenes' mention of the goal of 
immortality and the kinds of deeds that purify the soul (TH13b) may have provided 
inspiration for  Plato's celebrated discussions of the immortality of the soul in the Phaedo 
and book 10 of the Republic.  In another case, elements of his discussion of the Cyclopes 
seem to have been picked up on by generations of later writers (TH14a-o) – both Plato and 
Aristotle drew on the same passages on Cyclopean governance as Antisthenes in their own 
works.  But his most lasting contribution on this topic was the establishment of multiple 
connections between the Cyclopes and Hesiod's Golden Race.  By these arguments 
Antisthenes was able to demonstrate that there was something pure and uncorrupted in the 
nature of the Cyclopes that led to them being blessed with a bountiful existence.  This view 
of the Cyclopes' life became proverbial, as demonstrated by the considerable number of 
subsequent ancient authors who referred to versions of the Κυκλώπειὸν βίον 'Cyclopean 
lifestyle' – meaning to live in a state of natural abundance.
A group of fragments regarding the lifestyles of Alcibiades and Aspasia are sometimes 
termed 'biographical' fragments, and indeed a recent biographical volume of FGrH (IV.A.1, 
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1998) includes them as Antisthenes F 5-7.  It is interesting to note that Persaeus accuses 
Aeschines of plagiarising Antisthenes' works, and specifically mentions the Alcibiades as one 
of the examples.  In the commentary on CD18-20 it is noted that an identical passage about 
Pericles shedding tears at Aspasia's trial for impiety is found both in Antisthenes' fragment 
CD18 and in a passage from Aeschines – according to Plutarch (Per. 32.1-3).  This suggests 
not only that Aeschines also imitated Antisthenes' Aspasia, but that it was the content as 
well as the form that was copied – though to what extent exactly is impossible to tell from 
the fragments that remain of the two authors (Antisthenes CD18-20, Aeschines SSR VI A 59-
72).  Similarly, there is not enough information to determine what aspects of the remains of 
Aeschines' Alcibiades (SSR 41-54) may have been taken from Antisthenes.  For a start it is not 
obvious that any fragments of Antisthenes' Alcibiades are extant, as at least two of the 
fragments mentioning Alcibiades (CD9a-b) are said to come from his Cyrus.
Perhaps the most interesting thing emerging from the group of 'Contemporary Dialogue' 
fragments is the possibility that Antisthenes wrote a sort of 'constitutional' dialogue in 
which three aspirants for various thrones – Cyrus the Younger,211 Alcibiades, and Archelaus 
– discuss kingship.  Antisthenes is credited with producing dialogues entitled Cyrus (CD6-
9a; cf. DL 6.16, 18), Alcibiades (CD6), and Archelaus (CD3).  Persaeus pairs two of them in 
discussion – Little Cyrus and Alcibiades (CD6) – suggesting they were connected.  Diogenes 
Laertius lists the works in his catalogue: Cyrus, or, Concerning Kingship, (6.16) and Alcibiades,  
Archelaus, or, Concerning Kingship (6.18), suggesting that they are the discrete surviving 
portions of a series of related dialogues, or possibly one large dialogue that was later 
broken up and referred to by the persons featured in the separate parts.  Antisthenes' Ajax 
& Odysseus is an example of a work which is clearly one, but has been broken up by editors 
– ancient and modern – into a separate Ajax and Odysseus.  
There is no evidence that these three potential candidates for thrones ever did meet, 
however, historically they could have met, and all certainly shared a desire to rule.  Cyrus 
the Younger, in a campaign documented in Xenophon's Anabasis, attempted to overthrow 
211 The arguments for identifying Cyrus as Cyrus the Younger, rather than Cyrus the Great are made in the 
commentary to CD7 and CD9a-b.
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his brother King Artaxerxes II.  Alcibiades would probably have happily been king if he 
could (see commentary).  Archelaus actually became king of Macedonia, probably by 
murder (Pl. Gorg. 471).  If Antisthenes wrote such a dialogue we can speculate that the three 
aspirants engaged in discussion regarding the nature of kingship and the best way to 
manage the sovereignty – and possibly the best way to acquire it too.  The πόνος attributed 
to Cyrus in CD7 appears to suggest the 'hard work' involved in taking the throne, as 
Athenaeus seems to show awareness of Antisthenes' work by describing Cyrus the Younger 
as φιλόπονον when discussing his march inland against his brother (505a).  
There was already a tradition of quasi-historical dialogues on constitutional matters that 
was started with Herodotus who produced a dialogue with participants debating the merits 
of democracy, oligarchy, and monarchy (3.80-2).  The same author also included a dialogue 
between Solon and Croesus on eudaimonia (1.29-32).  Including characters in a dialogue who 
could have met, without necessitating direct historical evidence of them actually having 
done so, seems later to have become an accepted practice in this genre.  For example, 
Praxiphanes (early 3rd c. BC) wrote a dialogue, On History (F 18 Wehrli), in which a number 
of historical characters speak on behalf of their respective genres – Thucydides for History, 
Plato Comicus for comedy, Agathon for tragedy, Nikeratos and Choerilus for epic poetry, 
and Melanippides for lyric and dithyramb.  The fragment also mentions Archelaus 
suggesting that the dialogue took place at his court in Macedon (cf. Csapo & Wilson 
forthcoming).  Perhaps Praxiphanes modelled his dialogue after the style of a known 
precursor, such as a dialogue by Antisthenes with three aspirants to the throne (including 
Archelaus) discussing kingship.
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5   ANTISTHENES AS LITERARY CRITIC
As was the case for all of Antisthenes' writing, literary criticism was an avenue for 
advancing his ethical programme.  In his writing on tragedy, from the little evidence we 
have, it seems that Antisthenes was not slow to correct or 'improve' ethically inappropriate 
material, as he did with a line of Euripides (TH1).212  His approach to Homer's writing, 
however, was completely different.  Like Socrates,213 Antisthenes held Homer's works in 
high esteem, and as a result his critical method was aimed at preserving the integrity of the 
text against readings that might be described as unethical or even illogical.  In this pursuit 
Antisthenes created and deployed a range of interpretative strategies.  Saving the text by 
various methods, as he does, has a lasting impact on approaches to textual interpretation.    
A   Things as people think they are, as they really are, as they should be
Dio states that Antisthenes was the first to develop the theory that certain inconsistencies in 
Homer's text can be resolved by the fact that he has 'written some things as people think 
them to be, and others as they really are' (TH4).  Dio thereby credits Antisthenes with the 
genesis of an important strategy for interpreting Homer in order to preserve his text in its 
current form, without making it look like he is contradicting himself.  Stated another way, 
Antisthenes is saying that at times when Homer's depiction seems to conflict with people's 
impressions, it is because the poet is instead representing things as they really are, rather 
than as people say and think they are.  Dio notes that later Zeno more fully explained this 
theory and set it out step by step.
It seems also that Aristotle may owe a debt to Antisthenes here.214  In book 25 of the Poetics 
Aristotle discusses these theories that Dio attributed to Antisthenes, and to the two 
categories listed by Dio he adds a third (1460b8-11):
ἐπεὶ γάρ ἐστι µιµητὴς ὁ ποιητὴς ὡσπερανεὶ ζωγράφος ἤ τις ἄλλος εἰκονοποιός, ἀνάγκη 
212 cf. 5.iii below.
213 Xenophon represents Socrates using Homer as a moral and even practical guide (Mem. 1.2.58, 3.2.1).  In 
one of these cases (1.2.58) he was attacked by his accusers for apparently using Homer to justify 
tyrannical behaviour.
214 See also discussion by Richardson 1975, 78.
102
µιµεῖσθαι τριῶν ὄντων τὸν ἀριθµὸν ἕν τι ἀεί, ἢ γὰρ οἷα ἦν ἢ ἔστιν, ἢ οἷά φασιν καὶ δοκεῖ, ἢ οἷα 
εἶναι δεῖ.  
Since the poet, like a painter or any other likeness-maker, is a mimetic artist, he must represent, in 
any instance, one of three objects: the kind of things that were or are the case; the kind of things 
that people say and think; the kind of things that should be the case.
So in addition to  'how people think they are' and 'how things really are', Aristotle has a 
third category: 'how things should be'.  In this schema, the description of the three 
approaches said to be employed by the mimetic artist could perhaps be deemed realism, 
stereotyping, and idealism.  
Aristotle elaborates on part of this theory a little further on (Po. 25 1460b 33-4  TrGF 4 T 
53b):215
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐὰν ἐπιτιµᾶται ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ, ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως ὡς δεῖ, οἷον καὶ Σοφοκλῆς ἔφη αὐτὸς µὲν 
οἵους δεῖ ποιεῖν, Εὐριπίδην δὲ οἷον εἰσίν, ταύτῃ λυτέον.
In addition, if the criticism is that something is not realistic, perhaps it is as it should be instead, just as 
Sophocles said he created characters as they should be, but Euripides as they are – by this it must be 
solved.
Though Aristotle does not credit Antisthenes with this theory, Antisthenes' work appears to 
be the initial source of at least some of Aristotle's ideas here.  But even if he never expressed 
it as such, the fact that Antisthenes also had firmly in mind the third category listed by 
Aristotle – 'as things should be' – is amply demonstrated by his correction of a verse from 
Euripides (TH1).  Antisthenes clearly changes the line so as to move it from the category 'as 
people think things are' to the category 'as things should be'.
B   An Antisthenic methodology for literary criticism
One of the most arresting features of Antisthenes' fragments, as preserved in several scholia 
to the Iliad and Odyssey,216 is the demonstration of a clear methodological approach that he 
employs for literary criticism when dealing with Homer.  This methodology anticipates 
several of the strategies employed by post-Hellenistic Homeric commentators that are 
found in the exegetical scholia to manuscripts containing the Homeric epics.217  In 
215 cf. TrGF 4 T 172 which names Philoxenos instead of Euripides.
216 TH8, TH9, TH12, TH13, and TH14.
217 For an full survey of these techniques in the Iliad, a few of which Antisthenes foreshadows, see 
Richardson 1980.
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Antisthenes' eyes, Homer's texts simultaneously contain two meanings: the meaning of the 
words, and the meaning the text has because it is by Homer.  Whenever there is an apparent 
gap between these meanings Antisthenes has an interpretative methodology for explicating 
the texts.218  This methodology has three steps and adheres to the following pattern:
1. Problematise the literal meaning of the text, i.e. identify an inconsistency, 
generally of an ethical nature, often between different passages.
For example, Odysseus is a clever man, so why then did he not accept Calypso's 
offer of immortality (TH13)?  Polyphemus claims that the Cyclopes do not revere the 
gods, so why then do the gods give the Cyclopes good things (TH14)?
2. Locate a σημεῖον (indication) of the solution within the text (or more than one) 
that can be read to give consistency to the text.  
This is often an ethical meaning, for example Odysseus prefers Penelope over 
Calypso because Penelope is prudent (περίφρων, TH13c).  Or it could be another 
factor, such as the character of the person speaking.  For example when a statement 
implies that the Cyclopes are impious, and by extension perhaps Homer too, this is 
explained by the savage character of the speaker who makes the impious statement, 
i.e. Polyphemus (TH14c).
3. Reinforce this reading with other Homeric passages, i.e. 'clarify Homer by Homer' 
(Ὅμηρον ἐξ Ὁμήρου σαφηνίζειν).  
For example, the way in which Odysseus prefers Penelope because she is prudent is 
similar to the way in which the suitors prefer her over other women because of her 
excellence (ἀρετή, TH13c).  Or the fact that the Cyclopes are imperious 
(ὑπερφιάλων) is shown not to be negative, because the suitors use the same term of 
themselves in a positive sense (TH14c).
218 Similar to Todorov's explanation of the two meanings implicit in biblical texts – i.e. the literal meaning of 
the words, and the meaning it has because it is divinely inspired (1982, 98).
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This demonstrates a sophisticated method by which Antisthenes was able to produce and 
confirm a deep reading of the text.  Part of his expertise as a critic seems to have resided in 
his control of long poems that were usually encountered in oral performances. To be able to 
problematise the text and then locate an indication of the solution by ranging back-and-
forth in the poem was already to display a certain sort of sophistication, one not necessarily 
available to those who simply memorised extracts in grammar school or heard parts of the 
epics performed at various events.  Antisthenes' methodology culminates in an explanation 
of Homer by Homer, an approach that was to become widely employed (and lauded) in 
later centuries, especially by the Patristic exegetes.219  In particular, the practice of 'clarifying 
Homer by Homer' (Ὃµηρον ἐξ Ὁµήρου σαφηνίζειν) was later the trademark of the 
approach advocated by Alexandrian scholar, Aristarchus of Samothrace (c.216–144 BC), 
who believed that the poet was his own best interpreter.220  What is more, Aristarchus 
employed arguments used earlier by Antisthenes, showing that the Alexandrian scholar 
was aware of his predecessor's critical method and so possibly adopted his style directly.  
This is demonstrated in the introduction to the TH14 group of fragments under 'Attribution 
– TH14n-m', and the commentary in section Step 2d §4, where Aristarchus is found using 
material that is securely attributed to Antisthenes.  Much of this Homeric material is 
preserved in scholia derived from Porphyry (AD 234–c.305), who himself said: 'I, thinking it 
right to clarify Homer by Homer' (ἀξιῶν δὲ ἐγὼ Ὃµηρον ἐξ Ὁµήρου σαφηνίζειν, HQ 
1.56.3-4).  Porphyry probably drew heavily on Antisthenes' work because it already 
matched the style and form that he preferred to deploy himself.221
C   Antisthenes on Tragedy
Though the evidence for Antisthenes' approach to criticising Tragedy is meagre (three 
relevant fragments, TH1-3), one fragment offers direct evidence that Antisthenes' treatment 
of the tragedians differed markedly from his handling of Homer.  In TH1, Antisthenes is 
found correcting, or rather 'improving', the text of Euripides' Aeolus.  His criticism is still 
219 The study and confirmation of a text's internal consistency or coherence was a major focus of the early 
practitioners of philological exegesis (Todorov 1982, 140-1).
220 Lockwood 2003, 159.
221 For a discussion of Porphyry's stated methods see MacPhail 2011, 3-8.
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ethical, however, far from justifying or defending the text as he does with Homer, 
Antisthenes is apparently intent on adjusting tragic texts when necessary in order to make 
them ethically acceptable.  Another fragment of tragic criticism shows that Antisthenes had 
also discussed at least one other verse of Euripides, though neither the form nor the context 
is known (TH3).  
A further fragment mentions a collection of writings of Sophocles (Χρείας Σοφοκλέους) 
that appear to be extracts drawn from Antisthenes' works (TH2).  The tragic canon of 
Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides had obviously emerged by the time the three starred 
in Aristophanes' Frogs.222  Here in the late fifth or early fourth century we find Antisthenes 
likewise focussing on the work of two poets from the canon, and writing enough about one 
of them that it could be gathered into a collection.  Antisthenes' methodology appears to 
impact on Aristotle, as Sophocles and Euripides dominate the examples of tragic practice 
and style in the Poetics.  
D   Antisthenes' medical terminology
It actually seems likely that Antisthenes was trying to create a science of criticism – a τέχνη 
(system or method) for the analysis of texts.  Rather than producing wild allegorical 
readings, as did some of his precursors and contemporaries (cf. discussion below in section 
E on Theagenes' theory that the gods represented the various natural elements), 
Antisthenes was instead developing a controlled procedure for explicating texts.
Antisthenes' fondness for medical analogies is evident in a number of his fragments.   Some 
of the anecdotal material (though not always trustworthy) does imply that he saw himself 
as a sort of ethical doctor.  When someone enquired why he was striking his students so 
sharply, he said 'doctors do likewise with their patients'.223  He was also criticised for 
associating with base men and replied 'doctors associate with those who are diseased, but 
they do not fall ill'.224  As discussed in chapter 2.ii, excellence (ἀρετή) is the ethical major 
222 Nervegna 2014, 157-8.
223 DL 6.4 = DC 185, SSR 169.
224 DL 6.6 = DC 186, SSR 167; see also TH12 31-3 and commentary.
106
focus of Antisthenes' extant work and, most notably in this regard, Antisthenes' Ajax stated 
that 'no king competent to judge about excellence would entrust this to others any more 
than a good doctor would allow the diagnosis of illnesses by another'.225
It seems from his observable methodology in the Homeric scholia that Antisthenes, in his 
role as an 'ethical doctor', adopted a medical approach to textual 'diagnosis' and analysis.  
There is a vocabulary of terms that had medical meanings around the end of the fifth 
century which Antisthenes employs in his textual criticism.  These include, in particular, 
σηµεῖον, σηµαίνειν, ἐπισηµαίνεσθαι and σύστασις – words that were later absorbed into 
the common vocabulary of criticism, but which generally had quite a different meaning in 
the late fifth century.
σημεῖον, ἐπισημαίνεσθαι. The word σηµεῖον was used in medical terminology 
specifically to mean 'symptom' (LSJ s.v. A.II.4) – viz. a sign or indication that a doctor could 
read to produce a diagnosis.  The related verb ἐπισηµαίνειν, and the passive 
ἐπισηµαίνεσθαι, was used in late fifth century medical discussion with reference to disease 
meaning 'to bear a distinguishing mark' (LSJ s.v. A.2).  Antisthenes employs both these 
terms.  He uses σηµεῖον in the manner of a  'indication' (TH14a 6).  He also twice uses 
ἐπισηµαίνεσθαι with the sense 'to show an indication' (TH13c 3 & 8).  
σύστασις. Another medical term, σύστασις, meaning 'composition' or 'constitution' (LSJ 
s.v. B.II), is used by Antisthenes in a context of medical diagnosis (TH12 33), but also in a 
context of textual 'diagnosis' that, in Odysseus' case, reveals the 'constitution of his 
character' (τοῦ ἤθους σύστασιν, TH13d 5-6; cf. commentary at §7).  
Antisthenes employs a number of further technical terms that are not attested as definitely 
having medical meanings in the Classical period, though they did have them in the 
Hellenistic era.  These include ἔµφασις ('indication', TH13c 19), and ἐµφαίνειν ('to 
indicate', ΤΗ14e 3), as well as παριστάναι / παρίστασθαι ('to show / be shown by 
comparison', TH14g 2 & 4).
225 Aj.&Od. Aj.4.5 = DC 14, SSR 53.
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So, just as a doctor subjects a diseased body to a controlled set of examinations, and studies 
the symptoms in order to produce a sound diagnosis, it seems that Antisthenes was 
demonstrating that a skilled reader of Homer could subject the text to a series of tests and 
produce a sound reading.  By this approach to the text, Homer – speaking, for example, 
through Odysseus or Polyphemus – is not stating directly, but is putting forth 'indications' 
or 'symptoms' of what the text is really saying.  By accurately reading this evidence, 
Antisthenes is able to discern the deeper, literal message in order to grasp and report what 
he regarded to be the true meaning – and that meaning coincided with truth in Homer's 
texts was a given.226  This truth might forever remain obscure, however, for those who were 
unskilled at reading Homer.227
In the case of medical diagnosis, if the doctor's diagnosis and treatment is correct and the 
patient survives the illness and becomes healthy then the correct reading was made of the 
symptoms of the patient.  The patient's symptoms reveal unsound health, but then the 
correct treatment restores health to soundness.  In the case of Antisthenes' approach to 
textual analysis, an apparent contradiction in Homer suggests unsoundness, but with a 
correct reading of the text (in Antisthenes' view) a solution is provided by which Homer is 
proven to be ethically healthy and sound.  If Homer's text survives criticism intact, then the 
correct reading was made of the indications in the text.  In this sense, saving Homer's 
infallibility is the real aim of the exercise, but Antisthenes was content to regard the 
restoration of Homer's health as a final proof of the validity of his argument.
All of Antisthenes' literary critical ideas discussed here are very interesting and impact the 
whole history of textual interpretation.  For example, he anticipates both: the tradition of 
biblical exegesis whereby, since early times, biblical scholars and interpreters have used 
similar strategies to explain and preserve seemingly contradictory passages of the bible; 
and also the philological method of explaining Homer from Homer.  Regarding these 
approaches, Todorov states: 'Philology and patristic exegesis are thus not only two 
examples of interpretive strategies; they represent the two major types of possible 
226 Paraphrasing Todorov 1982, 137.
227 Cf. Todorov's discussion of Origen's views on interpreting scripture (1982, 110).
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strategies.'228  It appears, then, that Antisthenes played a major role in the development of 
the two methodologies for textual criticism that were to dominate over two millennia of 
literary exegesis, but in this regard he has been entirely unnoticed.
E   Antisthenes an allegorist?
The earliest recorded instances of allegorical interpretation of Homer are from the sixth 
century.  At least one passage of Pherecydes of Syros (floruit either c.580 BC, DK 7 A 2, or 
c.542 BC, DK 7 A 1) offers interpretations of Homeric verses concerning the gods that could 
be termed 'allegorical'.229   The next reported allegorist (and usually credited with being the 
first) is Theagenes of Rhegium who was active around 525 BC ('the time of Cambyses', DK 8 
A 1).  
A scholion quoting Porphyry gives an example of the sort of allegories that are used to 
defend Homer's 'detrimental' (ἀσύµφορος) and 'unseemly' (ἀπρεπής) representations of 
the gods (disapproving sentiments echoing those of Plato's Socrates who declared at 
Republic 378d that 'battles of the gods, such as Homer composed, must not be admitted to 
the city').  Porphyry lays out an example of an extensive allegorical interpretation of the 
battle between the gods at Iliad 20.67 that explains it as a battle between natural elements, 
adding that this type of apologetic strategy started with Theagenes.230  Modern scholars 
continue to label this approach as 'positive' allegoresis, i.e. 'claiming the poets' authority for 
the interpreter's own doctrines' (Trapp 2003, 64; cf. Tate 1934, 108).  That Theagenes 'wrote' 
about Homer is confirmed by an entry in the Suda (θ81 = DK 8 A 4), and that he was 
possibly a rhapsode, as well as an exegete, is suggested by a variant reading of Il. 1.381 
attributed to him (Sch. Il. 1.381 = DK 8 A 3).231
The next known proponent of allegorical interpretation, Anaxagoras (5th c.), introduced an 
ethical element into his interpretation.  Favorinus records that Anaxagoras was the first 'to 
make plain that the poetry of Homer was about excellence and justice' (τὴν Ὁµήρου 
228 Todorov 1982, 167.
229 DK 7 B 5; cf. Tate 1927, 214-5; Ford 1999, 37; but more cautiously Schibli 1990, 100 n.54.
230 Sch. B on Il. 20.67 Schrader 240.14-241.12 = DK 8 A 2.
231 For a full discussion of Theagenes and the beginnings of allegoresis see Ford 1999, and 2002, 67-89.
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ποίησιν ἀποφήνασθαι εἶναι περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ δικαιοσύνης; DL 2.11 = DK 59 A 1.11).  Thus 
Anaxagoras anticipates Antisthenes' basic presupposition but not his method.  No 
fragments of Anaxagoras' discussion in this vein are extant.  Metrodoros of Lampsacus, a 
friend of Anaxagoras, is the next pioneer of allegorical interpretation listed by Diogenes 
Laertius.232  He is also mentioned by Ion the rhapsode as being one of his greatest rivals (Pl. 
Ion 530d = DK 61 A 1) but is otherwise known only through a handful of further testimonia 
(DK 61 A 3-6).
It is not clear that any fragment of Antisthenes' is truly an allegorical interpretation of an 
Homeric verse.  It is possible to interpret one fragment as allegorical, but it is more in 
keeping with the rest of Antisthenes' commentary on Homer to view it as a quite literalistic 
reading of the text (TH8 and commentary).  A huge amount of ink has been spilt by 
scholars arguing over whether or not Antisthenes was an allegorist.  The majority of 
Giannantoni's discussion of Antisthenes' Homeric interpretation is devoted to this topic, 
and full details of the discussion, which seems to have blown out of all proportion, are best 
pursued there.233  In what seem the most sober assessments of the debate, Richardson 
commented 'I suspect that the battle may be over a phantom issue' (1975, 78), and Rankin 
rationally concludes: 'It is fair to attribute an allegorical element to some of his writings.  It 
is scarcely justified to classify him as an allegorist' (1986, 175).
232 DL 2.11 = DK 61 A 2; cf. Trapp 2003, 64.
233 SSR 4, 338-46, for bibliography see esp. n. 41.
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6   DATING AND TITLING OF ANTISTHENES' WORKS
A   Dating of the Works
As is the case with all the works of the Socratic authors, Plato included, there is very little 
evidence that allows confident dating.  But set out here is the evidence, largely indirect, that 
gives clues to the time Antisthenes was writing.
Euripides' Aeolus is parodied in Aristophanes' Clouds of 423 (first production, revised c. 417) 
and Peace of 421, and thus dates from 423 or earlier.  The same line from Aeolus that 
Antisthenes 'corrected' or 'improved' in TH1 is parodied by Aristophanes in Frogs (1474-5) 
of 405.  In Frogs he is bringing up an already infamous line and cleverly reworking it, 
suggesting Antisthenes' earlier commentary on it.  Aristophanes had already attacked the 
Aeolus in Clouds, but on that occasion it was the content – brother sister sexual relations – 
rather than the text he impugned.  If his play on the same line as THI is in fact revealing 
Antisthenes' influence, this would mean that the content of the fragment dates from the 
period 424-406.
Aristophanes' Clouds – originally produced 423, reworked 420-17 – contains a parody of 
Socratic dialogue.   As discussed earlier (ch. 4.i Section C, 'Aristophanes'), this suggests that 
there was Socratic dialogue in writing before this time, as it is unlikely that such authors 
would have picked up and continued using a style of representation of Socrates that 
contributed to his death, unless that was already the established form.  Antisthenes, 
probably born prior to 451/50 (ch. 1.i) appears to be the only author of Socratic dialogues 
who was old enough to be producing such material at the time – the others were born in the 
420s.
The 'Melian Dialogue' in Thucydides has been read as critique of Socratic dialogic method 
(ch. 4.i, Section C, 'Thucydides').  Thucydides was in exile from 424-404, so this also 
suggests the possibility that he learnt of such activities through reading texts of Socratic 
dialogue that were circulating in that period.
111
Antisthenes' dialogues involving Archelaus (CD3; cf. commentary on CD6-8) are unlikely 
to have been written before the time he became king of Macedonia (413-399), but could date 
from any time after 413.
Plato's Menexenus can be fairly certainly dated to sometime around 386, as in it Aspasia and 
Socrates are aware of the King's Peace of 386 BC (Kahn 1996, 28).  Given that the portrayal 
of Aspasia seems to reflect aspects of Aeschines' Aspasia Kahn suggests that Aeschines' 
Aspasia was written sometime in the early 390s or late 380s, and that his Alcibiades was 
written around the same time.  He also thinks that both of Antisthenes' dialogues of 
corresponding names to be earlier (1996, 29).  This is surely correct and agrees with 
Persaeus' assertion that Aeschines plagiarised Antisthenes' Alcibiades, and the evidence that 
he did so with the Aspasia as well (discussed in the commentary to CD17).
Kahn is almost certainly accurate in asserting: 'The dominant position of Plato, both as an 
author and as a leader of a school, was only established later, probably after 385 BC (1996, 
5).  This would suggest that Antisthenes' parody of Plato in Sathōn (CD4a-c) comes from the 
380s or later – after Plato had made his name.
Antisthenes was still writing in 471 or soon thereafter, as his comments on the indecent 
delight shown by the Thebans following the battle of Leuctra of 471 are preserved (Plu. Lyc. 
30.7 = DC 171, SSR 10).
B   Date to which works were extant
Many of Antisthenes' fragments are preserved only in the form of pithy aphorisms and 
memorable anecdotes, and a large portion of these seem to have been passed down as 
extracts and entries in various compilations.  This is especially clear in the cases where there 
are four, five or six extant versions of a fragment found in compilations from several 
different eras (e.g. CD14a-f, MD6a-d).  Sometimes, however, there is evidence in the 
testimonia and in the fragments themselves that suggests that the author was in the 
presence of complete works of Antisthenes', rather than extracts.  In some cases this is 
indicated only by the fact that the fragments contain no information that is particularly 
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memorable or worthy of an anecdote.  In such a case, especially if the text seems to have 
been selected to suit a specific argument an author is making, it can be a sign that the 
author was picking and choosing material from a complete work of Antisthenes he had in 
front of him rather than from a volume of extracts.  The most suggestive evidence, 
categorised by era, is laid out below.
First century BC
In a letter to Atticus Cicero declares that the Kursas pleased him, as did other works of 
Antisthenes (CD9), providing evidence that whole dialogues were still in circulation 
around the mid first century BC.  This is confirmed by Cicero's near contemporary, 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who is able to directly compare Thucydides' style against 
Antisthenes' (among others, De Thuc. 51.941 = DC 9, SSR 49). 
Second century AD
In the second half of the second century AD Aelius Aristides provides reasonably strong  
evidence that he was reading from a complete work (Sy10).  Aelius quotes a passage of a 
book he was reading that was by Antisthenes.  The passage is not made up of any 
particularly apophthegmatic or memorable statements and it does not appear anywhere 
else.  Instead the passage is very particular to Aelius' personal circumstances, containing, as 
it did, advice he felt he could use as part of his rehabilitation.  In addition, Aelius states the 
title of the work (as well as he could recall it in his slightly hallucinatory state): Concerning 
Use – The Crown Lover – a title not known from other sources.  All of this points to the fact 
that he was reading a work of Antisthenes first hand.  Writing around the same time as 
Aelius, Phrynichus rates Antisthenes amongst the best proponents of the pure Attic style 
and is able to comment on the genuineness of two works – Concerning Cyrus and Concerning 
Odysseus (apud Phot. Bibl. 101 b9 = DC 10, SSR 50) – suggesting that he was able to assess 
them himself, first hand.
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Third century AD
Porphyry, writing in the late late third century AD, preserves large tracts of one or more 
Antisthenic dialogues (TH12-14).  Though it is possible that Porphyry was drawing 
material from extracts, the length of the passages he cites and the fact that they are not 
particularly aphoristic, and barely replicated by other authors,234 suggests that he was 
reading and selecting from whole works of Antisthenes.
Fourth century AD
In the middle of the fourth century Julian discusses Antisthenes' works in three related 
fragments (MD14-16).   The content of MD14 and MD15 imply that Julian was familiar 
with much of Antisthenes' work, but that sort of information could have also been gathered 
from compilations.  In MD16, however, he recommends writing following the 'Antisthenian 
model', which implies that a model – i.e. a work – was extant to follow.  He also mentions 
Antisthenic writings implying that they included the figures Perseus and Theseus, who are 
otherwise known of from Antisthenes' works.  Similarly Themistius, writing in the late 
fourth century (MD1a-c), relates a passage of dialogue unknown from other sources, 
suggesting that he was reading it directly from a work of Antisthenes.  It thus seems likely 
that both Julian and Themistius were in the presence of whole works of Antisthenes in the 
mid to late fourth century AD.
C   Titles of the Works
The titles of all of Antisthenes' works are uncertain.  Diogenes Laertius provides a very long 
list of titles of Antisthenes' works (6.15-18).  Other writers, however, report titles that only 
partly overlap with these, or are altogether different.  Generally, it is not known if 
Antisthenes titled the works himself, or if not, when they were titled and by whom.  The 
exception is the Sathō, which Antisthenes seems to have titled himself (CD4).  Also 
unknown is whether the titles that have survived represent whole works, or excerpted 
234 Just two corresponding fragments from Aristarchus are preserved via Apollonius Sophistes, TH14m-n.
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portions of works, or both.  Some works seem to also have subtitles, though again it is 
unclear whether these were Antisthenes' or were applied at some later point.  
The received wisdom is that prose works from the fifth and early fourth centuries BC were 
usually untitled.235   Most book titles of these period are thought to have been applied by 
the Alexandrian librarians who were responsible for establishing and standardising the 
texts of the Classical period and were also thought to have been responsible for breaking up 
longer works into books – e.g. Herodotus and Thucydides.  With a title they could mark the 
outside of each scroll to identify its contents – whether it be the name of a principal 
interlocutor in a dialogue or the opening words of the text for other types of prose works.  
With Attic drama, however, it is accepted that titles of tragedies and comedies were entered 
for competition (Maehler 2003, 251).  It is not clear why, when various poetic works were 
being given titles, prose writers would produce works without naming them.  And there is 
actually evidence to suggest that they were in fact entitling their own works.  Plato, for 
example, refers in Politicus to the title of another of his works, The Sophist (ἐν τῷ Σοφιστῇ, 
Plt. 284b; Maehler 2012, 251).  Hinds claims (2012, 252) that the first writer known to have 
divided his own text into books is the fourth century historian Ephorus (DS 5.1.4, 16.76.5).  
But Baldwin has mounted a fairly persuasive argument that Herodotus in fact divided his 
own work into books and entitled those divisions himself (1984, 31-33).  
Antisthenes' works regularly have alternate titles or subtitles, which is also seen in Plato's 
works – for example his Alcibiades I is also known as On the Nature of Man: Maieutic.  In 
some cases it seems that separate titles listed by Diogenes Laertius are actually the title and 
subtitle of the same work.  For example, in Diogenes' list there appears Περὶ λέξεως ἢ περὶ 
χαρακτήρων, Concerning Diction, or, Concerning Character Types (6.15), immediately 
followed by Αἴας ἢ Αἴαντος λόγος, Ajax or Speech of Ajax and Ὀδυσσεὺς ἢ περὶ Ὀδυσσέως, 
Odysseus or Concerning Odysseus (treated in this thesis as one, i.e. Ajax & Odysseus).  The 
speeches given by Ajax and Odysseus are clearly an illustration of diction and character 
235 Maehler 2012, 251, Jacoby 1949, 82; and see Baldwin's discussion, including more references (1984, 31-2).
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type in action and thus they should probably be understood as an alternative title or 
subtitle of the same work.
In short, the whole area of ancient book titles is disputed and in need of further 
investigation.  It does not seem out of the question, however, that Antisthenes was titling 
his own works.  These may well have been divided later and the divisions given new titles 
to represent the content of the extract – in similar fashion to the way that we refer to 
Thucydides' 'Melian Dialogue' or Herodotus' 'Constitutional Debate'.  
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7   A NOTE ON THE APPROACH TO THE TEXTS
Texts
The texts of the fragments are taken in each case from the best available edition for each 
source author.  This is generally, but not always, the most recently completed edition.  My 
own emendations to the text, made in consultation with other editions and articles, or 
purely in order to make the texts translatable, are noted in the apparatus criticus.
Line numbering
For texts of less than five lines, no line numbering has been included.  For texts of five lines 
or more, they have been renumbered for this edition.  For ease of reference, wherever it was 
convenient, the line structure of the source text from the edition it was taken has been 
retained.  However, where this was too awkward or visually unappealing, the lines have 
been restructured as well.  For a few difficult-to-navigate texts, the original line numbers 
are also printed in minuscule print along with the new numbering.
Fragment numbers
The fragments under discussion in this thesis have been re-categorised, reordered, and 
renumbered accordingly.  Several fragments are attributed to Antisthenes here for the first 
time. One of the issues that comes with writing a commentary on a portion of the fragments 
of a fragmentary author is that the fragments not under direct discussion, and so not 
renumbered, must be referred to by the numbering system of a previous editor or editors.  
Therefore fragments that are not under direct discussion but which are referred to in this 
thesis, are referred to by the numbers of either or both of the most recent complete editions 
of Antisthenes' fragments (not all of the fragments are in both the editions).
For the 1966 edition of Fernanda Decleva Caizzi, Antisthenis Fragmenta, the fragments are 
referred to by 'DC' and the fragment number, e.g. DC 87.  For the 1990 edition of Gabriele 
Giannantoni, Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquae (SSR), the fragments are referred to by 'SSR' 
and the fragment number, e.g. SSR 54.  Giannantoni's volume also includes individual 
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author codes, for example Antisthenes' code is 'V A'.  This has been left out of the references 
to Antisthenes' fragments here for the sake of concision.  On the odd occasion where 
another author from Giannantoni's SSR is referred to, the full abbreviated reference will be 
supplied, e.g. SSR V B = Diogenes of Sinope.  But whenever SSR alone is used, it always 
refers to a fragment of Antisthenes.
Transliteration
For all reasonably well known figures (viz. they appear in the OCD4), the common 
Latinised forms of the names are used, but less well known persons are Hellenised 
following a consistent convention.  Thus 'Socrates' is the famous fifth century Athenian 
philosopher, but 'Sokrates' would be applied to various namesakes who never achieved 
sufficient notoriety to make the OCD's encyclopaedic shortlist.
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TEXTS AND TRANSLATIONS
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DIALOGICA VARIA
SOCRATIC DIALOGUES
SD1  Theopompus in Athenaeus 11.508c-d Kaibel = DC 4, SSR 42, FGrH 115 F 259.
Theopompus of Chios, born 378/7 BC, Greek historian and composer of epideictic speeches, renowned in antiquity for 
his censoriousness.  Athenaeus of Naucratis, fl. c. AD 200, authored Δειπνοσοφισταί ('The Learned Banqueters'). 
Aristippus of Cyrene, c. 430-355, reportedly the first student of Socrates to charge for his teaching.  Bryson of 
Heraclea, c. 400-340, sophist criticised by Aristotle, little further is known.
καὶ γὰρ Θεόποµπος ὁ Χῖος ἐν τῷ κατὰ τῆς Πλάτωνος διατριβῆς 'τοὺς πολλούς', φησι, 
'τῶν διαλόγων αὐτοῦ ἀχρείους καὶ ψευδεῖς ἄν τις εὕροι· ἀλλοτρίους δὲ τοὺς πλείους, 
ὄντας ἐκ τῶν Ἀριστίππου διατριβῶν, ἐνίους δὲ κἀκ τῶν Ἀντισθένους, πολλοὺς δὲ 
κἀκ τῶν Βρύσωνος τοῦ Ἡρακλεώτου'.
And in fact Theopompus of Chios, in his treatise Against Plato's Teachings, says that 'one 
would find that most of his (Plato's) dialogues are useless and fraudulent.  The majority 
are by other authors, and are from the teachings of Aristippus, and some from 
Antisthenes' works, and a number from the works of Bryson of Heraclea'.
SD2  Panaetius in Diogenes Laertius 2.64 Dorandi = DC 5, Panaetius F 126 van Straaten.
Panaetius of Rhodes, c. 185-109 BC, was head of the Stoic school in Athens from 129 BC.  Diogenes Laertius, 
probable floruit first half 3rd c. AD.  Aeschines Socraticus, c. 425-375 BC, author of seven Socratic dialogues.  
πάντων µέντοι τῶν Σωκρατικῶν διαλόγων Παναίτιος ἀληθεῖς εἶναι δοκεῖ τοὺς 
Πλάτωνος, Ξενοφῶντος, Ἀντισθένους, Αἰσχίνου.
Of all the Socratic dialogues, Panaetius considered the genuine ones to be those of Plato, 
Xenophon, Antisthenes, and Aeschines.
SD3  Theopompus apud Diogenes Laertius 6.14 Dorandi = DC 3, SSR 22, FGrH 115 F 295, 
Eudociae Violarium 96 Flach.
τοῦτον µόνον ἐκ πάντων τῶν  Σωκρατικῶν Θεόποµπος ἐπαινεῖ καί φησι δεινόν 
τ᾽εἶναι καὶ δι᾽ ὁµιλίας ἐµµελοῦς ὑπαγαγέσθαι πάνθ᾽ ὁντινοῦν. δῆλον δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν 
συγγραµµάτων κἀκ τοῦ Ξενοφῶντος Συµποσίου.
Theopompus praised him (Antisthenes) alone of all the Socratics, saying that he was 
skilful, especially at leading on absolutely anyone at all to conclusions for his 
(Antisthenes') own advantage by means of smooth discourse.  And this is clear from his 
writings and from Xenophon's Symposion.
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SD4 Herodicus in Athenaeus 5.216b-c Kaibel = DC 33 & 129, SSR 200, Stesichorus PMG F 
192 (= Pl. Phdr. 243a).
Herodicus of Babylon, prob. late 2nd c. BC, wrote Κωµῳδούµενοι ('People ridiculed in comedy'), Σύµµικτα 
ὑποµνήµατα ('Miscellaneous notes'), Πρὸς τὸν φιλοσωκράτην ('Against the friend of Socrates' i.e. Plato). 
Athenaeus of Naucratis, fl. c. AD 200, authored Δειπνοσοφισταί ('The Learned Banqueters'). 
καὶ Ἀντισθένης δ᾽ ὁ Σωκρατικὸς περὶ τῶν ἀριστείων τὰ αὐτὰ τῷ Πλάτωνι 
ἱστορεῖ. 'οὔκ ἐστιν δ᾽ ἔτυµος ὁ λόγος οὗτος' (Stesich. F 192). χαρίζεται γὰρ καὶ 
ὁ κύων οὗτος πολλὰ τῷ Σωκράτει· ὅθεν οὐδετέρῳ αὐτῶν δεῖ πιστεύειν σκοπὸν
 ἔχοντας Θουκυδίδην. ὁ γὰρ Ἀντισθένης καὶ προσεπάγει τῇ ψευδογραφίᾳ 
λέγων οὕτως· 5
(ξένος) 'ἡµεῖς δὲ ἀκούοµεν κἀν τῇ πρὸς Βοιωτοὺς µάχῃ τὰ ἀριστεῖά σε λαβεῖν.'
(Σωκράτης) 'εὐφήµει ὦ ξένε· Ἀλκιβιάδου τὸ γέρας, οὐκ ἐµόν.'
(ξένος) 'σοῦ γε δόντος, ὡς ἡµεῖς ἀκούοµεν.'
Antisthenes the Socratic recounts the same things as in Plato about the prize for valour.  
'But this is not a true account' (Stesich. F 192).  Because this dog shows great favouritism 
to Socrates; wherefore one who holds Thucydides as a guide should believe neither of 
the two of them.  Because Antisthenes even goes so far as to say, in his false account, the 
following:  
(Stranger) 'But we hear that also in the battle against the Boeotians you received the 
prize for valour.' 
(Socrates) 'Be silent, Stranger!  The honour is Alcibiades', not mine.' 
(Stranger) 'Because you (Socrates) awarded it, so we hear.'
SD5  Plutarch, Vita Alcibiades 7.5 194f-195a Ziegler = SSR 202.
Plutarch, c. AD 45-125, author of the parallel lives, and moralising, ethical, philosophical treatises.
ἐγίνετο µὲν οὖν τῷ δικαιοτάτῳ λόγῳ Σωκράτους τὸ ἀριστεῖον· ἐπεὶ δ᾽ οἱ στρατηγοὶ 
διὰ τὸ ἀξίωµα τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ σπουδάζοντες ἐφαίνοντο περιθεῖναι τὴν δόξαν, ὁ 
Σωκράτης βουλόµενος αὔξεσθαι τὸ φιλότιµον ἐν τοῖς καλοῖς αὐτοῦ, πρῶτος 
ἐµαρτύρει καὶ παρεκάλει στεφανοῦν ἐκεῖνον καὶ διδόναι τὴν πανοπλίαν.
So by the most just account, the prize for valour fell to Socrates. But since the generals 
were obviously eager to confer the honour upon Alcibiades, on account of his rank, 
Socrates, desiring to increase his (Alcibiades') love of distinction in the eyes of the 
nobility, was the first to bear witness, and encouraged them to crown him, and bestow 
the panoply on him.
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SD6  Aelian, Varia Historia 2.11 Dilts = DC 167, SSR 16.
Claudius Aelianus, c. AD 165-235, his Varia Historia ('Miscellany') preserves anecdotes.
Σωκράτης ἰδὼν κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν τριάκοντα τοὺς ἐνδόξους ἀναιρουµένους 
καὶ τοὺς βαθύτατα πλουτοῦντας ὑπὸ τῶν τυράννων ἐπιβουλευοµένους, 
Ἀντισθένει φασὶ περιτυχόντα εἰπεῖν· 'µή τί σοι µεταµέλει ὅτι µέγα καὶ σεµνὸν οὐδὲν 
ἐγενόµεθα ἐν τῷ βίῳ καὶ τοιοῦτοι οἵους ἐν τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ τοὺς µονάρχους ὁρῶµεν, 
Ἀτρέας τε ἐκείνους καὶ Θυέστας καὶ Ἀγαµέµνονας καὶ Αἰγίσθους; 5
οὗτοι µὲν γὰρ ἀποσφαττόµενοι καὶ ἐκτραγῳδούµενοι καὶ πονηρὰ δεῖπνα
δειπνοῦντες καὶ ἐσθίοντες ἑκάστοτε ἐκκαλύπτονται· οὐδεὶς δὲ οὕτως ἐγένετο 
τολµηρὸς οὐδὲ ἀναίσχυντος τραγῳδίας ποιητής, ὥστε ἐσαγαγεῖν ἐς δρᾶµα 
ἀποσφαττόµενον χορόν.' 
2 τοὺς βαθύτατα corr. anon. (1733)   :   βαρύτατα MSS     7 δειπνοῦντες MSS   :   δειπνίζοντες Albini     9 χορόν Holst.   :  
χοῖρον MSS   :   χειρώνακτα Casaub.   :   τὸν Ἷρον Faber
Socrates saw during the rule of The Thirty that men of high reputation were being seized 
and the most exceedingly wealthy were being plotted against by the tyrants, and it is 
reported that having met up with Antisthenes he said:
'Surely you do not regret that we have not become at all great or revered in life like the 
monarchs we see in tragedy, those Atreuses, Thyesteses, Agamemnons and Aegisthuses?  
For they were revealed on each occasion being slaughtered, being made tragic, and 
preparing and eating awful feasts.  But no poet of tragedy was so audacious and 
shameless as to introduce to a drama a chorus being slaughtered.'
SD7  Arrian, Epicteti Dissertationes 1.17.10-12 Schenkl = DC 38, SSR 160.
Arrian, AD c.86-160, prolific author, wrote down the discourses of the Stoic philosopher Epictetus c. AD 108.  Zeno of 
Citium, c.335-263 BC, founder of the Stoic school.  Cleanthes, c.330-230BC, succeeded Zeno as head of the Stoa.  
Chrysippus, c.280-c.205 BC, succeeded Cleanthes as head of the Stoa, was particularly focussed on logic.   This passage 
of Arrian is from one of Epictetus' discussions of Chrysippus, from whom the lemma derives.
'καὶ τὰ λογικὰ ἄκαρπά ἐστι'.  καὶ περὶ τοῦτο µὲν ὀψόµεθα. εἰ δ᾽ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο δοίη 
τις, ἐκεῖνο ἀπαρκεῖ ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων ἐστὶ διακριτικὰ καὶ ἐπισκεπτικὰ, καὶ ὡς ἄν τις 
εἴποι, µετρητικὰ καὶ στατικά. τίς λέγει ταῦτα; µόνος Χρύσιππος καὶ Ζήνων καὶ 
Κλεάνθης; Ἀντισθένης δ᾽ οὐ λέγει; καὶ τίς ἐστιν ὁ γεγραφὼς ὅτι 'ἀρχὴ παιδεύσεως ἡ 
τῶν ὀνοµάτων ἐπίσκεψις'; Σωκράτης δ᾽ οὐ λέγει; καὶ περὶ τίνος γράφει Ξενοφῶν ὅτι 
ἤρχετο ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ὀνοµάτων ἐπισκέψεως, τί σηµαίνει ἕκαστον; 
'Logic also is without fruit.'  We will take a look at this too.  So, even if one should grant 
this, it is sufficient that it (logic) is able to discriminate and examine other things, and, as 
one might say, is skilled in measuring and skilled in weighing things.  Who says this?  
Only Chrysippos, Zeno and Cleanthes?  But does Antisthenes not say so?  And who is it 
who wrote 'the beginning of education is the examination of names'?  Did Socrates not 
say so?  And about whom does Xenophon write, that he began from the examination of 
names – what each signifies?
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CONTEMPORARY DIALOGUES 
CD1  Diogenes Laertius 6.1 Dorandi = DC 7, SSR 11, Eudociae Violarium 96 Flach.
Diogenes Laertius, probable floruit first half 3rd c. AD.  From the opening of his account of the Cynics; relating 
Antisthenes' background.
οὗτος κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς µὲν ἥκουσε Γοργίου τοῦ ῥήτορος· ὅθεν τὸ ῥητορικὸν εἶδος ἐν τοῖς 
διαλόγοις ἐπιφέρει καὶ µάλιστα ἐν τῇ Ἀληθείᾳ καὶ τοῖς Προτρεπτικοῖς.
In the beginning he (Antisthenes) was a student of Gorgias the orator – from which he 
takes the rhetorical style he employs in his dialogues, and especially in his Truth and 
Protreptic Dialogues.
CD2  Athenaeus 14.656f Kaibel = DC 16 & 17, SSR 62 & 63.
Athenaeus of Naucratis, fl. c. AD 200, authored Δειπνοσοφισταί ('The Learned Banqueters').  This fragment is 
from a passage listing a series of quotes from various authors illustrating the use of the diminutive form δελφάκια.
Ἀντισθένης δ᾽ ἐν Φυσιογνωµονικῷ· 'καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖναι τὰ δελφάκια πρὸς βίαν 
χορτάζουσιν'. καὶ ἐν Προτρεπτικῷ δέ· 'ἀντὶ δελφακίων τρέφεσθαι'. 
Antisthenes in his Physignomy says: 'For indeed those women force-feed the piglets (or 
fatten the piglets by force).'  Also in his Protreptic Dialogue: 'being reared (or fed) instead 
of piglets.'
CD3  Herodicus in Athenaeus 5.220d Kaibel = DC 42 & 43, SSR 203 & 204. 
Herodicus of Babylon, prob. late 2nd c. BC, wrote Κωµῳδούµενοι ('People Ridiculed in Comedy'), Σύµµικτα 
ὑποµνήµατα ('Miscellaneous Notes'), Πρὸς τὸν φιλοσωκράτην ('Against the Friend of Socrates' i.e. Plato).  
This passage is from an extended discussion by Herodicus of Antisthenes' works.
ὁ δὲ Πολιτικὸς αὐτοῦ διάλογος ἁπάντων καταδροµὴν περιέχει τῶν Ἀθήνῃσιν 
δηµαγωγῶν.  ὁ δ᾽ Ἀρχέλαος Γοργίου τοῦ ῥήτορος.
His (Antisthenes') dialogue The Statesman contains an invective against all the 
demagogues in Athens.  And The Archelaus contains an attack on Gorgias the orator.
CD4a  Herodicus in Athenaeus 5.220d-e Kaibel; = DC 37a, SSR 147.
Part of the same passage of text as CD3.
καὶ Πλάτωνα δὲ µετονοµάσας Σάθωνα ἀσυρῶς καὶ φορτικῶς, τὸν ταύτην ἔχοντα 
τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν διάλογον ἐξέδωκε κατ᾽ αὐτοῦ. 
And he (Antisthenes) lewdly and vulgarly called Plato by a new name – Sathōn ('Fat-
cock') – and he published a dialogue bearing this title against him.
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CD4b  Herodicus in Athenaeus 11.507a Kaibel = DC 37b, SSR 147.
ἀλλὰ µὴν οὐδ᾽ Ἀντισθένη ἐπαινῶ· καὶ γὰρ καὶ οὗτος πολλοὺς εἰπὼν κακῶς οὐδ᾽ 
αὐτοῦ τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἀπέσχετο, ἀλλὰ καλέσας αὐτὸν φορτικῶς Σάθωνα τὸν ταύτην 
ἔχοντα τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν διάλογον ἐξέδωκεν. 
But I certainly do not even praise Antisthenes; since in fact he spoke ill of many men, not 
even sparing Plato himself, but rather he vulgarly called him Sathōn ('Fat-cock') and 
published a dialogue bearing this title.
CD4c  Diogenes Laertius 3.35 Dorandi = DC 36, SSR 148.
ἔγραψε διάλογον κατὰ Πλάτωνος Σάθωνα ἐπιγράψας· ἐξ οὗ διετέλουν ἀλλοτρίως 
ἔχοντες πρὸς ἀλλήλους.
He (Antisthenes) wrote a dialogue against Plato entitled Sathōn ('Fat-cock'); from this 
time they maintained a distant relationship with each other.
CD5  Cicero, Ad Atticum 12.38a Shackelton Bailey = DC 13, SSR 84.
 ΚΥΡΣΑΣ mihi sic placuit ut cetera Antisthenis, hominis acuti magis quam eruditi.
ΚΥΡΣΑΣ ΩΖ(b)λ   :   κύρβας Ζβ   :   Κῦρος Β´ SB
The Kursas pleased me as did the other works of Antisthenes, a man more keen-minded 
than refined.
Alcibiades and Cyrus
CD6  Persaeus in Diogenes Laertius 2.60-61 Dorandi = DC 6, SSR 43, SVF I F 457 = FGrH 584 
F 9.
Persaeus of Citium, c. 306-c.243 BC, a Stoic who was brought up by and then succeeded Zeno.  Wrote on kingship, 
constitutional matters, criticisms of Plato's Laws, and dialogues.  Aeschines Socraticus, c. 425-375 BC, author of seven  
Socratic dialogues.  Pasiphon , 3rd c. BC, author of dialogues.  The following fragment is from a discussion of Aeschines'  
dialogues in Diogenes' 'Life of Aeschines'.
διαλόγους [ … ] καὶ τῶν ἑπτὰ [δὲ] τοὺς πλείστους Περσαῖός φησι Πασιφῶντος εἶναι 
τοῦ Ἐρετρικοῦ, εἰς τοὺς Αἰσχίνου δὲ κατατάξαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν Ἀντισθένους τόν τε 
µικρὸν Κῦρον καὶ τὸν Ἡρακλέα τὸν ἐλάσσω καὶ Αλκιβιάδην καὶ τοὺς τῶν ἄλλων 
διεσκευώρηται.
διαλόγους [ … ] two unrelated lines intervening     [δὲ] del. Kenn.     διεσκευώρηται Susem.   :   δὲ ἐσκευώρηται MSS
And Persaeus (SVF I F 457) says that of these seven dialogues (of Aeschines), the majority 
are by Pasiphon, of the school of Eretria, but he placed them among the works of 
Aeschines.  And moreover, he (Aeschines) revised works of Antisthenes, including the 
Little Cyrus, the Lesser Heracles, and the Alcibiades, as well as the works of other authors. 
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CD7  Diogenes Laertius 6.2 Dorandi = DC 19, SSR 97.
This fragment is from Diogenes' 'Life of Antisthenes'.
καὶ ὅτι ὁ πόνος ἀγαθὸν συνέστησε διὰ τοῦ µεγάλου Ἡρακλέους καὶ τοῦ Κύρου, τὸ 
µὲν ἀπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων ἑλκύσας. 
Also, that hard work is a good thing, he (Antisthenes) proved through his Big Heracles 
and his Cyrus, having drawn the one paradigm from the Greeks, and the other from the 
barbarians.
CD8  Phrynichus in Photius, Bibliotheca 101 b9 Bekker = DC 10, SSR 50.
Phrynichus of Bithynia, fl. c. AD 170-190, an Atticising Greek grammarian who wrote books on literary style. Photius  
of Byzantium, c. AD 810-893, Patriarch of Constantinople, scholarly author of Βιβλιοθήκη, Library (c. 876), a mini-
history of Greek literature, and a lexicon that drew entries from several earlier lexica.
εἰλικρινοῦς δὲ καὶ καθαροῦ καὶ Ἀττικοῦ λόγου κανόνας καὶ σταθµὰς καὶ 
παράδειγµά φησιν ἄριστον Πλάτωνά τε καὶ Δηµοσθένην … καὶ Ἀντισθένην µετὰ 
τῶν γνησίων αὐτοῦ δύο λόγων, τοῦ περὶ Κύρου καὶ τοῦ περὶ Ὀδυσσείας.
He (Phrynichus) said that the best standard measure and paradigm of undiluted and 
pure Attic writing is Plato and Demosthenes … also Antisthenes – with two of his 
genuine works, his Concerning Cyrus, and his Concerning the Odyssey.
Alcibiades
CD9a  Herodicus in Athenaeus 5.220c Kaibel = DC 29a, SSR 141.
Herodicus of Babylon, prob. late 2nd c. BC, wrote Κωµῳδούµενοι (People Ridiculed in Comedy), Σύµµικτα 
ὑποµνήµατα (Miscellaneous notes), Πρὸς τὸν φιλοσωκράτην (Against the friend of Socrates i.e. Plato). From 
an extended passage of Herodicus' discussing Antisthenes' works.
Ἀντισθένης δ᾽ ἐν θατέρῳ τῶν Κύρων κακολογῶν Ἀλκιβιάδην καὶ παράνοµον εἶναι 
λέγει καὶ εἰς γυναῖκας καὶ εἰς τὴν ἄλλην δίαιταν. συνεῖναι γάρ φησιν αὐτὸν καὶ 
µητρὶ καὶ θυγατρὶ καὶ ἀδελφῇ ὡς Πέρσας. 
Antisthenes, in the second of his Cyruses, maligns Alcibiades and says he was perverse 
both as regards women and as regards his mode of living in other respects.  Because, he 
(Antisthenes) says, he (Alcibiades) had sex with his mother, and his daughter, and his 
sister, like Persians do.
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CD9b  Eustathius, Homer 'Odyssey' 10.7 Stallbaum 1645.11-13 = DC 29b, SSR 141.
Eustathius, archbishop of Thessalonica c. AD 1175, commentator on Homer, Pindar, et al.. Odyssey 10.7 is a passage 
describing the manner in which legendary king Aeolus gave his six daughters as wives to his six sons.
Ἀλκιβιάδην µέντοι παρεξηυληµένον ἐν τῷ ἄλλως βιοῦν ἐξωλέστερον ἔσκωψε, φησιν 
Ἀντισθένης παράνοµον εἶναι καὶ εἰς γυναῖκας καὶ εἰς τὴν ἄλλην δίαιταν, συνεῖναι 
γὰρ καὶ µητρὶ καὶ θυγατρὶ καὶ ἀδελφῇ ὡς τοὺς Πέρσας. 
He (Antisthenes) indeed rather caustically mocked Alcibiades who played himself to the 
point of exhaustion in his pointless way of life, Antisthenes said he was perverse both as 
regards women and as regards his mode of living in other respects, because he had sex 
with his mother, and his daughter, and his sister, like the Persians do.
CD10  Satyrus in Athenaeus 12.534c Kaibel = DC 30, SSR 198.
Satyrus, probably 3rd c. BC, renowned ancient biographer of poets, statesmen and philosophers.
ὅτε δὲ χορηγοίη ποµπεύων ἐν πορφυρίδι εἰσιὼν εἰς τὸ θέατρον, ἐθαυµάζετο 
οὐ µόνον ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν.  διὸ καὶ Ἀντισθένης 
ὁ Σωκρατικός, ὡς δὴ αὐτὸς αὐτόπτης γεγονὼς τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου, ἰσχυρὸν αὐτὸν 
καὶ ἀνδρώδη καὶ εὐπαίδευτον καὶ τολµηρὸν καὶ ὡραῖον ἐφ᾽ ἡλικίας <πάσης>
γενέσθαι φησίν. 5
4 εὐπαίδευτον Dalechamp  :  ἀπαίδευτον MSS     πάσης add. Kaibel
Whenever he (Alcibiades) was a choregos he paraded into the theatre dressed in purple, 
being admired not only by the men but also by the women.  As a result of which, 
Antisthenes the Socratic, who himself actually beheld Alcibiades with his own eyes, 
states that he was strong, and courageous, and cultured, and daring, and in the bloom of 
youth, throughout his entire life.
CD11a  Proclus, Plato 'Alcibiades I' 114.14-17 Westerink 1954, 51 = DC 32a, SSR 199.
Proclus, head of Neoplatonist school at Athens AD 438-485, prolific commentator on Plato.
ὅτι δὲ αὖ µέγας ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης ἐγένετο καὶ καλός δηλοῖ µὲν καὶ τὸ κοινὸν αὐτὸν 
ἐρώµενον καλεῖσθαι τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἁπάσης, δηλοῖ δὲ ὁ Ἀντισθένης εἰπὼν· 'ὡς εἰ µὴ 
τοιοῦτος ἦν ὁ Ἀχιλλεύς, οὐκ ἄρα ἦν ὄντως καλός.'
And again that Alcibiades was big and handsome is also clear from the fact that he was  
called the common loverboy of all Greece, and Antisthenes makes it clear when he says: 
'unless Achilles was such a man (as Alcibiades), he was not really handsome.'
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CD11b  Olympiodorus, Plato 'Alcibiades I' 28.18-25 Westerink 20 = DC 32b, SSR 199.
Olympiodorus, c. AD 500-570, Neoplatonist and commentator on Plato and Aristotle.
ὅτι γὰρ καλὸς ἦν τῷ σώµατι δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ κοινὸν ἐρώµενον αὐτὸν λέγεσθαι τῆς 
Ἑλλάδος, ἐκ τοῦ τοὺς Ἑρµᾶς Ἀθήνησι κατ᾽ εἰκόνα καὶ ὁµοίωσιν αὐτοῦ γράφεσθαι, ἐκ 
τοῦ τὸν Κυνικὸν Ἀντισθένην λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, 'εἰ µὴ τοιοῦτος ἦν ὁ Ἀχιλλεύς, οὐκ 
ἦν ὡραῖος'· περὶ οὗ φησὶν ὁ ποιητὴς βουλόµενος τὸν Νιρέα εἰς κάλλος ἐπαινέσαι 
Νιρεύς, ὃς κάλλιστος ἀνὴρ ὑπὸ Ἴλιον ἦλθεν 
τῶν ἄλλων Δαναῶν µετ᾽ ἀµύµονα Πηλείωνα. (Il. 2.673-4).
2 γράφεσθαι MSS   :   γλύφεσθαι ? Kenn.
For, that he (Alcibiades) was handsome in physique is clear from the fact that he was 
said to be the common loverboy of Greece; from the fact that in Athens the Herms were 
painted in his image and likeness; from the fact that the Cynic Antisthenes said about 
him 'unless Achilles was such a man (as Alcibiades), he was not handsome'; about whom 
(Achilles) the poet (Homer), wishing to praise Nireus as regards beauty, said: 
Nireus, the most handsome warrior of the all the other Danaans 
who came under Ilios, after the irreproachable son of Peleus. (Il. 2.673-4).
CD12  Plutarch, Vita Alcibiades 1 Ziegler = DC 31, SSR 201.
Plutarch, c. AD 45-125, author of the parallel lives, and moralising, ethical, philosophical treatises.
Ἀλκιβιάδου δὲ καὶ τίτθην, γένος Λάκαιναν, Ἀµύκλαν ὄνοµα, καὶ Ζώπυρον 
παιδαγωγὸν ἴσµεν, ὧν τὸ µὲν Ἀντισθένης, τὸ δὲ Πλάτων ἱστόρηκε (Alc. I 122b). 
And we also know the nurse of Alcibiades, a woman of the Spartan race, Amycla by 
name, and his tutor, Zopyros, the first fact is mentioned by Antisthenes, the second by 
Plato (Alc. I 122b).
Cyrus
CD13a  Stobaeus, Anthology 2.31.34 Wachsmuth = DC 21b, SSR 87.
Stobaeus, probably early 5th c. AD, compiled an anthology of excerpts from Greek prose and poetry.  This line is from a 
list of quotes under the heading 'Ἀντισθένης'.
ὁ αὐτὸς ἐρωτηθείς, τί ἀναγκαιότατον εἴη µάθηµα, 'τὸ ἀποµαθεῖν', εἶπε, 'τὰ κακά'. 
When he himself (Antisthenes) had been asked what lesson was most essential, he said 
'to unlearn base things'.
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CD13b  Arsenius, Violetum Walz 1832, 502 = DC 21a, SSR 87. 
Arsenius Apostolius, c.1468-1535, born in Crete, associate of Erasmus in Venice where he worked as a scribe and print 
editor, sometime Archbishop of Monemvasia, in 1519 & 1538 published a book of Greek proverbs, the Ιωνιά ('Violet-
Bed'), collected by his father, Michael, a scriptorium owner (Bietenholz & Deutscher 2003, 68-9).
Κῦρος ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐρωτηθεὶς τί ἀναγκαιότατον εἴη µάθηµα, 'τὸ ἀποµαθεῖν', ἔφη, 'τὰ 
κακά'. 
Cyrus, the king, when he had been asked 'what lesson is most essential', he said 'to 
unlearn base things'.
CD13c  Codex Neapolitanus graecus II D 22 n. 9 Sbordone = SSR 87.
 A compilation, probably 14th c., from earlier collections (Sbordone 1935, 5). 
Ἀντισθένης ἐρωτηθείς˙ 'τί ἐστιν ἄριστον µάθηµα;' ἔφη 'τὸ ἀποµαθεῖν τὰ κακά.' 
Antisthenes, having been asked 'What lesson is most noble?' replied 'To unlearn base 
things.'
CD14a  Arrian, Epicteti Dissertationes 4.6.20 Schenkl = DC 20a, SSR 86.
Arrian, AD c.86-160, prolific author, wrote down the discourses of the Stoic philosopher Epictetus c. AD 108. 
τί οὖν λέγει Ἀντισθένης; οὐδέποτ᾽ ἤκουσας; 
'βασιλικόν, ὦ Κῦρε, πράττειν µὲν εὖ, κακῶς δ᾽ ἀκούειν'.
So what does Antisthenes say?  Have you never heard?  
'It is kingly, O Cyrus, to do good but to be ill spoken of.'
CD14b  Marcus Aurelius 7.36 Dalfen = DC 20b, SSR 86.
Marcus Aurelius, while Roman Emperor AD 161-180 authored the Stoic work τὰ εἰς ἑαυτόν ('Meditations').
Ἀντισθενικόν. Βασιλικὸν εὖ µὲν πράττειν, κακῶς δὲ ἀκούειν. 
From Antisthenes. It is kingly to do good but to be ill spoken of.
CD14c  Diogenes Laertius 6.3 Dorandi = DC 150, SSR 28.
Diogenes Laertius, probable floruit first half 3rd c. AD.  This fragment from Diogenes' 'Life of Antisthenes'.
ἀκούσας ποτὲ ὅτι Πλάτων αὐτὸν κακῶς λέγει, 'βασιλικόν,' ἔφη, 'καλῶς ποιοῦντα 
κακῶς ἀκούειν.' 
One time when he heard that Plato was slandering him he said 'It is kingly while acting 
nobly to be ill spoken of.'
CD14d  Dio Chrysostom, Oration 47.25 De Arnim 2.87 = SSR 86.
Dio Chrysostom (earlier called Cocceianus), c. AD 40/50-120, Greek orator and Stoic-Cynic philosopher.
ἔφη δ᾽ οὖν τις ὅτι καὶ τὸ κακῶς ἀκούειν καλῶς ποιοῦντα καὶ τοῦτο βασιλικόν ἐστιν.
However, someone said that even being ill spoken of while acting nobly is also kingly.
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CD14e  Plutarch, Vita Alexander 41 Ziegler.
Plutarch, c. AD 45-125, author of parallel lives and moralising, ethical philosophical treatises.
(Ἀλέξανδρος) φάσκων βασιλικὸν εἶναι τὸ κακῶς ἀκούειν εὖ ποιοῦντα.
He (Alexander) used to say that it is kingly to be ill spoken of despite doing good.
CD14f  Plutarch, Regum et Imperatorum Apophthegmata 181f Nachstädt et al.
πυθόµενος δὲ ὑπό τινος λοιδορεῖσθαι ‘βασιλικόν’ ἔφη ‘ἐστὶν εὖ ποιοῦντα κακῶς 
ἀκούειν.’  
Having learnt that he (Alexander) was reviled by a certain person, he said 'it is kingly 
despite doing good to be ill spoken of.'
CD15  Diogenes Laertius 6.2 Dorandi = DC 95, SSR 134.
This fragment is from Diogenes' 'Life of Antisthenes'.
τὴν τ᾽ἀδοξίαν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἴσον τῷ πόνῳ.
A bad reputation is a good thing and equivalent to hard work.
CD16a  Ps.-Caecilius Balbus, Codex Monacensis Latinus 30.35.2-3 Wölfflin 31 = SSR 88.
Caecilius Balbus, fictitious name applied in late antiquity to an earlier body of Greek aphorisms.
Antisthenes cuidam dicenti, 'maledixit tibi ille', 'non mihi', inquit, 'sed illi, qui in se quod 
hic dicit agnoscit'.  idem dicenti cuidam, 'homines de te male loquuntur', 'superioris est, 
inquit, usus hoc pati personae, inferioris facere'.
Antisthenes, to someone saying 'he has slandered you', replied, 'not me, but that man 
who acknowledges in himself what this man states'.  The same man (Antisthenes) to 
someone saying 'people are slandering you', replied, 'it is indicative of superior character 
to undergo this experience, inferior character to deliver it'. 
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CD16b  Ps.-Caecilius Balbus in John of Salisbury, Policraticus 3.507c-d Webb 224 = SSR 88.
John of Salisbury, c. AD 1115-1180, Bishop of Chartres from 1179, humanist scholar well-versed in Latin literature.
Antisthenes quoque cuidam dicenti, 'maledixit tibi ille', 'non mihi' inquit, 'sed illi, qui in 
se, quod ille culpat, agnoscit.  sed etsi mihi maledicere curet, non curo, quia auditus 
lingua debet esse robustior, cum singulis hominibus linguae sint singulae, sed aures 
binae. aliquatenus tamen curo, quia eo ipso me fatetur esse superiorem, quoniam 
superioris personae usus est, detractionibus subiacere, inferioris inferre. gauderem 
itaque, nisi urgente humanitate compaterer infelici'. 
Antisthenes   :   Antitanes MSS     mihi   :   michi MSS
Antisthenes likewise, to someone saying 'He has spoken ill of you', replied 'not me, but 
that man who acknowledges in himself faults that man finds.  But even if he cares to 
speak ill of me, I don't care, because hearing must be stronger than speech, when the 
tongues of individual men are singular, but the ears are double.  I am concerned to a 
certain extent, however, as he admits that I am superior by the very act (of slander), since 
it is the practice of a superior man to be exposed to slander, and of an inferior person to 
deliver it.  I would be pleased therefore if human nature did not compel me to feel sorry 
for that unfortunate fellow.
Aspasia, Pericles, Xanthippos and Paralos, Archestratos and Euphemos 
(intimates of Xanthippos and Paralos), Cimon, Elpinice (sister of Cimon), 
Callias, Pericles' first wife (mother of Callias), Hipponicus (father of 
Callias).
CD17  Herodicus in Athenaeus 5.220d Kaibel = DC 34, SSR 142.
Herodicus of Babylon, prob. late 2nd c. BC, wrote Κωµῳδούµενοι ('People Ridiculed in Comedy'), Σύµµικτα 
ὑποµνήµατα ('Miscellaneous notes'), Πρὸς τὸν φιλοσωκράτην ('Against the friend of Socrates' i.e. Plato). This  
passage is from an extended discussion by Herodicus of Antisthenes' works and in the text of Athenaeus it directly 
follows CD3.
ἡ δ᾽ Ἀσπασία τῶν Περικλέους υἱῶν Ξανθίππου καὶ Παράλου διαβολὴν [περιέχει]. 
τούτων γὰρ τὸν µὲν Ἀρχεστράτου φησὶν εἶναι συµβιωτὴν τοῦ παραπλήσια ταῖς ἐπὶ 
τῶν µιαρῶν οἰκηµάτων ἐργαζοµένου, τὸν δ᾽ Εὐφήµου συνήθη, καὶ γνώριµον τοῦ 
φορτικὰ σκώπτοντος καὶ ψυχρὰ τοὺς συναντῶντας.
1 περιέχει supplied from text earlier in the same passage
His Aspasia contains slander about the sons of Pericles, Xanthippos and Paralos.  For he 
said the former was the intimate partner of Archestratos, whose line of work closely 
resembled that of the women working in filthy brothels, while the latter was a friend and 
intimate of Euphemos, who made crude and humourless jokes regarding the people he 
met.
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CD18  Athenaeus 13.589e-f Kaibel = DC 35, SSR 143.
Ἀντισθένης δ᾽ ὁ Σωκρατικὸς ἐρασθέντα φησὶν αὐτὸν (τὸν Περικλέα) Ἀσπασίας 
δὶς τῆς ἡµέρας εἰσιόντα καὶ ἐξιόντα ἀπ᾽ αὐτῆς ἀσπάζεσθαι τὴν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ 
φευγούσης ποτὲ αὐτῆς γραφὴν ἀσεβείας λέγων ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς πλείονα ἐδάκρυσεν 
ἢ ὅτε ὑπὲρ τοῦ βίου καὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἐκινδύνευε. καὶ Κίµωνος δ᾽ Ἐλπινίκῃ τῇ ἀδελφῇ 
παρανόµως συνόντος, εἶθ᾽ ὕστερον ἐκδοθείσης Καλλίᾳ καὶ φυγαδευθέντος 5
589f µισθὸν ἔλαβε τῆς καθόδου αὐτοῦ ὁ Περικλῆς τὸ τῇ Ἐλπινίκῃ µιχθῆναι. 
Antisthenes the Socratic said that when he (Pericles) fell in love with Aspasia, he went 
twice per day, into and out of her house, to aspazesthai (warmly greet) the woman; and at 
one time when she was a defendant on a charge of impiety, while speaking on her behalf, 
he wept even more than the time when he was a defendant at risk of his own life and 
property.  And Cimon had sex unlawfully with his own sister, Elpinice, then later when 
she was given in marriage to Callias and he (Cimon) was in exile, Pericles received as his 
reward for arranging his (Cimon's) return, sex with Elpinice.
CD19  Plutarch, Vita Pericles 24.7-8 165d Ziegler = SSR 143.
φαίνεται µέντοι µᾶλλον ἐρωτική τις ἡ τοῦ Περικλέους 8 ἀγάπησις γενοµένη 
πρὸς Ἀσπασίαν. ἦν µὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ γυνὴ προσήκουσα µὲν κατὰ γένος, συνῳκηκυῖα δ᾽ 
Ἱππονίκῳ πρότερον, ἐξ οὗ Καλλίαν ἔτεκε τὸν πλούσιον· ἔτεκε δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῷ 
Περικλεῖ Ξάνθιππον καὶ Πάραλον. εἶτα τῆς συµβιώσεως οὐκ οὔσης αὐτοῖς 
ἀρεστῆς, ἐκείνην µὲν ἑτέρῳ βουλοµένην συνεξέδωκεν. αὐτὸς δὲ τὴν Ἀσπασίαν 5 
λαβὼν ἔστερξε διαφερόντως. καὶ γὰρ ἐξιὼν, ὥς φασι, καὶ εἰσιὼν ἀπ᾽ ἀγορᾶς 
ἠσπάζετο καθ᾽ ἡµέραν αὐτὴν µετὰ τοῦ καταφιλεῖν. 
However Pericles' affection for Aspasia was clearly more the amorous kind.  For he had a 
wife who was related to him, and she had been married previously to Hipponicus, by 
whom she bore Callias 'The Rich'.  And she also bore Xanthippos and Paralos by Pericles. 
After that, as their married life was not to their satisfaction, he bestowed her, as she 
desired, upon another man.  And he himself took Aspasia and adored her exceedingly.  
And as they say, both going out and coming in from the agora, he aspazesthai (warmly 
greeted) her every day with a kiss.
CD20  Heraclides Ponticus in Athenaeus 12.533c-d Kaibel = SSR 144, Heraclides F 59 
Wehrli.
Heraclides of Pontus, 4th c. BC, philosopher who deputised for Plato at the latter's academy and wrote works, including 
dialogues, on diverse topics.
Περικλέα δὲ τὸν Ὀλύµπιόν φησιν Ἡρακλείδης ὁ Ποντικὸς ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἡδονῆς (F 59) 
ὡς ἀπήλλαξεν ἐκ τῆς οἰκίας τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ τὸν µεθ᾽ ἡδονῆς βίον προείλετο ᾤκει τε 
µετ᾽ Ἀσπασίας τῆς ἐκ Μεγάρων ἑταίρας καὶ τὸ πολὺ µέρος τῆς οὐσίας εἰς ταύτην 
κατανάλωσε. 
Heraclides of Pontus, in his On Pleasure (F 59), says that Olympian Pericles dismissed his 
wife from their house, and preferred a life of pleasure, and lived with the courtesan 
Aspasia of Megara, and he lavished the greater part of his wealth on her.
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MYTHIC DIALOGUES
Heracles and Prometheus
MD1a  Themistius, περὶ ἀρετῆς Sachau 1870, 33.5-21; translation A. Rigolio.236
Themistius, c. AD 317-385, philosopher, politician, and prolific commentator on Aristotle.  This fragment is from a 
work preserved only in Syriac, originally titled περὶ ἀρετῆς.
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But if you truly want to know that reason is an excellent thing, it is not Plato or Aristotle 
that I call as witnesses, but the wise Antisthenes who trod this path. Indeed, he said:
Prometheus told Heracles: 33.10 'Your toil is utterly worthless, for you are concerned with 
things of the world and you have abandoned the preoccupation with what is greater 
than this.  You will not be an accomplished man until you learn things that are higher 
than men.  If you learn these, then you will also learn the things of men, but if 33.15 you 
learn only the ones here (i.e. of this world), you will be wandering like wild animals.' 
He, then, whose care is for worldly things and has imprisoned the reason of his intellect 
and his sagacity within those mean and narrow bounds, is not wise – as Antisthenes said 
– but resembles an animal 33.20 that finds a dunghill agreeable. For all the celestial things 
are high, and we ought to have a high opinion of them.
236 I am extremely grateful to Alberto Rigolio for permitting me to use this translation from his forthcoming 
edition and English translation of Themistius' De Virtute.  My translation differs in that I have restored 
Prometheus as the speaker (as per the Syriac and contra Giannantoni's suggested emendation).  I have 
made a couple of other minor stylistic adjustments to the translation that do not effect the meaning.
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MD1b  Themistius, De Virtute Latin text Mach (in Downey & Norman) 3.43 = SSR 96.
See introductory note on MD1a.
sin autem vere cognoscere vultis prudentiam aliquid sublime esse, nec Platonem neque 
Aristotelem testes invoco, sed Antisthenem sapientem, qui hanc viam docuit.  ait enim 
Promethea Herculi ita locutum esse: 'vilissimus est labor tuus, quod res humanae tibi 
sunt curae, sed tamen curam eius, quod iis maioris momenti est, deseruisti. perfectus 
enim vir non eris, priusquam ea, quae hominibus sublimiora sunt, didiceris.  si ista 
disces, tunc humana quoque disces; sin autem humana tantum didiceris, tu tamquam 
animal brutum errabis.' 
qui enim rebus humanis studet et mentis suae prudentiam calliditatemque suam rebus 
tam vilibus et angustis includit, is, ut Antisthenes dixit, non sapiens est, sed animali 
similis, cui sterquilinium gratum est. sublimes vero sunt omnes res caelestes, et nos 
oportet sententiam de eis habere sublimem.
But if, on the other hand, you want to truly know that reason is a lofty thing, I call upon 
neither Plato nor Aristotle as witnesses, but wise Antisthenes, who taught this path.  
Namely, he says:
Prometheus spoke to Hercules thus: 'your labour is extremely contemptible, because 
human affairs are a concern to you, and concern for that which is of greater importance 
than these things, you have forsaken.  For you will not be a complete man until you have 
learnt those things which are higher than man.  If you learn such things, then you will 
learn human things also; but if you learn only about human affairs, you will err like a 
brute beast.'  
For he who applies himself to human affairs and confines the prudence and intelligence 
of his mind to things so petty and narrow, he is, as Antisthenes said, not astute, but is 
like an animal to which a dung heap is pleasing.  Truly lofty are all the heavenly things, 
and we ought to have a lofty opinion of them.
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MD1c  Themistius, De Virtute German text Gildemeister & Bücheler 1872 = DC 27. 
See introductory note on MD1a.
Wenn ihr aber wahrhaft erkennen wollt, dass die Vernunftmässigkeit eine erhabene 
Sache ist, so rufe ich nicht Platon und Aristotles zu Zeugen an, sondern den weisen 
Antisthenes, der diesen Weg gelernt hat.  Denn so sagte er: 
Prometheus sprach zum Herakles: 'Sehr verächtlich ist deine Handlungsweise, dass du 
um weltliche Dinge dich bemühst, denn du hast die Sorge um das Wichtigere 
unterlassen.  Denn du bist kein vollendeter Mann, bis du das gelernt, was höher ist als 
die Menschen, und wenn du dies lernst, lernst du auch das Menschliche. Wenn du aber 
allein das Irdische lernst, bist du irrend, wie die wilden Tiere'.  
Der aber, dessen Interesse an den Dingen dieser Welt ist und der die Denkkraft seiner 
Intelligenz und seiner Klugheit auf diese schwachen und engen Dinge beschränkt, ist 
nicht ein Weiser, wie Antisthenes sagt, sondern gleicht dem Tier, dem der Koth behaglich 
ist.
However, if you truly wish to know that reason is a noble thing, then I call as witness, 
not Plato and Aristotle, but the wise Antisthenes, who learnt this path.  For thus he 
stated: 
Prometheus said to Heracles: 'your manner of action is very contemptible, that you are 
striving for worldly things and have neglected caring about what is more important. 
Because you are not a complete man until you have learned what is higher than men, 
and if you learn that, you'll also learn what is human.  But if you learn only what is 
earthly, you are straying like the wild animals.'  
He, however, whose interest is in the affairs of this world and who limits the power of 
thought of his intelligence and his wisdom to these weak and narrow things, is not a 
wise man, as Antisthenes says, but is like the animals for whom the muck is comfortable.
MD2  Stobaeus, Anthology 2.31.76 Wachsmuth 2.215.1-3 = DC 173, SSR 173, Gnom. Vat. 743 n. 
7, Apophth. 49 Winckelm.
Stobaeus, probably early 5th c. AD, compiled an anthology of excerpts from Greek prose and poetry.
Ἀντισθένης ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπό τινος, τί διδάξει τὸν υἱόν, εἶπεν, 'εἰ µὲν θεοῖς µέλλει 
συµβιοῦν, φιλόσοφον, εἰ δὲ ἀνθρώποις, ῥήτορα.' 
Antisthenes when asked by someone 'What should I teach my son?' said 'If he is destined 
to live with the gods, philosophy, but if he is destined to live with men, rhetoric.'
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MD3  Diogenes Laertius 6.104 Dorandi = DC 22, SSR 98.
Diogenes Laertius, probable floruit first half 3rd c. AD.  Diogenes is here reporting views held generally by the Cynics.
ἀρέσκει δ᾽ αὐτοῖς καὶ τέλος εἶναι τὸ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ζῆν ὡς Ἀντισθένης φησὶν ἐν τῷ 
Ἡρακλεῖ, ὁµοίως τοῖς Στωικοῖς. 
They (the Cynics) also instruct that the goal of life is to live in accordance with 
excellence, as Antisthenes says in his Heracles – in like manner to the Stoics.
MD4  Diogenes Laertius 6.105 Dorandi = DC 23, SSR 99. 
ἀρέσκει δ᾽ αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν διδακτὴν εἶναι, καθά φησιν Ἀντισθένης ἐν τῷ 
Ἡρακλεῖ καὶ ἀναπόβλητον ὑπάρχειν.
They also instruct that excellence is teachable, just as Antisthenes says in his Heracles, and 
it is unlosable.  
MD5  Diogenes Laertius 6.10 Dorandi = DC 69, SSR 134.
This fragment is from Diogenes' 'Life of Antisthenes'.
ἤρεσκεν αὐτῷ καὶ τάδε. διδακτὴν ἀπεδείκνυε τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς εὐγενεῖς 
τοὺς καὶ ἐναρέτους. 
He used to be pleased by the following topics.  He used to prove that excellence is 
teachable, and that the nobly-born and the excellent are the same people.
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Chiron, Heracles, and Achilles.
MD6a  Ps.-Eratosthenes, Catasterismi 40 Olivieri 1897 = DC 24a, SSR 92, Eudociae Violarium 
998 Flach.
Eratosthenes of Cyrene, c. 285–194 BC, lived in Athens before becoming head librarian in Alexandria.  Authorship of 
the Καταστερισµοί, 'Constellations', is disputed, though it is certainly Alexandrian.
Κενταύρου. 
οὗτος δοκεῖ Χείρων εἶναι ὁ ἐν τῷ Πηλίῳ οἰκήσας δικαιοσύνῃ τε ὑπερενέγκας 
πάντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ παιδεύσας Ἀσκλήπιόν τε καὶ Ἀχιλλέα· ἐφ᾽ ὃν Ἡρακλῆς δοκεῖ 
ἐλθεῖν δι᾽ ἔρωτα, ᾧ καὶ συνεῖναι ἐν τῷ ἄντρῳ τιµῶν τὸν Πᾶνα. µόνον δὲ 
τῶν Κενταύρων οὐκ ἀνεῖλεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἤκουεν αὐτοῦ, καθάπερ Ἀντισθένης φησὶν ὁ 5 
Σωκρατικὸς ἐν τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ.  χρόνον δὲ ἱκανὸν ὁµιλούντων αὐτῶν ἐκ τῆς 
φαρέτρας αὐτοῦ βέλος ἐξέπεσεν εἰς τὸν πόδα τοῦ Χείρωνος, καὶ οὕτως ἀποθανόντος 
αὐτοῦ ὁ Ζεὺς διὰ τὴν εὐσέβειαν καὶ τὸ σύµπτωµα ἐν τοῖς ἄστροις ἔθηκεν αὐτόν.  ἔχει 
δέ τι θηρίον ἐν ταῖς χερσὶ πλησίον τοῦ Θυτηρίου, ὃ δοκεῖ προσφέρειν θύσων, ὅ ἐστι 
µέγιστον σηµεῖον τῆς εὐσεβείας αὐτοῦ.
1 τε Heyn.   :   δὲ MSS     8 ἔχει Rob.   :   ἔστι MSS     τι Wilam.   :   τὸ MSS
Centaurus.
This one seems to be the Chiron who dwelt on Pelion and in justice surpassed all men, 
and who educated both Asclepius and Achilles.  To him (Chiron) Heracles seemed to 
come on account of love, and living together with him in the cave he gave honour to Pan. 
Him alone of the Centaurs he did not destroy, but rather he became his student, just as 
Antisthenes the Socratic says in his Heracles.  After a considerable time, while they were 
conversing, an arrow fell from his (Heracles') quiver onto Chiron's foot, and thus, after 
he died, on account of his piety and the accident, Zeus placed him among the stars.  And 
he is holding some beast in his hands right by constellation Ara, this seems to be 
something he is bringing to sacrifice, which is the greatest indication of his piety.
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MD6b  Anonymous Latin II in Commentariorum in Aratum Reliquae Maass 1898, 264 = DC 
24c, SSR 92.
Commentary, 3rd c. AD or earlier, as scholia on a Latin translation of Aratus' Phaenomena of c. 270 BC.
Hic videtur Chiron esse qui in Pelio habitavit iustitia quidem superans homines omnes et 
ipse correxit Asclepium et Achilleum; apud quem Herculem videtur venisse propter 
amorem, cum quo et simul fuerat in antro honorificans Panem; solummodo quidem 
Centaurum non occidit, sed obaudibat ei, ut ait Antisthenes Socratensis. in tempore 
Herculis, super bono loquentes et quidem de cura eius, excidit sagitta supra pede 5
Chironis, et ita mortuus est. quem Iuppiter propter eius pietatem et ruinam inter astra 
posuit. iste autem habens bestiam in manibus iuxta Sacrarium, in quo videtur offerre 
quasi sacrificans, quod est signum maximum de pietate quam in se habebat.
5 bono conj. Kenn.   :   bona MSS     loquentes – de omnia corrupit Maass     quidem conj. Kenn.   :   quoniam MSS     de cura 
:   decuaura P
This one seems to be Chiron, who lived on Pelion, in justice indeed surpassing all men 
and himself instructed Asclepius and Achilles.  And Hercules appears to have come to 
him on account of love, and he was also together with him in a cave honouring Pan. He 
was certainly the only centaur he did not kill, but he was his student, as Antisthenes the 
Socratic says.  During this time, while they were speaking about excellence, and what is 
more about the tendance of excellence, an arrow of Hercules fell out over the foot of 
Chiron, and thus he died.  And Jupiter, on account of his (Chiron's) piety and downfall, 
placed him among the stars.  That one (Chiron) moreover is holding a beast in his hands 
beside the Shrine, which he seems to be offering just as if it were a sacrifice, which is the 
greatest indication of the piety which he had in himself.
MD6c  Scholia ad Germanici Aratea G. II Robert 1878, 185 = DC 24c, SSR 92.
Centaurus dicitur fuisse Chiron et habitasse in stabulis et sectasse iustitiam et, quoniam 
Asclepium et Achillem nutrierit inter astra conlocatus esse. Antisthenis autem dicit e 
pharetra Herculis lapsam sagittam pedem eius vulnerasse acceptoque vulnere animam 
exhalasse et ob hoc a Iove inter astra conlocatum esse.
It is said that the centaur was Chiron, and he lived in a stable, and he strove for justice, 
and, since he raised Asclepius and Achilles, he was placed among the stars. Antisthenes, 
however, says that an arrow slipped from the quiver of Hercules onto his (Chiron's) foot 
and wounded him, and by receiving the wound he breathed out his soul and on account 
of this he was placed by Jupiter among the stars.
MD6d  Scholia ad Germanici Aratea II Buhl 87 = SSR 92.
cuius [Chironis] hospitio quum Hercules uteretur, sicut Antisthenes dicit, e pharetra 
sagitta lapsa dicitur pedem eius vulnerasse, acceptoque vulnere animam exhalasse et ab 
Iove astris inlatus. 
Although Hercules was enjoying his (Chiron's) hospitality, as Antisthenes says, it is said 
that an arrow that slipped from his quiver onto his foot wounded him, and by receiving 
this wound he breathed out his soul and he was put among the stars by Jupiter.
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MD7  Proclus, Plato 'Alcibiades I' 98.14 Westerink 1954, 44 = DC 25, SSR 93.
Proclus, head of Neoplatonist school at Athens AD 438-485, prolific commentator on Plato.  Here Proclus is 
commenting on Alcibiades I 104c, where Socrates is telling Alcibiades that he has overwhelmed all his lovers because of 
their inferiority and his own power.  Proclus notes that individuals who are genuinely worth loving are unlovable to the 
masses and to base men.
λέγει γοῦν καὶ ὁ Ἀντισθένους Ἡρακλῆς περί τινος νεανίσκου παρὰ τῷ Χείρωνι 
τρεφοµένου· 'µέγας γάρ,' φησι, 'καὶ καλὸς καὶ ὡραῖος, οὐκ ἂν αὐτοῦ ἠράσθη δειλὸς 
ἐραστής'. 
And at least Antisthenes' Heracles also says, concerning a certain youth (Achilles) who 
went to Chiron to be raised: 'because he is big and handsome and in the bloom of youth, 
no cowardly lover would fall in love with him'. 
MD8  Gnomologium Vaticanum 743 n. 11 Sternbach = DC 28, SSR 95.
Gnomologium Vaticanum, Byzantine collection preserving sayings of ancient Greek philosophers and eminent persons.  
This fragment is from a collection of comments made by Antisthenes. 
ὁ αὐτὸς (Ἀντισθένης) θεασάµενος ἐν πίνακι γεγραµµένον τὸν Ἀχιλλέα Χείρωνι τῷ 
Κενταύρῳ διακονούµενον, 'εὖ γε, ὦ παιδίον, εἶπεν, ὅτι παιδείας ἕνεκεν καὶ θηρίῳ 
διακονεῖν ὑπέµεινας'.
He himself (Antisthenes), when he beheld a painting of Achilles serving Chiron the 
centaur, said: 'Well done Child! For the sake of education you submitted to serving even 
a beast'.
Heracles and his sons
MD9  Plutarch, De Vitioso Pudore 536B Sieveking = DC 26, SSR 94.
This fragment comes from a passage in which Plutarch is warning against susceptibility to flattery.  It follows on from 
an anecdote in which Menedemus of Eretria (fl. first half 3rd C. BC) is reported to have reacted with hostility to the news 
that Alexinus the Sophist often praised him.   
οὕτως ἄτρεπτος ἦν καὶ ἀνάλωτος ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ κρατῶν ἐκείνης τῆς 
παραινέσεως, ἣν ὁ Ἀντισθένειος Ἡρακλῆς παρῄνει, τοῖς παισὶ διακελευόµενος 
µηδενὶ χάριν ἔχειν ἐπαινοῦντι αὐτούς· τοῦτο δ᾽ ἦν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ µὴ δυσωπεῖσθαι 
µηδ᾽ ἀντικολακεύειν τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας.
So undeterrable and invincible was he (Menedemus) at the hands of such men, and so 
strongly did he cleave to the counsel which the Antisthenian Heracles recommended, 
when he exhorted his sons to be grateful to no man for praising them.  Which amounted 
to no more than this: neither to be affected by those praising them, nor to flatter them in 
return.
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MD10  Galen, Protrepticus 6 Barigazzi 122 = SSR 165.
Galen of Pergamum, AD 129-216, physician and author on topics including medicine, philosophy, and philology.
καλῶς οὖν καὶ ὁ Ἀντισθένης καὶ ὁ Διογένης, ὁ µὲν χρυσᾶ πρόβατα 
καλῶν τοὺς πλουσίους καὶ ἀπαιδεύτους, ὁ δὲ ταῖς ἐπὶ τῶν κρηµνῶν συκαῖς 
ἀπεικάζων αὐτούς· ἐκείνων µὲν γὰρ τὸν καρπὸν οὐκ ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλὰ κόρακας 
ἢ κολοιοὺς ἐσθίειν, τούτων δὲ τὰ χρήµατα µηδὲν µὲν ὄφελος εἶναι τοῖς ἀστείοις, 
δαπανᾶσθαι δ᾽ ὑπὸ τῶν κολάκων, οἵτινες, ἐὰν οὕτως τύχῃ, πάντων αὐτοῖς 5 
ἀναλωθέντων ἀπαντῶντες παρέρχονται µὴ γνωρίζειν προσποιούµενοι.
1 Ἀντισθένης corr. Kaib.   :   Δηµοσθένης A      3-4 ἐκείνων µὲν –– τούτων δὲ Marq.   :  ἐκείνων τε –– τούτων  τε A      
ἀπαντῶντες corr. Bas   :   ἀπατῶντες A
Both Antisthenes and Diogenes said it well – the latter calls those who are rich and 
uneducated golden sheep (cf. DL 6.47);
but the former (Antisthenes) likens (eikeinōn) them to the fig trees on cliff sides, for the 
fruit of these trees is not eaten by people, but rather by crows and jackdaws, and the 
assets of those men are of no use to their fellow citizens, but are devoured by the 
flatterers, who are the sort of men who, if they encounter people after they have 
consumed all their possessions, pass them by pretending not to know them.
MD11  Stobaeus, Anthology 3.14.19 Wachsmuth = DC 89, SSR 132.
Stobaeus, probably early 5th c. AD, compiled an anthology of excerpts from Greek prose and poetry.
Ἀντισθένης ἔλεγεν, ὥσπερ τὰς ἑταίρας τἀγαθὰ πάντα εὔχεσθαι τοῖς ἐρασταῖς 
παρεῖναι, πλὴν νοῦ καὶ φρονήσεως, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς κόλακας οἷς σύνεισιν. 
Antisthenes used to say, that just as courtesans pray that all good things come to their 
lovers, except intelligence and good sense; so also pray the flatterers with respect to the 
men they associate with (i.e. their patrons).
MD12  Antonius, Loci Communes 2.32.172 Migne PG 136.1084 = DC 83, SSR ?
Antonius 'Melissa', c. 11th c., Greek monk who recorded moral aphorisms by topic. This is the second of three aphorisms 
listed after the headword: Ἀντισθένης.
κακοὶ κολακευόµενοι κακώτεροι γίνονται. 
Base men who are flattered become baser men.
MD13a  Hecaton in Diogenes Laertius 6.4 Dorandi = DC 84a, SSR 131, Hecaton F21 Gomoll.
Hecaton of Rhodes, 1st c. BC, student of Panaetius and prominent Stoic, authored several works of an ethical nature.  
This fragment is from Diogenes' 'Life of Antisthenes'.
κρεῖττον ἔλεγε, καθά φησιν Ἑκάτων ἐν ταῖς Χρείαις, εἰς κόρακας ἢ εἰς κόλακας 
ἐµπεσεῖν· οἱ µὲν γὰρ νεκρούς, οἱ δὲ ζῶντας ἐσθίουσιν. 
He (Antisthenes) used to say, as Hecaton reports in his Useful Sayings, that it is better to 
fall in with crows than with flatterers; for the former devour the dead, but the latter 
devour the living.
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MD13b  Antonius, Loci Communes 1.52.94 Migne PG 136.941 = DC 84b, SSR 131, Stobaeus 
3.14.17, Ps.-Maximus Confessor 11.26./33. & -./34. Ihm.
Ἀντισθένης φησίν· αἱρετώτερον εἰς κόρακας ἐµπεσεῖν ἢ εἰς κόλακας· οἱ µὲν γὰρ 
ἀποθανόντος τὸ σῶµα, οἱ δὲ ζῶντος τὴν ψυχὴν λυµαίνονται. 
οἱ µὲν κόρακες τῶν τετελευτηκότων τοὺς ὀφθαλµοὺς λυµαίνονται, οἱ δὲ κόλακες 
τῶν ζώντων τὰς ψυχὰς διαφθείρουσιν. 
ὥσπερ ὁ Ἀκταῖος ὑπὸ τῶν τρεφοµένων υπ᾽ αὐτοῦ κυνῶν ἀπέθανεν, οὕτως οἱ 
κόλακες τοὺς τρέφοντας κατεσθίουσιν.
Antisthenes said: it is preferable to fall in with crows than with flatterers.  For the former 
will maltreat your body when you are dead, but the latter will maltreat your soul while 
you are still alive.
Crows damage the eyes of the dead, but flatterers destroy the souls of the living.
Just as Actaeon was killed by his dogs, who were being fed by him, so the flatterers 
devour their feeders.
Perseus and Theseus
MD14  Julian, Oration 7.209a Wright = DC 8a, SSR 44.
Julian 'the Apostate', born AD 331, emperor at Constantinople from 361-3.  Oration 7 was addressed as a rebuke to the  
Cynic Heracleios, whose lecture Julian had attended, and in which Heracleios used myth in a way that Julian felt was 
inappropriate.
εἰ δ᾽ Ἀντισθένης ὁ Σωκρατικὸς ὥσπερ ὁ Χενοφῶν ἔνια διὰ τῶν µύθων ἀπήγγελλε, 
µήτοι τοῦτό σε ἐξαπατάτω· καὶ γὰρ µικρὸν ὕστερον ὑπὲρ τούτου σοι διηγήσοµαι.
And if Antisthenes the Socratic – just like Xenophon – related some points by way of 
myth, do not let this mislead you.  And in a moment I will give you an account in 
support of this (statement).
MD15  Julian, Oration 7.215c Wright = DC 8b, SSR 44.
This excerpt is from a passage in which Julian is hypothesising that only ethical philosophers, and theologians concerned 
with initiations and the Mysteries are justified in employing myth in their teaching.
οὐ µὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ Ξενοφῶν φαίνεται καὶ Ἀντισθένης καὶ Πλάτων προσχρησάµενοι 
πολλαχοῦ τοῖς µύθοις, ὥσθ᾽ ἡµῖν πέφηνεν, καὶ εἰ µὴ τῷ Κυνικῷ, φιλοσόφῳ γοῦν τινι 
προσήκειν ἡ µυθογραφία.
But what is more, Xenophon and Antisthenes and Plato manifestly used myths in many 
places.  So that it is apparent to you that the writing of myths is indeed appropriate for a 
certain type of philosopher, even if not for the Cynic.
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MD16  Julian, Oration 7.216d-217a Wright = DC 8c, SSR 44.
In this passage it is apparent that Heracleios has irked Julian by using Prodicus' parable of the Choice of Heracles at the 
Crossroads, a parable that Julian refers to approvingly elsewhere (Or. 2.56d).
ἐπεὶ καὶ Πλάτονι πολλὰ µεµυθολόγηται περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου πραγµάτων θεολογοῦντι 
καὶ πρό γε τούτου τῷ τῆς Καλλιόπης, Ἀντισθένει δὲ καὶ Χενοφῶντι καὶ αὐτῷ 
Πλάτωνι πραγµατευοµένοις ἠθικάς τινας ὑποθέσεις οὐ παρέργως ἀλλὰ µετά τινος 
ἐµµελείας ἡ τῶν µύθων ἐγκαταµέµικται γραφή, οὓς σ᾽ ἐχρῆν, εἴπερ ἐβούλου 
µιµούµενος, ἀντὶ µὲν Ἡρακλέος µεταλαµβάνειν Περσέως ἢ Θησέως τινὸς ὄνοµα καὶ 
τὸν Ἀντισθένειον τύπον ἐγχαράττειν, ἀντὶ δὲ τῆς Προδίκου σκηνοποιίας ἀµφὶ τοῖν 
ἀµφοῖν τούτοιν θεοῖν ἑτέραν ὁµοίαν εἰσάγειν εἰς τὸ θέατρον.
For example, Plato, in his discourses on the gods, tells many mythic tales about the 
goings on in Hades, and before him so did the son of Calliope (i.e. Orpheus).  And the 
writing of myths is mixed in by Antisthenes and Xenophon and Plato himself when they 
are working out certain ethical arguments – not intrusively, but rather with a certain 
harmony.   If you wanted to imitate these men, instead of Heracles you should have 
introduced the name of a Perseus or a Theseus and cast them in the Antisthenic mould.  
And instead of the dramatic setting of Prodicus concerning those two goddesses, you 
should have introduced another similar setting (i.e. to Antisthenes') onto your stage.
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EROTIC DIALOGUES
ED1  Diogenes Laertius 6.9 Dorandi = DC 189, SSR 172.
This fragment is from Diogenes' 'Life of Antisthenes' and is one of a series of anecdotes recording things reportedly said 
by Antisthenes.
πρὸς τὸ παρασχηµατίζον αὑτὸ τῷ πλάστῃ µειράκιον, 'εἰπέ µοι,' φησίν, 'εἰ φωνὴν 
λάβοι ὁ χαλκός, ἐπὶ τίνι ἂν οἴει  σεµνυνθῆναι;' 
τοῦ δ᾽ εἰπόντος, 'ἐπὶ κάλλει,' 
'οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ οὖν,' ἔφη, 'τὰ ὅµοια γεγηθὼς ἀψύχῳ;'
οἴει add. Casaub.
To a young lad who was posing for a sculptor, he (Antisthenes) said 'Tell me, if the 
bronze had a voice, what do you think it would pride itself on?' 
And when he (the lad) replied 'On it's beauty',
He (Antisthenes) said 'Are you not ashamed then that you pride yourself on the same 
thing as an inanimate object?'
ED2a  Porphyrio, Scholia in Horatium Sermo 2.2.94-95 Holder 1894 295.13-17 = DC 191, SSR 
112.
Pomponius Porphyrio, early 3rd c. AD, wrote a commentary on Horace likely intended for schools.
– quae carmine gratior aurem occupat. (Hor. Sat. 2.2.94)
Which strikes the ear more pleasingly than song.
hoc Antisthenes dixisse traditur.  is enim cum vidisset adulescentem luxuriosum 
acroamatibus deditum, ait: 'miserum te, adulescens, qui numquam audisti summum 
acroama, id est laudem tuam.' 
It is related that Antisthenes said this.  For he, when he had seen an immoderate young 
lad given over to musical entertainments, said: 'You are unfortunate, young man, never 
to have heard the greatest music, that is, your own praise.'
ED2b  Ps.-Acro, Scholia in Horatium 'Sermo' 2.2.94 Keller 1904 134.7-10 = SSR 112.
Helenius Acro, 2nd c. AD, commentator on Terence.  These scholia on Horace date to the 5th c. AD but were only first 
attributed to Acro in the Renaissance, and it remains contentious whether any elements are really his.  
Antisthenes philosophus cum vidisset adulescentem multum acroamatibus delectari: o 
te, ait, infelicem, qui summum acroama numquam audisti, idest laudes tuas; quia plus 
delectamur laudibus nostris. 
Antisthenes the philosopher, when he had seen a young lad delighting greatly in musical 
entertainments, said: 'Oh you unfortunate fellow, you who has never heard the greatest 
music, that is, your own praise; because we delight most of all in the praises given to us.'
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ED3  Diogenes Laertius 6.3 Dorandi = DC 187, SSR 171.
This and the two following fragments are from Diogenes' 'Life of Antisthenes', and are part of a series of anecdotes 
recording things reportedly said by Antisthenes.
πρός τε τὸ Ποντικὸν µειράκιον µέλλον φοιτᾶν αὐτῷ καὶ πυθόµενον τίνων αὐτῷ δεῖ, 
φησί, 'βιβλιαρίου καινοῦ καὶ γραφείου καινοῦ καὶ πινακιδίου καινοῦ,' τὸν νοῦν 
παρεµφαίνων. 
καινοῦ F, Marcovich   :   καὶ νοῦ BPΦ & Arsen.
When a young lad from Pontus was about to become his student and enquired as to 
what he needed, he (Antisthenes) said 'a new book and a new pencil and a new writing 
tablet,' implying 'intelligence'.
ED4  Diogenes Laertius 6.9 Dorandi = DC 190, SSR 172.
Ποντικοῦ νεανίσκου πολυωρήσειν αὐτοῦ ἐπαγγελλοµένου, εἰ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφίκοιτο 
τῶν ταρίχων, λαβὼν αὐτὸν καὶ θύλακον κενὸν πρὸς ἀλφιτόπωλιν ἧκε καὶ 
σαξάµενος ἀπῄει: τῆς δὲ αἰτούσης τὸ διάφορον, 'ὁ νεανίσκος,' ἔφη, 'δώσει ἐὰν τὸ 
πλοῖον αὐτοῦ τῶν ταρίχων ἀφίκηται.'
When a young lad from Pontus promised to pay him generously, if his ship of salt fish 
should arrive, he (Antisthenes) took him and an empty sack and went to a barley seller 
and having filled it he began to leave.  When the woman asked for cash, he said 'The 
young lad will give it if his ship of salt fish arrives.'
ED5  Diogenes Laertius 6.9-10 Dorandi = DC 133, SSR 21.
αὐτὸς καὶ Ἀνύτῳ τῆς φυγῆς αἴτιος γενέσθαι δοκεῖ καὶ Μελήτῳ τοῦ θανάτου. 
Ποντικοῖς γὰρ νεανίσκοις κατὰ κλέος τοῦ Σωκράτους ἀφιγµένοις περιτυχὼν 
ἀπήγαγεν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὸν Ἄνυτον, εἰπὼν ἐν ἤθει σοφώτερον εἶναι τοῦ Σωκράτους· 
ἐφ᾽ ᾧ διαγανακτήσαντας τοὺς περιεστῶτας ἐκδιῶξαι αὐτόν.
It is thought that he (Antisthenes) was responsible for the exile of Anytus and the death 
of Meletus.   For having fallen in with some youths from Pontus who had come because 
of the reputation of Socrates, he (Antisthenes) led them to Anytus, mentioning deftly that 
he (Anytus) was wiser than Socrates.  Whereupon, those standing around, filled with 
indignation, drove him (Anytus) into exile.
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ED6  Papyrii Florentine 113 Comparetti & Vitelli, Col. 2.26-39 = DC 192, SSR 175, CPF 18 2T.
This papyrus was among a number of papyri purchased in 1903 at the papyrus market in Cairo by Italian Professors 
Breccia, Schiaparelli, and Vitelli.  It currently resides in the Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana in Florence.  The papyrus 
(21.5x24cm) has four columns plus a loose fragment (7.2x5.5cm) which appears to belong at the head of column two.  All  
the columns are incomplete at the top, the first is missing the left half, the third is full of holes, the fourth has only line 
beginnings, but in the second are 30 lines preserved almost intact, and another 13 partial lines.  The Antisthenes 
fragment is at the end of this last portion of the second column.  Preceding the Antisthenes fragment is a discussion that 
seems to be showing the futility of formal training.  It is claimed that untrained persons can perform the tasks of doctors 
and skilled wrestlers equally as well as the professionals can.  Then there is an anecdote wherein someone asks Socrates 
why Alcibiades has not become better after so long an association with Socrates' teaching.  Socrates replies that 
everything that he teaches Alcibiades by day, others undo by night.
						‘φα̣σι 	δε 	κα̣ι  ̣	Ἀν- 26
τ̣ι̣σ̣θ̣[ένη]ν̣	μειρακίου	τινὸς	ἐρᾶν
κ]αι 	τι̣ν̣ας	β[ο]υ̣λο̣με νους	θη-
ρευ  ειν	αυ  το  	ε πι 	δειπν̣ο̣ν	παρ̣α-
τιθέναι	λοπάδας	ι χθυ  [ω]ν̣.•	καὶ	 30
δὴ	εἰπεῖν	τινας	πρὸς	Ἀν̣τισθε -
ν[ην·	'νυ]ν̣	παρευημεροῦσιν	αὐ-
τ[ίκα	ἀν]τερασται '·•	'καὶ	μα ̣ λ̣α,
οὐ	δὲ	θα]λαττοκρατουμαι	δη  ·•
ἀλλὰ	γ]α ̣ ρ	ὁ	μὲν	ἄξιο̣ι̣	τ̣α̣υ̣τ᾽	α[ι ]τειν̣, 	 35
ο  	δ᾽α  πε ]χεσθαι	των	ι  ̣[χθυ  ω]ν̣,
αυ  ριον	δ᾽	ἂν	πα]ρ̣αθη	λο[πα  δας	α  λ-
λος	τις,	οὐκ	ἂν	πά]λιν	οἴχ[οιτο	μ]ε-
τὰ	τούτου;']
31-3		Α ντισθε |ν[ην·	'νυ]ν	παρευημερουσιν	αυ  |τ[ι κα	Crön.			:			Αντισθε|ν[η·	εισι]ν	παρ	ευημερουσιν	αυ|τ[οις	
Comp.					34	οὐ	δὲ	θα]λα-	Kenn.			:			εφη	ου	θα]λα-	Comp.					θα]λαττοκρατοῦμαι	cf.	Demetrius	I	PCG	5	F2					34-5		
δη  ·|	οι εται	γ]α  ρ	Kenn.			:			δητ|εγω	ει	γ]αρ	Comp.			δή-|που	εἰ	γ]ὰρ	Crön.					36	ὁ	δ᾽	Kenn.			:			ε γω  	δ᾽	Comp.					
ι [̣χθυ  ω]ν̣	Kenn.			:			τ̣[οιουτων]	Comp.					37-9	αὔριον	—	τούτου	reconstructed	by	Crön.	   
And they also say that Antisthenes was in love with a young lad, and some men, desiring 
to ensnare the boy, served him (the boy) dishes of fish at a dinner.  
And some other men said to Antisthenes: 'At this very moment your love rivals are 
getting the better of you'. 
'Yes indeed, but I am certainly not mastered by the sea / a ruler of the sea.  Since while 
one man thinks he is right to ask for these things, another thinks it right to keep away 
from fish (i.e. fools), and tomorrow, were someone else to serve him dishes, would he not 
go off in turn with that man?'
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PLATE 1
Florentine Papyrus 113, column 2, lines 26-44
(Close-up of Comparetti and Vitelli, 1908, Tav. III)
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TRAGICA & HOMERICA
TH1  Plutarch, Quomodo adulescens poetas audire debeat 33C Paton = DC 60, SSR 195, TrGF 5.1 
F 19, Ath. 13.582d.
Plutarch, c. AD 45-125, author of parallel lives and moralising, ethical philosophical treatises.  
Cleanthes, c. 331-230 BC, stoic philosopher (student of Zeno of Citium) and prolific author.  
Euripides' Aeolus (423 BC or earlier – parodied by Aristophanes' Clouds of 423) concerns the eponymous king who 
lives on a floating island in the farthest west with his six sons and six daughters (cf. Od. 10.1-12 & schol.).  One son, 
Macareus conceived a passion for his sister Canace, violated her, and made her pregnant. He is likely the speaker of the 
line preserved here, defending himself once discovered and put on trial.
ὅθεν οὐδ᾽ αἱ παραδιορθώσεις φαύλως ἔχουσιν αἷς καὶ Κλεάνθης ἐχρήσατο καὶ 
Ἀντισθένης, ὁ µὲν εὖ µάλα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἰδὼν θορυβήσαντας ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ 
'τί δ᾽ αἰσχρόν, εἰ µὴ τοῖς χρωµένοις δοκεῖ;' (TrGF 5.1 F 19).
παραβαλὼν εὐθύς
'αἰσχρὸν τὸ γ᾽ αἰσχρόν, κἂν δοκῇ κἂν µὴ δοκῇ'. 
For which reason the corrections are not worthless which Cleanthes and Antisthenes 
practised.  For the latter, quite rightly, when observing that the Athenians had raised an 
uproar in the theatre at the line: 
'What is shameful, if its doers do not think so?'
He (Antisthenes) at once put an alternative beside it: 
'What is shameful is shameful, whether one thinks so or no'.
TH2  Diogenes Laertius, 7.19 Dorandi = SSR 137, SVF 1 F 305, TrGF 4 F 1116c.
Zeno of Citium 333-261 BC, the first of the Stoic philosophers by Diogenes Laertius' reckoning.  This passage from 
Diogenes' 'Life of Zeno.'
πρὸς δὲ τὸν φάσκοντα ὡς τὰ πολλὰ αὐτῷ Ἀντισθένης οὐκ ἀρέσκοι, Χρείας 
Σοφοκλέους προενεγκάµενος ἠρώτησεν εἴ τινα καὶ καλὰ ἔχειν αὐτῷ δοκεῖ· τοῦ δ᾽ 
οὐκ εἰδέναι φήσαντος, 'εἶτ᾽ οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ,' ἔφη, 'εἰ µέν τι κακὸν ἦν εἰρηµένον ὑπ᾽ 
Ἀντισθένους τοῦτ᾽ ἐκλεγόµενος καὶ µνηµονεύων, εἰ δέ τι καλόν, οὐδ᾽ ἐπιβαλλόµενος 
κατέχειν;' 
Χρείας Kenn.   :   χρείαν MSS     ὑπ᾽ Ἀντισθένους del. Wilam.
When someone declared to him that for the most part Antisthenes did not please him, he 
(Zeno) brought out Antisthenes' Sayings of Sophocles and asked him if he thought it had 
any noble qualities.  And when he answered that he did not know, he (Zeno) said 'Then 
are you not ashamed that if something base was said by Antisthenes, you pick it out and 
mention it, but if it was something noble, you do not even attempt to understand it?'
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TH3  Scholia in Aristophanes Thesmophoriazusae 21b Regtuit = DC 59, SSR 196, TrGF 4 F 14, 
PCG 3 F 323.
Sophocles' Ajax the Locrian concerned his trial and fate after he raped Cassandra at the altar of Athena during the sack 
of Troy. Aristophanes' Thesmophoriazusae, 411 BC.
– Κηδεστής: οἷον γέ πού ᾽στιν αἱ σοφαὶ ξυνουσίαι . 21
Εὐριπίδης: πόλλ᾽ ἂν µάθοις τοιαῦτα παρ᾽ ἐµοῦ.
Relative: What a thing clever conversations are!
Euripides: Many other such things you could learn from me!
καὶ διὰ τούτου 
φαίνεται ὑπονοῶν Εὐριπίδου εἶναι τὸ 'σοφοὶ τύραννοι τῶν σοφῶν ξυνουσίᾳ.' 
ἔστι δὲ Σοφοκλέους ἐξ Αἴαντος Λοκροῦ. ἐνταῦθα µέντοι ὑπονοεῖ µόνον, ἐν δὲ 
τοῖς Ἥρωσιν ἄντικρυς ἀποφαίνεται. καὶ Ἀντισθένης καὶ Πλάτων Εὐριπίδου 
αὐτὸ εἶναι ἡγοῦνται. οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν ὅ τι παθόντες.  ἔοικε δὲ ἤτοι πεπλανηµένος 5
συνεξαπατῆσαι τοὺς ἄλλους ἤ, ὥσπερ ὑπονοοῦσί τινες, σύµπτωσις γενέσθαι  
τῷ τε Σοφοκεῖ καὶ τῷ Εὐριπίδῃ, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ ἄλλων τινῶν.  τὸ µέντοι δρᾶµα ἐν 
ᾧ Εὐριπίδης ταῦτα εἶπεν, οὐ σῴζεται.
2 ξυνουσίᾳ  Radt   :   συνουσίᾳ Regt.      5 παθόντες Burges in Dobree, Porson   :   παρόντες MSS
And from this he (Aristophanes) appears to be implying that the line was from 
Euripides: 'Kings are wise by way of their association with wise men'.  But it is from 
Sophocles, from his Ajax the Locrian.  Here however he (Aristophanes) only implies it, but 
in the Heroes he openly declares it.  Both Antisthenes and Plato believed it to be by 
Euripides.  I am unable to say what made them think this.  It seems likely to be the case 
either, that having been mislead himself he (Aristophanes) then deceived the others, or, 
as some have supposed, there was a corresponding line in both Sophocles and Euripides, 
as also in some other works.  However the drama in which Euripides said this is not 
preserved.
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TH4  Dio Chrysostom, Oration 53.4-5 Arnim = DC 58, SSR 194.
Dio Chrysostom (earlier called Cocceianus), c. AD 40/50-120, Greek orator and Stoic-Cynic philosopher.  Zeno of 
Citium 333-261 BC, the first of the Stoic philosophers by Diogenes Laertius' reckoning.
ὁ δὲ Ζήνων οὐδὲν τῶν τοῦ Ὁµήρου ψέγει, ἅµα διηγούµενος καὶ 
διδάσκων ὅτι τὰ µὲν κατὰ δόξαν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν γέγραφεν, 
ὅπως µὴ φαίνηται αὐτὸς αὑτῷ µαχόµενος ἔν τισι δοκοῦσιν ἐναντίως 30
εἰρήσθαι. ὁ δὲ λόγος οὗτος, Ἀντισθένους ἐστὶ πρότερον, ὅτι τὰ 
µὲν δόξῃ, τὰ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ εἴρηται τῷ ποιητῇ· ἀλλ᾽ ὁ µὲν οὐκ ἐξειρ-
γάσατο αὐτόν, ὁ δὲ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐπὶ µέρους ἐδήλωσεν.
28 τοῦ del Wilam.     ψέγει Emperius   :   λέγει MSS     ἅµα Jacobs   :   ἀλλὰ MSS
Zeno found no fault in the works of Homer, at the same time interpreting them and 
teaching that he (Homer) had written some things as people think them to be, and other 
things as they really are, in order that he (Homer) not appear to be contradicting himself 
when saying some things that seem to be contrary.  But this theory was Antisthenes' first, 
i.e. that some things are said by the poet as they are thought to be, but others as they 
really are; but the latter did not fully expound this theory, whereas the former set it out 
section by section.
TH5  Arsenius, Monembasias Apophthegmata s.v. Ἀντισθένους Walz 109 = DC 176, Od. 4.392.
Arsenius, AD 354-445, tutor to emperor Theodosius I's children, author of teachings for monks & apophthegmata.
ὁ αὐτὸς ἐρωτηθεὶς ποῖα δεῖ µανθάνειν τοῦ Ὁµήρου, ἔφη, 'ὅττι τοι ἐν µεγάροισι κακόν 
τ᾽ ἀγαθόν τε τέτυκται' (Od. 4.392). 
When he was asked what sort of things one should learn from Homer he said 'What evil 
and what good has been wrought in our halls' (Od. 4.392).
TH6  Scholia in Lipsiensis Graecus 32 to the Iliad 15.123 Erbse = DC 56, SSR 192. 
The fullest version of this scholion, as presented here, is found only in the Lipsiensis manuscript.
– εἰ µὴ Ἀθήνη πᾶσι περιδείσασα θεοῖσι. 15.123
If Athena had not been seized with fear for all the gods.
εἰκότως δὲ ὡς δεδοικυῖα τὸν πατέρα καὶ ἤδη πεπαιδευµένη µὴ ἐναντιοῦσθαι, περὶ 
τῶν µελλόντων ἡ γλαυκῶπις φροντίζει. ἐκ τούτου καὶ Ἀντισθένης φησίν ὡς, εἴ τι 
πράττει ὁ σοφός, κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἐνεργεῖ, ὡς καὶ ἡ Ἀθηνᾶ τριχῶς νουθετεῖ τὸν 
Ἄρην.
περὶ ... φροντίζει b   :  ὀφρ᾽ εἰδῇ γλαυκῶπις T (= Il. 8.406)      ἐκ τούτου etc. only in Lip.
Naturally, as she was afraid of her father and had already been trained not to oppose 
him, the Gleaming-eyed One was worried about the future.  From this Antisthenes also 
said that if a wise man does something, he executes it with all his excellence (i.e. to the 
best of his ability), so also Athena warned Ares three times.
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TH7  Scholia Venetus to the Iliad 23.66 Erbse = DC 57, SSR 193.
– ἦλθε δ᾽ ἐπὶ ψυχὴ Πατροκλῆος δειλοῖο,
πάντ᾽ αὐτῷ µέγεθός τε καὶ ὄµµατα κάλ᾽ εἰκυῖα, 66
καὶ φωνήν, καὶ τοῖα περὶ χροῒ εἵµατα ἕστο.
And there came to him the spirit of wretched Patroclus,
completely like his own self in stature, and beautiful eyes,
and voice, and the sort of garments that were clothed around his body. 
ἐντεῦθεν Ἀντισθένης ὁµοσχήµονάς φησι τὰς ψυχὰς τοῖς περιέχουσι σώµασιν εἶναι.
σώµασιν εἶναι A   :   σώµασι bT
From this Antisthenes said that spirits/souls have the same form as the bodies that 
contain them.
TH8  Porphyry, Scholia to the Iliad 11.636-7 Schrader 168.10-16 = DC 55, SSR 191.
Porphyry, AD 234-c.305, philosopher and theologian, student of Plotinus, author of c. 70 titles including 'Isagoge', an 
introduction to Aristotle, and philological studies of Homer's works.  His work on Homer is lost but fragments survive 
in multiple adaptations by scholiasts in the margins of manuscripts containing the Homeric epics.
– Νέστωρ δ᾽ ὁ γέρων ἀµογητὶ ἄειρεν. 11.637
But Nestor, the old man, lifted it up effortlessly.
διὰ τί πεποίηκε µόνον τὸν Νέστορα αἴροντα τὸ ἔκποµα; οὐ γὰρ εἰκὸς ῥᾷον αἴρειν 
νεωτέρων […] Ἀντισθένης δέ· οὐ περὶ τῆς κατὰ χείρα βαρύτητος λέγει, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι οὐκ 
ἐµεθύσκετο σηµαίνει· ἀλλ᾽ ἔφερε ῥᾳδίως τὸν οἶνον.
νεωτέρων MSS   :   νεώτερον L     [ … ] excised here, before Ἀντισθένης, an explanation from Stesimbrotos
Why did he (Homer) portray only Nestor raising the goblet?  Since it is not likely that it 
was easier for him to lift it than it would have been for younger men […] Antisthenes: he 
(Homer) was not saying that he shifted the greatest weight by hand, but rather he 
(Homer) was indicating that he (Nestor) was not becoming drunk – he could easily hold 
his wine.
TH9  Porphyry, Scholia to the Odyssey 9.525 Schrader = DC 54, SSR 190.
τί ὁ Ὀδυσσεὺς οὕτως ἀνοήτως εἰς τὸν Ποσειδῶνα ὠλιγώρησεν εἰπών· 'ὡς οὐκ 
ὀφθαλµόν γ᾽ ἰήσεται οὐδ᾽ Ἐνοσίχθων (Od. 9.525)'; Ἀντισθένης µέν φησι διὰ τὸ 
εἰδέναι ὅτι οὐκ ἦν ἰατρὸς ὁ Ποσειδῶν ἀλλ᾽ ὁ Ἀπόλλων. 
For what reason did Odysseus so stupidly slight Poseidon, saying: 'As not even the 
Earth-Shaker (Poseidon) will heal your eye' (Od. 9.525)?  Antisthenes says it is because he 
(Odysseus) knew that Poseidon was not a doctor, but rather Apollo was.
149
TH10  Xenophon, Symposion 3.5-6 Ollier = DC 61, SSR 185.
Stesimbrotos (FGrH 107), from Thasos, active late 5th c., rhapsode and exegete of Homeric and Orphic texts, listed by 
Ion among the great rhapsodes to whom he considers himself superior (Pl. Ion 530d = FGrH 107 T 3).
Anaximander (FGrH 9), from Miletus, active c. 404-358, wrote exegeses of Pythagorean codes and Homeric texts. 
5 ἀλλὰ σὺ αὖ, ἔφη (ὁ Ἀντισθένης), λέγε, ὦ Νικήρατε, ἐπὶ ποίᾳ ἐπιστήµῃ µέγα 
φρονεῖς. 
καὶ ὃς εἶπεν· ὁ πατὴρ ὁ ἐπιµελούµενος ὅπως ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς γενοίµην ἠνάγκασέ µε 
πάντα τὰ Ὁµήρου ἔπη µαθεῖν· καὶ νῦν δυναίµην ἂν Ἰλιάδα ὅλην καὶ Ὀδύσσειαν ἀπὸ 
στόµατος εἰπεῖν. 
6 ἐκεῖνο δ᾽ ἔφη ὁ Ἀντισθένης, λέληθέ σε, ὅτι καὶ οἱ ῥαψῳδοὶ πάντες ἐπίστανται ταῦτα 
τὰ ἔπη; 
καὶ πῶς ἄν, ἔφη, λελήθοι ἀκροώµενόν γε αὐτῶν ὀλίγου ἀν᾽ ἑκάστην ἡµέραν; 
οἶσθά τι οὖν ἔθνος, ἔφη, ἠλιθιώτερον ῥαψῳδῶν; 
οὐ µὰ τὸν Δία, ἔφη ὁ Νικήρατος, οὔκουν ἔµοιγε δοκῶ. 
δῆλον γάρ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ὅτι τὰς ὑπονοίας οὐκ ἐπίστανται. σὺ δὲ Στησιµβρότῳ 
(FGrH 107 T 4) τε καὶ Ἀναξιµάνδρῳ (FGrH 9 T 3) καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς πολὺ δέδωκας 
ἀργύριον, ὥστε οὐδέν σε τῶν πολλοῦ ἀξίων λέληθε. 
5 'But now you,' he (Antisthenes) said, 'tell us Nikeratos, what sort of knowledge you 
pride yourself on.'  
And he (Nikeratos) replied: 'my father, who was very concerned that I should become a 
good man, compelled me to learn the entire epics of Homer.  And at this moment  I could 
recite the whole Iliad and Odyssey by heart.'  
6 And Antisthenes said to him, 'has it escaped your notice that all the rhapsodes also 
know these epics?'  
'How could that escape my notice when I hear them almost every day?'  
'So do you know any group of people who are sillier than rhapsodes?'  
'No by Zeus,' said Nikeratos, 'not as far as I know.'  
'For it is clear,' said Socrates, 'that they don't know the underlying meanings.  But you 
gave a lot of money to Stesimbrotos and Anaximander and to many others so that you 
would miss nothing valuable.'
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6 ἐκ τούτου δὲ ὁ Νικήρατος, ἀκούοιτ᾽ ἄν, ἔφη, καὶ ἐµοῦ ἃ ἔσεσθε βελτίονες, ἂν ἐµοῖ 
συνῆτε. ἴστε γὰρ δήπου ὅτι Ὅµηρος ὁ σοφώτατος πεποίηκε σχεδὸν περὶ πάντων τῶν 
ἀνθρωπίνων. ὅστις ἂν οὖν ὑµῶν βούληται ἢ οἰκονοµικὸς ἢ δηµηγορικὸς ἢ 
στρατηγικὸς γενέσθαι ἢ ὅµοιος Ἀχιλλεῖ ἢ Αἴαντι ἢ Νέστορι ἢ Ὀδυσεῖ, ἐµὲ 
θεραπευέτω. ἐγὼ γὰρ ταῦτα πάντα ἐπίσταµαι. 
ἦ καὶ βασιλεύειν, ἔφη ὁ Ἀντισθένης, ἐπίστασαι, ὅτι οἶσθα ἐπαινέσαντα αὐτὸν τὸν 
Ἀγαµέµνονα ὡς 
'βασιλεύς τε εἴη ἀγαθὸς κρατερός τ᾽ αἰχµητής'; (Il. 3.179)
καὶ ναὶ µὰ Δί᾽, ἔφη, ἔγωγε ὅτι ἁρµατηλατοῦντα δεῖ ἐγγὺς µὲν τῆς στήλης κάµψαι (Il. 
23.323,334), 
'αὐτὸν δὲ κλινθῆναι ἐυξέστου ἐπὶ δίφρου 
ἦκ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἀριστερὰ τοῖιν, ἀτὰρ τὸν δεξιὸν ἵππον 
κένσαι ὁµοκλήσαντ᾽ εἶξαί τέ οἱ ἡνία χερσί.' (Il. 23.335-7) 
7 καὶ πρὸς τούτοις γε ἄλλο οἶδα, καὶ ὑµῖν αὐτίκα µάλ᾽ ἔξεστι πειρᾶσθαι. εἶπε γάρ που 
Ὅµηρος· 'ἐπὶ δὲ κρόµυον ποτῷ ὄψον.' (Il. 11.630)
6 After this, Nikeratos said 'you (all) would now hear from me the respects in which you 
will be improved, if you associate with me.  For I presume you know that Homer, the 
cleverest man, has written concerning almost every topic of humanity.  Any of you who 
wishes to become skilled in household management, or political arts, or generalship, or 
to be like Achilles, or Ajax, or Nestor, or Odysseus, should attend to me.  For I 
understand all these things.'  
'You understand kingship too do you?' said Antisthenes, 'so that you know that he 
praises Agamemnon as “both a good king and a mighty warrior?”' (Il. 3.179)
'Yes I do, by Zeus!' he said, 'and I also know a charioteer must turn close to the turning-
post (Il. 23.323, 334), “yourself leaning upon the well-polished car a little to the left, but 
goading on the right-hand horse with shouts, and give him the reins from your hands.” 
(Il. 23.335-337)  7 And in fact in addition to this I know something else, and it is possible 
to test it immediately.  For Homer says somewhere: “An onion adds relish to a drink.”' 
(Il. 11.630)
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Pontani = DC 51, SSR 187, Il. 9.313, Od. 19.521.
Porphyry, AD 234-c.305, philosopher and theologian, student of Plotinus, author of c. 70 titles including 'Isagoge', an 
introduction to Aristotle, and philological studies of Homer's works.  His work on Homer is lost but fragments survive 
in multiple adaptations by scholiasts in the margins of manuscripts containing the Homeric epics.
Πορφορίου· πολύτροπον. 'οὐκ ἐπαινεῖν', φησιν Ἀντισθένης 'Ὅµηρον 5
τὸν Ὀδυσσέα µᾶλλον ἢ ψέγειν, λέγοντα αὐτὸν “πολύτροπον.” οὔκουν 
τὸν Ἀχιλλέα καὶ τὸν Αἴαντα πολυτρόπους πεποιηκέναι, ἀλλ᾽ ἁπλοῦς καὶ 
γεννάδας· οὐδὲ τὸν Νέστορα τὸν σοφόν, οὐ µὰ Δία, δόλιον καὶ παλίµ-
βολον τὸ ἦθος, ἀλλ᾽ ἁπλῶς τῷ Ἀγαµέµνονι συνόντα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις
ἅπασι, καὶ εἰς τὸ στρατόπεδον, εἴ τι ἀγαθὸν εἶχε, συµβουλεύοντα καὶ οὐκ 10
ἀποκρυπτόµενον. καὶ τοσοῦτον ἀπεῖχε τοῦ τὸν τοιοῦτον τρόπον ἀποδέ-
χεσθαι ὁ Ἀχιλλεύς, ὡς ἐχθρὸν ἡγεῖσθαι ὁµοίως τῷ θανάτῳ ἐκεῖνον, “ὅς 
χ᾽ ἕτερον µὲν κεύθει ἐνὶ φρεσίν, ἄλλο δὲ εἴπῃ” (Il. 9.313).'
λύων οὖν ὁ Ἀντισθένης φησί· 'τί οὖν; ἆρα γε πονηρὸς ὁ Ὀδυσσεύς, ὅτι
πολύτροπος ἐρρέθη, καὶ µή, διότι σοφός, οὕτως αὐτὸν προσείρηκεν; 15
µήποτε οὖν τρόπος τὸ µέν τι σηµαίνει τὸ ἦθος, τὸ δέ τι σηµαίνει τὴν τοῦ
λόγου χρῆσιν; εὔτροπος γὰρ ἀνὴρ ὁ τὸ ἦθος ἔχων εἰς τὸ εὖ τετραµµένον. 
τρόποι δὲ λόγου αἱ ποιαὶ πλάσεις· καὶ χρῆται τῷ τρόπῳ καὶ ἐπὶ 
φωνῆς καὶ ἐπὶ µελῶν ἐξαλλαγῆς, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ἀηδόνος· “ἥτε θαµὰ τρωπῶσα 
χέει πολυηχέα φωνήν” (Od. 19.521).  εἰ δὲ οἱ σοφοὶ δεινοί εἰσι διαλέγεσθαι, 20
καὶ ἐπίστανται τὸ αὐτὸ νόηµα κατὰ πολλοὺς τρόπους λέγειν·
13 κεύθει corr. Polak   :   κεύθῃ MSS Hom.     εἴπῃ MSS Hom.   :   βάζει H Pont.     18 λόγου MSS   :   λόγων H Pont.     αἱ 
ποιαὶ πλάσεις conj. Buttm.   :   αἴτιοι αἱ πλάσεις MSS   :   αἴτιοι αἱ πολλαὶ χρήσεις Luzzatto    
Porphyry: polytropos.  Antisthenes says (Speaker One): 'Homer was criticising Odysseus 
rather than praising him when he called him polytropos (many-mannered).  Indeed he did 
not represent Achilles and Ajax as polytropos, but rather as honest (haplous) and noble.  
Nor indeed Nestor the wise man (sophos), no by god, he was not portrayed as having a 
deceitful and shifty character, but rather he was a man who conversed honestly (haplōs) 
with Agamemnon and all the others, and if he had something worth saying to the army, 
he gave advice and concealed nothing.  Achilles also was so far from accepting such a 
manner (tropos), that he thought that man hateful as death “who concealed one thing in 
his heart, but said another” (Il. 9.313).'  
So explicating it, Antisthenes says (Speaker Two): 'What then?  Is it really because 
Odysseus is wicked that he was called polytropos, and not because he was wise (sophos) 
that Homer called him that?  Does tropos then never indicate (σηµαίνει) partly character 
and indicate (σηµαίνει) partly the use of speech?  Because a man is of noble-manner 
(eutropos) who has a well-formed character.  And tropoi are qualitative figures of speech; 
and he uses trope both in respect of his voice, and in respect of the variations of tone, as 
does the nightingale: “and frequently turning (trōpōsa), she pours forth her many-toned 
voice” (Od. 19.521).  And if the wise men (sophoi) are wonderful at conversing, they also 
know how to express the same thought in many manners (polloi tropoi).
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ἐπι-
στάµενοι δὲ πολλοὺς τρόπους λόγων περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, πολύτροποι ἂν 
εἶεν. εἰ δὲ οἱ σοφοὶ καὶ <ἀνθρώποις ὁµιλεῖν> ἀγαθοί εἰσι, διὰ τοῦτό φησι τὸν Ὀδυσσέα
Ὅµηρος σοφὸν ὄντα πολύτροπον εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἠπίστατο
πολλοῖς τρόποις συνεῖναι.' 25
'οὕτω καὶ Πυθαγόρας λέγεται πρὸς παῖδας ἀξιωθεὶς ποιήσασθαι λό-
γους διαθεῖναι πρὸς αὐτοὺς λόγους παιδικούς, καὶ πρὸς γυναῖκας 
γυναιξὶν ἁρµοδίους, καὶ πρὸς ἄρχοντας ἀρχοντικούς, καὶ πρὸς ἐφήβους 
ἐφηβικούς· τὸν γὰρ ἑκάστοις πρόσφορον τρόπον τοῦ λόγου ἐξευρίσκειν 
σοφίας ἐστίν· ἀµαθίας δὲ τὸ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνοµοίως ἔχοντας τῷ τοῦ λόγου χρῆσθαι 30
µονοτρόπῳ.  ἔχειν δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἐν τῇ τῆς τέχνης κατορθώ-
σει, ἠσκηκυῖαν τῆς θεραπείας τὸ πολύτροπον διὰ τὴν τῶν θερα-
πευοµένων ποικίλην σύστασιν.  τρόπος µὲν οὖν τὸ παλίµβολον τὸ τοῦ 
ἤθους, τὸ πολυµετάβολον καὶ ἄστατον. λόγου δὲ πολυτροπία καὶ χρῆσις ποικίλη λό-
γου εἰς ποικίλας ἀκοὰς µονοτροπία γίνεται. ἓν γὰρ τὸ ἑκάστῳ οἰκεῖον· 35
διὸ καὶ τὸ ἁρµόδιον ἑκάστῳ τὴν ποικιλίαν τοῦ λόγου εἰς ἓν συναγείρει 
τὸ ἑκάστῳ πρόσφορον. τὸ δ᾽ αὖ µονοειδὲς, ἀνάρµοστον ὂν πρὸς ἀκοὰς 
διαφόρους πολύτροπον ποιεῖ τὸν ἄλλως  ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀπόβλητον ὡς αὐτοῖς 
ἀπότροπον λόγον.'
23  ἀνθρώποις ὁµιλεῖν add. Schr.     29 τοῦ λόγου conj. Buttm.   :   τῆς σοφίας MSS     30 σοφίας ἐστίν only Z     ἀµαθίας 
δὲ εἶναι M1Z     32 ἠσκηκυῖαν Polak   :   -ας MSS     33 ποικιλίας Z    lacuna after σύστασιν Schr.     34 καὶ ἄστατον 
Porph. Il. Schr.     38 ἄλλως add. Schr.     39  ἀπότροπον conj. Ludw.   :   ἀπόβλητον MSS   :   ἀπρόσβατον Polak
'And understanding many manners (polloi tropoi) of speech, regarding this same thing 
they would be polytropoi.  But if wise men (sophoi) are good <at conversing with> men, 
then because of this Homer said that Odysseus, being wise (sophos), was polytropos, 
because indeed he knew how to converse with men in many manners (polloi tropoi).  
And thus Pythagoras is said to have thought it appropriate when making speeches to 
children, to pitch childish speeches to them, and to women, speech fitting for women, 
and for rulers, ruler-like speech, and for adolescents, adolescent speech; since to discover 
the suitable manner (tropos) of speech for each person is characteristic of wisdom (sophia); 
but it is characteristic of artlessness to use a single-manner (monotropos) of speech when 
addressing those of diverse character.  Medicine is like this too, in the successful 
adjustment of the art, since the practice of the treatment is polytropos, on account of the 
varied constitutions of the patients.  So certainly tropos is variability of character, highly 
versatile and adaptable.  But many-manners (polytropia) of speech, and the changing 
(poikilē) use of speech, becomes one-manner (monotropia) to changing (poikilai) ears.  This 
is because there is one appropriate manner of speech for each person.  As a result, the 
adjustment for each person arranges the diversity (poikilia) of speech into a single 
element that is suitable for each. On the other hand, uniformity of speech, being 
unadjusted for different ears, is made polytropos, which is rejected by many people, as it 
is alien in manner (apotropos) to them.'
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TH13a  Porphyry, Scholia T to the Odyssey 7.257 Dindorf 347.13-22 (= Schr. note 69.2, 68.25) = 
DC 52b, SSR 188.
Porphyry, AD 234-c.305, philosopher and theologian, student of Plotinus, author of c. 70 titles including 'Isagoge', an 
introduction to Aristotle, and philological studies of Homer's works.  His work on Homer is lost but fragments survive 
in multiple adaptations by scholiasts in the margins of manuscripts containing the Homeric epics.
– ἠδὲ ἔφασκε | θήσειν ἀθάνατον (Od. 7.256-7)
She (Calypso) declared that she would make me (Odysseus) immortal.
καὶ διὰ τί µὴ βεβούληται;  ἔοικε διὰ τὸ (347.13)
οὔποτ᾽ ἔπειθε.  δῆλον οὖν οὐ τὸ µὴ θέλειν γενέσαι ἀθάνατος, ἀλλὰ
τὸ µὴ πιστεῦσαι αὐτῇ τοιαῦτα λεγούσῃ.  ἡ µὲν γὰρ ἔφασκε ποιή- (15)
σειν, ὁ δὲ οὐκ ἐπίστευεν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχὶ πιστεύων παρῃτεῖτο.  ᾔδει γὰρ 
ὡς σοφὸς ὅτι ἀθανασίαν οὐχ αἱ τοιαῦται δαίµονες χαρίσαιντ᾽ ἂν, 5
ἀλλὰ τοῦ Διὸς ἂν εἴη καὶ τῶν ἔργων ἃ πέφυκεν ἀπαθανατίζειν.  Ἀν-
τισθένης δέ φησιν ὅτι τοὺς ἐρῶντας ᾔδη ψευδοµένους τὰς ὑποσχέσεις·
τοῦτο γὰρ ποιεῖν οὐκ ἐδύνατο δίχα Διός.  ταῦτα γὰρ οὕτως (20)
ἐνδείκνυται ὅτι πάντων τῶν πραγµάτων προτέθεικε τὸν νόστον, ἵνα
µᾶλλον ὑπακούσῃ Ἀλκίνοος. 10
8  ἐδύνατο P.Q., Schr.   :   ἠδύνατο T, Dind.     ταῦτα Schr.   :   τὰ MSS     9 τῶν T, Schr.   :   τοῦ Dind.
And why he was unwilling (to accept Calypso's offer)?  It appears to be a result of the 
fact that she (Calypso) never persuaded him (Odysseus).  For it is clear that it was not 
that he did not wish to become immortal, but rather that he did not believe her saying 
such things.  Because she declared that she would do it, but he did not believe her, so not 
believing her, he declined her offer.  For he knew, as he was clever, that such goddesses 
would not grant immortality, but it would be from Zeus, and from deeds of the kind that 
normally confer immortality.  And Antisthenes says that he (Odysseus) knew that people 
in love make false promises; for she was unable to do this without Zeus' consent.  He 
(Odysseus) indeed spoke in this way because he put his home-coming before all other 
matters, so that Alcinoös might be more persuaded.
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TH13b  Porphyry, Scholia Vd to the Odyssey 23.337 Schrader 68.23-69.16 = SSR 188.
– ἀλλὰ τοῦ οὔ ποτε θυµὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν ἔπειθεν. (Od. 23.337)
But she (Calypso) could never persuade the heart in his (Odysseus') breast.
διὰ τί Ὀδυσσεὺς, τῆς Καλυψοῦς διδούσης αὐτῷ τὴν ἀθανασίαν, (68.23)
οὐκ ἐδέξατο; Ἀριστοτέλης [F 401 Gigon/F 178 Rose] µὲν οὖν πρὸς τοὺς 
Φαίακάς φησι ταῦτα λέγειν Ὀδυσσέα, ἵνα σεµνότερος φαίνηται καὶ µᾶλλον 
ἄλλων σπουδάσαι πάντων τὸν νόστον· συνέφερε γὰρ αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸ (69.1)
θᾶττον ἀποσταλῆναι. ἔπειτα ἔοικεν οὐ τῷ µὴ πεισθῆναι λέγειν µὴ λαβεῖν 5
τὴν τοιαύτην δωρεάν, ἀλλὰ µὴ πιστεῦσαι αὐτῇ τοιαῦτα λεγούσῃ· ἡ µὲν 
γὰρ ἔφασκε ποιήσειν, ὁ δὲ οὐκ ἐπίστευσεν, οὐχὶ πιστεύων παρῃτεῖτο.
εἴη δ᾽ ἂν καὶ τοῦ σοφοῦ ἀθανασία οὐχ ἣν τοιαῦται δαίµονες χαρίσαιντ᾽ (5)
ἂν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ Διὸς ἂν εἴη καὶ τῶν ἔργων, ἃ µὲν πέφυκεν ἀπαθανα-
τίζειν· τοιαῦτα δ᾽ ἂν εἴη ἀπὸ ἀρετῆς. παραιτούµενος δὲ τοὺς οἰκείους 10
καὶ τὴν εἰς οἶκον ἐπάνοδον δι᾽ ἐπαγγελίαν ἀθανασίας ἀπώλεσεν ἂν τὴν 
ἀρετήν. σὺν αὐτῇ δὲ καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀθανασίαν καὶ τὴν πρὸς θεοὺς 
ἄνοδον ἀπώλεσεν ἄν. διδάσκει οὖν ὅτι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων οὐκ ἄν τις ἐν- (10)
δύοιτο τὰ ἐναντία, ὡς οὔτε δι᾽ ἀποστερήσεως λάβοι ἂν δικαιοσύνην 
οὔτε ἂν διὰ µάχης σωφροσύνην οὔτε διὰ τοῦ φιλεῖν τὸν τῇδε βίον 15
θνητὸν ὄντα καὶ ἐπίκηρον τὸ τέλος τῆς ἀθανασίας, οὔσης ἀνδρὸς τὰ 
καθήκοντα καὶ τῶν ἔργων τὰ τοιαῦτα φιλοῦντος ἃ καθήρειεν ἂν τὴν 
ψυχήν, ………………………………………………… α τοῖς θεοῖς γίνεται (15)
πάντα …………………………………… ἐπέ τυχεν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τοῦ τέλους.
18  Schr.: 'post ψυχὴν et post πάντα 23 litt. avuls.    supr. γίνεται rubr. σθαι script.'     19  ἐπέ- add.  Kenn.
Why did Odysseus not accept the immortality Calypso was offering him?  Aristotle says, 
that Odysseus told these things to the Phaeacians so that he would appear more 
honourable and more eager about his home-coming than all other things.  Since it suited 
him 5 to be sent off more quickly.  Secondly, it appears not to be the case that he said he 
did not accept such a gift because he was not persuaded by it, but rather because he did 
not believe her when she was saying such things.  For while she declared that she would 
do it, he did not believe her, and not believing her, he declined her offer.  And also, for a 
clever man immortality would not be something that such goddesses would grant, but 
rather it would be from Zeus, and from deeds of the kind that normally confer 
immortality.  10 Such things should come from excellence.  But by rejecting his family and 
his journey home for the promise of immortality he would have lost his excellence.  And 
also, being together with her he would have lost both the immortality of his soul and his 
path up to the gods.  So this teaches that by means of the opposite actions one would not 
enter into the opposite state, so that one would not receive justice by withholding it, 15 
nor would one achieve restraint through strife, nor through loving life in this way – it 
being mortal and perishable – would one achieve the goal of immortality, which is for a 
man who loves his duty and loves such deeds as purify the soul … … all of which the 
gods have (?) … … he had attained, but not the goal (of immortality/dying prosperous?).
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– οὐ µέν θην κείνης γε χερείων εὔχοµαι εἶναι. (Od. 5.211)
I (Calypso) declare that I am surely not inferior to her (Penelope).
Ἀντισθένης φησὶν εἰδέναι σοφὸν ὄντα τὸν Ὀδυσσέα, ὅτι οἱ (69.17)
ἐρῶντες πολλὰ ψεύδονται καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα ἐπαγγέλλονται. ἐπισηµαί-
νεται δὲ καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν δι᾽ ἣν παραίτησιν πεποίηται τῆς θεοῦ.
ἐκείνης µὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ σώµατος εὐµορφίᾳ καὶ µεγέθει µεγαλαυχούσης καὶ (70.1)
τὰ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν προκρινούσης τῆς Πηνελόπης, συγχωρήσας µὲν τοῦτο 5
καὶ τῷ ἀδήλῳ εἴξας – ἄδηλον µὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ, εἰ 'ἀθάνατος καὶ 
ἀγήρως' (Od. 5.218) – ἐπεσηµήνατο ὅτι τὴν γαµετὴν ζητεῖ διὰ τὸ εἶναι 
περίφρονα, ὡς κἀκείνης ἂν ἀµελήσας, εἰ τῷ σώµατι καὶ µόνῳ τῷ κάλλει (5)
κεκόσµητο. τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ τοὺς µνηστῆρας εἰρηκέναι πολλάκις, λέ- 10
γοντας· 'οὐδ᾽ ἐπὶ ἄλλας ἐρχόµεθα, ἃς ἐπιεικὲς ὀπυιέµεν ἐστὶν 
ἑκάστῳ, ταύτης δὲ ἕνεκα τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιδικαζόµεθα' (Od. 2.206-7).
τὰ δὲ τῆς Καλυψοῦς ἐστι τοιαῦτα· 'οὐ µὲν ἐγὼ κείνης χερείων
εὔχοµαι εἶναι, οὐ δέµας οὐδὲ φυήν, οὐδὲ ἔοικε θνητὰς ἀθα- (10)
νάτῃσι δέµας ἐρίζειν καὶ εἶδος' (Od. 5.211-3), τὰ σωµατικὰ µόνον παραβαλ- 15
λούσης· τοῦ δὲ Ὀδυσσέως. 'οἶδα καὶ αὐτὸς πάντα µάλ᾽, οὕνεκα 
σεῖο περίφρων Πηνελόπεια εἶδος ἀκιδνοτέρη µέγεθός τ᾽ εἰς
ἄντα ἰδέσθαι· ἡ µὲν γὰρ βροτός ἐστι, σὺ δ᾽ ἀθάνατος καὶ 
ἀγήρως' (Od. 5.215-8)· τὸ γὰρ περίφρων Πηνελόπεια ἔµφασιν ἔχει τῆς κατὰ ὄρεξιν (15)
προκρίσεως. 20
2  ἐπαγγέλλονται E, Dind., Caiz.   :   παραγγέλλονται Vd, Schr., Gian.        3 τὴν αἰτίαν add. Schr.     τὴν αἰτίαν, τὴν 
παραίτησιν δι᾽ ἣν πεποίηται. τῆς θεοῦ Schr.     7 ἐπεσηµήνατο Schr.   :   ἐπεσηµήνασθαι MSS     11 ante οὐδ᾽ add. 
εἵνεκα τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐριδαίνοµεν Od. 2.206 Allen     12 post ἑκάστῳ del. ταύτης δὲ ἕνεκα τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιδικαζόµεθα Od. 
2.207 Allen     13-20 [τὰ … προκρίσεως] Schr.
Antisthenes says that that Odysseus, being clever, knew that people in love tell a lot of 
lies and promise the impossible.  He also indicated the reason why he made the rejection 
of the goddess.  For whereas she prided herself on the beautiful form and large size of 
her body, and she judged her attributes superior to Penelope's – though he conceded this 
and yielded to something he was unsure of; it being unclear to him whether she was 
'immortal and ageless' (Od. 5.218) – he indicated that he was seeking his wife because she 
was prudent, and that he would have ignored her too, if she had only embellished her 
body and her beauty.  For this the suitors also often stated: 'we do not go after other 
women, whom it would be possible for each of us to fittingly wed, but for the sake of her 
excellence we make our claims for her hand' (Od. 2.206-7).  The arguments of Calypso 
were as follows: 'I profess that I am not inferior to her, neither in bodily form nor in 
stature, and nor is it fitting for mortal women to vie with an immortal in bodily form and 
beauty' (Od. 5.211-3) – comparing only physical points with her.  And the arguments of 
Odysseus: 'I myself know very well that prudent Penelope is less impressive to look 
upon than you in both beauty and size.  For she is mortal, whereas you are immortal and 
ageless' (Od. 5.215-8).  Since the expression 'prudent Penelope' holds a suggestion of a 
preference based on an inclination.
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– ἀλλ᾽ ἐµὸν οὔποτε θυµὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν ἔπειθον. (Od. 9.33)
But they (Circe & Calypso) could never persuade the heart in my breast.
ἴσως µὲν κατ᾽ ἄλλον λογισµὸν οὐκ (408.20)
ἐπείθετο ὁ Ὀδυσσεὺς, εἰδὼς τοὺς ἐρῶντας πάντα µὲν ὑπισχνουµένους, 
τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀθανασίας ὡς ἀδύνατον ὂν  ἀνθρώπῳ δοῦναι·  πρὸς µέντοι τοὺς 
Φαίακας οὐχ ὡς ἀπιστῶν λέγει, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς καὶ ἀθανασίας καταφρονήσας 
πόθῳ τῆς πατρίδος·  τοῦτο γὰρ εἶχεν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἤθους [τῆς πατρίδος] 5
σύστασιν. (25)
3 ὂν ins. Polak     4  ἀπιστῶν Polak   :   ἄπιστον MSS     5 τῆς πατρίδος post ἤθους del. Polak
Perhaps there is another reason why Odysseus was not persuaded (by Calypso's offer), 
namely, he knew that lovers promise everything, and knew that the granting of 
immortality to a human was impossible.  To the Phaeacians, however, he did not say that 
he did not believe her, but that from longing for his fatherland he disdained even 
immortality.  Since this showed the constitution of his character.
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Porphyry, AD 234-c.305, philosopher and theologian, student of Plotinus, author of c. 70 titles including 'Isagoge', an 
introduction to Aristotle, and philological studies of Homer's works.  His work on Homer is lost but fragments survive 
in multiple adaptations by scholiasts in the margins of manuscripts containing the Homeric epics.
– Κυκλώπων δ᾽ ἐς γαῖαν ὑπερφιάλων ἀθεµίστων (Od. 9.106).
The land of the Cyclopes, imperious and unrighteous creatures.
πῶς ὑπερφιάλους καὶ ἀθεµίστους καὶ παρανόµους εἰπὼν τοὺς Κύ-  (86.14)
κλωπας ἄφθονα (Hes.Op.118) παρὰ θεῶν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν λέγει τὰ ἀγαθά; ῥητέον 
οὖν ὅτι ὑπερφιάλους µὲν διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ σώµατος, ἀθεµίστους 
δὲ τοὺς µὴ νόµῳ χρωµένους ἐγγράφῳ διὰ τὸ ἕκαστον τῶν ἰδίων ἄρ- (87.1)
χειν· 'θεµιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος παίδων ἠδ᾽ ἀλόχου' (Od.9.115), ὅπερ 5
ἀνοµίας σηµεῖον. Ἀντισθένης δέ φησιν ὅτι µόνον τὸν Πολύφηµον 
εἶναι ἄδικον· καὶ γὰρ ὄντως τοῦ Διὸς ὑπερόπτης ἐστίν· οὐκοῦν οἱ 
λοιποὶ δίκαιοι; διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτοῖς τὰ πάντα ἀναδιδόναι (5)
αὐτοµάτως (Hes.Op.118)· καὶ τὸ µὴ ἐργάζεσθαι αὐτὴν δίκαιον ἔργον ἐστίν. ἀλλ᾽
ἔµπροσθεν εἶπε βιαίους· 'οἵ σφεας σινέσκοντο, βίηφι δὲ φέρτεροι 10
ἦσαν' (Od.6.6). ὥσπερ καὶ τοὺς Γίγαντας· ὅσπερ 'ὑπερθύµοισι Γιγάν-
τεσσιν βασίλευε' (Od.7.59). ὥσπερ καὶ τοὺς Φαίακας βλαπτοµένους ὑπ᾽ 
αὐτῶν µεταναστῆναι (Od.6.7-8). ἐγένετο δὲ διὰ τὸ ἀνόµοιον τῆς πολιτείας. (10)
1 ὑπάρχειν λέγει Dind.   :   ὑ. φησὶ Schr.  ὑπάρχει MSS.     5  ἀλόχου   :   cf. ἀλόχων Od. 9.115 Allen      3 ὄντως Schr.   :   
οὗτος Prel., ὅπως T     Διὸς ὑπερόπτης Prel.   :   διὸς εἴποντος Τ      6 ἀνοµίας Prel.   :   εὐνοµίας MSS     8 ; add. Kenn.     
9 ἐργάζεσθαι Prel.   :   ἄζεσθαι MSS     10 εἴπε β. Dind.   :   βιαίως β. MSS     10-11 βίηφι–ἦσαν add. Schr     11-12 [ὥσπερ 
– βασίλευε] Schr.     12 ὥσπερ MSS   :   ὥστε Polak     13 ἐγένετο κτλ. add. Schr. fr. Sch. M, cf. TH14i 4
How could he (Odysseus) say that the Cyclopes were hyperphialoi (imperious) and 
athemistoi (unrighteous) and paranomoi (transgressive), when he says that they have 
unstinting (Hes. Op. 118) blessings from the gods?  One has to say that they are 
imperious because of their superiority of body, and they are unrighteous in so far as they 
are not subject to written law, because each is ruler of his own domain: 'Each one lays 
down the themis (law) for his children and wife' (Od. 9.115), which is an indication of a 
state of 'lawlessness'.  Antisthenes says: 
(Spk. 1) Polyphemus alone is unjust, and indeed he is truly contemptuous of Zeus.  
So are not the rest (of the Cyclopes) just?  On account of which even the 
earth yields everything for them of her own accord (Hes. Op. 118; cf. Od. 
9.108-11).  And the fact that they do not work her is also a just deed.
(Spk. 2) But he said earlier that they were violent: 'They (the Cyclopes) kept 
plundering them (the Phaeacians), and were greater in strength than them' 
(Od. 6.6).
(Spk. 1) Just as he also said regarding the Giants:  he (Eurymedon the Phaeacian) 
'was king over the imperious giants' (Od. 7.59).  
(Spk. 2) Even as he also said that the Phaeacians, continually being harmed by 
them, emigrated (Od. 6.7-8). 
(Spk. 1) But this happened on account of the dissimilarity of their polity. 
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ὑπερφιάλων: τῶν µεγαλοφυῶν τῷ σώµατι· τῶν δισήµων γὰρ ἡ (87.11)
λέξις. ἀθεµίστων δὲ τῶν νόµοις µὴ κεχρηµένων· φησὶ γὰρ 'θεµιστεύει 
δὲ ἕκαστος παίδων ἠδ᾽ ἀλόχων' (Od. 9.115).  εἰ γὰρ ἦν ἀθεµίστων ἀντὶ τοῦ 
ἀδίκων, πῶς λέγει· 'οἵ ῥα θεοῖσι πεποιθότες' (Od. 9.107);  εἰ δ᾽ εἴποι τις· 'καὶ 
πῶς ὁ Πολύφηµός φησιν· “οὐ γὰρ Κύκλωπες Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο ἀλέ-    (15)     5
γουσιν”(Od. 9.275);'   σκοπείτω τὸ πρόσωπον, ὅτι Πολυφήµου ἐστὶ τοῦ 
ὠµοφάγου καὶ θηριώδους. καὶ Ἡσίοδος (Op. 277-9)
ἰχθύσι µὲν καὶ θηρσὶ καὶ οἰωνοῖσι πετεινοῖς
ἔσθειν ἀλλήλους, ἐπεὶ οὐ δίκη ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς,
ἀνθρώποις δὲ δέδωκε δίκην.    (20)     10
ὥστε Πολύφηµον µόνον λέγει ὑπερήφανον καὶ ἄδικον, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς 
πάντας Κύκλωπας εὐσεβεῖς καὶ δικαίους καὶ πεποιθότας τοῖς θεοῖς, ὅθεν 
καὶ ἀνῆκεν αὐτοῖς αὐτοµάτως ἡ γῆ τοὺς καρπούς (Hes.Op.118).
Hyperphialōn (imperious): natural greatness in physique; for the expression is of the 
'double-meaning' (disēmos) category.  
They are athemistoi (unrighteous) since they are not subject to laws.  For he (Odysseus) 
said 'each one lays down the themis (law) for his children and wives' (Od. 9.115).  For if 
athemistoi (unrighteous) is standing for adikoi (unjust), how could he say: 'they trust in the 
gods' (Od. 9.107)?   
And what if someone should ask: 'How can Polyphemus say “For the Cyclopes pay no 
heed to aegis-bearing Zeus”(Od. 9.275)?'   
Let him consider the character (of the person speaking), as it is the character of 
Polyphemus the raw-flesh-eater and savage.  Also Hesiod (Op. 277-9)
(Cronus has decreed this law for mankind,)
that fish and beasts and winged birds
should devour each other, since there is no justice in them,
but to mankind he gave justice.
So he (Antisthenes, cf. TH14a 6) says that Polyphemus alone is arrogant and unjust, but 
all the rest of the Cyclopes are pious and just and trusting in the gods, and hence the 
earth causes crops to spring up for them of her own accord (Hes. Op. 118; cf. Od. 9.108-
11).
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'ὑπερφιάλων'. 'ἀθεµίστων'. οὔ φασι συµφερόντως εἰρῆσθαι τοῦτο· (87.24)
τὸ γὰρ τοῖς ἀθεµίστοις, ὡς αὐτὸς λέγει, τοιαῦτα ἐκ θεῶν δεδωρῆσθαι 
ἀκούειν ἀσύµφορον. λύεται δὲ τῇ λέξει· τὸ µὲν γὰρ ὑπερφίαλον καὶ 
ἐπὶ τοῦ µεγάλου καὶ κρείττονος τάττεται. οὐ γὰρ οἱ µνηστῆρες καθ᾽ 
ἑαυτῶν ἔλεγον ἄν· 'οὐκ ἀγαπᾷς ὃ ἕκηλος ὑπερφιάλοισι µεθ᾽ (88.1)      5
ἡµῖν δαίνυσαι' (Od. 21.289). τὸ δὲ ἀθέµιστον τὸ µὴ κοινῶς τοῖς θεσµοῖς 
χρῆσθαί φασιν, ὡς τὸ 
τοῖσι δ᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἀγοραὶ βουληφόροι οὔτε θέµιστες,
ἀλλ᾽ οἵ γ᾽ ὑψηλῶν ὀρέων ναίουσι κάρηνα (5)     10
ἐν σπέσσι γλαφυροῖσι, θεµιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος
παίδων ἠδ᾽ ἀλόχων (Od. 9.112-5)·
ὅτι µὲν γὰρ χρῶνται τῇ θέµιδι δηλοῖ, πλὴν οὐ κοινῇ.
'Hyperphialōn (imperious)'.  'Athemistōn (unrighteous)'.  They (the Antisthenians) state 
that this is not said congruently (with the rest of the poem), because he (Antisthenes) 
says, that to understand that such great gifts are given by the gods to unrighteous beings 
is incongruous.  It is solved by the expression.  Since the word 'hyperphialon' is applied to 
those who are great and superior.  Otherwise the suitors would not have said of 
themselves: 'are you not content to be feasting at your ease with us, the Hyperphialoi?' 
(Od. 21.289).  The word 'athemiston', they say, refers to not being subject to thesmoi (laws) 
in common, as in:
They have neither counselling assemblies nor established laws (themistes),
but they dwell on lofty mountain peaks
in hollow caves, and each one sets the laws (themisteues)
for his children and wives (Od. 9.112-5).
So it is clear that they use rules, just not in common.
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πῶς τοῦ Κύκλωπος προειπόντος· 'οὐ γὰρ Κύκλωπες Διὸς (88.24)
αἰγιόχοιο ἀλέγουσιν, οὐδὲ θεῶν µακάρων, ἐπειὴ πολὺ φέρ- (89.1)
τεροί εἰµεν' (Od. 9.275-76), πάλιν ἐποίησε τοὺς Κύκλωπας λέγοντας· 
'νοῦσον δ᾽ οὔ πως ἔστι Διὸς µεγάλου ἀλέασθαι, ἀλλὰ σύ γ᾽ 
εὔχεο πατρὶ Ποσειδάωνι' (Od. 9.411-12); ἐναντίωµα γὰρ φαίνεται, 5
µὴ τὰ αὐτὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λέγοντος· τὸ γὰρ µὴ προσέχειν τοῖς θεοῖς (5)
κρειττόνων ἂν εἴη εἰκότως, τὸ δὲ προσέχειν πάλιν ἡττόνων. λύεται 
δὲ πάλιν ἐκ προσώπου τῶν λεγόντων. ὅτι µὲν γὰρ οἱ Κύκλωπές εἰσι 
πολὺ φέρτεροι τῶν θεῶν, ὁ Πολύφηµος εἴρηκε πρὸς τὸν Ὀδυσσέα, ὅτι 
δὲ οἱ Κύκλωπες τῶν θεῶν εἰσι κρείττους, τῶν ἄλλων οὐδεὶς εἴρηκεν. 10
εἰ µὲν οὖν ὁ ποιητὴς ταῦτα εἴρηκεν, ἢ δ᾽  αὐτὸς παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ, ἐναντία (10)
ἂν  ἦν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος ἐστὶν ὁ λέγων, σκεπτέον τίνι περιέθηκε 
τοὺς ἀφρονεστέρους λόγους. δῆλον δὲ ὅτι τῷ Πολυφήµῳ, ὃς οὐχ 
ὁµογνώµων ἦν τοῖς ἄλλοις οὐδ᾽ ἐν τῇ περὶ θεῶν δόξῃ ὡµολόγει· 'ἐποι-
µαίνετο' γὰρ, ὥς φησιν ὁ ποιητὴς, 'ἀπόπροθεν· οὐδὲ µετ᾽ ἄλλους 15
πωλεῖτο, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπάνευθεν ἐὼν ἀθεµίστια ᾔδει' (Od. 9.188-9).  (15)
αὐτὸς οὖν καὶ περὶ θεῶν τὰ 'ἀθεµίστια εἰδὼς' (Od. 9.428) ἡγεῖτο καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους 
Κύκλωπας τὰ αὐτὰ δοξάζειν αὐτῷ, τοὺς δὲ συµβεβήκει βελτίους ἐκείνου 
τὴν φύσιν ὄντας µὴ τὰ αὐτὰ γινώσκειν ἐκείνῳ· περὶ γὰρ τούτων ἔφη 
ὁ ποιητής· 'οἵ ῥα θεοῖσι πεποιθότες ἀθανάτοισιν' (Od. 9.107). 20
11 δ᾽ add. Kenn.   :   ὁ add. Schrader.     12 ἂν add. Polak
How, when the Cyclops (Polyphemus) says earlier 'For the Cyclopes pay no heed to 
Aegis-bearing Zeus, nor to the blessed gods, since we are much better than them' (Od. 
9.275-6), does he (Homer) conversely make the Cyclopes say 'Disease which comes from 
mighty Zeus cannot be avoided; but you (Polyphemus) should indeed pray to our Father 
Poseidon' (Od. 9.411-2)? For it seems to be an antithesis, i.e. he (Homer) is not saying the 
same things about the same things. For not attending to the gods would reasonably be 
characteristic of mightier beings, but on the other hand attending to them would be 
characteristic of weaker beings.  Again it is solved by the character of the people 
speaking. That the Cyclopes are far better than the gods, Polyphemus asserted to 
Odysseus, but none of the other Cyclopes asserted that the Cyclopes are mightier than 
the gods. So if the poet asserted this, or he (Polyphemus) asserted it in the poet's work, 
they would be antithetical cases. And since the speakers are different, one must consider 
to whom he (the poet) assigned the more foolish arguments. And it is clear that he does 
this to Polyphemus, who was not like-minded with the others and was not in agreement 
about the glory of the gods. Since 'he was a shepherd', as the poet says, 'far away, he 
roamed about not with the others, but living far apart, he was unrighteous' (Od. 9.188-9).  
And so since 'he was unrighteous' (Od. 9.428) in matters concerning the gods he supposed 
that the other Cyclopes also held the same beliefs as he did, but it happened that, being 
better than him in respect to their nature, they did not hold the same opinions as him. 
For about these matters, the poet says 'they trust in the immortal gods' (Od. 9.107).
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'οὐδ᾽ ἀλλήλων ἀλέγουσιν' (Od. 9.115). 'ἀδικίαν καὶ παρανοµίαν ἐγκαλεῖ 
τοῖς Κύκλωψιν ἐντεῦθεν ὁ ποιητής, ὡς µὴ προνοουµένοις ἀλλήλων'. (88.10)
'ἀλλὰ µᾶλλον ἐµφαίνει, ὅτι διὰ τὴν ἄγαν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὸ µὴ 
πλεονεκτεῖσθαι παρ᾽ ἀλλήλων ἢ ἄλλως ἀδικεῖσθαι οὐδὲ ἐδέοντο τῆς 
ἀλλήλων προνοίας. ὅτι δὲ οὕτως ἔχει δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ Πολυφήµου· 5
τούτου γὰρ κράξαντος συνῆλθον ἅπαντες' (Od. 9.401). τινὲς δὲ τὸ οὐκ 
ἀλέγουσιν ἀλλήλων οὕτω φασίν· οὐ φροντίζουσιν ἀλλήλων ὅσον (15)
ἕνεκεν ὑποταγῆς· ἕκαστος γὰρ αὐτοκράτωρ ἐστὶ (cf. Od. 9.115) καὶ οὐχ ὑποτάσσεται 
τῷ ἑτέρῳ.
6  κράξαντος συνῆλθον ἅπαντες   :   cf. οἱ δὲ βοῆς ἀίοντες ἐφοίτων ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος Od. 9.401 Allen
'And they pay no heed to each other' (Od. 9.115).  
Hence the poet (Homer) charges the Cyclopes with being unjust and transgressive, as 
they do not give thought for each other.  
Yet he (Homer) implies more, that it is because of their very great justice, and the fact 
that they do not covet each other's property or otherwise treat each other unjustly, that 
they do not need to have care for each other.  That this is the case is clear from what 
happened to Polyphemus – everyone came together at his shouting (Od. 9.401).  
Some explain the 'they pay no heed to each other' thus: they do not pay attention to each 
other in so far as subjection is concerned.  For each one is his own ruler (cf. Od. 9.115) 
and not subjected to another.
TH14f  Porphyry, Scholia T to the Odyssey 9.225 Dindorf 424.19-23 = Schrader 88 n. 12.
'τυρῶν αἰνυµµένους' (Od. 9.225)· ὅσον ἕκαστος ἐδύνατο φέρειν βάρος τῶν 
εὑρεθέντων τυρῶν, τοσοῦτον ἐκέλευόν µε, φησὶν, οἱ ἑταῖροι ἀποφέρειν. 
ἐκ τούτων δὲ ἡ δικαιοσύνη τῶν Κυκλώπων δήλη, ἐκ τοῦ ἀµελῶς εὑρε-
θῆναι τὸ σπήλαιον πλῆρες ὂν τυρῶν τε καὶ θρεµµάτων. ᾔδει γὰρ ὁ 
Κύκλωψ, ὅτι οὐδεὶς ὑφαιρήσεται τῶν ἐπιχωρίων. 5
'Taking the cheeses' (Od. 9.225): the companions urged me to carry off as big a load as 
each man was able to carry of the discovered cheeses, he (Odysseus) said.  From these 
things the justice of the Cyclopes is clear, from the fact that the cave was effortlessly 
discovered to be full of cheeses and livestock.  Since the Cyclops (Polyphemus) knew 
that none of the native inhabitants (i.e. the other Cyclopes) would rob him.
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TH14g  Porphyry, Scholia Vd to the Odyssey 9.275 Schrader 88 n. 24.
'οὐ γὰρ Κύκλωπες Διός'· ἀσεβὴς ὢν ὁ Πολύφηεµος διαβάλλει καὶ τοὺς 
λοιπούς.  ὅτι γὰρ ἐκεὶνοι οὐκ ἦσαν ἄθεοι, παρίστησιν ὁ ποιητὴς λέγων· 
'νοῦσον δ᾽ οὔ πως ἔστι Διὸς µεγάλου ἀλέασθαι' (Od. 9.411). τὸ µέντοι µὴ 
ὁµογνώµονα εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸν Πολύφηµον παρίσταται ἀπὸ τοῦ τὸν 
ποιητὴν λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ·  'ἐποίµαινεν ἀπόπροθεν οὐδὲ µετ᾽ ἄλλους 5
πωλεῖτο, ἀλλ᾽ ἀπάνευθεν ἐὼν ἀθεµίστια ᾔδει' (Od. 9.188-9).
'For the Cyclopes don't (heed) Zeus': Being impious, Polyphemus also maligns the rest.  
For that they were not ungodly, the poet shows by comparison, saying: 'disease which 
comes from mighty Zeus cannot be avoided' (Od. 9.411).  That, however, Polyphemus is 
not like-minded with the others is shown by comparison with what the poet says about 
him: 'he was a shepherd far away, he roamed about not with the others, but living far 
apart, he was unrighteous' (Od. 9.189). 
TH14h  Porphyry, Scholia H to the Odyssey 9.275 Schrader 88 n. 24.
'Διὸς αἰγιόχου ἀλέγουσιν': τὸ ἴδιον ἁµάρτηµα ἑαυτοῦ ὁ Πολύφηµος 
κοινὸν ποιεῖται·  ὅτι γὰρ οἱ ἄλλοι Κύκλωπες οὐκ ἦσαν ἄθεοι, φησί· 
'νοῦσον δ᾽ οὔ πως ἔστι Διὸς µεγάλου ἀλέασθαι' (Od. 9.411). 3
'They pay no heed to Aegis-bearing Zeus': Polyphemus makes his personal fault 
common.  For that the other Cyclopes are not ungodly, he (the poet) says: 'disease which 
comes from mighty Zeus cannot be avoided' (Od. 9.411).
TH14i  Porphyry, Scholia M to the Odyssey 9.106 Schrader 87 n. 12.
δίκαιοι οὗτοι πλὴν τοῦ Πολυφήµου.  ὅθεν τὸ µὲν ὑπερφιάλων νῦν 
µεγάλων, τὸ δὲ ἀθεµίστων µὴ ἐχόντων χρείαν νόµων διὰ τὸ 'θεµιστεύειν 
ἕκαστον παίδων ἠδ᾽ ἀλόχων' (Od. 9.115) πῶς δὲ ἠδίκουν τοὺς Φαίακας καὶ 
ἐλύπουν (Od. 6.5-6) δίκαιοι ὄντες; διὰ τὸ ἀνόµοιον τῆς ποιτείας. 4
They were just except for Polyphemus.  Whence 'hyperphialoi' as used here means 'large', 
and 'athemistoi' means 'they had no need of laws', because 'each one laid down the themis 
(law) for his children and wife' (Od. 9.115).  And why did they wrong the Phaeacians and 
harry them if they were just?  On account of the dissimilarity of their polity.
TH14j  Porphyry, Scholia M to the Odyssey 9.106 Schrader 86 n. 15.
'ὑπερφιάλων': ἀθεµίστων δὲ τῶν νόµοις µὴ κεχρηµένων.  καὶ εἰ οἱ Κύκλωπες 
θαρροῦσι τοῖς θεοῖς, πῶς ὁ Πολύφηµος οὐκ ἀλέγει; σκόπει τὸ πρόσωπον, 
ὅπως Πολυφήµου ἐστὶν ἡ φωνὴ τοῦ ἀπηνοῦς καὶ θηριώδους. 3
Hyperphialoi (Imperious): they are athemistoi (unrighteous) by not being subject to laws.  
And if the Cyclopes trusted in the gods, how is it that Polyphemus pays no heed?  
Consider the character, that it is the voice of Polyphemus, who is cruel and savage.
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TH14k  Porphyry, Scholia T to the Odyssey 9.107 Dindorf 416.23-29 & Schrader 88.18-23 = DC 
53, SSR 189. 
'οἵ ῥα θεοῖσι πεποιθότες'·  φασὶ γὰρ ὅτι διὰ τὸ εὔκρατον τῶν (416.23)
ἀέρων προνοοῦσιν αὐτῶν οἱ θεοὶ ὡς ἀπογονων, 'ἐπεί σφισιν ἐγγύθεν 
εἰσίν' (Od.7.205), ἢ ὡς δικαίων. µόνος γὰρ ἄδικος ὁ Πολύφηµος· 'ἀπάνευθεν γὰρ ὢν 
ἀθεµίστια ᾔδη' (Od.9.189) καὶ 'οἶος ποιµαίνεσκε' (Od.9.188), τῶν δ᾽ ἄλλων 'ἕκαστος θεµι-
στεύει παίδων ἠδ᾽ ἀλόχων' (Od.9.115)· ὅθεν οὐδὲ τὸ σπήλαιον ἀνοίξαντες πολυ- 5
πραγµονοῦσι τί πέπονθεν. καὶ µαντείαις χρῶνται (Od.9.510) καὶ θεοὺς νοµίζουσι· 
ἀλλὰ σύ γ᾽ εὔχεο πατρὶ Ποσειδάωνι ἄνακτι (Od.9.412).  
6  καὶ µαντείαις χρῶνται   :   cf. καὶ µαντευόµενος κατεγήρα Κυκλώπεσσιν Od. 9.510 Allen
'They trust in the gods':  for they (the Antisthenians) say that by way of the temperate 
nature of the climate the gods provide for them because they are their descendants, 'since 
we are near of kin to them' (Od. 7.205), or because of their (the Cyclopes') justness.  For 
Polyphemus alone was unjust.  'For living far apart, he was unrighteous' (Od. 9.189) and 
'he shepherded alone' (Od. 9.188), and of the others 'each lays down the themis (law) for 
his children and wife (Od. 9.115).  Which is why, not even after they opened his cave 
were they prying into what happened to him.  And they consult oracles (Od. 9.510) and 
honour the gods.  'But you should indeed pray to our Father Lord Poseidon' (Od. 9.412).
TH14l  Porphyry, Scholia H to the Odyssey 9.106 Schrader 86 n.15. 
πάντες µὲν οἱ Κύκλωπες ἀγαθοί εἰσι καὶ θεοὺς τιµῶντες χωρὶς τοῦ 
Πολυφήµου, ὅστις ἦν ἡγεµὼν αὐτῶν, ἀφ᾽ οὗ καὶ τοὺς Κύκλωπας 
ὑπερφιάλους λέγει.  ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀθεµίστους λέγει, οὐχ ὡς ἀδίκους, 
ἀλλ᾽ ὡς µὴ θέµιδος ἤτοι νόµου χρῄζοντας εἰς εὕρεσιν τοῦ καλοῦ· 
ἦσαν γὰρ ἀγαθοί. 5
All the Cyclopes are noble and honour the gods apart from Polyphemus, who was their 
leader, which is why he (Homer) also says that the Cyclopes are hyperphialoi (imperious).  
But he also says they are athemistoi (unrighteous), not because they are adikoi (unjust), but 
because they had no need of themis (rights) or nomos (law) in order to discover the noble 
way of doing things – since they were noble.
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TH14m  Apollonius Sophistes, Lexicon Homericum 'ἀθεµίστων' Bekker 12.20-30.
Apollonius, 1st c. AD, compiler famous for his Homeric lexicon.
ἀθεµίστων· ἐν τῇ Ι Ὀδυσείας ἐπὶ τῶν Κυκλώπων ἐπιθέτου 20
λεγοµένου 'Κυκλώπων δ᾽ ἐς γαῖαν ὑπερφιάλων ἀθεµίστων' (Od. 9.106), ὁ 
γοῦν Ἡλιόδωρος Ἀρισταρχείως µεταφράζων φησὶ, 'καθὸ οὐ κοι-
νοῖς χρῶνται νόµοις'. ὁ γοῦν Ἀρίσταρχος λέγει δικαίους εἶναι τοὺς 
Κύκλωπας ἐκτὸς τοῦ Πολυφήµου·  φησὶ γοῦν περὶ αὐτῶν 'θεµι-
σεύει δὲ ἕκαστος παίδων ἠδ᾽ ἀλόχων, οὐδ᾽ ἀλλήλων ἀλέγουσιν' (Od. 9.114-5).  25
ὁ δὲ Κύκλωψ ἐκ τῆς ἰδίας ἀσεβείας περὶ αὐτῶν φησὶν 'οὐ 
γὰρ Κύκλωπες Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο ἀλέγουσιν·'  ὅπερ ψεῦδος·  αὐτοὶ 
γάρ εἰσιν οἱ λέγοντες 'εἰ µὲν δὴ µήτις σε βιάζεσθαι οἶον ἐόντα, 
νοῦσον δ᾽ οὔπως ἔστι Διὸς µεγάλωου ἀλέασθαι' (Od. 9.410-1) καὶ ἔστιν ὅλος ὁ τόπος 
οὗτος τῶν προβληµάτων. 30
Athemistōn: In book 9 of the Odyssey it is said as an epithet to the Cyclopes 'to the land of 
the Cyclopes, hyperphialoi athemistoi' (Od. 9.106),  Heliodorus, at least, interpreting it in 
Aristarchan style, says 'in so far as they were not subject to laws in common'.  At any 
rate, Aristarchus says that the Cyclopes are just, apart from Polyphemus; at least he says 
about them 'each one lays down the themis for his children and wife, paying no heed to 
one another' (Od. 9.114-5).  And it is a result of his personal impiety that the Cyclops says 
about them (the other Cyclopes): 'For the Cyclopes pay no heed to Aegis-bearing Zeus' 
(Od. 9.275).  This is false.  For it is they (the Cyclopes) who say 'If then, no one is doing 
violence to you, being alone as you are, disease which comes from mighty Zeus cannot 
be avoided' (Od. 9.410-1).  And the entirety of this topic is from The Problems.
TH14n  Apollonius Sophistes, Lexicon Homericum 'ὑπερφίαλοι' Bekker 158.30-35.
ὑπερφίαλοι ὑπερήφανοι.  λέγονται δὲ οὗτοι καὶ οἱ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν 30
διαφέροντες, οἷον ὅταν τις τῶν µνηστήρων λέγῃ· 'ὑπερφιάλοισι 
µεθ᾽ ἡµῖν'.  οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἑαυτοὺς κακῶς ἔλεγον.  καὶ τοὺς Κύκλωπας 
χωρὶς τοῦ Πολυφήµου δικαίους συνέστησεν, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ 'Κυκλώπων 
δ᾽ ἐς γαῖαν ὑπερφιάλων ἀθεµίστων' τοὺς µὴ τοῖς κοινοῖς νό-
µοις χρωµένους. 35
Hyperphialoi excelling.  And men who are surpassing in terms of excellence are also 
referred to by these words, for example, when one of the suitors said: 'with us, the 
hyperphialoi'.  Since they would not have spoken badly about themselves.  And he made 
the Cyclopes apart from Polyphemus just, and the phrase 'Cyclopes were hyperphialoi 
and athemistoi on the earth' meant that they were not subject to laws in common.
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TH14o  Eustathius, Commentarii ad Homeri Odysseam Stallbaum 1.325.33 - 326.23 & 26-31.
1.325.33  ὅτι τοῦ περὶ Κυκλώπων λόγου ἀρξάµενος Ὀδυσσεὺς, ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν 
φιλοξένων Λωτοφάγων εἰς τοὺς ἀξένους τούτους ἡ τοῦ 35 ποιητοῦ µεταβαίνει 
πλάσις, φησί· 'Κυκλώπων δ᾽ ἐς γαῖαν ὑπερφιάλων ἀθεµίστων ἱκόµεθα. 'οἵ ῥα 
θεοῖσι πεποιθότες ἀθανάτοισιν οὔτε φυτεύονται χερσὶ φυτὸν, οὔτ᾽ ἀρόωσιν. ἀλλὰ 
τά γ᾽ ἄσπαρτα καὶ ἀνήροτα πάντα φύονται, πυροὶ καὶ κριθαὶ ἠδ᾽ ἄµπελοι, αἵτε 5
φέρουσιν οἶνον ἐριστάφυλον. καί σφιν Διὸς ὄµβρος ἀέξει' (Od. 9.106-11). ἃ δὴ
ἐπιτεµὼν ὁ γεωγράφος φησί· 'Κύκλωπες αὐτοφυεῖς νέµονται καρπούς'. καὶ οὕτω 
τὴν ἰδιότητα φράσας τῆς γῆς ὁ ποιητὴς, ὡς εἰ καὶ νῆσος µακάρων ἦν τις καὶ αὕτη,
περιᾴδεται 40 γὰρ ἐν παροιµίαις ἐπ᾽ εὐδαιµονίᾳ καὶ ἡ τῶν Κυκλώπων ὡς καὶ ἡ τῆς
Αἰγύπτου γῆ καὶ ἡ τῶν Ἀράβων, ἐκτίθεται καὶ εἰσέτι τοὺς νησιώτας Κύκλωπας 10
ὁποῖοι τινές εἰσιν, εἰπών· 'τοῖσι δ᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἀγοραὶ βουληφόροι οὔτε θέµιστες, ἀλλ᾽ οἵ γ᾽
ὑψηλῶν ὀρέων ναίουσι κάρηνα ἐν σπέσσι γλαφυροῖσι. θεµιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος 
παίδων ἠδ᾽ ἀλόχων, οὐδ᾽ ἀλλήλων ἀλέγουσι' (Od. 9.112-5). καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν αὐτοῖς 
τὸ ἀθεµίστοις εἶναι, τὸ µὴ κοινωνικῶς ἔχειν, µηδὲ πολιτικῶς θεµιστεύειν κατὰ 
τοὺς ἐν κοινῷ 45 βουληφόρους καὶ ἀγορητὰς, ἀλλὰ κατ᾽ οἴκους ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτῶν. 15
ὥστε οὐχ᾽ ἁπλῶς ἀθέµιστοι οἱ καὶ 'θεοῖς πεποιθότες' καὶ παροιµίαν παραγαγόντες 
ἐκ θεοφιλείας τὴν ἄσπαρτα καὶ ἀνήροτα φύεσθαι πάντα τοῖς 1.326.1 εὐδαιµονοῦσι
λέγουσαν, ἀλλὰ πῇ µὲν ἀθέµιστοι, πῇ δὲ θεµιστεύοντες. 
When beginning his story about the Cyclopes, Odysseus – the mode of representation of 
the poet changes (i.e. fictional to factual) from the story of the stranger-loving Lotus-
eaters to those stranger-hating people – says: 'We came to the land of the Cyclopes who 
are hyperphialoi athemistoi.  Trusting in the immortal gods they do not plant crops by their 
own hand, nor plough.  But unsown and unploughed all these things spring up, wheat 
and barley and vines, which bear wine from fine grapes.  And the rain of Zeus makes 
these grow for them' (Od. 9.106-11).  Things which indeed, summarising, The 
Geographer (i.e. Strabo) says: 'Cyclopes harvest spontaneously-growing crops' (Str. 
13.1.25.21-2).  And since the poet describes the specific character of the country in this 
way, as if this island too was one of the Isles of the Blessed – for the Isle of the Cyclopes is 
celebrated for its prosperity in proverbs, as is also Egypt and Arabia – he sets forth yet 
further what sort of people the Cyclopic islanders are, saying: 'They have neither 
counselling assemblies nor established laws (themistes), but they dwell on lofty mountain 
peak in hollow caves, and each one sets the laws (themisteues) for his children and wives, 
nor do they pay heed to one another' (Od. 9.112-5).  And this is their situation: they (the 
Cyclopes) are athemistoi; they hold nothing in common; they do not publicly lay down 
laws formed by common counsel or discussion, but each does so for his own household.  
So being not simply 'athemistoi' they also 'trust in the gods' (Od. 9.107) and have elicited 
the proverbial saying, that from divine favour the unsown and unploughed earth puts 
forth everything for the blessed, so in a certain sense they were 'athemistoi' but in another 
sense they had themis.
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1.326.1  ὃ γενικῇ συντάσσει ὁ
ποιητὴς, οὐκ ἀπολύτως φράσας κατὰ τοὺς ὕστερον, καὶ ἄλλως δὲ 'ἀθέµιστοι' 
γοργῶς εἰπεῖν, διὰ τὸ µὴ νόµους ἔχειν κοινούς. εἰ δὲ δίκαιοι ὄντες ἐλύπουν τοὺς 20
Φαίακας ἦν ὅτε γειτιῶντας ὡς προγέγραπται (Od. 6.6), ἀλλὰ τοῦτο διὰ τὸ τῆς
πολιτείας φασὶν ἀνόµoιον ἐγίνετο. Φαίακες µὲν γὰρ ἐκοινώνουν ἀλλήλοις εἴτε
5 ἀριστοκρατίας νόµῳ εἴτε καὶ δηµοκρατικῶς. οἱ δὲ Κύκλωπες οὐ τοιοῦτοι. εἰ 
δὲ καὶ 'πεποιθέναι µὲν θεοῖς' (Od. 9.107) ἐνταῦθα Κύκλωπες λέγονται, ὁ δὲ 
Πολύφηµος ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς ἐρεῖ (Od. 9.275) 'ὡς οὐκ ἀλέγουσι Διὸς οἱ Κύκλωπες ὡς 25
φέρτεροι.' ψευδῶς ἐκεῖνο φησίν – ὃ δὴ ποιοῦσιν οἱ κακοὶ συνδιαβάλλοντες ἑαυτοῖς 
τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἢ καὶ συνεξεικάζοντες – θεοσεβεῖς γὰρ οἱ λοιποὶ Κύκλωπες
πλάττονται· οἳ καὶ τὴν Διὸς νόσον ὑποβλέπονται καὶ εὔχεσθαι οἴδασιν. ὅτι δὲ τοὺς 
Κύκλωπας Λεοντίνους οἱ ὕστερον ἐκάλεσαν, καὶ ὅτι 10 λῃσταὶ ἦσαν καὶ ἄγριοι, καὶ 
ὅτι πίων ἡ παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς γῆ ὡς καὶ ἡ πλείων τῆς Σικελίας, δῆλόν ἐστι.  φασὶ δὲ οἱ 30
παλαιοὶ καὶ ὅτι ὥσπερ Αἴολος ἐδυνάστευσε τῶν περὶ Λιπάραν νήσων, οὕτω καὶ
Κύκλωπες καὶ Λαιστρυγόνες τῶν περὶ Λεοντίνην καὶ Αἴτνην, ἄξενοί τινες ὄντες. 
'διὸ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν πορθµὸν ἀπροσπέλαστα εἶναι τότε' τοῖς πολλοῖς. ὁ µέντοι
ποιητὴς οὐ πάντα φασὶ πλάττων οὐδ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ µηδενὸς ἀεὶ µακρὰν τερατολογίαν 
ἀνάπτων προσµυθεύει τι καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοῖς ἀληθέσι. 35
22  ἀνόµoιον Kenn.   :    ἀνόµιον Stall.
This phrase the poet constructs in the genitive case, not in an unqualified sense, 
according to later writers (i.e. the Antisthenians), and who also otherwise (claim that the 
poet) pointedly says 'athemistoi' because they (the Cyclopes) did not use common laws.  If 
they were just in harrying the Phaeacians – at one time they were neighbours, as was 
written earlier (Od. 6.6) – they (the Antisthenians) say this is because their polity was 
dissimilar.  Since the Phaeacians co-operated with one another either by the custom of 
aristocracy, or even democratically.  But the Cyclopes were not such people.  Even if the 
Cyclopes are said therein to 'trust in the gods' (Od. 9.107), Polyphemus in the following 
lines says 'the Cyclopes do not heed Zeus as they are superior' (Od. 9.275).  He says this 
falsely – indeed wicked men accuse good men along with themselves, or even present 
them as like themselves – since the rest of the Cyclopes are represented as god-
reverencing; they both looked with awe upon disease from Zeus and knew how to pray.  
And it is clear that later writers called the Cyclopes 'Leontinians' (e.g. Strabo 1.2.9.20), 
and that they were brigands and savage, and that the earth was rich for them, just as was 
most of Sicily.  And the ancients also say that just as Aeolus held sway over the islands 
around Lipara, so also the Cyclopes and the Laestrygonians, being unwelcoming sorts, 
held sway over the lands around Leontini and Etna.  'Wherefore also the strait (of 
Messina) was unapproachable' (Strabo 1.2.9.21-2) for most.  Indeed the poet, they say, 
though he did not invent everything, nor always conjure from nothing a long tale of 
wonder, he did also add a certain amount of myth to the facts therein.
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τὸ δὲ ὑπερφιάλων 1.326.15 δίσηµον ὂν, ὡς καὶ 35
προγέγραπται, οὐ δοκεῖ ἐπὶ ψόγῳ ἐνταῦθα κεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸ κατὰ σῶµα δηλοῦν
µεγαλοφυὲς τῶν Κυκλώπων, ὥς που καὶ οἱ µνηστῆρες ὑπερφιάλους καλοῦσιν
ἑαυτούς. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀθεµίστων οὐκ ἐφ᾽ ὕβρει κεῖται νῦν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ἱστορίας 
εἴδει, ὡς τῶν Κυκλώπων µήτε νόµους µήτε ἔθη κοινὰ ἐχόντων, ὡς ἐῤῥέθη, µηδὲ
τοχαζοµένων τοῦ κοινῇ συµφέροντος διὰ τὸ µηδὲ κοινῇ πολιτεύεσθαι ἀλλ᾽, ὡς 40
εἰπεῖν, οἰκοκρατεῖσθαι. καὶ σηµείωσαι ὅτι τε διττὸν τὸ ἀθέµιστον τό, τε εἰδότα 
θέµιν µὴ 20 χρᾶσθαι αὐτῇ ὅτε ὁ ἀθέµιστος εἴη ἂν ὁ αὐτὸς τῷ ἀδίκῳ, καὶ τὸ µὴ πεῖραν
ἔχειν θέµιδος ὅλως, ὁποῖοι οἱ Ὁµηρικοὶ Κύκλωπες.  καὶ ὅτι, ἔνθα µὴ θέµις, καλῶς 
ἐκεῖ οὐδ᾽ 'ἀγοραὶ βουληφόροι' (Od. 9.112), εἴπερ θέµις ἀνδρῶν ἀγορὰς ἠµὲν λύει 
ἠδὲ καθίζει. δῆλον δὲ ὅτι τε ἄλλο τι σηµαίνει ὁ ὕστερον ῥηθεὶς 1.326.23 ἀθέµιτος 45
παρὰ τὸν ἐνταῦθα Ὁµηρικὸν ἀθέµιστον.
... ... ... 
1.326.26 τὸ δὲ 'οἳ θεῷ πεποιθότες ἀθανάτῳ' (Od. 9.107-14) οὔτε φυτεύουσι καὶ ἑξῆς 
ἕως τοῦ, 'ναίουσιν ἐν σπέσι γλαφυροῖσι', πρέπει τοῖς καθ᾽ ἡµᾶς ἀναχωρηταῖς. οἳ 
καὶ αὐτοὶ πόλεις µὲν φυγόντες, ὀρέων δὲ ναίοντες κάρηνα ἐν σπηλαίοις, οὔτε
φυτεύουσιν, οὔτ᾽ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἐφεξῆς ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἄσπαρτα καὶ 50
ἀνήροτα ἔχουσιν ἄνωθεν τὰ καλὰ, αὐτοκράτορες ὄντες ἑαυτῶν, καὶ τρόπον 
ἄλλον θεµι-  στεύοντες οὐ µὴν ἀθεµίστως ἔχοντες.
And hyperphialoi is double-meaning, as also written earlier, it does not seem to be put 
here as disapproval, but rather referring to their physique it signifies the natural 
greatness of the Cyclopes, as to be sure the suitors also called themselves hyperphialoi.  
Thus also athemistoi does not imply hubris as it does now, but it is in an historical 
meaning, as it was characteristic of the Cyclopes to have neither laws nor character in 
common, as was stated, nor did they strive after profit in common, because they did not 
have a government in common, but, as stated, they were household-rulers.And note well 
that athemistos is also double-meaning, signifying both a person who knows themis (right) 
but does not practice it, in which case an athemistos person would be the same as as an 
unjust person; and signifying a person who has absolutely no experience of themis 
(right), such as the Homeric Cyclopes.  And that, where there is no themis (Od. 2.68-9), 
rightly, there are not the 'counselling assemblies' (Od. 9.112), if indeed themis both 
dissolves and establishes assemblies of men.  It is clear that a later person being called 
athemistos signified something other than the Homeric athemistos here.
… … … (unrelated morphological material).
'They trusted in immortal god' (Od. 9.107), not planting and all that follows up to 'living 
in hollow caves' (Od. 9.113-4), suits the Anchorites of our time.  They avoid cities, and 
dwell in caves on mountain peaks, not planting, nor doing any of the things that 
naturally follow, but without sowing and without ploughing they have blessings from on 
high, they are self-sufficient, and give themis in another manner, not actually being 
athemistos.
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SYMPOTICA
Sy1  Aristotle, Rhetoric 3.1407a 9-12 Cope; = DC 157, SSR 51.
Aristotle is giving a list of examples from known authors of simile and metaphor.
καὶ ὡς Ἀντισθένης Κηφισόδοτον τὸν λεπτὸν λιβανωτῷ εἴκασεν, ὅτι ἀπολλύµενος 
εὐφραίνει. 
And just as Antisthenes likened Kephisodotos, 'the skinny', to incense, because it was by 
being destroyed that he gave pleasure.
Sy2  Plutarch, Vita Pericles 1.5 Ziegler; = DC 158, SSR 102.
Plutarch, c. AD 45-125, author of the parallel lives, and moralising, ethical, philosophical treatises.
διὸ καλῶς µὲν Ἀντισθένης ἀκούσας ὅτι σπουδαῖός ἐστιν αὐλητὴς Ἰσµηνίας 'ἀλλ᾽ 
ἄνθρωπος' ἔφη 'µοχθηρός˙ οὐ γὰρ ἂν οὕτω σπουδαῖος ἦν αὐλητής.' 
Antisthenes therefore put it well, when after being told that Ismenias was an excellent 
piper, said 'But the man is a scoundrel; otherwise he would not be such an excellent 
piper.'
Sy3  Diogenes Laertius 6.6 Dorandi; = DC 159, SSR 101.
Diogenes Laertius, probable floruit first half 3rd c. AD.
εἰπόντος αὐτῷ τινος παρὰ πότον, 'ᾆσον,' 'σύ µοι,' φησίν 'αὔλησον.' 
When someone said to him (Antisthenes) over wine 'Sing!' He said 'You accompany me 
on the pipes!'
Sy4  Photius, Lexicon s.v. (ο685) Theodoridis; = DC 121, SSR 65.
Photius of Byzantium, c. AD 810-893, Patriarch of Constantinople, scholarly author of Βιβλιοθήκη, Library (c. 876), 
a mini-history of Greek literature, and a lexicon that drew entries from several earlier lexica.
οὐροδόκην. τὴν ἀµίδα Ξενοφ άνης · οὔριον δὲ βῖκον Ἀντισθένης.
Ξενοφάνης Bossi   :   Ξενοφῶν MSS
Ourodokēn:  Xenophanes (uses the word for) the amis (piss-pot).  But Antisthenes (uses) 
urine bīkos (another type of piss-pot).
Sy5  Pollux, Onomasticon 10.68.10-12 Bethe 2.209; = DC 18a, SSR 64.
Iulius Pollux, of Naucratis, fl.  late 2nd c. AD; Onomasticon largely a thesaurus of terms.
τὸ δὲ καλούµενον κυρίλλιον πρὸς τῶν Ἀσιανῶν βοµβύλιον µὲν Ἀντισθένης εἴρηκεν 
ἐν τῷ Προτρεπτικῷ, οἱ δὲ καὶ σύστοµον αὐτὸ ὀνοµάζουσιν.  
That which is called a 'kyrillion', is called by the Asians a 'bombulios', as indeed 
Antisthenes said in his Protreptikos / Exhortation, and they also call it 'narrow-mouthed'.
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Sy6  Pollux, Onomasticon 6.98.14-99.1 Bethe 2.28; = DC 18b, SSR 64.
βοµβυλιὸς δέ, τὸ στενὸν ἔκπωµα καὶ βοµβοῦν ἐν τῇ πόσει ὡς Ἀντισθένης ἐν 
Προτρεπτικῷ.
But the bombulios, the narrow cup, also resonates during drinking, as Antisthenes says in 
his Protreptikos / Exhortation.
Sy7  Scholia in Apollonius Rhodius 2.569–570a Wendel 175; = DC 18c, SSR 64.
Scholia from the end of the 2nd century AD or earlier.  The lemma the scholiast is commenting on is from the episode 
where the argonauts sent a dove between the clashing rocks at the end of the Bosphorus, and they resonated as they came 
together.
ἐβόµβεον· ἤχουν.  ὅθεν καὶ βοµβυλιὸς εἶδος µελίσσης, καὶ ποτηρίου δὲ εἶδος, ὡς 
Ἀντισθένης παραδίδωσιν· ἔστι δὲ στενοτράχηλον.
βοµβυλιός Keil :  -υλιοὶ L : -ύλη P    
They resonated: they reverberated.  Whence also comes 'bombulios', a type of bee (i.e.  
bumblebee), and also a type of cup, as Antisthenes transmits.  And it is narrow-necked. 
Sy8  Scholia in Apollonius Rhodius 2.570b Wendel 175.
†βοµβυλίον ὅπερ τ .  .  .  ον ἐπικέκληται διακλύστερον.†  
570b from the third letter Deicke read τ .  .  ερον, Keil τοιοῦτον, Wendel suspects βοµβυλιὸς τὸ ποτήριον, ἐπικέκληται  
δ᾽ καὶ  διακλυστήριον.
Bombulios is that thing which is called a diaklusteron (wine-cooler).
Or from Wendel's conjectured text in the apparatus: 
A bombulios is a cup, but it is also called a diaklusterion (wine-cooler). 
Sy9  Athenaeus 11.784D Kaibel; = DC 18d, SSR 64.
Athenaeus of Naucratis, fl. c. AD 200, authored Δειπνοσοφισταί ('The Learned Banqueters').
Βοµβυλιός, θηρίκλειον Ῥοδιακόν, οὗ περὶ τῆς ἰδέας Σωκράτης φησίν· 'οἱ µὲν ἐκ 
φιάλης πίνοντες ὅσον θέλουσι τάχιστ᾽ ἀπαλλαγήσονται, οἱ δ᾽ ἐκ βοµβυλιοῦ κατὰ 
µικρὸν στάζοντος .  .  .  '.  ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ ζῷόν τι.  
The bombulios, a Rhodian cup made by Thericles, concerning whose form Socrates says: 
'People drinking as much as they desire from a bowl, will go off (or get away) very 
quickly, but those drinking from a bombulios, dripping only a little at a time .  .  .'.  It is 
also a creature (i.e. bumblebee).
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Sy10  Aelius Aristides, Oration 49.30-33 (Ἱερῶν λόγων Γ) Keil; = DC 41, SSR 197. 
Translation in consultation with C. A. Behr (1981-6. Aelius Aristides. 2 vols. Leiden).
Aelius Aristides, AD 117- after 177, aspiring orator from Mysia.  Severe illness forced him into a long convalescence at  
the Healing Sanctuary of Asclepius at Pergamum, during which he had religious experiences that he wrote about in a 
series of sacred discourses (among many other works).
βιβλίον τι τῶν σπουδαίων ἔδοξα ἀναγιγνώσκειν, οὗ τὰ µὲν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, πάλιν γὰρ 
τὸν αὐτὸν ἐρῶ λόγον, οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιµι εἰπεῖν. πῶς γὰρ τοσοῦτόν γε ὕστερον, ἄλλως τε 
καὶ τῆς ἀπογραφῆς τὸ τῇ µνήµῃ προσέχειν ἀφελοµένης;  31 ἀλλὰ πρὸς τῷ τέλει τοῦ 
βιβλίου τοιάδε µάλιστα ἐνῆν. – ἦν δὲ ὡς ἐπί τινος τῶν ἀγωνιστῶν λεγόµενα – 
'ταῦτα δὴ πάντα ὁ θεὸς συλλογισάµενος καὶ ὁρῶν τὸ ῥεῦµα ἄρδην φερόµενον 
προσέταξεν ὕδωρ πίνειν, οἴνου δὲ ἀπέχεσθαι, εἴ τι δεῖται νικῆσαι· 
ἃ δὴ καὶ σοί, ἔφη, ἔξεστι µιµησαµένῳ στεφανοῦσθαι ἢ συστεφανοῦσθαι'. 
ἐνταῦθα ἔλεγεν. εἶθ᾽ ὑπεγέγραπτο τοῦ λόγου δὴ τοὐπίγραµµα, φιλοστέφανος, ἢ 
φιλησιστέφανος. 
32 ὅσον µὲν οὖν τινα χρόνον διήνεγκα τὴν ὑδροποσίαν, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἔχω λέγειν, ὅτι δ᾽ 
εὐκόλως τε καὶ ῥᾳδίως, ἀεί πως πρότερον δυσχεραίνων τὸ ὕδωρ καὶ ναυτιῶν. ὡς δὲ 
καὶ τοῦτο ἐλελειτούργητο, τοῦ µὲν ὕδατος ἀφίησί µε, οἴνου δὲ ἔταξε µέτρον, καὶ ἦν 
γε τὸ ῥῆµα ἡµίνα βασιλική· γνώριµον δή που ὅτι ἔφραζεν ἡµικοτύλιον. ἐχρώµην 
τούτῳ καὶ οὕτως ἤρκει ὡς οὐκ ἤρκει πρότερον τὸ διπλάσιον, ἔστι δ᾽ ὅτε καὶ 
φειδοµένῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ δεδιέναι µὴ ἐπιλείπῃ περιῆν. 
I seemed to read a certain excellent book, the details of which – for I will tell the same old 
story again – I would not be able to recount.  For how indeed could I, so much later, 
especially as my record obviated the need to commit it to memory?  31 But the following 
contents were at the end of the book; it was said, as it were, concerning some competitor 
in a contest:
'When the god had reckoned up all these things and seeing that the flow carried on 
copiously, he ordered the drinking of water and the abstention from wine, if one desired 
at all to win.  
“Which things,” he said, “if you imitate them, even you can be crowned as victor, or 
share in the crown”.'  
That's what he said there.  Next, subjoined to the work was the title Lover of Crowns, or 
The Crown Lover.  
32 For what extent of time I endured the drinking of water, this I cannot say; because it 
was pleasant and easy, when previously water was always somehow unbearable and 
nauseating.  So when this duty had been performed, he released me from water, and 
assigned me a measure of wine, and in fact the word was a 'half royal'.  Of course it was 
intelligible that he meant a half-cup.  I used this, and it sufficed, as previously twice the 
amount did not suffice.  And there are even times when I had wine left over, because I 
was sparing from fear that it would run out. 
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οὐ µὴν τοῦτό γε ἐποιούµην ἐξαίρετον εἰς τὴν ὑστεραίαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔδει τῷ 
µέτρῳ στέργειν.  
ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ταύτην εἶχε τὴν πεῖραν, ἀφίησιν ἤδη πίνειν πρὸς ἐξουσίαν, οὑτωσί πως 
χαριεντισάµενος, ὅτι 
'µάταιοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶεν ὅσοι τῶν ἱκανῶν εὐποροῦντες µὴ τολµῶσιν ἐλευθέρως 
χρῆσθαι.'
33 καὶ τὸ βιβλίον αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐδόκει εἶναι Ἀντισθένους περὶ χρήσεως· ἔφερεν δὲ εἰς 
οἶνον, καὶ Διονύσου προσῆν τινα σύµβολα.
Nor indeed did I make use of this set-aside portion on the next day, but from the outset it 
was necessary to be content with the set measure. 
And when he had also conducted this trial, he freed me again to drink as much as I 
wanted to, and he made light of it, saying: 
'it would be foolish for men who have plenty not to dare to make free use of what they 
have.'  
33 And this same book seemed to be Antisthenes' Concerning Use.  It referred to wine, and 
there were certain tokens of Dionysus present too.
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DIALOGICA VARIA
Introduction
This section contains fragments of dialogue, some of which hint at a variety of other literary 
genres and thereby showcase Antisthenes' extraordinary originality and versatility.
Rather than trying to guess which actual 'titles' of Antisthenes' they may have fallen under, 
instead they have been grouped according to the main speaker of the dialogue, or the 
person who was the subject of the dialogue.  The categories are:
Socratic Dialogues
Contemporary Dialogues 
Mythic Dialogues
Erotic Dialogues
Named Dialogues
Several fragments in the following groupings refer to the titles of eight works of 
Antisthenes as 'dialogues':
Little Cyrus
Lesser Heracles
Alcibiades 
Truth
Exhortations 
Sathōn 
The Statesman
Archelaus 
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Antisthenes' characters in dialogue
It is well established that Antisthenes wrote Socratic dialogues, that is, dialogues in which 
Socrates was one of the interlocutors and also probably the principal interlocutor.  Several 
contemporaries of Antisthenes' were also engaged in this category of dialogue writing, 
most notably Plato, Xenophon, and Aeschines Socraticus (cf. SD2).  What the fragments 
here reveal, very interestingly, is that Antisthenes also seems to have written many 
dialogues in which non-Greek contemporary figures and mythic characters were speakers.
SOCRATIC DIALOGUES   SD1-7
This class of dialogue, in which Socrates is one of the principal interlocutors, is the most 
well known style of dialogue from the period in which the prose dialogue form was born.  
In fact the Socratics, apart from Antisthenes, seem to have almost exclusively used this 
form.  A further Antisthenic fragment outside this group, Sy9, also preserves direct speech 
from Socrates in a sympotic setting.  
The fragments of Socratic dialogue come from a wide range of contexts.  One has Socrates 
expounding on the theory of education 'the beginning of education is the examination of 
names (ὀνόµατα)' (SD7).  Another has Socrates discussing with a stranger the award of the 
aristeia to Alcibiades (SD4).  A further fragment is especially interesting because it has 
Socrates speaking to Antisthenes (SD6).  Theopompus implies that Antisthenes wrote 
himself, rather persuasively, into his own dialogues (SD3), and all of the Erotic Dialogue 
fragments (ED1-6) also have Antisthenes himself speaking.  Perhaps all of Antisthenes' 
Socratic dialogues featured Antisthenes himself as an interlocutor with his closest friend, 
Socrates (see further discussion in ch. 4.ii section C).
SD1.  As Plato's dialogues are all Socratic (with the exception of the Laws), this offers near 
contemporary evidence confirming not only that Antisthenes wrote Socratic dialogues, but 
that some people believed that Plato had plagiarised Antisthenes' work.  By extension, this 
also means that Theopompus believed that Antisthenes' dialogues were earlier than Plato's.  
175
SD2.  This offers evidence that Antisthenes wrote Socratic dialogues and was thought to be 
one of only four close associates of Socrates to have produced 'genuine' (ἀληθεῖς) Socratic 
dialogues.  By 'genuine' here Panaetius probably means that they contained first hand 
experience of the historic Socrates and (at least reasonably) faithfully reported his thought, 
as opposed to being later (purely) fictional creations by authors who had no immediate 
knowledge of Socrates or his ideas.  It is interesting to note that a second of the four writers 
of genuine dialogues, Aeschines, was accused by Persaeus (CD6) of plagiarising 
Antisthenes' work (as was Plato, SD1).  This of course suggests that Persaeus believed, as 
did Theopompus (SD1), that Antisthenes was writing before Aeschines.
SD3.  This fragment is included in this group for the style of content it suggests.  It offers 
evidence that the nature of Antisthenes' style of dialogic engagement in written discourse 
was more than a little 'Socratic'.  According to Antisthenes' contemporary, Theopompus, 
this fragment states that Antisthenes was 'skilful, especially at leading on (ὑπαγαγέσθαι) 
absolutely anyone at all to conclusions for his own advantage by means of smooth 
discourse'.   Here, to give the right sense, the translation 'leading on for conclusions for his 
own advantage' is being drawn out of ὑπάγεσθαι.  In the active sense, ὑπάγω (LSJ s.v. III) 
has the sense 'lead on by degrees' or 'draw or lead on by art or deceit'.  While in the middle 
voice it has the sense 'lead on for one's own advantage'.  So this seems to say that Antisthenes 
wrote himself into his dialogues, and portrayed himself as being able to manoeuvre anyone 
at all to come to the conclusion he desired.  This quality appears to be the same as Socrates' 
reputed ability at ἔλεγχος, or 'cross-examination', which generally amounted to the ability 
to drive anyone at all into a corner of his choosing through argumentation and refutation.  
Certainly, in the case of Plato's Socrates, this is one of his defining traits.  The way 
Xenophon portrays Antisthenes and Socrates, it appears that this argumentative quality 
actually was somewhat more prominent in Antisthenes.  Particularly in the Symposion 
Socrates is generally convivial and good natured, whereas Antisthenes is the one regularly 
cross-examining the other guests, including Socrates himself (see further discussion in ch. 
1.iii section I).  This agrees with Aristophanes' portrayal of Socrates and his students in the 
176
Clouds, where it was his students or associates, more so than Socrates himself, who were 
most combative (see further ch. 4.i Section C).  Xenophon may of course have been playing 
down the most annoying aspects of Socrates that lead to him being killed.  If Xenophon's 
depiction is accurate, however, then it may suggest that Plato's Socrates was modelled to a 
greater or lesser extent on Antisthenes' self-portraiture in his own dialogues.
SD4-5. The first of these fragments incorporates an attractive snippet of Antisthenic 
dialogue featuring Socrates as a speaker.  The interlocutor, who receives the other two lines, 
is a xenos, 'stranger', identified when Socrates addresses him in the vocative: ὦ ξένε (7).  As 
well as this vocative, the lines contain other elements typical of dialogue, including an 
imperative (εὐφήµει, 7) and a conversational particle (γε, 8).  
The other figure mentioned in their conversation is Alcibiades, however, there is no way of 
establishing what work of Antisthenes this dialogue originated from.  Although there is a 
work attributed to Antisthenes titled Alcibiades (DL 6.18) that does not provide any sure 
guidance, as Alcibiades is also mentioned in reference to a dialogue titled The Lesser Cyrus 
(CD10) a title itself which is not a match for any of the four titles mentioning Cyrus listed 
by Diogenes (6.16 & 18).
The topic under discussion in this fragment is the aristeia, the prize for valour that was 
awarded after the battle of Delium in Boeotia (424 BC).  In this piece of dialogue the 
stranger suggests that Socrates won the prize, Socrates cautions him that the prize is 
Alcibiades', and the stranger counters that it was actually Socrates who did the awarding of 
the prize.  
As the introductory remarks in the fragment suggest, Herodicus was more than dubious 
about the claim that Alcibiades won the aristeia.  In the text just preceding this fragment 
Herodicus in fact denies that Alcibiades was involved in the campaign at all and argues that 
Socrates himself never left Attica apart from one trip to the Isthmus (Ath. 216b).  The 
mention of Plato in the fragment (1) is no doubt referring to the Charmides, in which 
Socrates claimed that he was present at the Battle of Potidaea and in the thick of the fighting 
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(153b-c) and the Symposion where Alcibiades says that Socrates gave up the prize for valour 
(220e).   Clay has plausibly suggested (1994, 30) that the award by Alcibiades of a crown to 
Socrates (Smp. 212b-223a) is Plato's response to Socrates' award of a trophy to Alcibiades in 
Antisthenes' Alcibiades.  Herodicus' key evidence for refuting the historicity of Alcibiades' 
aristeia is that Thucydides describes the battle (1.62-5), but fails to mention Socrates' or 
Alcibiades' role in it.  Thucydides was not in the habit, however, of mentioning every 
person known to have been present at a battle.  There is also evidence that he did not think 
much of 'Socratic' methods (see ch. 4.i section C 'Thucydides'), so he could well have passed 
over Socrates' role intentionally.  Additionally, there is historical evidence that discounts 
Herodicus' argument.  Alcibiades the Younger, in a public defence speech, mentions his 
father being crowned and receiving the prize for valour after Potidaea as though it is a well 
known fact (Isoc. 16.29-30).
The second fragment in this pair, SD5, refers to the same episode.  When it states that the 
prize for valour fell to Socrates 'by the most just account' (τῷ δικαιοτάτῳ λόγῳ) this 
appears to mean the account of Antisthenes and/or Plato.  Certainly both these authors infer 
that Socrates was the winner of the prize by right, but effectively 'awarded' it to Alcibiades.  
Plato's account, however, only mentions that Socrates was 'more eager' in recommending 
the prize to Alcibiades than the generals themselves, who were already well inclined to do 
so (Smp. 220e).  It therefore appears that Plutarch had access to an account other than Plato's 
since this fragment mentions Socrates' desire to increase Alcibiades' standing, his bearing 
witness, and the crowning and bestowing of the panoply.  The other account Plutarch was 
relying on seems most likely to have been Antisthenes'.  SD4 might imply a further 
development of the dialogue which would have included relevant details, as the stranger 
enumerated the steps of Socrates' role in the awarding of the aristeia, in the face of Socrates' 
continued protests to the contrary.
Being from the close of the 2nd century BC, SD4 contains what is apparently the earliest 
reference to Antisthenes as 'Κύων', pre-dating Diogenes Laertius (first half 3rd cent. AD).  
Although the terms κυνικός 'dog-like', i.e. Cynic, or κυνισµός 'Cynic philosophy or mode 
178
of living' are derived from κύων, and all three terms were applied to Diogenes of Sinope 
and Crates of Thebes,237 it is unlikely to have that meaning here. The reference in this case is 
most likely purely derogatory, lending a sense such as 'this bastard' (as per Olson's Loeb 
translation).
SD6. This fragment has a passage from a dialogue wherein Socrates is speaking to 
Antisthenes.  It was implied in fragment SD3 (cf. commentary above) that Antisthenes 
wrote himself, rather persuasively, into his own dialogues, and in fact a number of other 
fragments (ED1-6) present Antisthenes as a speaker.  As speculated earlier (ch. 4.ii section 
C) it may be the case that all of Antisthenes' Socratic dialogues portrayed Antisthenes in 
conversation with his great friend and mentor.  
While the historical topic of this fragment is rather morbid, i.e. the murder of the opponents 
of Thirty Tyrants, the comparison it draws with tragedy is rather witty.    Socrates points 
out that the great figures from tragedy always came to a grisly end, but the chorus was 
never subjected to such a fate.  He is therefore implying that he and Antisthenes are merely 
'common folk' and as such should be grateful that they never really 'made it' in life in terms 
of fame and fortune, as that ought to mean they will be spared from slaughter themselves.  
Ironically, in Socrates' own case this turned out ultimately not to be the case and it is 
therefore likely that Socrates is being self-deprecating and ironic.  The way the passage is 
written, however, Socrates is perhaps shown as genuinely innocent of the very real threat 
against him from the Thirty which arose from his defiance of their orders.  So it is possible 
that this passage of dialogue was set, and written, in the year 404 or early 403 – after the 
Thirty had come to power, but before they had ordered Socrates to arrest Leon of Salamis.  
In Plato's Apology Socrates claims that he knew full well that he risked death by walking 
away without carrying out the Thirty Tyrants' orders to arrest Leon, and it was only their 
overthrow soon after that saved his life (32c-e).
237 See ch. 2.i, especially section D.
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SD7.  This fragment is included because it has a direct quotation from Socrates, which 
suggests that it was a line given to him in a dialogue.  Successive questions are asked in this 
fragment: 
But does Antisthenes not say so?  Who is it who wrote 'the beginning of education is the 
examination of names (ὀνόµατα)'?  Did Socrates not say so?
It appears likely that Antisthenes is the author referred to 'who wrote', and if Socrates said 
the words, then these words must have been written in a dialogue.  This then appears to be 
a fragment of Socratic dialogue written by Antisthenes.
The passage of Xenophon referred to is apparently from the Memorabilia.  There, although 
Xenophon does not specifically use the word ὄνοµα (name), he does describe Socrates' 
habit of discussing things according to their kind (κατὰ γένη, 4.5.12) as well as his 
unceasing persistence in examining with his students 'what any given thing is' (τί ἕκαστον 
εἴη τῶν ὄντων, 4.6.1).   The fact that ὄνοµα appears in this fragment but was not used by 
Xenophon, and that Antisthenes is mentioned, lends extra credence to the argument that 
this fragment quoting Socrates was from a dialogue of Antisthenes.
Antisthenes seems to have built on the Socratic principle of examining things to discover 
what they are.  Diogenes Laertius (6.3 = DC 45, SSR 151) states that Antisthenes 'was the 
first to define logos (account/definition/description), saying, “logos is that which reveals 
something's essence”' (λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τὸ τί ἦν ἢ ἔστι δηλῶν); cf. LSJ εἰµί F.1.: 'in the 
Aristotelian formula τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι (Apo. 82b38, al.), used to express the essential nature of a 
thing'.  This statement attributed to Antisthenes may also have been a line in a dialogue, 
also probably delivered by Socrates.
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CONTEMPORARY DIALOGUES   CD1-20
CD1-3.  From this trio of fragments we learn the name of five of Antisthenes' dialogues, all 
of which probably contained his contemporaries as speakers.  These titles are Truth, 
Protreptic Dialogue or Dialogues, Physiognomy, The Statesman, and The Archelaus.
Apparently The Archelaus 'contained an attack on Gorgias the orator' (CD3).  If Gorgias 
featured as a speaker in the dialogue that may help to explain the comment in CD1 that 
Antisthenes 'was a student of Gorgias'.  We are not told by whom or on what basis the 
attack on Gorgias in The Archelaus was made.  The fact, however, that  'Gorgias the orator' is 
specified, rather than simply 'Gorgias', suggests that it was in his capacity as a rhetorician 
that he was being censured in Antisthenes' text.  This idea is supported by the fact that the 
Archelaus is mentioned at the same time as The Statesman which attacks politicians.  
Furthermore Plato's dialogue of the same name – viz. Gorgias – is essentially an attack on 
rhetoric, and coincidentally it criticises Archelaus himself, whose seemingly happy but in 
reality 'bad' life Plato compares unfavourably with Socrates' life which was 'just' and 'best'.  
With the sparse remaining evidence, it is difficult to know how meaningful this coincidence 
is.  In Diogenes Laertius' catalogue the work is listed as Archelaus, or, Concerning Kingship, 
(6.18) – there is further speculation on its possible contents in the commentary on CD13-14 
below.
Antisthenes' general disdain for orators is further evinced in CD3, which reports his attack 
in The Statesman on all the demagogues in Athens.  Given Antisthenes' attacks on flatterers, 
and the damning character sketch of them he builds up (cf. MD9-13 below), it is tempting 
to imagine that The Statesman also contained a scathing, generalising characterisation of 
politicians.  The Statesman does not appear in Diogenes Laertius' list of Antisthenes' works, 
but perhaps it equates to Περὶ νόµου ἢ περὶ πολιτείας, Concerning Law or Concerning 
Government, listed in the 'third volume' (DL 6.16).  However the verity of all of these titles is 
uncertain, as is the question of whether they refer to discrete dialogues or only excerpts (see 
further ch. 6).
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The work listed as Protreptic Dialogue (CD2) and Protreptic Dialogues (CD1) is almost 
certainly one and the same.  Diogenes Laertius lists a work for Antisthenes titled Περὶ 
δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας προτρεπτικὸς πρῶτος, δεύτερος, τρίτος, Concerning Justice and 
Courage: a Protreptic Dialogue, first, second, and third book (6.16).  The brief quotation from the 
Protreptic Dialogue, 'being reared instead of piglets' (CD2) is the sort of colourful expression 
found in dialogue.  The Physiognomy (CD2) is presumably the same work listed by 
Diogenes as Περὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν φυσιογνωµονικός, Concerning the Sophists: on 
Physiognomy (6.16).  The comment preserved – 'For indeed those women force-feed the 
piglets' – is the sort of colourful language suited to a dialogue but in what context is 
difficult to guess.
CD4a-c.  These three fragments report on the dialogue Antisthenes penned and 
humorously entitled Sathōn (Σάθωνα acc., Σάθων nom.).  This is clearly a play on Plato's 
name which directly transliterated from Greek is Platōn (Πλάτων).  Platōn was evidently 
not Plato's original name – he was named Aristocles at birth (DL 3.4).  There are three 
theories offered by Diogenes Laertius as to how Plato acquired this nickname – viz. that it 
was from the breadth of his literary style, from the breadth of his forehead (noted by 
Neanthes), or a name given to him by his wrestling instructor Ariston on account of his 
good physique (DL 3.4).  Platus (πλατύς) in Greek means 'broad', and of a man usually 
'broad-shouldered' (LSJ s.v.), meaning that the Ariston anecdote appears most plausible, 
though this does not rule out the broad forehead possibility.  Sathē (σάθη) is a colloquial 
term for 'penis' (Henderson 1991, 109-10), the most common word, at least in comedy, being 
peos (πέος, 108), though many other terms were also used (109-24).   Sathōn therefore is a 
humorously insulting play on Plato's name rendering a translation such as 'Broad-cock' or 
'Fat-cock'.  The fact that this play on words was made by Plato's older contemporary, 
Antisthenes, with reference to a physical attribute, seems to rule out Diogenes Laertius' 
speculation that Plato's nickname referred to the breadth of his style.  According to Photius 
(s.v.) the comic poet Teleclides (F 71, fl. c. 440 BC; cf. Henderson 1991, 110) used the word 
sathōn, apparently as an endearing nickname (ὑποκόρισµα) for a male child.  Antisthenes 
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application of the name to Plato therefore had the added twist of using a word that already 
had comedic currency.   
It is fascinating that Antisthenes published a dialogue with this title.  It is unfortunate that 
no secure fragments of this dialogue remain, as they would more than likely be highly 
entertaining (there are speculated to be a couple of possible extant fragments – see below 
and TH1).  It seems a good chance, however, that Plato would have appeared in the 
dialogue as his alter-ego 'Satho', portrayed no doubt in a humorous and unflattering light.  
Diogenes Laertius reports that Antisthenes wrote this work in response to disparaging 
comments Plato had made about a work he had written about the impossibility of 
contradiction.  Plato said '”How then are you writing about this very subject?”, and so 
demonstrating that the argument refutes itself' (3.35), viz. if contradiction was impossible, 
then how could Antisthenes contradict the existence of contradiction?  Diogenes then states 
that Antisthenes wrote the Sathōn as a result (CD4c).  Immediately following this, Diogenes 
reports (3.35): 
And they also say (φασὶ δὲ καὶ) that having heard Plato read out the Lysis, Socrates cried out 'By 
Heracles, what a lot of lies the young man is telling!', since he had written several things which the 
man Socrates did not say.
It appears possible that Diogenes includes this passage here because he found the 
information in his sources together with the comment about Antisthenes' Sathōn.  The 
wording 'and they also say', suggests a connection with the previous remarks.  So possibly 
the comment that Plato was telling a lot of lies was in fact alleged by Antisthenes' Socrates 
in the Sathōn, of which this may therefore be a fragment.  See speculation in the 
commentary of TH1 that it may be another fragment of the Sathōn.
CD5.  Cicero's endorsement of the Kursas (and other works), as well as being testament to 
Antisthenes' pleasing style, is evidence that whole dialogues of his were in circulation at 
least as late as the mid first century BC.  Shackleton Bailey emended ΚΥΡΣΑΣ to Κῦρος Β᾽.  
Patzer points out (1970, 153-4) that the manuscripts read ΚΥΡΣΑΣ and reports 
Wilamowitz's view that Cicero would not have written Cyrus in Greek;238 i.e. because 
238 1919, v.2 27 n.2.
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'Cyrus' is the regular Latin word.  Additionally, Patzer notes that the Suda entry for 
'Socrates' contains the story of a man named Kursas who came to Athens and slept by 
Socrates' tomb, and that this story itself resonates closely with the Socratic epistle 17.2 in 
which a young Spartan, after coming to Athens for love of Socrates but finding him dead, 
held conversations with the gravestone (Patzer 1970, 155-6).  The name Kursas was 
uncommon, but not unheard of – LPNG cites examples known in Ionia (vol. 5a) and Thrace 
(vol. 4).  In Diogenes Laertius' catalogue of Antisthenes' works, two of the entries in the 
'tenth volume' report titles 'Κύριος' which are considered corrupt.  Patzer includes 
photocopies of the catalogue portions of three manuscripts of Diogenes Laertius at the back 
of his volume (1970).  In one of these, Cod. Parisinus gr. 1759, the second of these titles looks 
more like Κύρσας than Κύριος – though admittedly the reproductions are far from perfect.
Alcibiades, Cyrus and Heracles
CD6.  This fragment provides evidence, from a very early source (mid 3rd century BC at 
latest), that the Little Cyrus, the Lesser Heracles, and the Alcibiades were all dialogues.  
Interestingly, we learn from the same source that Aeschines reworked and republished 
these works of Antisthenes under his own name, which is similar to the charge that 
Theopompus made against Plato (cf. SD1).239  It is noteworthy that while Plato and 
Aeschines are charged with plagiarising Antisthenes' works, charges of plagiarism were 
never levelled against Antisthenes himself.  This seemingly points not only to the 
originality and attractiveness of Antisthenes' prose, but also to the likelihood that his 
writings were commonly known to antedate these other authors.
Alcibiades. In Diogenes Laertius' list of Antisthenes' works there appears an Alcibiades 
(Ἀλκιβιάδης) in the 'tenth volume' (6.18).  Apart from some interesting and, at times, 
entertaining anecdotes, not much can be deduced from the surviving fragments about 
Antisthenes' own opinions on Alcibiades.  A couple of comments about Alcibiades are 
239 The text is not as clear as it could be and some scholars (e.g. Döring 2006; Prince 2015, 165) think that is is 
Pasiphon who plagiarised Antisthenes.  Grammatically this is possible.  In terms of timelines, however, it 
seems impossible.  As Antisthenes was a widely read 'classic' by the late fourth century, after that point it 
would be impossible to 'plagiarise' him, one could only foolishly imitate him.  Only contemporaries 
could have gotten away with plagiarism, such as Plato (SD1) and Aeschines here are accused of doing.
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negative in tone – alluding to his sexual profligacy (CD9a-b), but others are positive and 
praise his appearance (CD10a-11).  All these comments made by 'Antisthenes' would 
naturally have started life as lines delivered by characters in his dialogues, and 
subsequently the most lurid and titillating portions seem to have been extracted and then 
the attribution made to 'Antisthenes' so as to preserve record of his authorship and, more 
importantly, his authority.
It is interesting to note that Persaeus accuses Aeschines of plagiarising Antisthenes' works, 
and specifically mentions the Alcibiades as one of the examples.  It is not certain precisely 
what ancient writers meant by διεσκευωρῆσθαι when they used it to describe one author 
making a διασκευή of another author's work, rather than of his own.  It seems that 
διασκευή could mean all of 'revised', 'reworked', 'forged', or 'plagiarised' (Csapo & Slater 
1995, 6 & 23; cf. Ath. 3.110b); though it is still not clear whether it was the form or content or 
both that might have been 'reworked'.  Thus it is unclear whether Persaeus means that 
Aeschines adjusted Antisthenes' work and then represented it as his own, or if, perhaps, it 
was the subject matter or general form of the work – e.g. a dialogue with the same 
interlocutors – that was 'reworked'.   
It is worth noting that around a dozen fragments of the Alcibiades attributed to Aeschines 
are extant, and some of them are quite substantial (i.e. 25-50 lines each in SSR).  They may 
give clues as to the content of Antisthenes' Alcibiades.  Aeschines' version was a dialogue 
some of which seems to have involved Socrates relating to a third person a dialogue he had 
with Alcibiades (e.g. SSR VI A 53), and others seem to contain portions of the actual 
dialogue between Socrates and Alcibiades about the excellence of Themistocles in 
overcoming the Persians (e.g. SSR VI A 50-51).
Cyrus and Heracles. In the list of Antisthenes' titles provided by Diogenes Laertius' there 
are no exact title matches for the Little Cyrus or the Lesser Heracles.
There are two works listed by Diogenes certainly containing Cyrus in the title.240  They are:
240 Two further works in the 'tenth volume' have κύριος – various emendations have been proposed 
including: Κῦρος, Κύρνος, Κυρσᾶς (see apparatus in Dorandi).
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Cyrus (Κῦρος) in the 'fourth volume' (6.16), and 
Cyrus, or, Concerning Kingship (Κῦρος ἢ περὶ βασιλείας) in the 'fifth volume' (6.16)
There are also three works listed containing Heracles in the title, being:
Greater Heracles, or, Concerning Might (Ἡρακλῆς ὁ µείζων ἢ περὶ ἰσχύος) in the 
'fourth volume' (6.16)
Heracles, or, Midas (Ἡρακλῆς ἢ Μίδας) and
Heracles, or, Concerning Good Sense or Might (Ἡρακλῆς ἢ περὶ φρονήσεως ἢ ἰσχύος) 
in the 'tenth volume' (6.18).
It is possible that some of these titles are different parts of what was originally one work, 
but was broken up into smaller excerpts or extracts at a later date.  As the Heracles title 
listed by Persaeus is specifically the Lesser Heracles, this must distinguish it from the Greater 
Heracles listed by Diogenes, though it is not at all clear which of the other two titles it may 
imply (cf. commentary on MD9-12).  It is a noteworthy coincidence that titles including the 
names of Alcibiades, Heracles, and Cyrus all appear in the 'tenth volume' as Diogenes lists 
them, match the three titles Aeschines is accused of plagiarising by Persaeus.  This implies 
that this collection of titles was seen as a natural grouping quite early in the study of 
Antisthenes' texts and that they remained together for some centuries thereafter.
Textual notes.  On a philological note, there is clearly something wrong with this text.  The 
δὲ following ἑπτὰ is odd (though it was printed without comment by Dorandi 2013 and 
Marcovich 1999).  It could have started life as an explanatory gloss δ᾽ (i.e. = 4), in which case 
it may have been referring to 'the majority of the seven' mentioned.  Alternately, it could 
possibly have been started out as ζ (i.e.  = 7), being a gloss on ἑπτά, and was subsequently 
misread as a δ᾽.
δὲ ἐσκευώρηται emended to διεσκεύασται.  The δέ printed in editions of the text as the 
second last word of this fragment is in a virtually impossible position grammatically.  The 
verb printed following it, σκευώρεῖσθαι, generally meaning 'contrive' or 'scheme', is a just 
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barely plausible word that can be made to fit the sense with a bit of imagination.  LSJ made 
it a more plausible fit by creating a special entry just for this instance (s.v. III.3 plagiarize).  
Susemihl proposed διεσκευώρηται or διεσκευωρῆσθαι, which is attested in a Platonic 
letter (316a) meaning 'revise' and solves the impossible δέ and the non-perfectly suited verb 
in one stroke.
CD7. As Persaeus (CD6) paired dialogues by Antisthenes including Cyrus and Heracles in 
the title, so does Diogenes here.  Though whereas Persaeus mentions a Little Cyrus and 
Lesser Heracles, Diogenes lists a Cyrus and a Big Heracles.  As noted previously and discussed 
in chapter 6, the titles of Antisthenes works cannot be considered secure by any stretch of 
the imagination, so these later writers may or may not be referring to exactly the same pair 
of works.  Regardless of that, it is interesting that these two characters, one contemporary 
(viz. Cyrus the Younger – arguments for identifying Cyrus as Cyrus the Younger, rather 
than Cyrus the Great are made in the commentary to CD7 and CD9a-b) and one from 
myth, share a relationship in the minds of Antisthenes' readers.  Thus it is quite likely, but 
not certain, that he had tied them together in some manner himself.
No work with the exact title Big Heracles appears in Diogenes Laertius' list of works, though 
from the list of titles in the commentary on CD7 above the closest match is Greater Heracles 
or Concerning Might (Ἡρακλῆς ὁ µείζων ἢ περὶ ἰσχύος, 6.16).
The 'hard work' attributed to both Cyrus and Heracles is interesting.  For Heracles it is 
natural to imagine that πόνος (hard work / toil) is equivalent to ἆθλος (prize contest / 
labour).  For Cyrus the exact nature of the hard work is less obvious.  But interpreting it as 
the struggle for the kingship, by Cyrus the Younger, as envisaged being discussed in a 
dialogue on that topic (commentary CD9a-16b), it is possible to make decent sense out of it. 
That this is probably the correct interpretation is confirmed by circumstantial evidence 
from Athenaeus.  Speaking of the Cyrus with whom Xenophon marched inland to attack 
the Persians (i.e. Cyrus the Younger) he says 'I surmise that he loved hard work' 
(φιλόπονον, Ath. 505a).  Athenaeus' deduction implies familiarity with the content, or at 
the very least the theme, of Antisthenes' dialogue Cyrus.
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CD8.  This fragment offers further confirmation of the attractiveness and genuineness of a 
Antisthenes' works Cyrus and Concerning the Odyssey.  The fact that Phrynicus felt 
compelled to mention that these were 'genuine works' of Antisthenes points to the fact that 
there were writings in existence that bore Antisthenes' name, but which at least one ancient 
critic did not think were his.  So not only is it reported that Antisthenes was plagiarised, but 
apparently his reputation for excellent style led to the suspicion that his name had been 
falsely applied to works that were composed by other authors – in a bid, no doubt, to lend 
them credibility.
CD9a-b.  The first of these fragments offers further confirmation of a work known as the 
Cyrus, in this case a 'second' Cyrus.  It also demonstrates that the titles of Antisthenes' works 
are scant guide to the full contents thereof, as here it is stated that a work titled Cyrus 
contains disparaging comments about Alcibiades.  Although, as is argued below, it appears 
that Antisthenes may have written dialogues with Cyrus, Alcibiades, and Archelaus 
conversing together.
Alcibiades' sexual habits. These fragments, clearly from a common source, report that 
Alcibiades was 'perverse (παράνοµος) both as regards women and as regards his mode of 
living in other respects'.  They then state that Alcibiades had sexual relations with three 
generations of women from his own family, i.e. his mother, his sister, and his daughter, in a 
like manner to the Persians.  
Antisthenes is referring here to the Persian custom of xvaētvadatha, or next-of-kin marriages 
between parents and children or uterine siblings (cf. detailed discussion Hastings 1916, 
8.456-9).  The Greeks were aware of this practice.  Herodotus discusses the manner in which 
Cambyses II (Great King of Persia 530-22 BC) took first one sister (Atossa) to wife, and 
subsequently wed another younger one of his sisters (3.31).  According to Ctesias and 
Plutarch, Darius II (424-404 BC) had four sons by his sister Parysatis (FGrH 688 F 15, Plu. 
Artax. 1).  One of these sons, Artaxerxes II (405/4-359 BC), married two of his own 
daughters at his mother Parysatis' urging (Plu. Artax. 23; cf. Heracleides, FGrH 689 F 7).  In 
a related vein, Ctesias records that the satrap Terituchmes ignored his wife in order to carry 
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on a passionate affair with his sister Rhoxane (FGrH 688 F 15, 53-4).  When discussing 
varying customs, Diogenes Laertius claims that the Persians do not think it perverse 
(ἄτοπον) for a man to marry his daughter (9.83).  
In an article exploring the love life of Alcibiades, Littman declares that these charges by 
Antisthenes against Alcibiades are highly suspect, largely because there is no independent 
evidence of Alcibiades having a sister and because unsubstantiated charges of incest were 
often made by the orators (1970, 270 & n.15).  These are plausible arguments, though 
perhaps not sufficient grounds to dismiss these allegations out of hand.  It is worth 
considering that similar charges were made against Cimon and his sister Elpinice (see 
commentary below on CD18).
Eustathius, in CD9b, included the additional comment from Antisthenes that Alcibiades 
was 'played himself to the point of exhaustion (παρεξηυληµένος) in his pointless way of 
life'.  The verb παρεξαυλέω generally appears, as it does here, as a perfect passive 
participle (middle/passive form) used adjectivally.  In the passive it quite literally means 
(LSJ s.v.) 'worn out by being played upon'.  But it seems that it is employed here in the middle 
voice – Alcibiades was far from being a passive victim in these activities. By using this word 
Antisthenes no doubt intended humorous innuendo, especially given the comments that 
follow on the nature of Alcibiades sexual habits.  Not surprisingly, word play was common 
with the vocabulary relating to pipe-playing.  The αὐλητρίς, pipe-player, was a female 
slave commonly in attendance at symposia who is often referred to in a manner that 
'implies the likely overlap of musical and sexual services' (Wilson 1999, 84).  In particular, 
the verb λεσβιάζειν, meaning 'do as a woman of Lesbos', is a double entendre which often 
refers to performing on the kithara or aulos, but in comedy equally to fellatio (84-5).
Alcibiades' sexual profligacy was a popular subject of his biographers and target for his 
detractors.  Disparaging comments from Ps.-Andocides are preserved in the speech Against 
Alcibiades, where he claims that Alcibiades' habit of bringing courtesans into his house 
drove his wife, Hipparete, to divorce him (4.14; cf. Plu. Alc. 8.3-4).  He also alleges that 
Alcibiades, having subjected the women of Melos to slavery (cf. Th. 5.84.1, 5.116.4) 
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purchased one of them and had a child by her, a union he claims was more unnatural than 
that of Aegisthus' parents (i.e. Thyestes and his daughter Pelopia, Ps.-And. 4.22-3; cf. Plu. 
Alc. 17.4).  Lysias, in a speech written against Alcibiades' son Alcibiades, lists the sins of the 
younger Alcibiades' ancestors, and almost certainly includes his father when he alleges: 
'Have not most of them been whoring, and while some of them have had intercourse with 
their sisters, others have had children by their own daughters' (14.41-2).  Also from Lysias 
we find the claim that Alcibiades and Axiochus both fell in love with Medontis of Abydus, 
married her and lived with her.  When she later had a daughter, not knowing whose she 
was, they both slept with her as well (fr. 8 Carey = Ath. 13.534f-5a).
Rumour had it that whilst Alcibiades was a guest of the Spartans he carried on a secret 
affair with Queen Timaea, the wife of King Agis, and that Agis' reputed son Leotychides, 
borne by Timaea, was in fact an illegitimate child from Alcibiades (Plu. Lys. 22.3-5).  
Allegedly, Agis openly declared that Alcibiades was the father of Leotychides and in private 
Timaea addressed the child as 'Alcibiades' (Ages. 3).  In one of the two versions of 
Alcibiades' death offered by Plutarch, while hiding out from the Thirty Tyrants and the 
Spartans in Phrygia, Alcibiades is said to have corrupted a girl from a notable family and 
while she was in his company her brothers – failing to bear his transgressions with 
equanimity – burned the house down and shot him dead as he ran out through the flames 
(Alc. 39.5).  Giving a clue as to how Alcibiades might have viewed himself in this domain of 
life, Plutarch reports that Alcibiades' golden shield bore no ancestral device, but rather an 
Eros wielding a thunderbolt (16.1-2; cf. Ath. 12.534e).
Nature of the dialogue Cyrus. According to Persaeus' report in CD6, the Cyrus dialogue by 
Antisthenes that he was familiar with was entitled Little Cyrus (µικρὸς Κῦρος).   This seems 
reasonably clearly to be referring to Cyrus the Younger (c. 423-401 BC),241 satrap of Lydia, 
Phrygia and Cappadocia and supreme Persian military commander in Asia Minor from 
around 408/7, and the younger brother of King Artaxerxes II.  There does not appear to be 
another extant reference to him with this epithet - 'Little'.  However Cyrus the Great, king 
241 Contra Engels who is certain this is Cyrus the Great: 'there can be no doubt that Kyros I was A.'s ideal 
ruler' FGrH IV.A.1 1998, 103; and Prince: 'probably Antisthenes' text on Cyrus the Great 2015, 145.
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of Persia c. 560-530 BC, was also referred to in literature as Cyrus the Elder.  So by analogy 
it may also be natural for Cyrus the Younger also to be known as Cyrus the Little or Little 
Cyrus.  The alternate – and probably more attractive – possibility is that this title refers to a 
work titled Cyrus of lesser stature (in some sense) compared to some other larger or more 
significant work by the same title, as the epic The Little Iliad (Ἰλιάς µικρά) was known in 
comparison to the famous work by Homer.  If so, this would not exclude the possibility that 
the title referred to a smaller work, but one that was nonetheless about Cyrus the Younger.
The contents and nature of the dialogue may be speculated with a little more certainty.  As 
there is a fragment of Antisthenes that mentions 'Cyrus the king' (CD13a) it seems that 
Cyrus the Great may have been a topic of conversation in one of the dialogues 
incorporating 'Cyrus' in the title.  As discussed under CD7 above, these dialogues 
predominantly focussed on Cyrus the Younger, whose life overlapped with both 
Antisthenes, and the character mentioned here in the dialogue, Alcibiades.  It also became 
the convention when giving titles to dialogues to name them after one of the principal 
interlocutors, as is the case with Plato's and Aeschines' dialogues.  For this to hold true, a 
'Cyrus' must have been a participant in the dialogue.  There is no dialogic fragments of 
Antisthenes remaining that are known to include historical persons (as opposed to 
contemporaries) participating in them, which again points to Cyrus the Younger being both 
the subject referred to by the title, and a speaker in the dialogue.
A dialogue or dialogues containing Cyrus the Younger, Alcibiades and Archelaus?  
A tantalising possibility is that several of these titles relating to Cyrus, Alcibiades, and 
Archelaus are from single work or group of related works.  There is evidence pointing to 
the fact that it was a dialogue, or dialogues, on kingship.  In Diogenes Laertius' catalogue, 
one of the works on Cyrus attributed to Antisthenes is entitled Cyrus, or, On Kingship (6.16).  
As noted by Persaeus (CD6 & commentary) Antisthenes produced a work titled Alcibiades.  
He is also credited with a work titled The Archelaus (CD3) which almost certainly featured 
the eponymous Macedonian king (413-399).  It is fascinating therefore to discover that 
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Diogenes Laertius lists these works as: Alcibiades, Archelaus, or, On Kingship (6.18).242  The 
common subtitle suggests that they were all part of the same dialogue, or were a series of 
related dialogues.
There is no direct evidence that Alcibiades ever actually met Cyrus, however, they easily 
could have met.  Cyrus had taken over the Satrapy based in Sardis from Tissaphernes (X. 
An. 1.1.2, X. HG 1.4.3; cf. Plu. Art. 2.3) to whom Alcibiades had been a trusted advisor for a 
period of time (Th. 8.45-6; cf. Plu. Alc. 24-5).  Cyrus then supported the Spartan general 
Lysander (Th. 2.65.12, X. HG. 1.5.1-9) who defeated an Athenian fleet under the command 
of Alcibiades' deputy, Antiochus, at the battle of Notium in 406 (X. HG. 1.5.12-14), leading 
directly to Alcibiades dismissal as an Athenian general (1.5.16) and subsequent 
assassination in 404 by the Persian satrap Pharnabazus, who was himself influenced by 
Lysander and the Thirty Tyrants (Plu. Alc. 38.4-39.1).  Cyrus' attempt to overthrow his 
brother the king, Artaxerxes II, ended with his own death at the battle of Cunaxa in 401, a 
campaign extensively chronicled by Xenophon, particularly in his Anabasis. 
Antisthenes is no doubt creative enough to have written one or more dialogues featuring 
three royal aspirants: Archelaus who became king, likely by murder (Pl. Gorg. 471); Cyrus 
the Younger who fought a campaign aimed at the kingship against his own brother; and 
Alcibiades who would probably have happily set himself up as king if the chance arose.  In 
such a dialogue it is possible to imagine that Archelaus, Cyrus, and Alcibiades were 
engaged in a discussion regarding the nature of kingship and the best way to manage the 
sovereignty – and perhaps the best way to acquire it too (the πόνος attributed to Cyrus in 
CD7 perhaps suggests the 'hard work' involved in taking the throne).
Direct evidence for participation by Cyrus in such a dialogue is provided by a fragment in 
which he is addressed by name (CD14a & commentary).   A piece of direct speech 
attributed to 'Cyrus the king' may have originally been delivered by 'Cyrus the Younger' 
242 Modern editors have placed 'Alcibiades' as a separate title on a separate line followed by a comma 
(Marcovich, Dorandi) or a full stop (Hicks).  Fortunately Patzer 1970 prints reproductions of the portions 
of three manuscripts showing Diogenes Laertius' catalogue.  In two of them – Cod. Neap. Burb. 3.B29 
and Cod. Paris. gr. 1759 – 'Alcibiades' and 'Archelaus' are clearly visible listed one after the other on the 
same line with no punctuation.
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who wanted to differentiate the earlier Cyrus from himself.  Alternately, an attribution of 
'Cyrus' may have been modified by a later compiler to include 'the king' – either because it 
made the identity speaker clearer or more impressive for his audience (see CD13a & 
commentary).
Quasi-historical dialogues. The sort of dialogue envisaged here would be not unlike the 
passage of Herodotus in which Otanes, Megabyzus, and Darius debating the merits of 
democracy, oligarchy and monarchy respectively (3.80-2).  Including characters in a 
dialogue who could have met, without necessitating direct historical evidence of them 
actually doing so, seems later to have become an accepted practice in this genre.  For 
example, Praxiphanes (early 3rd c. BC) wrote a dialogue, On History (F 18 Wehrli) wherein 
an unlikely meeting of characters took place in which they each spoke on behalf of their 
respective genres – Thucydides for History, Plato Comicus for comedy, Agathon for 
tragedy, Nikeratos and Choerilus for epic poetry, and Melanippides for lyric and 
dithyramb.  Archelaus is also mentioned in the fragment which suggests that the dialogue 
took place at his court in Macedon (cf. Csapo & Wilson forthcoming).  It is possible that 
Praxiphanes fashioned his dialogue on a known precursor – viz. a dialogue by Antisthenes 
with three aspirants to the throne (including Archelaus) discussing kingship.
It is interesting to note that the author of the Alcibiades II (generally thought to be an 
imitator of Plato) makes a connection between Archelaus and Alcibiades.  Socrates holds up 
the recently assassinated Archelaus to Alcibiades as a counter-example, showing the sort of 
reactions holding absolute sovereignty (τυρρανίς) can provoke (141d-e).  Clearly there was 
some correlation between Archelaus and Alcibiades in the minds of contemporaries.
Taking into account the separate surviving Antisthenic titles naming these figures, this may 
indicate that there were a series of related dialogues, or possibly one large dialogue that 
later got broken up and referred to by the figures featuring in the discrete pieces.  
Antisthenes' Ajax & Odysseus is an example of a work which is clearly one, but has been 
broken up by editors – ancient and modern – into a separate Ajax and Odysseus.
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Persaeus on kingship.  Persaeus, who reports two of the relevant titles – i.e. Little Cyrus and 
Alcibiades (CD6), had particular interests in kingship and constitutional matters and was 
also an important figure in the Macedonian court.  Zeno had been invited by the king 
Antigonus Gonatas to come to his court, however he declined and sent his pupil Persaeus 
in his stead (DL 7.6, 9).  Persaeus became a trusted advisor in the royal court and was given 
charge, as tutor, of Antigonus' son Halcyoneus (DL 6.36).  It appears that Persaeus' interest 
in kingship extended to a personal preference for such a system of governance.  An 
anecdote relates that when Antigonus was on the verge of restoring democracy to the 
Eritreans, Persaeus prevented him (κωλῦσαι, DL 2.143-4).  He ended his career 
commanding Antigonus' Macedonian garrison at Corinth, a post he died defending (Paus. 
2.8.4).  Given Persaeus' interest in kingship, and Macedonian sovereignty in particular, the 
dialogues of Antisthenes he mentions are likely to have had a special appeal.  Listed among 
Persaeus' own works are: On Kingship, Περὶ βασιλείας, The Spartan Constitution, Πολιτεία 
Λακωνική, and A Response to Plato's Laws, in seven books, Πρὸς τοὺς Πλάτωνος νόµους ζ 
(DL 7.36).  The first title replicates precisely the subtitle of two of Antisthenes' works he 
cites (Cyrus and Alcibiades) viz. Περὶ βασιλείας.  
Cyrus the Younger's aspirations for the kingship.  Xenophon never directly reports that 
Cyrus the Younger wanted to emulate his ancestor of the same name, Cyrus the Elder.  
Xenophon does report, however, that 'Cyrus was a man who was the most kingly and most 
worthy to rule of all the Persians since Cyrus the Elder' (An. 1.9.1).  Plutarch also reports a 
couple of lines of dialogue attributed to Cyrus: 'What are you saying Clearchus?  Are you 
bidding me, who am reaching out for a kingdom, to be undeserving of a kingdom?' (Artax. 
8.2-3).  As Plutarch presents them, the lines are delivered by Cyrus to Clearchus the Spartan 
exile, just as Cyrus prepares to engage in battle with his brother Artaxerxes II at Cunaxa.  
The lines also seem just as well suited to be part of a dialogue about the merits of strategies 
for acquiring a kingdom, such as the notional work of Antisthenes being speculated on 
here.  If the lines have been utilised by Plutarch out of their original context, it is possible 
that Clearchus was also a participant in a dialogue, or that Plutarch attached his name to 
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these lines to suit his purpose at hand.  In that case the lines could be imagined being 
addressed as a rebuke to an interlocutor in a dialogue discussing aspirations for kingship 
and where some approach, apparently incongruous with Cyrus' virtues, had been 
proposed.  Reusing famous lines in new contexts was not unheard of, and Plutarch had, in 
fact, recycled another well known line of Antisthenes' and given it to Alexander the Great 
(see CD14e-f and commentary).  
Alcibiades' tyrannical tendencies. There is ample evidence showing that Alcibiades 
harboured ambitions for tyranny or kingship and that the Athenians suspected as much. 
Plato's Alcibiades I portays Socrates conversing with Alcibiades when the latter was on the 
verge of entering public life.  Socrates says that Alcibiades imagines that he will prove to 
the Athenians that he is worthy of honour more so than even Pericles or anyone else who 
ever lived, and will thereby wield the greatest power in the state, and be the greatest as well 
among all the Greeks, and also among all the barbarians on their continent.  Even if ordered 
by a god not to enter Asia, Alcibiades would be reluctant to live under that constraint, 
believing that apart from Cyrus and Xerxes no one of any account has ever lived.  Socrates 
concludes 'That this is your hope (i.e. to be the greatest man living), I know perfectly well 
and I am not guessing' (105b-c; cf. Ps.-Pl. Alc. II 141a-c).  He adds, a few lines further on, 
that Alcibiades has hopes of proving himself of great worth to the city and thereby winning 
'power without limit' (105d-e), and later speculates about a notional challenge from 
Alcibiades against the Persian king Artaxerxes II (123c). Plutarch also describes Alcibiades 
as dreaming of world domination, noting that while Nicias was trying to persuade the 
Athenians that an expedition against Sicily was beyond them, Alcibiades quite openly saw 
it as a first step – before moving on to conquer Carthage, Libya and ultimately Italy and the 
Peloponnesus (Alc. 17.2-3; cf. Nic. 12.1-2).  
In another more contemporaneous account, Ps.-Andocides accused Alcibiades of aiming to 
increase his power by attempting to seize control of the estate of Alcibiades' own father-in-
law, Hipponicus (reputedly the richest man in Athens), by plotting to assassinate his 
brother-in-law, Callias; and Callias himself allegedly accused Alcibiades of the same plot 
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before the assembly (4.15; cf. Plu. Alc. 8.2).  Ps.-Andocides compares the terror Alcibiades 
inspires to that of the Persian king (17) and accuses him of exacting tribute from Athens' 
allies for personal use and being maintained by the allies at Olympia in Persian style (30-1; 
cf. Plu. Alc. 12.1).  He elsewhere plainly states that it is men such as Alcibiades who go on to 
establish tyrannies (24), and accuses Alcibiades of acting like a tyrant (27).  Plutarch 
similarly reports that the reputable men of Athens thought Alcibiades' behaviour tyrannical 
(τυραννικά) and monstrous (Alc. 16.2).  The elders of the city also felt that it was 
'tyrannical' and 'perverse' when Alcibiades' image was painted in a chamber of the 
Propylaea (cf. CD13-14 below), prompting Archestratus to note wryly that 'Hellas could not 
endure two Alcibiadeses' (16.5).  In a particularly relevant passage, Plutarch comments on 
Alcibiades' effect on regular Athenians (34.6): 
The common and working people were so enthralled by his leadership that they desired with 
astounding passion to be ruled by him as tyrant, and some said as much, and others approached 
him encouraging him to prove himself better than envy, and to abolish decrees and laws, and get 
rid of gossipers (φλύαροι) who were destroying the city, so that he might manage and deal with 
matters without fear of informers.
Though Plutarch observes that Alcibiades' own intentions on the tyranny remained opaque, 
the most powerful Athenians nonetheless feared that he desired it (35.1).  Certainly when 
Socrates suggested to Alcibiades that he had in mind to be leader of the state, and make 
contest with the kings of Sparta and Persia, Alcibiades agreed (Pl. Alc. I 120a).  For the sake 
of Alcibiades' happiness, Socrates urges him to procure excellence (ἀρετή) rather than the 
tyranny (τυραννίς, 135b).  Elsewhere, Alcibiades is reported to have declared that he did 
not seduce the Spartan queen, Timaea, out of wantonness, but because he desired to see the 
Spartans ruled over by his descendants (Plu. Ages. 3.2).  Even Alcibiades' own son, 
Alcibiades the Younger, admitted in a speech that his father had a number of opportunities 
to join an oligarchical faction and dominate the city (Isoc. 16.36), and that many citizens 
suspected him of plotting to gain a tyranny (38).  Aristophanes' Aeschylus in the Frogs, 
when commenting on Alcibiades, observes: 'It's best to rear no lion in the city, but once you 
have raised one, cater to its whims' (1431b-2).  In an anecdote from Plutarch Alcibiades 
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actually compares himself to a lion (Alc. 2.2).  Images of lions were routinely associated 
with monarchs and others wielding great power.243
CD10.  This fragment is another comment from Antisthenes about Alcibiades but, in 
contrast to CD9a-b above, on this occasion it is a positive one.  The simplest explanation for 
these differing opinions being attributed to Antisthenes is that they were put forward by 
different speakers in his dialogues – one speaker criticising Alcibiades and, in another 
place, another speaker praising and defending him.  The fragment then relates Alcibiades' 
legendary beauty – admired by men and women alike – which allegedly stayed with him 
throughout his entire life.  Plutarch seems to have drawn directly on this passage of 
Antisthenes for his Alcibiades.  In a passage following directly on from his mention of 
Antisthenes name in C12 he writes about Alcibiades' beauty that 'it was unnecessary to say 
anything except that as a child, as a youth, and as a man, it bloomed in every stage and 
season of his physique in a lovely and agreeable fashion' (Alc. 1.3).   In another passage 
seemingly drawing once again on the content of this fragment Plutarch notes Alcibiades' 
tendency to wander about in purple robes (16.1).
CD11a-b.  This pair of fragments contains further statements regarding Alcibiades' physical 
attractiveness.  Both of them include a near identical direct quotation from Antisthenes that 
unless Achilles was like Alcibiades he was not really handsome.  Achilles' beauty was 
legendary, and as Iliad 2.673-4 cited in CD11b states, he was the handsomest of all the 
Greeks who came to Troy.  Achilles was aware of his own beauty, and before killing Priam's 
son Lycaon, Achilles invited him to look upon 'how big and handsome I am' (οἷος καὶ ἐγὼ 
καλός τε µέγας τε, Il. 21.108).  Though this is standard vocabulary, possibly Antisthenes 
was referring to this very line, as the text of CD11a calls Alcibiades 'big' (µέγας) and 
'handsome' (καλός) using words identical to that of Achilles.  In CD13a for καλός 
Olympiodorus substitutes ὡραῖος, which in the Classical period when Antisthenes was 
writing had the meaning 'in the bloom of youth' but in post-Hellenistic usage came to mean 
'beautiful' or 'handsome' (LSJ s.v. III.2-3).  Plutarch also commented that it was possible to 
243 See e.g. Ar. Kn. 1037-44, Hdt. 1.84, 5.92, 6.121; A. Ag. 717-36.
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say of Alcibiades that 'he was not a child of Achilles, but the very man himself' (οὐ παῖς 
Ἀχιλλέως, ἀλλ ἐκεῖνος εἴη ἄν αὐτός Alc. 23.6).
The amusing comment preserved in both fragments that Alcibiades 'was called the common 
loverboy (ἐρώµενος) of (all) Greece' may have belonged in the same dialogue as fragments 
CD9a-b discussing Alcibiades' proclivity for sexual encounters of all kinds.  Though the 
comment here is not obviously negative.
There are two additional comments on Alcibiades in CD11b not found in CD11a.  The first 
is the claim that 'in Athens the depictions of the Herms were painted (γράφεσθαι) in 
Alcibiades' image and likeness.'  Taken literally, this statement means that when images of 
Herms were painted (on vases, wall paintings, etc.) their faces were depicted in Alcibiades' 
likeness.  As the Herms themselves were sculpted it seems likely, by the principal of lectio 
difficilior potior, that the text originally read 'depictions of the Herms were sculpted 
(γλύφεσθαι) in Alcibiades' image'.  The exceedingly common word γράφεσθαι 'to be 
painted' might easily have been misread by a copyist for the comparatively uncommon 
word γλύφεσθαι 'to be sculpted'.  Note that either way this would not be the only time 
Alcibiades featured in famous images.  Among paintings of numerous mythical heroes in a 
chamber off the Propylaea on the Acropolis, Pausanias records a painting of Alcibiades 
with emblems of victory his team won at Nemea (1.22.7).  Plutarch elaborates that this 
painting was by Aristophon and pictured Alcibiades lounging in the arms of a female 
personification of Nemea (Alc. 16.5).
The second additional point in CD11b is the quote from Il. 2.673-4 noted above.  As 
Antisthenes' standard modus operandi was to quote Homer to emphasise or prove his point 
when discussing Homer (ch. 5 section B), he seems entirely likely to have employed Homer 
in discussions elsewhere – thus suggesting that this line was part of the original dialogue 
from which the fragment was excerpted.
CD12.  A factual note about Alcibiades, viz. that his nurse was named Amycla, found by 
Plutarch in an unnamed work of Antisthenes.  Plutarch comments elsewhere that non-
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Spartans sometimes placed Spartan nurses over their infants due to the skill of these nurses 
for raising contented, robust, and fearless children; and he cites Alcibiades' nurse Amycla as 
an example of this practice (Lyc. 16).  The name Amycla is only known for this one woman 
noted twice by Plutarch, though similar Laconian names Ἀµύκλας, Ἀµυκλαῖος, Ἀµύκη, 
and Ἄµυκος are also attested (LGPN III.a s.v. respectively).  The fact that this name is only 
known from Plutarch, who credits Antisthenes as his source, perhaps suggests that the 
information on the skill of Spartan nurses also originated from a work of Antisthenes.  
Antisthenes would have been discussing something relevant to have cause for introducing 
Amycla's name – possibly commenting on the unbringing of Alcibiades.  
CYRUS
CD13a-c.  The fact that the same fragment is attributed both to Cyrus and to Antisthenes 
suggests that many of the statements attributed to 'Antisthenes' originally started life as 
words he gave to one of the participants in his dialogues.
If the reference to 'Cyrus the king' here is accurate, it must be to Cyrus the Great.  As there 
is no trace of a dialogue attributed to Antisthenes featuring non-contemporary historical 
characters, one plausible explanation is that Cyrus the Great is being quoted by a speaker in 
a dialogue.  If so, this comment would have fit quite naturally into the sort of discussion 
that was imagined between Archelaus, Cyrus the Younger, and Alcibiades in the discussion 
above on CD9a-b.  Cyrus the Younger, for example, could have used this expression in 
order to distinguish the king from himself.  
The ethical nature of the comment given to Cyrus in this fragment, that the most essential 
knowledge is to 'unlearn base things', is quintessentially Antisthenic in nature.  For a 
collection of Antisthenes comments warning against 'base men' and 'base deeds' (often 
κακοί and κακά) see the discussion in ch. 2.ii section A.  The ethical opposition between 
what is noble and what is base in this group of fragments is made particularly clear when 
the term ἀναγκαιότατον, 'most necessary' in CD13a-b, is replaced by ἄριστον, 'most noble' 
or 'best' in CD13c.
199
CD14a-f and CD15. This is another group of fragments linked to Cyrus.  In this case a 
certain Cyrus is being addressed rather than speaking himself (as in CD13a).  The Cyrus in 
this case is argued here to be Cyrus the Younger.  As discussed in the commentary on 
CD9a-b, Antisthenes wrote a dialogue titled Cyrus, or, On Kingship, and this fragment gives 
evidence that Cyrus was one of the participants in that dialogue, and that someone is 
consoling the aspiring prince that 'it is kingly to do good but be ill spoken of'.  The thought 
captured in these fragments – the notion of doing good deeds in the face of being ill spoken 
of – is particularly Antisthenic and several more Antisthenes fragments concern the value of 
a bad reputation.  As usual, these comments should be considered to have been delivered 
by a speaker in one of his dialogues – whether that be Antisthenes himself or another.  
When hearing that base men (or the masses, πονηροί) were praising him, he said 'I feel 
quite anxious I have done something wrong.'244  and 'he urged people who were being ill 
spoken of to bear it more steadfastly than if they were being pelted with stones' (DL 6.7 = 
DC 85, SSR 90).
Although in this fragment Cyrus' interlocutor is not named, taking into consideration 
Alcibiades' chequered history, including derogatory comments made about him in the 
fragments above, it is tempting to imagine that he is the one reassuring Cyrus here.  At any 
rate, we know that Alcibiades is discussed in at least one of the dialogues bearing the title 
Cyrus (CD9a), and in that dialogue it was specifically his tendency to engage in Persian 
customs that was referred to.  The fact that Antisthenes demonstrated the value of πόνος, 
hard work, in a Cyrus dialogue, and that Atheneaus described Cyrus the Younger as 
φιλόπονον, 'hard work loving' (505a) was discussed above (SD6).  
CD15.  This fragment brings together πόνος and bad reputation, known to be part of the 
Cyrus dialogue from CD7 and CD14a-f respectively.  Whereas in CD7 hard work was said 
to be an ἀγαθόν, a good thing, here a bad reputation is said to be an ἀγαθόν and 
equivalent to hard work.  It thus seems highly likely that this fragment is part of the same 
dialogue.  Two further Antisthenes fragments also discuss πόνος in a similar vein.  One 
244 DL 6.5 = DL 6.8, Ant. Loci Com. 2.32.172, Gnom. Vat. 743 n. 9, DC 178a-c, SSR 88, 89. 
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records: 'Antisthenes said that hard labours are like dogs.  Since they also bite those who 
are unfamiliar with them' (Gnom. Vat. 1 =  DC 96, SSR 113).  And the other: 'One must 
pursue pleasures that follow hard work, but not pleasures that precede hard work' (Stob. 
3.29.65 = DC 113, SSR 126).245
In CD14c the words of the fragment are slightly paraphrased and put into the mouth of 
Antisthenes as if he were addressing Plato, instead of someone else addressing Cyrus.  It is 
not clear in what context Antisthenes would be speaking about being 'kingly' (βασιλικόν) 
in relation to himself.  However this is readily explainable.  If this line of Antisthenes' was 
extracted from a dialogue by someone compiling aphoristic phrases about kingship and 
kingliness, it would be one natural approach for them to drop the address to Cyrus and 
insert Antisthenes' name in order to preserve his authorship.  At a later date when Diogenes 
Laertius (or someone he was copying from) wanted to use the statement as a specific reply, 
it would be easy for them to surmise that Plato was involved – due to the legend of their 
rivalry – and thus add in Plato's name.  Alternately, the line delivered by Antisthenes' Cyrus 
could have been so well known that it was given instead to Antisthenes himself as a joke.
The line evidently became so famous later that it was attributed by Plutarch (in two 
different works) to Alexander the Great (CD14e-f).  Plutarch was familiar with Antisthenes' 
work, so it is impossible to know if he found the statement second hand via another source, 
or knew perfectly well that it was from Antisthenes, but liked it, and so recycled it into his 
own work as a line of Alexander's (Plutarch may have done this elsewhere with 
Antisthenes' works, see commentary at CD9a-b: Cyrus the Younger's aspirations for the 
kingship).  If the line was sufficiently well-known in educated circles as Antisthenes', it 
would in fact show superior style not to name him.  If one has a character in a modern 
dialogue say 'to be, or not to be', it would be poor form to mention that it originated with 
Shakespeare – information any cultured person may be assumed to know. 
245 For the ancient 'philosophicoreligious' dichotomy between ponos and hedone see Detienne 1996, 126-8.
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Only the first line of CD16a and CD16b has previously been attributed to Antisthenes.  The 
second line of CD16a starts idem ('the same man'), clearly indicating that this comment was 
also from Antisthenes – and it is synonymous with the kind of statement made in CD14a-f.
Aspasia, Pericles, Xanthippos and Paralos, Archestratos and Euphemos 
(intimates of Xanthippos and Paralos), Cimon, Elpinice (sister of Cimon), 
Callias, Pericles' first wife (mother of Callias), Hipponicus (father of 
Callias).
CD17. In the 'fifth volume' of Antisthenes' works, as listed by Diogenes Laertius, there is a 
title Aspasia, which is likely the source of this fragment.  By the usual convention of naming 
dialogues after key interlocutors, it is probable that Aspasia herself appeared as one of the 
speakers in this dialogue.  
This fragment reports disparaging comments made about both of Pericles' legitimate sons.  
As noted several times before, these comments should be imagined being delivered by a 
speaker in one of Antisthenes' dialogues, and therefore these sentiments may or may not 
coincide with Antisthenes' own opinions.
Archestratos, the alleged lover of Xanthippos, is identified by Kirchner (PA 2430) as the 
same Archestratos (of Phrearrhe) elected to the generalship, along with Pericles, son of 
Pericles, and Conon (among others), in 406 following Alcibiades' dismissal after the Battle 
of Notium (X. HG. 1.5.16, Diod. 13.74.1).  Archestratos sailed at one point aboard a ship over 
which Lysias the orator was trierarch and died later in 406 during the Battle of Arginusae 
(Lys. 21.8).
Euphemos (PA 6036), the intimate of Paralos, is otherwise unknown.
CD18-20.  In the first instance these fragments contain observations about the nature of 
Pericles' relationship with the courtesan and intellectual Aspasia of Miletus.  In sum, they 
make clear that he was especially enamoured of her.  Aspasia was Pericles' mistress (and 
treated as his wife) from the time of his divorce c. 445 to his death in 429.  The comic poets 
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blamed this perilous romance for causing calamities that afflicted Athens including the 
Peloponnesian War (Ar. Ach. 523-538) and the Samnian War (Duris FGrH 76 F 65).  
Antisthenes tells us that after Pericles had 'dismissed his wife from their house' (CD20) and 
'bestowed her upon another man' (CD19 6-7) he openly entered into a relationship with 
Aspasia.  Fragments CD18 2-3 and CD19 8 relate how Pericles called on Aspasia's house 
twice per day and greeted her with great affection.  Punning on Aspasia's name, both 
fragments report that Pericles 'fondly greeted' (aspazesthai) her.  This could also be a playful 
line from Antisthenes suggesting an etymology of Aspasia's name – i.e. that she is a 
'greeter', the epitome of a good courtesan.  The implication is clearly that such overt 
displays of affection – particularly toward a foreign mistress – did not become a statesman 
of Pericles' status or social class.  Antisthenes is not explicitly named by Plutarch in CD19, 
however the common content, and particularly the common witty use of the verb suggests 
a common source.  As noted in the commentary for CD10, Plutarch seems to have used 
Antisthenes' writing when it suited him without necessarily acknowledging his authorship.
In CD18 4-6 it is claimed that Pericles appeared and spoke on behalf of Aspasia in court 
when she was up on charges of impiety.  Pericles apparently made a greater show of 
emotion than when he himself had been before the court.  Plutarch seems to be relying 
indirectly on Antisthenes when he reports the same charge of impiety.  He adds that the 
charges were brought against her by Hermippus the comic poet (Per. 32.1), however, 
Hornblower 2012 thinks that the identification of Hermippus as Aspasia's accuser probably 
arose from a misunderstanding of a passage slandering her in one of his comedies.  Further 
suggesting the link to Antisthenes is the fact that Plutarch goes on to relate that Pericles 
secured Aspasia's acquittal by 'shedding a great many tears for her at the trial' (Per. 32.3) 
just as reported in CD18.  Notably, however, Plutarch states that the source of this last piece 
of information is Aeschines rather than Antisthenes.  The charge that Aeschines plagiarised 
Antisthenes' Little Cyrus, Lesser Heracles and Alcibiades has already been noted above (CD6 
and commentary).  From this evidence, one might be led to suspect that Aeschines 
plagiarised Antisthenes' Aspasia as well.  Persaeus may not have been aware of, or 
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commented on, this particular case of fraud because his own fields of interest were 
sovereignty and constitutional matters (cf. commentary on CD6), so he may not have been 
familiar with the various versions of the Aspasia, or it was irrelevant to the point he was 
making at the time.  
The second portion of CD18 continues an Antisthenic theme of commenting on the illicit 
sexual habits of Athenian aristocrats (cf. CD9a-b on Alcibiades).  Similar claims were made 
about Cimon and Elpinice by Ps.-Andocides, who claims that Cimon 'lived in wedlock 
(συνοικεῖν) with his own sister' (Contra Alc. 33).  Plutarch also reports 'slanders' against 
Cimon regarding his sister, and reproduces a poetic passage from Eupolis in which Cimon 
is described as spending a lot of time in Sparta and leaving Elpinice on her own (Cim. 15).  
The allegations here in CD18 that Pericles received sex with Elpinice as a reward for 
services rendered are not reported elsewhere.
Regarding CD20, Antisthenes is attributed with a work by the same title, i.e. περὶ ἡδονῆς 
DL 6.17.  Due to the similarity of content, and the charges of plagiarism that were levelled 
at Heraclides (DL 6.92), it seems likely that either Heraclides' name was applied to 
Antisthenes' material on purpose or inadvertently, or that Heraclides reproduced or drew 
directly on Antisthenes' earlier work – περὶ ἡδονῆς could have been a subtitle or alternative 
title for his Aspasia.  Note also that this fragment contains a reference to 'Aspasia of Megara', 
which appears to be a mistake; Aspasia is everywhere else known as Milesian.  There is a 
story in Aristophanes' Acharnians about Megarian youths stealing a couple of prostitutes 
from Aspasia (526-7), so probably the confusion arose from a misunderstanding of the 
location of those events – in the comedy they actually took place in Athens.
MYTHIC DIALOGUES   MD1-16
Heracles and Prometheus   MD1a-5
MD1a-2.  The first three fragments are one in essence, being three different translations of 
the same text.  The text from Themistius, first published by Sachau in 1870 (Inedita Syriaca, 
33), is preserved only in Syriac.  MD1a includes a new translation directly from the Syriac 
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into English by Alberto Rigolio that will appear as part of his forthcoming edition and 
translation of the full Syriac text of Themistius' De Virtute.  MD1b was translated into Latin 
by Mach in Downey and Norman (1974, 3.43).  MD1c is a translation into German by 
Gildemeister and Bücheler (1872, 450).
This fragment is remarkable in the first instance as it is an example of a philosophical 
dialogue featuring mythical characters as interlocutors.  Dialogues produced by other 
authors in the first few decades of the genre seem to have been, almost uniformly, 
philosophical discussions featuring Socrates – i.e. they were Socratic dialogues.  Apparently 
by the time of the generation of dialogue writers following Antisthenes and Plato, historical 
persons started to be written into dialogues.  Cicero states that he himself replicated 
Heraclides' (of Pontus, Plato's student) habit of including historical figures in dialogues 
(Epist. ad Att. 13.19.4).  There are scarce traces of attempts by Classical authors to write 
prose dialogues including mythical characters (though Julian perhaps does so indirectly – 
see MD14-16).  The only examples of something similar are Prodicus' story of 'The Choice 
of Heracles' recorded in Xenophon (Mem. 2.1.21-34) and there is a Trojan Dialogue attributed 
to Hippias of Elis in which Nestor makes a speech to Neoptolemus as to how to gain a good 
reputation (DK 86 A2).  Mythical dialogues are probably not included in histories of the 
genre because our main sources – such as Aristotle – were either products of Plato's 
academy or highly influenced thereby.
The subject matter of these fragments is excellence, and the original Greek title of the work 
by Themistius that MD1a-c were drawn from was almost certainly περὶ ἀρετῆς, 
'Concerning Excellence'.  Alberto Rigolio, who is preparing an edition and English 
translation of the text, says that the direct translation of the Syriac word used is 'excellence', 
which he feels the Syriac translator was using to translate ἀρετή.246  This fragment of 
Antisthenes is provided as evidence by Themistius to support his argument – in the 
preceding text – that man's excellence flourishes in his intellect, and a man will be blessed if 
he nurtures it.
246 From personal email correspondence with Alberto Rigolio.
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In Antisthenes' text Prometheus is found addressing Heracles.  Giannantoni has argued that 
the speaker should be changed, i.e. so Heracles is addressing Prometheus (SSR 4.312-7).  
However the tone of the ethical advice being given by Prometheus is quite in keeping with 
his depiction as a wise advisor of men in the Prometheus Bound attributed to Aeschylus, and 
also with Plato's  portrayal of him in Protagoras' creation myth (Prot. 320c-323a).  
Heracles himself delivers no direct speech in this fragment, though he is a speaker in MD7 
and MD9.  Prometheus is seen dispensing some particularly Antisthenic advice.  He 
rebukes Heracles for being contemptible by striving in the field of worldly/human affairs 
and for neglecting matters of greater importance.  He tells Heracles that he will not be an 
accomplished or complete man until he learns things that are higher than human, in which 
case he will learn about human matters in passing anyway.  But to only learn about 
earthly/human affairs, says Prometheus, is to 'be wandering like wild animals.'  The general 
thrust of his argument closely matches the most central tenet of Antisthenes ethical 
philosophy – viz. the adherence to excellence (see ch. 2.ii).  
The sentiment and meaning of this passage is closely replicated in MD2, where Antisthenes 
(i.e. a speaker in one of his dialogues) tells someone to teach his son philosophy if he wants 
him to cohabit with the gods, but rhetoric if he is to live with men.  
The nub of the argument from these fragments is that if one has no aspirations above 
consorting with men who are inherently base, then by all means one should learn about 
human affairs and learn rhetoric.  But if one has aspirations higher than that, one should 
learn about things that are higher than human – hence, one should learn philosophy.
MD4-5 are drawn from a dialogue of Antisthenes titled Heracles.  There were three titles 
listed by Diogenes Laertius including Heracles (cf. CD7 commentary) though as always it is 
unclear whether those were the original titles, or whether they were originally one dialogue 
which was later divided up.  Nevertheless, they are included in this grouping as Heracles is 
a participant in the dialogue discussed here.  Thus it is reported that Antisthenes said in his 
Heracles that excellence, ἀρετή, is the goal of life, and that it is teachable and unlosable.  
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Note also that in MD6b Heracles and Chiron are found 'conversing about excellence.'  MD4 
and MD5 both report that excellence is teachable. MD4 adds that the original source of this 
statement was Antisthenes' Heracles, and includes the additional assertion that the nobly-
born and men who are excellent are one and the same.
Chiron, Heracles, and Achilles    MD6a-8
MD6a-d.  The first four of this group of fragments relate to a dialogue titled Heracles that 
depicts a conversation between Heracles and Chiron the centaur.  As discussed in the 
commentary to CD7, there are three titles listed in Diogenes Laertius' catalogue including 
the name Heracles, and a further title he mentions in discussion, plus there is an additional 
variant title listed by Persaeus, as follows.
By Diogenes – in his catalogue:
Greater Heracles or Concerning Might, Ἡρακλῆς ὁ µείζων ἢ περὶ ἰσχύος (6.16)
Heracles or Midas, Ἡρακλῆς ἢ Μίδας, and
Heracles or Concerning Good Sense or Might, Ἡρακλῆς ἢ περὶ φρονήσεως ἢ ἰσχύος, 
(6.18);
In his discussion (CD7):
 Big Heracles, µεγάλου Ἡρακλέους.
By Persaeus (CD6):
Lesser Heracles,  Ἡρακλῆς ὁ ἐλάσσων
It is difficult to determine which of these titles (if any) may apply to the fragments under 
examination here, though perhaps we can exclude the one with the alternative title Midas.  
The working hypothesis that Antisthenes' works were all dialogic in nature is again 
confirmed in the case of these fragments.  An incident involving Heracles and Chiron is 
described as occurring: 'After a considerable time, while they were conversing' (MD6a 5).  In 
MD7 direct speech by Heracles is recorded.
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Chiron the just.  In MD6a-c the justice of Chiron is mentioned, MD6a-b claiming that in 
justice he surpassed 'all men' (sic. though Chiron was a centaur).  Along with excellence 
(ἀρετή), justice was an especial ethical concern of Antisthenes (see further ch. 2.ii section E). 
Particularly relevant is Antisthenes' assertion: 'Those who desire to be immortal, must live 
piously and justly' (DL 6.5 = DC 75, SSR 176).  This latter quote fits the context of the extant 
fragments discussed in this section and also the ultimate immortality achieved by Heracles, 
suggesting perhaps that the line could actually have started life as a pronouncement from 
Chiron to Heracles as part of the same dialogue under discussion here.  
Pederasty. MD6a-b also mention that Chiron was the tutor who educated Asclepius and 
Achilles (for the latter cf. MD7-8), and that Heracles, rather than destroying Chiron – as he 
had done the other centaurs – became his student.  The comment that Heracles went to him 
on account of love (δι᾽ ἔρωτα / propter amorem) suggests that the style of teacher-pupil 
relationship Heracles entered into was pederastic in nature, with Heracles being the 
eromenos and Chiron being the erastes (using Dover's terminology: 1978, 16).  This seems 
confirmed by MD7 where Chiron is referred to as the ἐραστής of some other strapping 
youth – probably Achilles.  There is additional linguistic evidence in MD6a to suggest that 
this was the sort of relationship Chiron had with his pupils.  There Heracles is described as 
συνεῖναι with Chiron, which has been translated 'living together with,' but with the 
implied meaning 'shacked up with.'
The Cave of Pan.  Heracles and Chiron are described in MD6a-b as being together in a cave 
honouring Pan.  This brings to mind the scene at the conclusion of Plato's dialogue Phaedrus 
where Socrates offers a prayer to Pan on behalf of himself and his companion Phaedrus 
(279b8-c3).  One wonders if this passage influenced Plato and contributed to the accusations 
of plagiarism against him (cf. SD1 and commentary).
Death of Chiron.  Fragments MD6a-d report an account of the death of Chiron as 
described by Antisthenes.  While Heracles was conversing with Chiron an arrow slipped 
from his quiver onto Chiron's foot and killed him, due to the deadly Hydra's poison the 
arrows were dipped in.  
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Conversing about excellence. MD6b includes an interesting comment about the nature of 
the conversation that Heracles and Chiron were having.  The text of line 5, as printed by 
Maass, does not make sense, which he acknowledges with 'omnia corrupit' in his apparatus.  
The emendations printed here require relatively minimal changes but produce a text that 
makes sense.  Changing one letter of bona produces bono, an ablative form that is needed 
when super has the meaning 'about, concerning' – the sort of meaning wanted here.  The 
second emendation, changing quoniam to quidem requires a bigger adjustment, i.e. four 
letters into three.  It is natural for quidem to follow et when it is being used to reinforce a 
point (OLD s.v. 5a), as is the case here.  
The emended text suits Antisthenes' ethics.  We read that during the time that Heracles was 
with Chiron 'they were conversing about excellence, and what is more, about the tendance 
of excellence' (5).  It is possible that bonum could be understood as 'the good', i.e. τὸ καλόν.  
This, however, is not a topic that Antisthenes is reported as showing interest in.  Translating 
bonum instead as 'excellence' has Heracles and Chiron speaking about ἀρετή – Antisthenes' 
principal ethical concern and a topic that was a central focus in at least one of his dialogues 
entitled Heracles (cf. MD4-5 and commentary).
A certain youth.  In MD7 fragment 'a certain youth' is described by Heracles as 'big and 
handsome and in the bloom of youth' (µέγας … καὶ καλὸς καὶ ὡραῖος).  The 'certain 
youth' is never identified, but the description best suits Achilles, who in MD8 is associated 
with Chiron by Antisthenes.  Further supporting this view is that fact that Antisthenes uses 
the same adjectives from MD7 when comparing Alcibiades and Achilles: µέγας … καὶ 
καλὸς in CD11a and ὡραῖος in CD11b. 
Constellation Centaurus.  MD6a-d all report that Zeus (Jupiter) placed Chiron among the 
stars.  MD6a-b add that it was on account of his piety and the accidental nature of his death 
that he received this honour.  There are two constellations featuring a centaur – Centaurus 
and Sagittarius.  The constellation referred to, however, must be Centaurus.   Ps.-
Eratosthenes mentions that Chiron's constellation is 'right by Ara' (Θυτηρίου = 
Θυσιαστήριον, 'altar', and in Latin = Ara).  On its own, that information would not 
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distinguish the constellations Sagittarius and Centaurus from each other, as both are about 
equidistant from Ara – each is one constellation removed.  To make it clear why he thinks 
that Centaurus is the pious Chiron, Ps.-Eratosthenes describes the centaur beside Ara 
'holding some beast in his hands', as if he is 'bringing a sacrifice' (7-8).  He means that 
Centaurus appears to have the constellation now known as Lupus (the Wolf) in his hands.  
In the passage that follows on from the Antisthenes fragment, Eratosthenes again describes 
Centaurus holding in his right hand the 'so-called Beast' (40.24) and in his left a thyrsus (27). 
Aratus writes of Centaurus 'He seems always to stretch his right hand towards Ara, but 
through his hand is drawn, and firmly grasped, the Beast (Θηρίον, Phaen. 439-42; cf. 
Cicero's Latin translation Nat. D. 2.44; and cf. also Arat. Phaen. 662-3).
Heracles and his sons
MD9-13b.  Against flatterers.  This group of fragments is linked by their common 
condemnation of flatterers.  The first of the fragments, MD9, names Heracles as a speaker 
and it seems that the other fragments develop the line of argument he was pursuing.  
MD9.  Immunity from flattery.  This fragment is introduced by Plutarch's account of 
Menedemus of Eretria, who was apparently immune to flattery.  The sketch of Menedemus' 
character is reinforced by connecting his conduct with the counsel that Antisthenes' 
Heracles gave his sons in a dialogue.  Heracles urged his sons not to feel favour towards 
anyone who praised them – which meant they should not feel obliged to those praising 
them, nor should they offer flattery to such men in return.  The verb δυσωπεῖσθαι is 
translated here as 'to be affected by', as it can have the sense of 'being constrained' or 'being 
susceptible to importunity' (for the semantic range see LSJ s.v.).
MD10. This fragment preserves comments on flatterers from both Diogenes of Sinope and 
Antisthenes (corrected from the certainly wrong 'Demosthenes').  Here ὁ µέν has been 
taken as referring to Diogenes for whom another very similar fragment is recorded 
elsewhere: 'He (Diogenes) was wont to say that an ignorant rich man was a sheep with a 
golden fleece' (πρόβατον χρυσόµαλλον, DL 6.47).  The ὁ δέ then refers to Antisthenes.  
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However, there is a similar, but less developed, version of Antisthenes' portion of this 
fragment that is attributed to Diogenes of Sinope by Stobaeus (4.31.48). The fact that this 
fragment is a more complete version, that it includes an eikon – a penchant of Antisthenes' – 
and it reports the first of several of his remarks comparing flatterers to crows, makes this 
most likely to be Antisthenes'.  In which Stobaeus either incorrectly attributed his fragment, 
or that fragment shows Diogenes paraphrasing Antisthenes.
The Antisthenes passage itself has been surprisingly handled by the two most recent editors 
of Antisthenes' fragments – Giannantoni and Prince both cut it short – they end their texts 
at κολάκων (5), even though οἵτινες, directly following, is grammatically dependent on the 
preceding clause, and completes the sense of the simile.
The fragment represents an example of Antisthenes indulging his penchant for making an 
eikon, or likeness, of something (cf. Sy1 and commentary).  It was clearly a talent he prided 
himself on and in this case he again offers a particularly clever illustration.  Antisthenes 
likens rich but uneducated men to fig trees hanging over cliffs.  Such fig trees bear a rich 
bounty of fruit but instead of being enjoyed by the citizens this fruit is devoured by 
scavenging crows and jackdaws.  In like manner, the wealth and possessions of a rich man 
devoid of proper education is not enjoyed by his fellow citizens but is consumed by 
scavenging flatterers.  The comparison of flatterers to crows was a favourite of Antisthenes' 
(cf. MD13a-b) and had the added attraction of making a pun on κόλαξ (flatterer) with 
κόραξ (crow), especially if using a lisping pronunciation (cf. Ar. V. 42-51 and MacDowell 
1971 commentary ad loc.).
The fragment ends with the claim that after flatterers have reduced their victims to penury, 
if they encounter them on the street they look the other way and pass them by as if they 
had never known them.  Their interest in the rich men thus being confirmed as purely 
predatory and self-interested all along.  The style of this pithy and scathing assessment 
seems to anticipate Theophrastus' Characters.  This fragment and those following, taken 
along with Heracles' comments regarding flatterers, could have formed just such a 
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character sketch denouncing flatterers, and one that was offered in a dialogue by Heracles 
to his sons (see further discussion in ch. 3 section A).
MD11.  Continuing the character delineation of the rapacious flatterers, here they are 
compared to courtesans.  Just as courtesans pray that their lovers have every kind of 
blessing, but not intelligence or good sense, so the flatterers pray that their victims will be 
rich but foolish.  This prompts the thought that in the case of the courtesans the customers 
were at least likely to have received something worthwhile in return for their wealth, but in 
the case of the flatterers this seems less certain.  The simile is clearly intended to be 
amusing, as the flatterers are imagined as effete and worthless individuals whose only skill 
is their ability to strip their unwise patrons of their wealth.  
Apparently the structure of this statement was popular with Antisthenes, as Plutarch 
reports another fragment that follows similar lines (De Alexandri magni fortuna aut virtute 
336A = DC 99, SSR 77): 
For Antisthenes used to rightly say that it was necessary to pray for all good things for one's 
enemies, except for bravery.  For thus these good things come to belong, not to those who possess 
them but, to those who conquer them.
MD12. Here Antisthenes shifts his condemnation from the flatterers to their patrons.  Base 
men are the target of his attacks in several other fragments (see discussion in ch 2.ii section 
A).  In this case he observes that base men who receive flattery become worse men.
MD13a-b. These fragments contain another punning comparison of crows (korakes) and 
flatters (kolakes, cf. MD10).  Both state that it is preferable to fall in with crows than with 
flatterers, because crows only eat those who are dead, but flatterers devour those who are 
still alive.  The same verb, ἐσθίειν 'to devour', is also used of the actions of flatterers in 
MD10.  A similar saying is credited by Athenaeus to Diogenes of Sinope (254c = SSR VB 
425).  MD13a adds the distinction that the crows destroy the bodies of the dead, whilst 
flatterers destroy the actual souls of the living.  
MD13b lists two further statements about flatterers.  In Migne's edition of Antonius they 
follow on from the first statement, beginning 'Antisthenes said' without mention of another 
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name, and thus suggesting that Migne viewed them as being attributed to Antisthenes.  
Without further examination of the manuscripts, however, both these fragments must be 
considered dubia for the time being as they are elsewhere attributed to other authors.  They 
are included here as they also closely mirror the style and content of Antisthenes' comments 
about flatterers in the other fragments of this group.  The attribution to authors is 
inconsistent in the body of around 90 manuscripts which contain all or part of the Loci 
Communes and only a few of them have been properly examined (Richard 1962-4, col. 488-
92).  So these statements are tentatively put forward as Antisthenes', with the following 
arguments in support of that suggestion. 
The first of the additional statements again compares the effect of crows on the dead to 
flatterers on the living, with the distinction that here the crows are said to destroy the 'eyes' 
rather than the 'bodies' of the dead.  But as in the other statements, flatterers are said here to 
destroy the souls of the living.  In Ps.-Maximus Confessor (11.39) this statement is credited 
to Epictetus.  Epictetus was familiar with, and quoted, Antisthenes' work (as reported by 
Arrian cf. SD7, CD19, DC 118).  So considering the almost identical content of other firmly 
attested fragments of Antisthenes, an ultimate attribution – directly or indirectly – of this 
statement to Antisthenes is also likely.
The second additional statement about flatterers is elsewhere attributed to Favorinus (AD c. 
85-155; Stobaeus 3.14.12, Maximus 11.35).  In Antonius, however, this fragment is listed 
after Antisthenes' name, and considering the appropriate nature of the content to 
Antisthenes' other pronouncements on flatterers, it is tentatively included here.  Actaeon 
had been transformed into a deer by Artemis after he deliberately (Stesich. F 236, E. Ba. 337-
40) or inadvertently (Call. H. 5.107-166, Ov. Met. 3.138-252) sighted and thus slighted her, 
and his own dogs subsequently turned on him and tore him to pieces (Hes. F 346 MW), 
thus killing the very man who had nourished them.  In this fragment the patrons of 
flatterers are compared to the deer that Actaeon became, viz. they are helpless prey, vitually 
uncomprehending of what is happening to them.  The flatterers, on the other hand, are 
compared to the pack of dogs that tear to pieces the ones who had fed them.  Not only is 
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this consistent with Antisthenes' other comments about flatterers, discussed above, but it is 
also consistent with his tendency to use characters and situations from myth to explicate his 
ethical interpretations (cf. MD14-16, commentary on TH12-14, and esp. ch.5 section B).
Perseus and Theseus
MD14-16.  In these fragments Julian discusses Antisthenes' use of myth in his writings.  
Oration 7, from which the fragments are drawn, is a critique of a talk given by Herakleios 
the Cynic which Julian attended.  In MD14 Antisthenes' use of myth is compared to 
Xenophon's, and in MD15 Antisthenes, Plato and Xenophon are grouped together as 
writers who explicitly use myth in their writing.  Note that MD15 contrasts the Cynic with 
other types of philosopher – such others represented here by Antisthenes, Plato and 
Xenophon – thus making it clear that Julian does not consider Antisthenes to have a  
connection with Cynicism.
It appears from MD16 that Herakleios employed the figure of Heracles, and in particular 
Prodicus' tale 'The Choice of Heracles' in his talk.  This tale, recounted in detail by 
Xenophon (Mem. 2.1.21-34), describes Heracles being given the choice between the paths 
offered respectively by the divine personifications of Excellence (Ἀρετή) and Happiness 
(Εὐδαιµονία), the latter otherwise known as Vice (Κακία).  Julian advises Herakleios that 
instead of using Prodicus' tale of Heracles he should have followed the Antisthenic model 
and introduced a Perseus or Theseus to his work.  This appears to imply that Antisthenes 
also wrote dialogues featuring these mythical heroes.  As Antisthenes himself wrote 
dialogues featuring Heracles (cf. MD6-13), and Julian presumably knew this, it would 
appear that it is not Herakleios' use of Heracles per se that Julian is objecting to, but rather 
his use of Heracles without 'harmony' (4, ἐµµελείας).  It seems that Herakleios was trying 
to force the tale of Heracles to illustrate a point for which it was not naturally suited.  
Julian's objection was probably compounded by the fact that he had a personal liking for  
tale of Heracles' choice, having used it himself (Or. 2.56d).
214
EROTIC DIALOGUES   ED1-6
These fragments are particularly interesting because they feature Antisthenes himself as a 
speaker, something that Plato did not attempt, but which was probably imitated by 
Xenophon (see commentary on SD6 and discussion in ch. 4.ii section C).  In each fragment 
Antisthenes is addressing, or discussing youths.  In at least one of the fragments (ED6) the 
youth is a love interest of Antisthenes, and in another two (ED3-4) the youths are 
prospective students who may or may not have also been love interests.  Hence, as a group, 
the fragments have been tentatively categorised as 'Erotic'.  The persona-type, the erotic 
philosopher, characterises Plato's Socrates in many dialogues and one wonders if it is a type 
Plato borrowed to some extent from Antisthenes' self-portraiture.  Xenophon is possibly 
playing on this image when he has Antisthenes declare how exceedingly in love he is with 
Socrates (Smp. 8.4).
ED1.  This fragment is an amusing passage of dialogue between Antisthenes and a young 
lad who was posing for a sculptor.  The verb παρασχηµατίζειν has the sense (LSJ s.v.) 'to 
change from the true form, transform', and thus in the context of working with a sculptor 
clearly means 'to pose'.  Evidently, the young lad was posing in a manner that made his 
delight in his own attractiveness only too apparent, prompting Antisthenes to ask him what 
the bronze might pride itself on, had it a voice.  This is a novel question and reminiscent of 
the sort of question Socrates was in the habit of asking.  The youth replied that the bronze 
would pride itself on its beauty, to which Antisthenes responded by asking him if he was 
not ashamed to pride himself on the same thing as an inanimate object.  This 
admonishment was evidently aimed at provoking the young lad to reconsider his priorities 
and to aspire to philosophy, i.e. the cultivation of the soul – viz. what an inanimate object, 
by definition, cannot pride itself on.
ED2a-b. Only preserved in Latin, in two scholia that derive from the same source, this 
fragment has Antisthenes again admonishing a young lad.  In this case the youth was 
overly impressed by music and seeing this Antisthenes called him unfortunate, because he 
had not experienced the greatest music of all – his own praise.  The value of praise, in 
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Antisthenes' eyes, seems to depend on whether it comes from good or bad men.  There are 
only a couple of other fragments where Antisthenes focuses on praise and praising.  The 
attitude to praise is uniformly negative in them, but it is clear that the praisers are bad or 
base men.  For example, Antisthenes is said to have expressed anxiety or concern that he 
had done something wrong when he heard that base men were praising him (DC 178a-c, 
SSR 88-9).  As discussed above (cf. CD14a-f) he had someone tell Cyrus that it is kingly to 
be ill spoken of.  And in CD15 a bad reputation is said to be a good thing.  
ED3.  This is the first of three fragments featuring youths from Pontus.  In this case a young 
student asks what he needs in order to attend Antisthenes' teaching.  Antisthenes responds 
with some witty punning.  The word play revolves around the word καινοῦ meaning 'new', 
but the same six letters separated, e.g. καὶ νοῦ, meaning 'and intellect'.  So the sentence 
when delivered sounded simultaneously like both:
'a new book and a new pencil and a new writing tablet'
and
'a book and intelligence and pencil and intelligence and writing tablet and intelligence'.
Another fragment of Antisthenes places similar emphasis on possessing νοῦς.  He stated 
(Chrysippus in Plu. De Stoic. repug. 1039e = DC 67, SSR 105):
δεῖν κτᾶσθαι νοῦν ἢ βρόχον.
One must possess intelligence or a halter.
The same pun on καινοῦ and καὶ νοῦ is also attributed to Stilpo when speaking to Crates 
(DL 2.118).
ED4. In this fragment a young lad from Pontus is unable or unwilling to pay Antisthenes at 
the present time, but promises he will pay if and when his cargo of salted fish arrives.  
Antisthenes then takes the young man along as he goes to a grain seller and fills up his bag. 
When Antisthenes attempts to leave with his bag of grain, the grain seller asks for payment, 
prompting Antisthenes to tell her that the youth will pay her if his cargo of fish comes in.  
The outcome of Antisthenes' proposal to the grain seller is not reported, but must have been 
one of two possibilities: either, and most likely, Antisthenes' promise that the youth would 
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pay was rejected, thus demonstrating to the young lad the futility of such future promises; 
or, a contract came into force between the youth and the grain seller, relieving Antisthenes 
of further involvement, and possibly putting the youth under greater compulsion to follow 
through with his payment.  There is no indication as to what the payment might be for but 
the obvious thing would be for Antisthenes' teaching.  Given that Antisthenes almost 
certainly took after Socrates in disdaining those who charged a fee for teaching, the 
fragment is probably conveying a negative view of trade in accord with the traditional 
aristocratic attitude.247  This attitude – that merchants and traders are necessities, but 
worthy of disdain – is well summed up by Plato in his Republic (371c): 'in well-conducted 
cities they [traders] are generally those who are weakest in body and those who are useless 
for any other task.  They must wait there in the agora and exchange money for goods with 
those who wish to sell, and goods for money with as many as desire to buy.'248  Aristotle's 
view of merchants is similar, and he states (Pol. 1328b38-40): 'the citizens must not live a 
mercantile life – for such a life is ignoble and directly opposed to excellence (ἀρετή).'249
ED5.  This fragment again features youths from Pontus, making it clear that these young 
men constituted a sub-theme in these fragments of dialogue.  Diogenes Laertius here 
reports that it was youths from Pontus whom Antisthenes stirred up to drive Socrates' 
accuser, Anytus, from the city.  Diogenes Laertius also mentions in his 'Life of Socrates' that 
the Athenians executed Meletus and banished the other accusers (2.43).  It seems that 
Antisthenes was responsible, at the very least, for provoking attacks against the accusers.
ED6. The sense of this fragment has proven to be elusive to date.  It was assumed that there 
was some allusion or joke being made, beyond the obvious anecdote, that we lacked the 
requisite background information to understand (e.g. Decleva Caizzi 1966, 128).  
Comparetti feels that there is nothing distinctive about the writing style that may reveal the 
author, but guesses that it is the work of a minor sophist of Plutarch's era (1908, 20).  His 
overall assessment of the papyrus is that it is a discussion about παιδεία (education), and 
247 I am grateful to Liz Irwin for this suggestion.
248 Shorey's Loeb translation.
249 Generally following Rackman's Loeb translation.
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whether or not skills can be taught and learnt (19).  He sees the Antisthenes anecdote as 
being part of that discussion and the sense of Antisthenes' response is that while the boy 
searches for such pleasures 'I teach to abstain' (20: io insegno ad astenersene).  His assessment 
is that Antisthenes acknowledges that the power of his teaching is not as persuasive as fine 
cuts of fish (22, n. l.26).  Comparetti has a traditional view of Antisthenes as the founder of 
Cynic philosophy and so finds it a little difficult to accept the anecdote at all because of 
Antisthenes', apparently incompatible, love interest in a boy (23, n. l.26).  Crönert thinks 
that the papyrus is a Stoic-Cynic diatribe about τὸ πείθειν (persuasion) rather than about 
παιδεία (1908, 1201).  Körte supports this view and thinks that Antisthenes is relying on his 
abstinence being more persuasive and making a stronger impression on the boy in the long 
run than the pleasures themselves (1920, 239).  
All of the above opinions are probably influenced by a series of fragments attributed to 
Antisthenes in which he warns against indulging in pleasures (see ch. 2.ii section D).  In 
general, recent scholarship has followed similar lines of analysis and argument.  Gallo 
(1980, 227-8) sees the fragment as a 'chria' that fits Antisthenes' imagined Cynic outlook – 
'non appare estraneo allo spirito cinismo.'250  Very recently Luz described it as an anecdote 
by an unknown author illustrating the inability of Antisthenes to instil moral values in his 
student (2015, 194).  The most insightful assessment offered is by Brancacci (2004), who 
rejects the idea that this text is a 'χρεία' and instead judges that the text was part of a 
dialogue written by Antisthenes – though he feels 'Antisthenes' has been presented as the 
speaker in place of what was originally 'Socrates' (226-8).  This is a possibility, though it is 
argued here that the style of dialogue speaking about a young lad, and the witty remark in 
the fragment, are typically Antisthenic.
The papyrus itself resides at the Biblioteca Laurenziana, which provides low resolution 
scans on its website.  Fortunately Comparetti and Vitelli provided a large photographic 
plate in their edition (1908, Tav. III).  A copy of the relevant portion appears following the 
text of the fragment as 'Plate 1'.  By enlarging a scan of this plate a lot of detail can be 
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observed, some of which appears to have faded over time, judging by comparison with the 
new scans.  
One finding that emerged from detailed study of the plate is the fact that the papyrus 
contains punctuation marks that have not been noticed by previous editors.  These are 
marked on the text printed here.  They indicate the beginning of a new passage at φασί and 
the end of sentences in lines 30, 33, and 34.  Elsewhere there are paragraphoi, indicating 
divisions in the text, and it appears likely that the whole papyrus is actually an ancient 
commentary.
Though the fragment remains a little difficult to translate, a handful of emendations to the 
text (as noted in the apparatus) greatly improve its readability.  In particular, emending 
Comparetti's line 36 τ[οιούτων] to ἰ[χθύων] allows more sense to be extracted from it.  Of 
the first letter of this word, only the lower part of a vertical stroke is visible on the papyrus 
(cf. Plate 1).  In his notes to the papyrus, Comparetti actually mentions that he considered 
printing ἰ[χθύων] but rejected it because the space from the previous ν suggested a τ rather 
than an ι (22).  Even a cursory glance at the papyrus, however, reveals other occasions 
where a similar space preceding an ι exists.  For example in line 17 of this papyrus a similar 
gap from ε to ι exists mid-word in λέγεις.  Furthermore ἰχθύων actually seems a superior 
fit to the available space.  The edge of the final ν is visible after the gap in the papyrus.  
While it is difficult to envisage how τοιούτων could be compressed into the space, ἰχθύων 
seems a natural fit.
Knowing that ἰχθύων was an alternative better fitted to the space may not seem to 
necessarily offer any better sense than τοιούτων until one considers this passage from 
Plutarch: πότερα τῶν ζῴων φρονιµώτερα τὰ χερσαία ἢ τὰ ἔνυδρα ἰχθῦς δὲ τοὺς ἀµαθεῖς 
καὶ ἀνοήτους λοιδοροῦντες ἢ σκώπτοντες ὀνοµάζοµεν. 'But those stupid and ignorant 
people whom we abuse and mock we call “fish”'(2.975b).  In a related vein, Hesychius notes 
(κ3971 Latte) κραπαταλός· παρὰ πολλοῖς ὁ µωρός, 'krapatalos (a type of fish): in the eyes of 
many a moron.'  Pherecrates wrote a comedy, Κραπάταλοι, employing this sense, of which 
20 fragments remain (PCG VII).  It seems that fish themselves were generally known for 
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their lack of intelligence.  Plato writes that fish are cursed to live in an extreme environment 
due to their extreme stupidity (ἀµαθία, Tim. 92b).  
Understanding 'fish' as a euphemism for 'fools' allows an interpretation of this papyrus 
fragment that is consistent with Antisthenes' other thought.  Antisthenes several times 
emphasises the importance of good sense and intelligence (e.g. MD11, ED3; cf. also ch. 2.ii 
section C).  By stating that 'another thinks it right to keep away from fish (i.e. fools)' (36), 
Antisthenes seems to be simultaneously admonishing the young lad for his foolish choice of 
company, and expressing his own intention to keep away from the fools courting the lad – 
and probably, by extension, from the foolish lad himself.
Antisthenes' use here of	θαλαττοκρατεῖν shows a liking for such compounds that is 
demonstrated elsewhere by his use of οἰκοκρατεῖσθαι, 'to be a household-ruler' (see TH14o 
33-4 and commentary under TH14 Step 2b §3).  Antisthenes' use also provides a 
comparatively rare example in extant Classical literature of the Attic form -ττ-, instead of 
-σσ-.  Thucydides and (not surprisingly) Herodotus both use the Ionic θαλασσοκρατεῖν.  
Xenophon, however, in Hellenica twice uses the Attic form (1.6.2-3, 4.8.10).  Antisthenes' 
employment of the middle/passive form appears to be one of as few as two examples from 
the Classical era.  The other certain example is noted by Guida (1989, 239), showing that the 
vocabulary had currency during the late stages of the Peloponnesian War (Demetrius of 
Sicily c. 402 BC, PCG 5 F 2):
Λακεδαιµόνιοί θ᾽ ἡµῶν τὰ τείχη κατέβαλον, 
καὶ τὰς τριήρεις ἔλαβον ἐµµήρους, ὅπως 
µηκέτι θαλαττοκρατοῖντο Πελοποννήσιοι. 
The Spartans tore down our walls, and took our triremes hostage, so that the Peloponnesians 
would no longer be mastered by the sea.
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TRAGICA & HOMERICA 
TH1. We know from a scholiast to Aristophanes (Tzetz. on Fr. 1475, p.1112 Koster) that the 
original line being critiqued in this fragment is from Euripides' Aeolus.  Giannantoni prints 
this fragment under his section 'Homerica' and Decleva Caizzi prints it under 'Le 
interpretazione omeriche; i rapsodi'.  They apparently categorise it thus because there 
mention is made of Aeolus by Homer (Od. 10.1-12).  It is clearly the work of Euripides, 
however, not Homer, that is the object of Antisthenes' critical attention here.  
In this fragment Antisthenes demonstrates his compulsion for offering ethical criticism by 
rejecting the thought put into the mouth of one of Euripides' characters (probably 
Macareus) and correcting it.  In doing so he reveals his conservative, absolutist stance on 
moral and ethical issues by reacting against a relativist view of ethical values espoused by 
this line of Euripides, which itself reflects sophistic discourse of the late fifth and early 
fourth centuries on such topics.  A passage of verse quoted in the Dissoi Logoi or Double 
Argument (Δισσοὶ Λόγοι) sets out an elaborated version of the same relativist view (DK 90, 
2.19 = TrGF 2 F 26, F com. ad. 1209 Kock):  
καὶ γὰρ τὸν ἄλλον ὧδε θνητοῖσιν νόµον
ὄψῃ διαιρῶν· οὐδὲν ὂν πάντῃ καλόν
οὐδ᾽ αἰσχρόν, ἀλλὰ ταὔτ᾽ ἐποίησεν λαβών 
ὁ καιρὸς αἰσχρὰ καὶ διαλλάξας καλά.
For if you examine the matter in this way, you will see another law among mortals; that nothing is 
absolutely noble or shameful, but rather the appropriate occasion takes the same things and makes 
them shameful, and then changes them and makes them noble.
The Dissoi Logoi was probably composed at some point in the second half of the fifth 
century, or very early fourth century.251   Some have argued that this line of verse quoted in 
the Dissoi Logoi should, in fact, be attributed to Euripides (see note on TrGF 2 F 26).  As 
noted above, Kock included it in his edition of comic fragments, presumably believing that 
it must be a parody.  Regardless of who the author was, the line of verse quoted, and the 
251 At 1.8 it mentions battles – mentioning 'the most recent first' (τὰ νεώτατα πρῶτον ἐρῶ) and starting 
with a victory of the Spartans over the Athenians and their allies; this could be referring to the final 
defeat of Athens in 404, or the defeat at Mantinea in 418, or possibly the defeat at Tanagra in 457. 
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entire Dissoi Logoi itself, are further examples of the type of relativist standpoint which 
Antisthenes rejected and was reacting to in this fragment (see further ch. 2.iii).
Taking into account TH2, it looks like Antisthenes' short, pithy and witty commentaries on 
various passages of the tragic poets may later have been gathered into collections.  Though 
it is uncertain what the exact nature of Antisthenes' work was from which this comment on 
Aeolus was extracted, we can presume that both the original line of Euripides and the retort 
were put into the mouths of speakers in a dialogue.   Macho of Sicyon (or Corinth, 3rd c. BC) 
later used the same line from Aeolus in just such a way, having Laïs of Corinth humorously 
turn the line back on Euripides himself  (Ath. 13.582d):
Ευρ: τίς εἶ, γύναι; οὐκ  αἰσχροποιός;
Λαΐς: τί δ᾽ αἰσχρόν, εἰ µὴ τοῖσι χρωµένοις δοκεῖ;
Eur: Who are you, woman?  Are you not a doer of shameful deeds?
Laïs: What is shameful, if my fuckers don't think so?'
The same original line of Euripides was also parodied by Aristophanes in Frogs (1474-5):
Ευρ: αἴσχιστον ἔργον προσβλέπεις µ᾽ εἰργασµένος;
Διον: τί δ᾽ αἰσχρόν, ἢν µὴ τοῖς θεωµένοις δοκῇ;
Eur: Do you dare look me in the face after doing a most disgraceful deed?
Dion: What deed is disgraceful if the spectators don't think so?
Frogs was produced in 405, so Aristophanes' implicit criticism here might have been 
influenced by Antisthenes.  We have no known dates for Antisthenes' works, but given that 
he was probably born prior to 451/50 (see ch. 1.iii) it is certainly likely that he was writing 
before 405.  It is true that Aristophanes was already aware at an earlier date of the comic 
potential in Euripides' Aeolus, as he has Strepsiades launch an attack against it in Clouds 
(1371-2).  Clouds was originally produced in 423 and the reworked, and only extant, but not 
performed version dates from the period 420-17.252  The attack against Aeolus in Clouds, 
however, is against the content of the play (a brother and sister having sexual relations) 
rather than a clever reworking of an existing line, meaning that the above example from 
Frogs could be revealing Antisthenes' influence.
252 Dover 1968, 80-98; cf. Sommerstein 1982, 2 n.1.
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There is a tantalising possibility that what we have here is actually a line of dialogue 
delivered in Antisthenes' Sathōn.  The dialogue probably featured Plato either as himself or 
his alter-ego Sathōn (see CD4a-c).  Serenos (author and moral critic from late 2nd c. AD) says 
Plato addressed Euripides himself with Antisthenes' line as follows (Stob. 3.5.36 Hense 
3.266.11): 
καὶ Πλάτων ἐντυχὼν αὐτῷ 'ὦ Εὐριπίδη' ἔφη, 'αἰσχρὸν τό γ᾽ αἰσχρόν, κἂν δοκῇ κἂν µὴ δοκῇ'.  
And Plato, having bumped into him, said 'O Euripides, what is shameful is shameful, whether one 
thinks so or no.'
Plutarch's attribution to Antisthenes in TH1 is likely to be secure.  He had access to a range 
of material by Antisthenes, as attested by the fact that eight Antisthenic fragments are 
drawn from Plutarch's works, half of which are presented as direct and acknowledged 
quotations from Antisthenes (i.e. TH1, and CD12, MD9, Sy2).  But if the comment was 
delivered by 'Plato' in Antisthenes' dialogue then both attributions would be accurate.  The 
tenor of the comment could easily be imagined to fit such a dialogue featuring Plato as the 
sententious puritan 'Fat-cock.'  See further conjecture about the Sathōn along with another 
possible fragment under the commentary for CD4a-c.
Apart from this line of dialogue, which may have been given to him by Antisthenes, Plato is 
well known to have had a conservative stance on moral and ethical issues that was more or 
less equivalent to Antisthenes'.  As such, Plato's Socrates expresses an absolutist view, 
similar to that in the fragment under discussion, on αἰσχρός in Euthydemus (301b): 
Σωκ: οὐ τὸ καλὸν καλόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν αἰσχρόν;
Soc: Is not what is noble noble, and what is shameful shameful?
TH2.  Giannantoni prints this fragment in his section 'De congruentia inter Cynicam 
disciplinam et Stoicam sectam intercedente'.  Decleva Caizzi does not print it, but instead 
mentions it in a note on Diogenes Laertius' catalogue of Antisthenes' works, calling it 
'another work of Antisthenes', otherwise unknown' (un'altra opera di Antistene, altrimenti 
sconosciuta; 1966, 87).  It will be argued here, however, that this fragment is best 
categorised, in company with TH1, as Tragica.
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In as much as scholarly attention has fallen on this fragment, which is very little, the debate 
has focussed on the meaning of the expression (as reported in the manuscript): χρείαν 
Σοφοκλέους.  Patzer takes issue with Decleva Caizzi, who interpreted this as a 'work' 
(opera) of Antisthenes, and with Menagius who stated that it comes 'from books' (libris) of 
Antisthenes (1970, 161).  Patzer points out that χρεία only means 'collection of sayings' 
(Sprachsammlung) in the plural and that in this case 'it is absolutely not a book' (es ist 
überhaupt kein Buch).  Rather than being a reference to a book, he says that here the 
reference is to a 'quotable maxim' (zitathafte Gnome) from a Sophoclean tragedy, meaning 
something to the effect of: 'do not criticise without acknowledging what is good.'  He 
therefore concludes that this title should be deleted from the catalogue of Antisthenes' 
works.  
Very similarly, Radt states that it was incorrect of Cobet to write 'from his book' (eius libro) 
and for Hicks to call it an 'essay', and he then quotes Kühn who instead says that this 
passage must refer to an adage written by Sophocles (TrGF 4, 633).  There are two clear 
problems with this argument.  Firstly, and less importantly, there is no known passage of 
Sophocles that matches the requirements of being a maxim stating something to the effect 
of: 'do not criticise without acknowledging what is good.'  Secondly, and much more 
importantly, there would be defective logic in the fragment if the explanations advanced so 
far to explain it are accepted.  The thrust of the argument in the fragment, as presented by 
Diogenes Laertius' text, is that when someone criticises Antisthenes, in response Zeno 
produces something that defends or rescues Antisthenes' reputation. Yet in no way would 
quoting some aphorism from Sophocles achieve this end.  Clearly Zeno must have 
produced something written by Antisthenes, which he considered masterful, in order to 
prove how worthy Antisthenes was and how misguided his interlocutor was.  
The most straightforward way to make sense out of the fragment would be to amend the 
text (as per the fragment printed here) to make χρείαν plural χρείας, requiring the 
alteration of one letter.  The correction Antisthenes made to the Euripides' line in TH1 could 
easily be termed a χρεία in it's own right – certainly it was turned into one by the poet 
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Macho (see commentary above).  If Antisthenes had made similar observations on 
Sophocles' works then there is no reason why a later collector of such comments would not 
have termed them Χρείαι Σοφοκλέους.  Naturally such comments on Sophocles (and 
Euripides) would most likely have originally appeared in the context of Antisthenic 
dialogues.  Then, because Antisthenes was good at commenting using pithy, quotable 
remarks, these would have been extracted into collections and given new titles, such as the 
one suggested here. 
TH3.  It is unclear who the writer is who offers their opinion in the first person in this 
scholion.  The extant scholia on Aristophanes is based on Symmachus' commentary (1st or 
2nd c. AD) which in turn was largely based on the work of Didymus (c. AD 1; cf. Dickey 
2007, 29).  The scholiast's assertion that Plato thought this line was by Euripides is more 
than a mere idle conjecture – Plato's Socrates attributes the exact line to Euripides twice, at 
Theages 125b and Republic 8 568ab.  A scholion to the latter reference (Greene 1938, 266) also 
states that the line is from Sophocles, but is credited to Euripides as well, claiming that it is 
nothing amazing if the poets correspond.  It has been conjectured that there was a similar 
line in Euripides, something like: ἀγαθὸν τυράννοις αἱ σοφῶν ξυνουσίαι (see note at PCG 
3 F 323).  A very long note to the tragic verse in question (TrGF 4 120-1) seems to offer no 
stronger evidence showing that the line was by Sophocles than the scholia on Aristophanes 
and on Republic 8 (noted above) – it lists multiple sources repeating the same information.  
Given that three well-informed, contemporary commentators – Aristophanes, Antisthenes 
and Plato – thought the tragic verse was by Euripides, it seems highly likely that it actually 
was by Euripides.  In this case the scholiast is either correct in suggesting that there was a 
corresponding, identical line in both poets, or he was incorrect in attributing it to Sophocles' 
Ajax the Locrian.
The fact that the scholiast knew that Antisthenes thought it was from Euripides shows that 
(like Plato) Antisthenes had written something about this verse.  Whatever Antisthenes 
wrote was probably originally set out in a dialogue where the tragic verse was either 
quoted, discussed or 'improved.'  Perhaps at a later date it was even extracted and inserted 
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into a work with a title such as: Sayings of Euripides (cf. final portion of commentary on 
TH2).
TH4. Here Dio tells us that Antisthenes was the first to employ an innovative approach for 
reading Homer that avoided interpretations that made it seem like Homer was 
contradicting himself, thus 'saving the text' in its current form.  So sometimes Homer 
represents things as people say and think they are, but at times where his depiction seems to 
conflict with people's impressions, it is because he is instead representing things as they 
really are.  
Dio states that Antisthenes 'didn't fully expound this theory' whereas Zeno, at a later point, 
'set it out section by section'.  This probably means that Antisthenes communicated the 
theory in dialogues but did not set it out formally in a treatise.  So dramatis personae in 
Antisthenes' dialogues would have argued that Homer was presenting things either as 
people think they are, or as they really are.  As the dialogue genre does not lend itself to 
setting out methodologies in a structured way, theories must be understood from what is 
said by the interlocutors.  This is much the same as the manner in which Plato's theories 
must be pieced together from his dialogues.  By contrast, according to Dio, Zeno actually 
formally spelt out the theory step by step.  See further discussion in ch. 5 section A.
TH5.  Decleva Caizzi includes this as a regular fragment, however, Giannantoni does not 
refer to it at all.  In Walz's edition it has an asterisk beside it, the meaning of which is 
unclear, but Giannantoni's non-inclusion suggests that he thinks it is a dubious attribution.  
Elsewhere deployment in the same manner of the same verse of Homer is attributed to 
another student of Socrates, Aristippus ([Plu.] Strom. ap. Eus. Praep. Ev. 1.8.9 = F 144 
Mannebach = I B 19 Giannantoni).  Diogenes Laertius mentions the same line of Homer 
quoted by Diogenes of Sinope (6.103), but also connects it with Socrates (2.21).  Themistius 
also attributes it to Socrates (33.5.9).  Attributing the line to Socrates is consistent with it 
being from a dialogue in which Socrates was one of the interlocutors.  As the line is also 
attributed to Antisthenes, one of his dialogues is probably the source.
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In its original context in the Odyssey, the line was delivered by Eidothea, daughter of 
Proteus, to Menelaus.  In that case ἐν µεγάροισι clearly meant 'in your halls', as Menelaus 
would learn from Proteus what had happened at home while he was away.  The  attribution 
to Socrates in Diogenes Laertius offer slightly varied context to the Antisthenes attribution 
of this fragment, and they suggest that a better translation for ἐν µεγάροισι is 'in our halls' 
(DL 2.21):
κἀκεῖνα δὲ φάσκειν ζητεῖν· 'ὅττι τοι ἐν µεγάροισι κακόν τ ἀγαθόν τε τέτυκται'.
He declared that he was enquiring into: 'what evil and what good has been wrought in our halls'.
It appears from this fragment, and from the correction to Euripides (TH1), that Antisthenes 
may be the originator and main exponent of the view that the function of poetry is to give 
ethical guidance.  
Another Antisthenes fragment reinforces this idea of self-investigation: 'According to 
Phainias in his Concerning The Socratics, when Antisthenes was asked by someone, “What 
should I do to be noble and good?” he said “Learn from those who know that the problems 
(κακά) that you currently have are avoidable!” (DL 6.8 = DC 175, SSR 172).
TH6.  'Excellence', ἀρετή, was the most important value in Antisthenes' ethical agenda (see 
ch. 2.ii). The thought in this fragment would have originally been articulated by one of 
Antisthenes' characters in a dialogue.  Another Antisthenes fragment makes a statement 
similar to the one in this fragment regarding the relationship between ὁ σοφός and ἀρετή 
(DL 6.11 = DC 101, SSR 134): 
καὶ τὸν σοφὸν οὐ κατὰ τοὺς κειµένους νόµους πολιτεύσεσθαι ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀρετῆς. 
And the wise man will engage in public life, not according to the established laws, but rather 
according to the law of excellence.
TH7.  As in this passage from the Iliad describing the ψυχή of Patroclus, the spirits 
Odysseus meets during the Nekyia in Book 11 of the Odyssey are each identified from their 
ψυχή (e.g. Elpenor 51, Anticleia 84-5, Teiresias 90).  Compare this fragment of Pindar that 
preserves a similar concept regarding what remains after the death of the body (131b Snell-
Maehler):
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σῶµα µὲν πάντων ἔπεται θανάτῳ περισθενεῖ,
ζωὸν δ᾽ ἔτι λείπεται αἰῶνος εἴδω-
λον· τὸ γάρ ἐστι µόνον
ἐκ θεῶν·
The body of every man yields to exceedingly powerful death, but a living image of life is still left 
behind; for it alone is from the gods.
The word εἴδωλον, translated 'image' here, also includes the notion of 'ghost' or 'spirit'.  In 
the Odyssey the seer Theoclymenos had a waking vision of the suitors as 'spirits' (εἴδωλα) 
crowding the porch before hastening down to Hades (20.355-6).  Clearly he knew that these 
spirits were the suitors because he recognised them from their appearance.
Antisthenes' observation in this fragment seems most likely to be purely physiognomic, 
implying that the form, and therefore nature, of a person's soul may be perceived by one 
who knows how to accurately read that person's outside form – so including living persons 
as well as the spirits of the dead.  For example, the notion of being able to perceive their 
soul may be consistent with reading their χαρακτήρ, their 'stamp', that is to say, the sort of 
ethical mould they were cast from, be it noble or base.  
This ability to read the character from an outside sign is precisely what Euripides' Medea 
longs for (516-9):
ὦ Ζεῦ, τί δὴ χρυσοῦ µὲν ὃς κίβδηλος ᾖ
τεκµήρι᾽ ἀνθρώποισιν ὤπασας σαφῆ,
ἀνδρῶν δ᾽ ὅτῳ χρὴ τὸν κακὸν διειδέναι
οὐδεὶς χαρακτὴρ ἐµπέφυκε σώµατι; 
O Zeus, why, when you granted men clear signs of gold that is base, is there no stamp set by 
nature on the human body by which to distinguish the base man? 
The chorus in the Hecuba (379-80), however, declare that such a stamp actually does exist in 
the case of nobles - with reference to Polyxena, they claim that 'to be born of noble stock 
(ἐσθλαί) among mortals is to bear a wondrous and unmistakable stamp (χαρακτήρ)'.253
This idea of external form reflecting inner nature was not new.  When Odysseus paused in 
his performance to the Phaeacians, the queen asked the audience: 'Phaeacians, how does 
253 A useful round up of the scholarship on χαρακτήρ, and more ancient examples, is provided by Diggle 
2004, 4-5.
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this man seem to you in physical form (εἶδος), and stature, and mind (φρήν) within?' 
(11.336-7).  King Alcinous states that 'shapeliness (µορφή) is upon your words, and your 
mind (φρήν) within is noble (ἐσθλή, 367; cf. 8.170-77).254  
If this is the sense that Antisthenes' comment on the spirit of Patroclus is taken – that the 
inner spirit or character is a recflection of the outer form – then the fragment may have been 
drawn from Antisthenes' Περὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν φυσιογνωµονικός, Concerning the Sophists, a 
Physiognomy (DL 6.16) or Περὶ λέξεως ἢ περὶ χαρακτήρων, Concerning Style, or, Concerning 
Character Types (6.15; see further ch. 3).  The use of the present participle certainly supports 
this interpretation, meaning the bodies 'that presently surround them' (περιέχουσι).  
Alternately, it seems possible in this fragment, by claiming that the spirit has the same form 
as the body, that Antisthenes may be reacting against the theory of reincarnation attributed 
to Pythagoras, viz. that the spirit or soul (ψυχή) travels on a circuit through one form of 
creature after another (DL 8.14).  A fragment from Xenophanes humorously claims that 
Pythagoras once recognised a human soul (ψυχή) crying out from a puppy that was being 
beaten (DK 21 B 7).  There is an anecdote in Diogenes Laertius (8.15) that Plato paid 100 
minas to purchase the only three books published describing the doctrines of Pythagoras.  
Regardless of the truth of that, Pythagoras' description of the journey of the spirit certainly 
had something in common with Plato's reincarnation theory found in Phaedo, Phaedrus, 
Timaeus, and the myth of Republic 10, where spirits of the dead adopt new lives (some as 
animals, some as men, some as women) that are suited to, or determined by, the nature or 
form of their past lives (Phd. 81e-82b, Phdr. 248a-249d, Ti. 42ad & 91d-92c, R. 620a-d).  So 
conceivably Antisthenes is asserting that the spirit has one shape and one shape only, viz. 
that of the body from which it came.  In this case the fragment could be from Antisthenes' 
work categorised by Diogenes Laertius as Περὶ τῶν ἐν ᾅδου, Concerning Those in Hades 
(6.17).
254 All noted and discussed by Ford 2002, 30.
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TH8.  This fragment demonstrates the partial deployment (Steps 1-2 of 3) of the Antisthenic 
critical methodology discussed in chapter 5 section B.  
Step 1. Antisthenes problematises the text by identifying an inconsistency.  Here, after 
asking why Homer only showed Nestor as capable of lifting the goblet, he notes that it was 
not likely that it would have been easier for Nestor to lift than for the younger men.  
Step 2. Antisthenes locates a σηµεῖον (indication) of the solution that can be read to give 
consistency to the text.  Antisthenes here asserts that Homer was 'indicating' that Nestor 
was not becoming drunk.  Notable here is Antisthenes' use of the verb σηµαίνειν, 'to 
indicate'.  As discussed in chapter 5 section D, Antisthenes used a range of medical and 
other technical vocabulary in his criticism.  This word in particular was used by Antisthenes 
when revealing 'indications' that could be interpreted by the skilled reader to provide an 
accurate 'diagnosis' of the text.  In this case the indications in the text are referring to the 
sympotic machismo, which Nestor possessed, of not getting drunk when everyone else is 
becoming heavily inebriated.  This is a quality Socrates was lauded for in Plato's Symposion 
(220a). His self-control was indicative of a superior being.  Schrader (Proleg. p. 387-8) has 
suggested that this fragment derives from περὶ οἴνου χρήσεως ἢ περὶ µέθης ἢ περὶ τοῦ 
κύκλωπος in Diogenes Laertius' catalogue (6.18).
This verse of Homer's was obviously a popular one for interpretation, and drew the 
attention of a number of other critics.  Porphyry records three further explanations from 
Stesimbrotos, Glaucos (or Glaucon) and Aristotle (Sch. Il. 11.636 Schrader; cf. Richardson 
1975, 72 & 77).  Stesimbrotos argued that this passage gave a rationale for why Nestor had 
lived for so many years – if his strength was undiminished it was reasonable that the length 
of his life should correspond (= FGrH 107 F 23).  Glaucos said that it was simply that Nestor 
had the knack of lifting the cup by the diametrically opposite handles.  Aristotle stated that 
this only meant Nestor moved the cup without difficulty in comparison with others at a 
similar stage of life.  It is interesting to note that explanations from Aristotle are also found 
together with Antisthenes' in the scholia in TH9 and TH13c.
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Possible Step 3? Found among the scholia on Iliad 11.636 is the following interesting 
observation attributed to Aristonicus (1st c. AD; Venetus A Scholia to the Iliad 11.636 Erbse):
πρὸς τὸ ζητούµενον, πῶς 'ὁ γέρων ἀµογητὶ', οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι µετὰ κακοπαθείας.  ... ἀλλὰ νοεῖν ὅτι 
καὶ τοῦτο τῶν ἐπαίνων λεγοµένων Νέστορός ἐστι, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ 'Νέστωρ δὲ πρῶτος κτύπον 
ἄϊε φώνησέν τε' (Il. 10.532).
From the problem, how did 'the old man effortlessly', but the others with distress.  ... but reflect 
that this is also one of the characteristics of Nestor that is spoken of in praise, as also in the 
example: 'Nestor was the first to perceive the sound and speak' (Il. 10.532).
In highly Antisthenic style, Aristonicus here supplies another example of Nestor being 
praised for his heightened physical powers, and adduces it as evidence to confirm the 
accuracy of Homer's text.  This confirmation of a reading of Homer using Homer would fit 
with Antisthenes' comments on this Homeric verse as a natural Step 3 of his methodology.  
It is tempting therefore to conjecture that Aristonicus, like Porphyry, was drawing here on 
work that was originally Antisthenes'.
Allegory? Giannantoni thinks that this fragment is evidence showing that Antisthenes did 
not employ allegorical interpretation (SSR 4 n.35.343), and this is surely the right 
conclusion.  Antisthenes seems to have intended his interpretation to be as a literal reading, 
possible for those who were skilled in reading the 'indications' in the text.
TH9.  This is another fragment showing evidence of the partial use of the Antisthenic 
methodology of textual criticism.  Here we have step 1, in which he problematises the text 
by asking why Odysseus 'stupidly' insulted Poseidon.  The problem here is that Odysseus 
was apparently acting 'stupidly' (ἀνοήτως) when it was well known that he was, in fact, 
very 'clever' (σοφός; cf. TH12 15, 24 and commentary, and TH13a-d and commentary at §3). 
Another part of the problem could also have been the implied impiety of Odysseus, and by 
extension, the impiety of Homer.
Antisthenes resolves this problem by explaining that Odysseus (being smart) was merely 
making a statement in accordance with a well understood fact, viz. that Poseidon was not 
the deity responsible for the domain of healing, but rather Apollo was.  This also 
demonstrated that there was no injustice done or lack of appropriate reverence shown by 
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Odysseus (or Homer) toward Poseidon.  This thus reveals another of Antisthenes' strategies 
for preserving Homer's text.  Decleva Caizzi (note on DC 54) has suggested that this 
fragment may have been drawn from the work Κύκλωψ ἢ περὶ Ὀδυσσέως.  It seems that it 
might alternatively have appeared under the title περὶ ἀδικίας καὶ ἀσεβείας or the title 
περὶ Ὁµήρου (DL 6.17).  
Immediately following Antisthenes explanation in the scholion for this verse is Aristotle's 
explanation for the same line (F 174 Rose).  An explanation from Aristotle also followed 
Antisthenes' in TH8, and another example of the two authors being quoted one after the 
other in the scholia occurs in TH13c.
TH10.  Here Antisthenes reveals a level of disdain for rhapsodes that was held in common 
with other conservative, elite thinkers.  Elsewhere, a sentiment almost identical to that 
accorded here to Antisthenes about rhapsodes (that there is no one sillier) is given by 
Xenophon to Euthydemos (Mem. 4.2.10):
τοὺς γὰρ τοι ῥαψῳδοὺς οἶδα τὰ µὲν ἔπη ἀκριβοῦντας, αὐτοὺς δὲ πάνυ ἠλιθίους ὄντας. 
For the rhapsodes, I know, recite the verses accurately, but are themselves extremely silly.
Plato's Ion is very largely an investigation of the value of rhapsodes.  Though Socrates is 
generally good natured toward his eponymous antagonist, the rhapsode Ion, Socrates' 
overall finding in the dialogue is that rhapsodes understand nothing at all about the 
material they recite.  In one extended passage, Socrates sets out an argument that the 
rhapsodes actually know nothing themselves but depend solely on divine inspiration, 
which they receive second hand, via the poets, from the god (533d-536d).  Though in the 
dialogue Ion resists this explanation, when finally forced into a corner where he is given a 
choice between being termed 'unjust' (ἄδικος) or 'divine' (θεῖος), he effectively concedes 
that it is divine inspiration, admitting 'it is much nobler to be known as divine' (542a).
By late antiquity the foolishness and unreliability of the rhapsodes was proverbial, as 
demonstrated by these lexicon entries: 
Suda (ρ67) Ῥαψῴδηµα· ψεῦσµα, Rhapsōidēma (recitation) = lies;  
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Suda (ρ69) Ῥαψῳδία· φλυαρία, λόγων συναφή, ἀδολεσχία, Rhapsōidia (recitation) 
= nonsense, combination of stories, vacuous talk;  
Hsch. (ρ166 Hansen) ῥαψῴδηµα· ψεῦσµα. φλυαρία,  Rhapsōidēma (recitation) = lies, 
nonsense.
There are a couple of curious points to note at the end of this fragment.  Firstly, just as 
Antisthenes was warming to his task – of questioning Nikeratos and forcing him to admit 
that he probably should not pride himself as much as he does on being able to recite Homer 
– Socrates interrupts and halts that line of enquiry.  Secondly, Socrates offers a justification 
on Nikeratos' behalf, as to why he is different from the rhapsodes.  Socrates says that 
Nikeratos paid a lot of money to men who taught him αἱ ὑπονοίαι (the underlying or 
hidden meanings).  This, however, is precisely what the rhapsodes themselves also claim to 
know.  In the Ion Socrates puts it to Ion that 'the rhapsode ought to become an interpreter of 
the poet's thought for his audience' (τὸν γὰρ ῥαψῳδὸν ἑρµηνέα δεῖ τοῦ ποιητοῦ τῆς 
διανοίας γίγνεσθαι τοῖς ἀκούσι), with which Ion whole heartedly agrees (530c).  This 
function of being an interpreter (ἑρµηνεύς) is the ability to take the poet's thought 
(διανοία) and then draw out the underlying meanings (ὑπονοίαι).  Thus it seems in 
Xenophon that Socrates was coming to Nikeratos' rescue to save him from further cross-
examination and embarrassment, but the precise reason he was doing so is unclear.  He was 
either being ironical, or (in Xenophon's view) he genuinely believed that Homer was worth 
knowing, so long as one understood the underlying or hidden meanings.  
If Plato's depiction of Socrates is to be believed, then Xenophontic Socrates' last comment 
must be taken as ironical.  As discussed above, in the Ion Socrates attempts to show that the 
rhapsodes actually understand nothing at all about what they recite, let alone being an 
interpreter of anything deeper.  In the Phaedrus (229e) Socrates terms allegorical 
explanations τὰ ἀλλότρια (irrelevant matters) and in Republic (378d) he states that Homer's 
verses concerning the affairs of the gods should not be admitted to the city οὔτ᾽ ἐν 
ὑπονοίας πεποιηµένας οὔτε ἄνευ ὑπονοιῶν, 'either written in hidden meanings or 
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without hidden meanings'; cf. Thucydides' Pericles rejecting the need of a Homer, or any 
other poet, to present the ὑπόνοια of Athens' deeds rather than the plain truth (2.41).255
On the other hand, Xenophon's portrayal of Socrates differs markedly.  In the Memorabilia 
Socrates is depicted questioning a man recently selected as general, and he chooses 
passages from Homer to test his suitability, with no obvious irony (3.2.1-4).  Socrates is 
shown apparently believing that Homer contains sound leadership examples that may be 
applied to real life.  It seems at least possible that the hostility displayed towards rhapsodes 
throughout Plato's dialogues was actually a characteristic of Antisthenes that Plato 
appropriated to the dramatic persona of his Socrates.
The use of αἱ ὑπονοίαι in this fragment is translated as 'the underlying' or 'hidden 
meanings'.  The meaning of this word evidently changed over time.  For example, Plutarch 
equated this ancient use of the word to be equivalent to the use of the word ἀλληγρορία 
(allegorical interpretations) in his own time (Quomodo adul. 19 E, ταῖς πάλαι µὲν ὑπονοίας 
ἀλληγρορίας δὲ νῦν λεγοµέναις).
TH11.  In this passage it appears that Antisthenes, once more, wants to go on the offensive 
and cross examine Nikeratos about his Homeric education.  After Nikeratos' response, 
however, the conversation between the symposiasts moves on and Antisthenes has no 
opportunity to pose further questions.  Of the capabilities claimed by the rhapsodes (and 
their students such as Nikeratos), the most controversial was an understanding of military 
command.  Aristophanes' Aeschylus asks 'For what reason did the divine Homer have 
honour and renown except for this reason: that he instructed well concerning tactics, brave 
deeds, the arms of men?' (Fr. 1034-6).  Just as in this fragment Nikeratos claims to 
understand generalship, Plato's Ion also claimed to possess that talent, a notion that 
Socrates spent considerable effort attempting to disabuse him of (Ion 540d-541d; cf. R. 599c). 
It seems that in addition to generalship, or kingship, there were a number of other stock 
topics that came up when discussing the talents that could reputedly be learnt from the 
255 οὐδεν προσδεόµενοι οὔτε Ὁµήρου ἐπαινέτου οὔτε ὅστις ἔπεσι µὲν τὸ αὐτίκα τέρψει, τῶν δ᾽ ἔργων 
τὴν ὑπόνοιαν ἡ ἀλήθεια βλάψει.
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study of Homer.  Nikeratos here says he knows about chariot racing from Iliad 23.  In 
discussion with Socrates, Ion offers the identical three lines (plus three further lines) in 
making the same claim (Pl. Ion 537ab).  The line that Nikeratos closes with, about onion as a 
relish in drink, is also quoted by Socrates when he is quizzing Ion about his claimed 
medical ability (538c). 
Once again, in this passage there is evidence that it was actually Antisthenes and not 
Socrates who was the most vigorous interrogator of people claiming knowledge as a result 
of memorising Homer.  When Antisthenes questions Nikeratos, he asks, incredulously, if 
Nikeratos really understands kingship, and quotes the line regarding Agamemnon.  As 
noted above (TH10), in another passage from Xenophon, Socrates questions a man who had 
been chosen as general.  In doing so he quotes the same passage of Homer (Mem. 3.2.2):
ἢ τί δήποτε οὕτως ἐπῄνεσε τὸν Ἀγαµέµνονα εἰπών:
'ἀµφότερον, βασιλεύς τ᾽ ἀγαθὸς κρατερός τ᾽ αἰχµητής'; (Il. 3.179)
ἆρά γε ὅτι αἰχµητής τε κρατερὸς ἂν εἴη, οὐκ εἰ µόνος αὐτὸς εὖ ἀγωνίζοιτο πρὸς τοὺς 
πολεµίους, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ καὶ παντὶ τῷ στρατοπέδῳ τούτου αἴτιος εἴη, καὶ βασιλεὺς ἀγαθός, οὐκ εἰ 
µόνον τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ βίου καλῶς προεστήκοι, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ καί, ὧν βασιλεύοι, τούτοις εὐδαιµονίας 
αἴτιος εἴη; 
Or why do you suppose he (Homer) praised Agamemnon, saying:
'he is both, a good king and a mighty warrior'? (Il. 3.179)
Should it be then that he was 'a mighty warrior too', not if he alone was fighting well against the 
enemy, but if he himself was also responsible for the entire army fighting well?  And 'a good king' 
not if he alone arranged his own life well, but if also, for those he ruled, he was responsible for 
their happiness? 
In this passage, and what follows it, Socrates actually carries out an exegesis of Homer to 
make it clear to the newly appointed general what his responsibilities are.  Apparently this 
particular line of Homer remained famous as a summary of the qualities of leadership for 
some centuries.  Dio Chrysostom (Orat. 2.51-4) offers a discussion of the virtues of Homer 
for understanding sound military strategy, and he rounds it off with exactly the same line: 
Iliad 3.179.
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Taking into account the discussion here, the listing περὶ ἐξηγητῶν in Diogenes Laertius' 
catalogue of Antisthenes' works (6.15-18) was quite conceivably a dialogue containing an 
attack by Antisthenes on Homeric exegetes.
Polytropos   TH12
In this scholia, as with TH13a-d and TH14a-l, a scholiast is reporting comments made by 
Porphyry from a work of Antisthenes which is otherwise lost.  The work of Porphyry is 
now also lost, and is only preserved by various scholiasts as marginal notations to 
manuscripts of Homer's epics.  The title this particular work may have fallen under, as 
catalogued by Diogenes Laertius, is unclear.  Possibly it was included under Κύκλωψ ἢ 
περὶ Ὀδυσσέως, 'The Cyclops, or, Concerning Odysseus' (6.17), along with the TH14 group 
of fragments.  
This fragment preserves one of the longest extant passages of Antisthenic dialogue.  It is 
clear that the fragment is extracted from a dialogue, as there are conversational particles 
and expressions (6 οὔκουν, 8 οὐ µὰ Δία, 14 τί οὖν; ἆρα γε, 16 µήποτε), and there are two 
speakers characterised as taking diametrically opposite ethical positions.  
'Speaker One' (5-13) makes the argument that polytropos, 'many-mannered', was used 
negatively of Odysseus by Homer.  His arguments represent a traditional aristocratic view 
that valued simplicity, honesty, and constancy, and on the other hand reviled what was 
changeable, deceitful, and polymorphous in any way.  On the other hand 'Speaker Two,' for 
the remainder of the fragment, makes the case that polytropos is really equivalent to sophos, 
'wise', and as such should be considered a positive attribute of Odysseus.  The second 
speaker thus represents the sort of shifty nature that the old aristocracy ascribed to the 
demos and demogogues alike.  In an extended discourse he sets out to show that polytropos 
was in fact intended in a very positive light.  As such he is characterised as a silver tongued, 
sophistic speaker, not very different to Odysseus himself.  It is not possible to determine the 
personalities of the speakers as the dialogue is characterising theoretical positions, not the 
speakers themselves.  Thus the speakers putting forward the arguments, and in particular 
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the second speaker, are positing hypothetical positions (which they themselves do not 
necessarily agree with) in order to fully illustrate opposing ethical positions.
Most modern scholars have claimed that Antisthenes is actually making an argument for 
polytropos being a positive attribute here.256   A careful examination of Antisthenes' work, 
however, shows clearly that Antisthenes connects multiplicity and changeability with 
concealment, dishonesty and deceitfulness, all ethical qualities that he associates with base 
men, demagogues, sophists and, in fact, with democracy.  Whereas, immutability, 
consistency, steadiness, honesty and openness are qualities he associates with traditional 
aristocracy.  In this he is followed by Plato, whose use of the same classes of semantically 
loaded words to discuss ethical qualities, establishes a key theme in his works.  This may be 
another indication of Plato's debt to Antisthenes and so help to explain the charges of 
plagiarism that were levelled at Plato (cf. SD1 and commentary).   
So what this fragment actually represents is Antisthenes critiquing character and rhetoric.  
The text brings out ideological semantic oppositions implicit in polytropos, meaning 'many-
mannered'.  The first contrast is between poly meaning 'many', and haplous meaning 'single', 
and in regard to persons, 'open' or 'honest'.  The second contrast is between tropos, from the 
verb trepo meaning 'turn, alter, change', which is contrasted with consistency, steadiness 
and immutability.  Antisthenes' language is very sensitive to the semantic fields of words.
In general poly- root words were associated by elite critics with the worst aspects of 
demagoguery and sophistry.  The Eleatic stranger in Plato's Politicus describes the race of 
sophists as being like lions and centaurs and other such creatures, and very many of them 
are like satyrs, and the weak and polytropoi beasts (291a-b).  Elsewhere, the same Eleatic 
refers to the sophist as polykephalos (many-headed) because of his ability to force people 
involuntarily to admit to contradictory positions and to deceive people (Sph. 240c-d).  It is 
telling that in Antisthenes' Ajax & Odysseus, when Odysseus was defending himself in front 
of a jury, he was prepared to call himself polytlas, polymetis and polymechanos (much-
enduring, much-wily, and much-scheming, 2.14.3), but not polytropos.  Presumably because 
256 E.g. Decleva Caizzi 1966, 105; Giannantoni 1990, 4.343; Prince 2015, 598-622.
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this word was so negatively loaded that it would have done him no favours in winning his 
case.  
5-13. Speaker One. πολύτροπος vs. ἁπλοῦς, γεννάδας, σοφός.  Though the scholion 
reports 'Antisthenes says' this should be understood as relating what was said by a speaker 
in a dialogue of Antisthenes – in much the same way as quotes attributed to Plato from his 
dialogues should be understood as emanating from the mouths of his dramatis personae.  
The first speaker makes the claim that Homer is criticising (ψέγειν) Odysseus, not praising 
him, when he calls him polytropos (6).  He then goes on to set up a clear ethical opposition 
between polytropos, 'many-mannered', the chameleon-like quality attributed to Odysseus, 
and haplous, 'honest' (7), which was the way Achilles and Ajax were represented by 
Homer.257  This thus implies that, by contrast, polytropos is dishonest.  Achilles and Ajax are 
also further described as 'noble' (γεννάδας, 8), thus implying that polytropos is 'ignoble'.  
Nestor also, who was a sophos, 'wise man' (8), always spoke haplos, 'honestly' (9), while 
'concealing nothing' (οὐκ ἀποκρυπτόµενον).   This then suggests that being polytropos 
means consciously concealing things.  Finally, polytropos is equated with having a 'deceitful 
and shifty nature' (δόλιον καὶ παλίµβολον τὸ ἦθος), the ethical opposites of which are 
honesty and constancy.   So, in summary, the first speaker advances the assertions that 
being polytropos equates to being dishonest, ignoble, concealing, deceitful, and shifty; and 
these qualities are deliberately opposed to being honest, noble, wise, and constant.
Comparison to the Hippias Minor.  The ethical opposition set up here, is identical to the 
one that Hippias highlights in his discussion with Socrates in the Hippias Minor.  Hippias 
uses the superlative forms of polytropos, haplous and sophos, and applies them respectively to 
the same characters as Antisthenes' 'speaker one.'  He labels Odysseus as polytropotatos 
(exceedingly many-mannered, 364c), describes Achilles as haploustatos (exceedingly honest, 
364e) and aristos (noblest, 364c, equivalent to the superlative of γεννάδας above), and 
257 For the expression haplous logos, meaning 'speaking honestly', see A. PB 46, 610, 975 and Griffith 1983 ad 
loc.; and see also Ar. Ach. 1151.  Being haplous is a key quality of the citizens in Plato's ideal state, see R. 
370b-c, 374a-d, 380d and Adam 1902 ad loc.
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Nestor as sophotatos (wisest, 364c).  The similarity is best illustrated by a side by side 
comparison of Odysseus and Achilles/Nestor from the two sources:
Antisthenes, TH12 Hippias Minor
Odysseus  πολύτροπος πολυτροπώτατος 
Achilles/Nestor  ἁπλῶς, γεννάδας, σοφός ἁπλούστατος, ἄριστος, σοφώτατος
Hippias also quotes a passage from the Iliad containing the same verse (Il. 9.313) that 
Antisthenes' 'Speaker One' quotes in this fragment (12-13).  He explains to Socrates that this 
shows plainly that the character of Achilles is true and haplous (honest) whereas that of 
Odysseus is polytropos (many-mannered) and false (365b).  The contrast of terms in this 
Antisthenes fragment and the Hippias Minor is so nearly identical that it seems likely either 
that the author is one and the same, or that the author of one is imitating the other.  It is 
quite possible that the characters in both works are also the same, therefore making Hippias 
'Speaker One' in this fragment and Socrates 'Speaker Two.'  See further speculation about 
the authorship of the Hippias Minor in Appendix B.
Decleva Caizzi's conjecture that the Hippias Minor preceded Antisthenes' work, claiming 
that Plato ignores his interpretation (1966, 105) is a little puzzling.   Patzer has argued, on 
the contrary, that Antisthenes preceded Plato, and that this is thus the oldest example of a 
dispute between two literary Socratics (1970, 176).  Giannantoni is also inclined towards this 
theory and suggests that Antisthenes may well have written down his ideas before the 
other Socratics, who may (surely!!) have known about his work when they started 
producing their own (1990, 4.344-5).
14-25. Speaker Two. πολύτροπος = σοφός.  In its current form this is not a λύσις, or 
explication, supplied by Antisthenes as the scholion misleadingly suggests (i.e. λύων οὖν ὁ 
Ἀντισθένης) .  Rather, as per the note above, this is the second speaker in a dialogue 
providing a response and rebuttal to what had immediately preceded.  This interlocutor 
takes the opposition set up between polytropos and sophos by the first speaker and attempts 
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to show instead that they are equivalent.  In particular, he separates tropos from polytropos.  
He then proposes a bipartite meaning for tropos that indicates both a person's character and 
their use of speech, going on to point out that the term eutropos when used of a man means 
'of noble-manner', and that tropoi are figures of speech (16-18).  Next he argues that sophoi 
(wise men) are able to both express the same thought in many manners (polloi tropoi) and 
understand speech of many manners (polloi tropoi, 20-1).  He explicitly equates his use of 
polloi tropoi here with polytropoi (polytropos in plural, 22-3).  He concludes this section by 
stating that this shows that for Homer's Odysseus, being sophos was the same as being 
polytropos (23-4).
The word tropos (generally plural tropoi) is close to meaning 'character' in popular speech, 
with an emphasis on the ingrained ways and habits of an individual.  This notion of fixed 
habits and ways of operating almost comes to give tropos almost the meaning of 
conditioned reflexes.  There are examples found in a number of verses from comedy, e.g. 
Epicharmus PCG 1 F 266:258
ὁ τρόπος ἀνθρώποις δαίµων ἀγαθός, οἷς δὲ καὶ κακός.
Manner/character is a good guiding spirit for men, but also a bad one for them.
From Menander Epitrepontes (1093-4):259
ἑκάστῳ τὸν τρόπον συν<ῴκισαν> φρούραρχον
(The gods) have assigned the manner/character of each man as his guardian.
The vocabulary Antisthenes is employing in this fragment to critique rhetoric is also used 
by conservative thinkers to criticise musical trends they disapprove of, and in particular, 
what is referred to by modern scholarship as the 'New Music'.  Speaker Two quotes a line 
from the Odyssey (19.521) about the quality of a nightingale's voice to support his point (19-
20).  This is a reference to what appears to have been a readily recognised motif that 
symbolised the New Music and its depravity.  The nightingale was used in Aristophanes' 
Birds in an explicit and extended parody of the complexity, variability, vulgarity, and 
258 Noted by Thimme 1935, 6.
259 Cf. PCG F 687, F 846.
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transgressiveness of the New Music (Barker 2004).  The New Music was habitually equated 
by elite critics with democracy and everything that was wrong with it (see further Csapo 
2011, 96-108).  
For such conservative musical critics the Dorian mode was the only music that was 'manly 
and grandiose, not diffuse or giddy, but sombre and severe, not intricate (poikilon) and 
polytropos', i.e. not like New Music (Herakleides of Pontos fr. 163, quoted from Csapo 2011, 
95-6).  As well as the noteworthy pejorative use of polytropos here, compare also the pairing 
of poikilon and polytropos against the pairing of poikile and polytropia in our fragment (34), 
which Antisthenes is contrasting with haplotes (honesty, simplicity).  
The semantic field of poikilos when used as an ethical term includes meanings such as:  
subtle, artful, crafty, intricate, changeful, mutable, and unstable (cf. LSJ s.v. III).  The 
cunning tricks of a consummate villain are described as poikiloi by a chorus in Aristophanes 
(Eq. 686).  Plato compares the democratic city to a poikilos garment, describes democracy 
itself as poikile, and the democratic man as poikilos (R. 557c, 558c, 561e).  He also claims that 
cities by the sea tend to produce men with a poikila and base disposition (Lg. 704e).  
Aristotle says that the fortunate (i.e. noble) man is neither poikilos nor eumetabolos (easily 
changeable, EN 1101a8).  Euripides' Polynices declares that the argument of truth is haplous 
and in no need of being poikiloi (crafty, Ph. 469-70).  This opposition, between what is 
haplous and poikilos, is precisely mirrored by Antisthenes' use of these terms in his 
discussion here about styles of speech, and in turn is consistently employed by elite critics 
in their discussion of musical styles (Csapo 2011, 100).  Overall, the contemporary criticism 
of rhetoric and music, as well as politics and theology, drew upon these same ethical 
oppositions implicit in the vocabulary of simplicity versus complexity, and constancy 
versus mutability.
On a textual note, the addition of ἀνθρώποις ὁµιλεῖν in line 23 by Schrader is necessary to 
to make sense of the text.
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26-31. Πυθαγόρας.  The second speaker here adduces in support of his argument 
Pythagoras' style of speech as an example to demonstrate that Odysseus was in good 
company when constantly changing his style of speech.  He notes that Pythagoras adjusted 
his style of speech to fit each group of people; children, women, rulers, adolescents.  In a 
way that seems to echo this, Plato's Ion claims that he knows the appropriate thing for a 
man to say, and the sort of thing that is appropriate for a woman, a slave, a freeman, a 
subject and a ruler to say (Ion 540b).  Speaker Two goes on to assert that it is a sign of 
wisdom (sophia) to find the right manner (tropos) of speech for each person, but a sign of 
artlessness (amathia) to use a single-manner (monotropos) of speech.  Antisthenes' Odysseus 
makes the same contrast between sophia and amathia with reference to Ajax (Ajax & 
Odysseus Od.13.260  In fact, Ajax is presented by Antisthenes as one who very conspicuously 
fails (or refuses) to adapt his style of speech to his audience to the same extent that 
Odysseus is presented as being conspicuously successful at doing so (see discussion at 
Kennedy 2011, 42-5).  
Scholars are divided over whether this portion of the dialogue is originally from 
Antisthenes, or whether it is an aside, or insertion, of Porphyry's.  A very similar passage 
occurs in another work of Porphyry's where Dikaearchos (Vita Pyth. 18 Places = F 33 Wehrli) 
is named as the source, rather than Antisthenes.  Patzer (1970, 180-2) has assembled the 
details of the opposing views, as follows.  Arguing that the reference to Pythagoras should 
be traced back to Antisthenes are: Joël (1901, 209, who claims that Dikaearchos depends on 
Antisthenes), Rostagni (1922, 148-201), and Detienne (1962, 55).  Preferring to attribute the 
passage to Porphyry are Schrader (app. crit. p.2.6), Delatte (1951, 121), Buffière (1956, 368 n. 
9), Di Benedetto (1966, 213 n. 1), and Patzer himself (1970, 180-2).  None of them argue for 
Dikaearchos as the originator.  Decleva Caizzi (1966, 105) and Giannantoni (1990, 4.337) 
both decline to favour one side or the other.
On closer investigation the argument that the section concerning Pythagoras was originally 
part of Antisthenes' work appears to be sustainable.  It is bolstered by two passages of 
260 Noted by Decleva Caizzi 1966, 107.
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Julian's that seem to have been influenced by it.  In one he refers to Odysseus as 'the 
polytropos orator from Ithaca' (Or. 2.75c).  The fact that he combined polytropos with oratory 
hints that he was aware of the argument made in our fragment – certainly he was generally 
aware of Antisthenes' work (see e.g. MD14-16).  In another, longer passage he elaborates 
further (Or. 1.12d):
καίτοι τὸν Ὀδυσσέα συνετὸν Ὅµηρος ἐκ παντὸς ἀποφῆναι προαιρούµενος πολύτροπον εἶναί 
φησι καὶ πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸν νοῦν καταγνῶναι καὶ ἐπελθεῖν τὰς πόλεις, ἵν᾽ ἐξ ἑκάστων 
ἐπιλεξάµενος ἔχοι τὰ κράτιστα καὶ πρὸς παντοδαποὺς ἀνθρώπους ὁµιλεῖν δύναιτο.  ἀλλὰ τῷ 
µὲν ὃς οὐκ ἐβασίλευσε ποικίλων ἠθῶν ἐµπειρίας χρεία. 
And indeed Homer chooses to reveal Odysseus as being intelligent in every way by representing 
him as polytropos, and saying that he had perceived the mind of many men and come to their cities, 
so that from each he would take what was most excellent, and would be able to converse with 
every kind of man.  Yet even this man who did not rule as king needed experience of diverse 
characters.
The general thought that Julian is capturing here, that Odysseus was able to converse in 
many ways, is present in the portion of the dialogue preceding and following the 
Pythagoras section.  The notion that Odysseus was 'able to converse with every kind of 
man' is also equivalently expressed in the passage about Pythagoras.  This suggests that 
Julian was aware of Antisthenes' work including the Pythagoras portion.  Julian was writing 
in the Western Roman empire during the mid fourth century.  It is just possible, however,  if 
the Pythagoras part was Porphyry's insertion (writing late third century in Rome), that 
Julian was being influenced by the altered version.  The simplest explanation, however, is 
that the reference to Pythagoras was part of Antisthenes' dialogue.  Changing one's style of 
speaking, and in fact any oratorical skills at all, were things Antisthenes was opposed to.  So 
it is most likely that his inclusion of Pythagoras, known for his powers of oratory, was 
ultimately intended in a derogatory sense.  As mentioned it is also possible that Antisthenes 
is taking aim at Pythagoras' theories in TH7 (see commentary).  Interestingly, Plato's 
Socrates appears to stand in agreement with Pythagoras and against Antisthenes in this 
regard – in the Phaedrus (270c-272c) Socrates asserts that the orator must be able to know 
how many kinds of soul there are and have an equivalent number of types of speech.261
261 Noted by Boys-Stones & Rowe 2013, 14-16.
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On a textual note, Buttmann's conjecture at line 29 of τοῦ λόγου for τῆς σοφίας is necessary 
to make sense of the text.
31-33. ἡ ἰατρική.  The discussion of the adaptation of speaking styles to suit the listeners is 
continued with a comparison to the medical art, in which, Speaker Two states that the 
treatment is also adjusted for each patient.  A similar analogy to our fragment, correlating 
the deployment of the medical art to the use of oratory, is found in Plato's Theaetetus where 
the work of a physician using drugs is compared to the work of a sophist using oratory 
(167a; cf. Csapo 2011, 120).  In a further interesting comparison, Euripides' Polynices claims 
that the unjust argument (being itself diseased) has a need of clever drugs (E. Ph. 471-2).  
Gorgias too states that the power of speech over the state of the soul or mind (ψυχή) is like 
the power of drugs over the state of the body, and that certain speech can drug and beguile 
(ἐξεγοήτευσα) the soul with a kind of evil persuasion (DK 82 B 11.14).  So while the 
application of drugs produces an involuntary effect in the body, in a similar way oratory 
produces an involuntary change in the soul or mind – at least for those who are not steady 
and constant.    
33-4. παλίμβολον τὸ τοῦ ἤθους, πολυμετάβολον, ἄστατον. The second speaker is 
returning here to terms that have been used negatively earlier in the dialogue, in an attempt 
to show that they are actually positive attributes.  We have the part of the dialogue where 
παλίµβολον τὸ τοῦ ἤθους was used by the first speaker (8-9).  The other two, 
πολυµετάβολον and ἄστατον, must have been used in another portion of Speaker One's 
argument which is no longer extant.  The semantic field of each expression is broad enough 
that, though they usually have a negative sense, they could also be taken in a neutral, or 
even in a positive sense.  All three terms were no doubt used in a highly negative sense by 
the original speaker.  The second speaker then attempts to rehabilitate the terms in the 
context of his discussion to show them as positive.  He uses παλίµβολον τὸ τοῦ ἤθους 
with the sense 'variability of character'.  Most regularly, however, παλίµβολον is an ethical 
term with distinctly negative connotations, translatable as 'shiftiness' or 'untrustworthiness'. 
This is the force with which it was used by the first speaker (8-9).  Similarly, 
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πολυµετάβολον, translated here as 'highly versatile', more usually means 'highly 
changeable or fickle or unreliable', which is the sense the original speaker would have 
employed.  Finally, ἄστατον, translated here as 'adaptable', has the negative sense of 
'unstable'.  Though the second speaker has attempted to couch the terms in a positive sense, 
the negative sense for each of these words was generally employed by ancient authors, as 
the following examples illustrate.
παλίμβολον. A scholiast to Aristophanes Clouds (V on 298) claims that the poet chose 
clouds as the goddesses for the sophistic 'Socrates' because of their mutability 
(παλίµβολον).  Plato writes that overexposure to luxury breeds a shifty (παλίµβολα) and 
untrustworthy disposition in men's souls (Lg. 705a). 
πολυμετάβολον. In Plato's Republic Socrates states that it is universally the case that those 
things that are in the best state, by nature or design, are the least liable to admitting 'change' 
(µεταβολή) from something else (381ab).  In the Laws 'change' (µεταβολή) is claimed to be 
the most dangerous thing that exists in regard to every area of life, except what is evil 
(797d; cf. Csapo 2011, 108-9).  Demosthenes urges speakers to offer their best advice at the 
first opportunity to avoid the charge of fickleness (34.1, µεταβουλευόµενοι).  The chorus in 
Aristophanes' Acharnians mocks the Athenians for being quick to make up their minds (630, 
ταχυβούλοι) and just as quick to change them (632, µεταβούλοι).
ἄστατον. A scholiast on Euripides' Orestes (371 Schwartz) comments:  ὕπουλα πάντα τὰ 
ῥήµατα Μενελάου, ἀφ᾽ οὗ ὁ ποιητὴς τὸ ἄστατον τῆς Λακεδαιµονίων γνώµης κωµῳδεῖ,  
'The completely deceitful speech of Menelaus, by which the poet ridicules the instability of 
the disposition of the Lacedaemonians.'  The general force of ἄστατον when used as an 
ethical term is best summed up by an anonymous iambic verse (F 29 Iambica Adespota 
(ALG) Diehl = F 1324 Kock, D.Chr. 32.23):
δῆµος ἄστατον κακὸν
καὶ θαλάσσῃ πάνθ᾽ ὅµοιον ὑπ᾽ ἀνέµου ῥιπίζεται.
καὶ γαληνὸς ἢν τύχῃ πως, πνεῦµα βραχὺ κορύσσεται,
κἄν τις αἰτία γένηται, τὸν πολίτην κατέπιεν. 
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The demos is an unstable and wicked thing
and is quite like the sea whipped up by a gale.
And if a calm somehow ensues, the demos boils up again at the merest breeze,
at any reason at all, and the citizen is engulfed.
And compare also the following passage from Demosthenes (De Falsa Leg. 136):
ὁ µὲν δῆµός ἐστιν ἀσταθµητότατον πρᾶγµα τῶν πάντων καὶ ἀσυνθετώτατον, ὥσπερ ἐν 
θαλάττῃ κῦµ᾽ ἀκατάστατον, ὡς ἂν τύχῃ κινούµενον. 
A demos is the most unstable and fickle thing in the world, like an unstable wave of the sea being 
set in motion at the whim of chance. 
Another fragment from Antisthenes sums up the sort of ethical oppositions being examined 
here in so far as they apply to individuals (Philo, Quod Omnis Probus Liber Sit 28 Cohn-
Reiter 1915 6.8-9 = DC 91, SSR 106): 
δυσβάστακτον εἶπεν εἶναι τὸν ἀστεῖον· ὡς γὰρ ἡ ἀφροσύνη κοῦφον καὶ φερόµενον, οὕτως  ἡ 
φρόνησις ἐρηρεισµένον καὶ ἀκλινὲς καὶ βάρος ἔχον ἀσάλευτον; 
A good man is difficult to carry.  For as foolishness is unsubstantial and floats about, <so> good 
sense is firmly fixed and unswerving and has an unshakeable gravity.
The segment of TH12 under discussion containing these highly loaded terms highlights the 
crux of the ethical debate, and represents Antisthenes' attempt to characterise the opposing 
sides with fitting language.  On the one hand, simplicity, stability and constancy are 
associated with Socrates and traditional aristocratic values, while on the other hand 
complexity, variability and inconsistency are associated with sophistry, rhetoric, and 
democracy.  
These oppositions are succinctly highlighted by Albinus when he describes how to 
intelligibly characterise philosophers and sophists in dialogues (Eisagōgē 2.14-18 Hermann 
p. 148): 
τὰ οἰκεῖα ἤθη δεῖ ἑκάστῳ ἀνατιθέναι, τῷ µὲν φιλοσόφῳ τὸ γενναῖον καὶ τὸ ἁπλοῦν καὶ τὸ 
φιλάληθες, τῷ δὲ σοφιστικῷ τὸ ποικίλον καὶ τὸ παλίµβολον καὶ τὸ φιλόδοξον, τῷ δὲ ἰδιωτικῷ 
τὸ οἰκεῖον.
It is necessary to assign to each their own proper character; to the philosopher, nobility, honesty, 
and love of truth; but to the sophist, craftiness, shiftiness, and love of reputation; a distinctive 
personality for the particular individual.
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Albinus' use of ἁπλοῦς and γενναῖος (= γεννάδας) opposed to ποικίλος and παλίµβολος 
correlates so closely to the use of the same oppositions in TH12, that it seems likely Albinus 
was personally familiar with this text of Antisthenes'.  
Plato and Aristophanes, in particular, were also prominent contributors to this dialectic.  
Plato's Socrates accuses Ion of eluding him by 'being just like Proteus, assuming every kind 
of shape and changing every which way' (Ion 541e, παντοδαπὸς γίγνῃ στρεφόµενος ἄνω 
καὶ κάτω).  The verb strepho here, meaning 'turn, change, alter', is virtually synonymous 
with trepo from which the negatively viewed tropos is derived.  The adjective pantodapos 'of 
every kind' is another word meaning 'multiplicity', and which generally has a negative 
meaning.  In Aristophanes' Frogs Xanthias spies a monstrous beast (287) that is horrible, 
taking 'every kind' (pantodapos) of shape, now a cow, now a mule, now a lovely woman 
(289-91).  Andocides speaks contemptuously of 'every kind' (pantodapoi) of slave and 
foreigner who seem to be receiving citizen rights (2.23).  Callicles also refers 
contemptuously to a mob of 'every kind' (pantodapoi) of slaves and people (Pl. Grg. 489b).262 
In Plato's Republic Socrates asks incredulously if the god (τὸν θεόν) is some sort of wizard 
(γόης) who changes his appearance into many forms to deceive people, or if he is not rather 
haplous, 'simple, honest' (380d).  Socrates goes on to state that no poet should claim that the 
gods takes on the likeness of strangers in every sort of shape (381c-d, quoting Od. 17.485-6).  
He later insists that if a man ever arrived in the city who was capable of assuming every 
shape and imitating every thing that they should send him on to another city (397e-398a).  
In the Gorgias Socrates says that Callicles is prone to complete about-faces (ἄνω καὶ κάτω 
µεταβαλλουµένου) in order to satisfy his listeners, whereas Socrates himself always holds 
the same views (481d-2c).  In the Philebos the discipline concerning  reality, being, and what 
is eternally immutable (i.e. philosophy) is contrasted with the art of persuasion (i.e. oratory) 
which is able to make anything willingly change and become subject to itself (58a-b; cf. 
Csapo 2011, 120-1).
262 Shorey 1937 at R. 557b notes further negative uses at R. 431b-c, 561d, 567e, 559d, Sym. 198b, Lg. 788b.
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34-9.  The second speaker concludes that the many-manners (polytropia) of speech become 
one-manner (monotropia) when received by each individual person.  He adds that speech 
that is uniform, or not polytropos to start with, is actually rejected by many people as the 
lack of individual adjustment makes it polytropos and incomprehensible or apotropos, 'alien', 
when they hear it.  Thus he concludes that rather than polytropos being negative, it is 
actually a lack of polytropia that is negative.  
This is a remarkable sophistic deconstruction (worthy of Derrida) and is surely intended by 
Antisthenes to exemplify sophistic prestidigitation and the logical dexterity and sleight of 
hand of sophistic polytropia itself.  The second speaker is in fact highly polytropic himself 
and, as such, is surely an ironical characterisation of a deceptive position of polytropia by a 
Socrates or his like (see further discussion in ch. 3 section C).
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Odysseus & Calypso   TH13a-d.  
This fragment cluster shows deployment of a range of Antisthenes' literary skills.  The 
moral character of Odysseus is assumed by the argument to be critical to Homer's meaning 
and composition.  As with TH12, one or more scholiasts are reporting comments from a 
work of Porphyry which is otherwise lost.  Schrader creates an entry at Od. 7.258 that 
combines the scholia found at Od. 23.337 (TH13b) and 5.211 (TH13c).  Clearly he realised 
that the two belong together from a scholion at Od. 7.257 (TH13a; printed by Dindorf, but 
by Schrader only as notes), which combines elements of the content of both Od. 23.337 and 
5.211.  A further scholion at Od. 9.33 (TH13d; again printed by Dindorf, but only as a note 
by Schrader) contains an abbreviated version of some of the content, with a couple of 
additional elements that deserve interest.  The table above shows the overlapping portions 
of the texts with identical (or near identical) portions highlighted by bold text, and the text 
of any fragment that is a repetition (to provide context) of text already in the table printed 
in grey.
Attribution – extent of the scholia attributable to Antisthenes
There is a strong case to be made that all of the scholia reported here, including most (if not 
all) of what has previously been attributed to Aristotle in the scholion to Od. 23.337 
(TH13b), was written by Antisthenes.  Rose published Aristotle's portion of this fragment as 
running from διὰ τί Ὀδυσσεὺς through to παρῃτεῖτο (1-7) – the portions of the fragment 
highlighted in the table boxed in bold lines (Table 1 §7 & §2).  Rose placed it with a number 
of other Homeric fragments under the heading ἀπορήµατα Ὁµηρικά, Homeric Questions, a 
work of Aristotle's reported by Diogenes Laertius (5.26).  The portion of TH13b from 
ἔπειτα through to ἀπαθανατίζειν (5-10, §2 & §3), however, is identical in form and content 
to the first part of TH13a (1-8, §1, §2, §3 & §5) which has no mention of Aristotle but does 
mention Antisthenes (6, §5).  The entirety of this portion of the fragment is almost certainly 
from Antisthenes, as is confirmed by the following comparisons with the other scholia.  
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Firstly, the argument at §2 in TH13b 5-7, duplicates the sense – that Odysseus was not 
convinced by Calypso – of a portion securely attributed to Antisthenes (TH13c 5-6).  
Secondly, TH13d combines elements of TH13c, which are certainly Antisthenic, with 
elements of the portion of TH13b attributed to Aristotle, as follows: in §5 at TH13d 2 there 
is a line about lovers making a lot of promises (τοὺς ἐρῶντας πάντα µὲν ὑπισχνουµένους) 
that replicates the idea attributed to Antisthenes at TH13c 2 (οἱ ἐρῶντες πολλὰ ψεύδονται 
καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα ἐπαγγέλλοντα); and in §2, from either side of the 'lying lovers' line in 
TH13d are the statements that Odysseus 'was not persuaded' (οὐκ ἐπείθετο) and 'did not 
believe her' (ἀπιστῶν) which are also found in TH13b (5 µὴ πεισθῆναι, 7 οὐχὶ πιστεύων).  
So, in TH13d the 'lying lovers' statement that is certainly Antisthenic, by comparison with 
TH13c, is found wedged between two statements that are duplicated in the portion that 
Rose attributed to Aristotle. 
Thirdly, παρῃτεῖτο (§2 TH13b 7) cannot be the end point of a fragment (as Rose had 
estimated) as in §3, both TH13a and TH13b carry on from that point with identical 
arguments.  Additionally, at TH13a 4 there is an explanatory γάρ, directly linking it, as an 
explication, to the passage ending in παρῃτεῖτο that precedes it.  Thus demonstrating that 
these thoughts are directly linked and belong together.  
There are a number of persuasive arguments confirming that the remainder of TH13b 
should be attributed to Antisthenes.  In §3 TH13a has an almost identical text to TH13b.  In 
common with TH13c they both use of σοφός (clever) to describe Odysseus, and in TH13c 
the use of σοφός is preceded by Ἀντισθένης φησίν, 'Antisthenes says', thus demonstrating 
that the portion of TH13b from line 8 is indubitably from Antisthenes.
In §5 at TH13b 11 the expression 'promise of immortality' (ἐπαγγελίαν ἀθανασίας) echoes 
the language of Antisthenes at TH13c 2 'promise the impossible' (τὰ ἀδύνατα 
ἐπαγγέλλονται), and we find TH13d 3 (ἀθανασίας ὡς ἀδύνατον) combining ἀθανασίας 
from TH13b and ἀδύνατα from TH13c.  
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In §4 at TH13b 10-12 and TH13c 12 priority is given to ἀρετή (excellence), which is 
Antisthenes' primary ethical concern (see ch. 2.ii section E).  In §3 the ἔργων of TH13b 10 
and TH13a 6 links to the ἀρετή of TH13b.  Antisthenes stated that ἀρετή is a matter of 
ἔργα (DL 6.11 = C 70, SSR 134), and this was a major plank of the case made by his Ajax in 
Ajax & Odysseus (Aj.7.1-3; cf. Kennedy 2011, 29, 41 & 71).   
The discussion in §4 TH13b 13-19 (abbreviated in the table, see fragment for full text) about 
the manner of living required to achieve immortality is consistent with Antisthenes' 
declaration that those desiring immortality should live piously and justly (DL 6.5 = DC 75, 
SSR 176).263
Finally, the portion that names Aristotle in §7 TH13b 2 has the argument that Odysseus told 
his tale as he did in order to persuade the Phaeacians to expedite his journey home.  This 
same assertion, however, is also originally found attributed to Antisthenes.  In §7 the text of  
TH13a 8-10 is linked by an explanatory γάρ to the preceding text at §5 TH13a 6-8 that 
names Antisthenes.  Alcinoös, the Phaecian king, is mentioned (§7 TH13a 9-10) and the 
same sequence and relationship of thoughts is also present in §7 TH13d 3-6, where the 
interaction with the Phaeacians is directly related to Odysseus' knowledge that lovers 
promise the impossible (Antisthenes' argument in §5).   Finally, it seems that Antisthenes 
had a penchant for using the Phaeacians as examples when explicating Homeric texts (cf. 
TH14a 9-13, TH14i 3-4, TH14o 17-20 & commentary at Step 1-3 §9).  
The simplest explanation for the mention of Aristotle, if it is inaccurate, as it seems to be, 
would be that 'Aristotle' was misread for 'Antisthenes' by a scribe copying Porphyry who 
expected an author's name of about that length, starting with 'A' to be 'Aristotle'.  But 
perhaps the best explanation is that the references to Aristotle and Antisthenes are actually 
from the same work – a work by Aristotle in which he was quoting Antisthenes.  Aristotle 
was familiar with Antisthenes' work and in fact several Antisthenic fragments are preserved 
in Aristotle's works.  So it is highly likely that part of a work Antisthenes had written was 
reported by Aristotle (or one of his students) in his ἀπορήµατα Ὁµηρικά as a solution to 
263 Cf. similar arguments made by Di Benedetto 1966, 223 & 227.
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one of the 'Homeric problems.'  Porphyry would probably have included in his work the 
details of how Aristotle was utilising Antisthenes' text.  So both names would have been in 
Porphyry's text and associated with these ideas.  The scholiast, however, when he was 
extracting notes, could easily have seen Aristotle's name and mistakenly attributed a 
passage to him when actually it should have been attributed to Antisthenes, whom 
Aristotle was quoting.
Comments from Aristotle appear combined with those from Antisthenes in other Porphyry 
scholia on Il. 11.636 (TH8), Od. 9.525 (TH9), and Od. 9.106 (TH14).
Commentary
Due to the interrelationship of the four fragments, they will be discussed section by section, 
as a group, in the order set out in Table 1 – TH13 Comparison of Fragments Table.  Note 
that in a couple of places the text of the fragment has been abbreviated for the table, as 
indicated by '…'.  Considering the content of this group of fragments, they may have been 
part of the work catalogued by Diogenes Laertius as περὶ Ὀδυσσείας, 'Concerning the 
Odyssey', or, περὶ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως καὶ Πηνελόπης καὶ περὶ τοῦ κυνός, 'Concerning the tale 
of Odysseus and Penelope, and concerning the tale of the dog', or even, περὶ Ἑλένης καὶ 
Πηνελόπης, 'Concerning Helen and Penelope' (6.17-18).
 §1   Step 1 of the Antisthenic methodology.  Problematise the text.   Here Antisthenes 
problematises the text – the first step of his critical methodology, as discussed in chapter 5 
section B.
The problem in this text is the fact that Odysseus rejected the immortality offered to him by 
Calypso.  Clearly immortality is a good thing, and – as Antisthenes states further on at §3 
and elsewhere, e.g. TH12 15 & 24 – Odysseus is 'clever' (σοφός).  So why does this clever 
man not accept the offer of such a boon?
διὰ τί. In both TH13a and TH13b this problem is stated as a question, asking respectively 
'Why did he not want it?' and 'Why did he not accept it?'  In TH13c the question is turned 
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instead into a statement explaining δι᾽ ἣν παραίτησιν 'why he made the rejection'.  διὰ τί is 
Porphyry's standard way of posing direct questions (MacPhail 2011, 7).  So this probably 
represents a severely contracted form of the material from the original dialogue – having 
been summarised by Porphyry and then again by a scholiast.
ἐπισημαίνεται.  Step 2 of the Antisthenic methodology.  Locate a σημεῖον (indication) 
of the solution.  Notable in the line at TH13c 2-3 is the use of the verb ἐπισηµαίνεσθαι, 
which appears again a few lines down at 8 (cf. commentary at §6).  In common with the un-
prefixed σηµαίνειν (cf. TH12 16), used as it is here, this word has the sense of 'indicate' or 
'give a sign (σηµεῖον).'  Perhaps the most famous example of such a usage is Heraclitus' 
description of Apollo, who through his oracle at Delphi 'neither speaks nor conceals but 
σηµαίνει' (DK 22 B 93).  This implies imparting signs in forms that require decoding.  In the 
case of the Delphic oracle, it meant cryptic or riddling signs.  In the case of Antisthenes' 
textual analysis, however, it meant signs that may only be comprehended by the astute or 
the appropriately trained.  Unlike interpreting an oracle, which was a matter of luck or 
inspiration, the approach to interpreting medical indications or symptoms was scientific 
and rational.  As per the discussion in chapter 5 section D, Antisthenes' approach was 
similarly scientific and systematic, and made deliberate use of medical terminology.  So in 
this context ἐπισηµαίνεσθαι is best understood in the medical sense 'to show a symptom', 
or in the case of Homer's text, 'to give an indication'. 
Textual issue.  The text of the latter half of the line at TH13c 3 is corrupt.  The sense, 
however, seems clearly to be that Odysseus indicated his reasons for rejecting Calypso.  The 
line in the manuscript (and as printed by Dindorf) reads: δὲ καὶ τὴν παραίτησιν δι᾽ ἣν 
πεποίηται τῆς θεοῦ.  This is untranslatable.  Schrader added τὴν αἰτίαν before τὴν 
παραίτησιν which still produces an unreadable text.   Polak had suggested removing the 
δι᾽, but more recently Di Benede o has suggested retaining the δι᾽ and bringing δι᾽ ἣν 
forward to read: δὲ καὶ δι᾽ ἣν αἰτίαν τὴν παραίτησιν πεποίηται τῆς θεοῦ (1966, 224 n. 2).  
This is a step in the right direction, however the most likely text for this line is as printed 
here, i.e.: δὲ καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν δι᾽ ἣν παραίτησιν πεποίηται τῆς θεοῦ.  Both Schrader's 
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addition of τὴν αἰτίαν, and this suggested sentence structure, seem confirmed by 
comparison with a line from another Porphyry scholion on Il. 23.71, which contains several 
of the principal words in similar order: εἰπὼν δὲ καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν προστίθησι δι᾽ ἣν 
βούλεται ταφῆναι.
 §2  Odysseus doubts Calypso.  Here the first reason is advanced for Odysseus' rejection of 
Calypso's offer of immortality.  This explanation states that Odysseus refused her offer, not 
because he did not wish to become immortal, but because he did not believe Calypso would 
truly supply it.  In this portion of the argument it appears unclear whether Odysseus did 
not believe that she actually had the power to confer immortality, or, if she had the ability, 
whether he doubted her intention to follow through on her promise and grant it.  It seems 
most likely, as the following discussion will reveal, that he held both doubts 
simultaneously.  These are the first of several doubts expressed in these scholia that 
Odysseus held about Calypso and her powers.
Confirming their common origin, a substantial portion of this section of TH13a and TH13b 
are word for word identical.  The willingness of the scholiasts, who were copying from 
Porphyry, to adapt the text in front of them, however, is illustrated more so by the 
differences that have been introduced.  The wording of the first line of each fragment is 
notably different, with even a word retained in common taking quite a different form, i.e. 
the verb πείθω, which appears as ἔπειθε and πεισθῆναι respectively.  Yet another form, 
ἐπείθετο, appears in TH13d 2, whose common source is further attested by the use of 
ἀπιστῶν – compare with TH13a µὴ πιστεῦσαι, οὐκ ἐπίστευ(σ)εν and TH13b οὐχὶ 
πιστεύων.  In TH13d the thought found across the lengthier passages of TH13a and TH13b 
is severely compressed and modified.  TH13c 4-20 in §6 produces a portion of Antisthenes' 
argument not repeated in the other fragments, but still containing a summary at lines 5-6 of 
the idea that Odysseus was unsure of Calypso's claims.
 §3  Odysseus is σοφός. Limitations on granting of immortality.  Here clarification is 
given as to why Odysseus did not believe Calypso.  Because he was σοφός (clever) he knew 
that immortality could not be granted by such goddesses, but only by Zeus, and even then 
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only after congruous deeds (ἔργα) had been performed.  This explanation provides a 
solution from the character of Odysseus – a strategy that is explicitly spelled out in other 
fragments (e.g. TH14d 7-8 λύεται … ἐκ προσώπου 'it is solved from the character').  In his 
discussion in Book 25 of the Poetics, Aristotle discusses techniques for resolving difficult 
texts, including finding a solution from the character.  He says that when assessing 
'whether or not someone has spoken or acted well, one should examine not only whether 
the actual deed or utterance is good or bad, but also the identity of the agent or speaker, to 
whom he acted or spoke, etc' (1461a 3-7 Halliwell's Loeb trans.).  The method of finding a 
solution 'from character' (ἐκ τοῦ προσώπου) was also used by Porphyry (MacPhail 2011, 7). 
Richardson recognises that Antisthenes uses this sort of technique when he says that he 
'anticipates the later λύσις ἐκ προσώπου' (1975, 78).  It seems, however, that Antisthenes 
was actually deploying a fully formed version of this strategy, even if he did not develop 
the precise technical vocabulary found in Porphyry.  
The common source of the fragments is demonstrated by the position of a form of εἰδέναι 
and/or σοφός in a similar position in the text of all four.  These lines are almost identical in 
TH13a and TH13b.  The exception is the inclusion of an explanatory γάρ at TH13a 4 that 
demonstrates a direct link to the preceding passage.  In its compressed style, TH13d merely 
states that the granting of immortality to a human is impossible.
The adjective σοφός was extensively used of Odysseus by Antisthenes (see especially TH12 
15 & 24 and commentary, and cf. commentary on TH9).  The importance of deeds as an 
indication and affirmation of aristocratic character – particularly in contrast to words – is a 
recurring topic in Antisthenes' thought and finds its fullest expression in the speech of his 
Ajax in Ajax & Odysseus (Aj. 1.4, 1.7, 7.1-4, 7.8, 8.2-3, 9.7; and see Kennedy 2011, 29, 41 & 71).
 §4  TH13b 10-13. ἀρετή.  The text of TH13b continues at this point with a shift away from 
Odysseus' doubts and concerns to a commentary regarding excellence and the attainment 
of immortality.  This starts with the overarching statement that 'such things (i.e. deeds that 
confer immortality) should come from ἀρετή (excellence)'.  As noted above, Antisthenes 
somewhere stated that 'excellence is a matter of deeds' (DL 6.11 = DC 70, SSR 134.).  
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Conversely, by not displaying ἀρετή and by enacting unjust deeds – such as accepting the 
goddess' offer and abandoning his family and his home-coming – Odysseus would have 
destroyed his ἀρετή, and lost the immortality of his soul (ψυχή), and his pathway up to the 
gods.  This passage offers further evidence of the programmatic nature of ἀρετή in 
Antisthenes' thought  – it is the key to his ethical agenda (cf. ch.2.ii section E, and §6 below 
on TH13c 4-15, and TH14n 30-1 with commentary at Step 3a §2).264  And the passage also 
shows Antisthenes demonstrating how Homer, in general, can be interpreted as a major 
ethical lesson in ἀρετή.
Di Benedetto thinks he detects the intrusion of the pen of a Christian author in some of the 
later comments from this section (1966, 226 n. 2).  He seems perhaps unconvinced that 
notions such as 'immortality of the soul' and 'pathway to the gods' are Antisthenic.  These 
ideas, however, are well in keeping with Antisthenes' thought found in other fragments.  In 
one of Antisthenes' dialogues Prometheus rebukes Heracles for concerning himself with 
human affairs and not giving his attention to what is 'higher than men' (MD1a-c and 
commentary; cf. MD2).   Antisthenes also said that 'those who desire to be immortal, must 
live piously and justly' (DL 6.5 = DC 75, SSR 176).  Clearly the notion of 'the immortality of 
the soul' is in keeping with these views.  
Plato's celebrated discussions of the immortality of the soul in the Phaedo and book 10 of the 
Republic seem to owe a debt to Antisthenes' ideas expressed here.  As an example, Plato's 
expression that the 'the soul, an immortal thing' (ἀθάνατον ψυχή) 'becomes purified' 
(καθαρὸν γιγνόµενον, Pl. R. 611bc) is highly redolent of Antisthenes' collocation here of 
'the goal of immortality' (τὸ τέλος τῆς ἀθανασίας) and deeds that 'would purify the soul' 
(καθήρειεν ἂν τὴν ψυχήν, 13-15).
TH13b 13-19.  Summary.  Here Antisthenes reiterates the lessons to be taken from 
Odysseus' episode with Calypso.  For the attainment of immortality, actions consistent with 
264 Complete list of ἀρετή fragments: TH6; TH13c; TH14n; MD1-6; DC 14 & 15 = SSR 53 & 54 (Ajax & 
Odysseus); Arist. Pol. 1284a5-17 = DC 100, SSR 68; DL 6.11 = DC 101, SSR 134; DL 6.11 = DC 70, SSR 134; 
Diocles in DL 6.12 = DC 71, SSR 134; Stob. 3.1.28 = DC 93, SSR 125; Diocles in DL 6.12 = DC 72, SSR 134; 
Gnom. Vat. 743 n.12 = DC 86, SSR 104; DL 6.11 = DC 70, SSR 134.
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becoming immortal are required.  This means being just, restrained, and not overly 
attached to this mortal life.  Just as we are about to find out what the goal of immortality is 
'for a man who loves his duty and such deeds as purify the soul … ' the text peters out.  The 
sense of the final portion is perhaps that, by not following these dicta, a man might attain 
other worldly things but 'not the goal of immortality', or alternately, 'not the goal of 
prosperity'.  Antisthenes said that what was 'more blessed/happier (µακαριώτερον) among 
men' was 'to die prosperous/fortunate (εὐτυχῶν)'.265
 §5   Calypso was a lying lover.  Here Antisthenes states that Odysseus knew that people in 
love make false promises.  Thus he implies that Calypso was lying when she promised 
immortality, and he goes on to spell out that it was impossible for her to grant such a 
benefaction without Zeus' say so.  The thought of these lines is replicated (with variations) 
in TH13a, c, and d.  In summary, the three variations are: 
TH13a 'people in love make false promises'; 
TH13c 'people in love tell a lot of lies and promise the impossible'; and 
TH13d 'lovers promise everything'.  
TH13b only preserves the phrase ἐπαγγελίαν ἀθανασίας (promise of immortality) in 
language echoing ἐπαγγέλλονται of TH13c and ἀθανασίας of TH13d.  The preparedness 
of Porphyry and/or the scholiasts to be flexible in adapting Antisthenes' material is further 
evident in the manner in which the thought of TH13a, τοῦτο … ποιεῖν οὐκ ἐδύνατο δίχα 
Διός, 'she was unable to do this without Zeus' consent,' is compressed in TH13c into τὰ 
ἀδύνατα, 'impossible things.'
The idea that lovers willingly tell lies had become a commonplace by the time late 
republican Latin authors were writing.  Most famous perhaps is Catullus' declaration that 
what a woman says to an ardent lover should be written in the wind and fast-flowing water 
(70.3-4).  The most similar thought preserved from the Classical period is a fragment from 
Sophocles that offers a comparable thought on the value of women's words: ὅρκους ἐγὼ 
265 DL 6.5 = DC 164, SSR 177; cf. Solon's advice to Croesus at Hdt. 1.29-32.
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γυναικὸς εἰς ὕδωρ γράφω (TrGF F 811, 'I write the oaths of a woman in water'.266  In this 
case the assertion is just that the 'oaths of women' cannot be trusted, rather than that people 
in love generally tell lies.  So it does not appear that the 'lying lover' cliché, so loved by 
Catullus, was ever articulated prior to Antisthenes doing so here.
 §6  TH13c 4-10. Odysseus unmoved by Calypso's size and beauty.  Calypso prided herself 
on her large size and beauty, and in particular the extent to which she exceeded Penelope in 
both.  Though Odysseus accepted the fact of her physical beauty, it was with the reservation 
that he was not convinced that she was actually 'immortal and ageless' (6-7), i.e. really a 
goddess.  This is an additional doubt of Odysseus' added to the doubt about her ability 
and/or intention to make him immortal (cf. commentary at §2 on TH13a and TH13b).  
Porphyry has obviously compressed an extended justification given by Antisthenes of 
Odysseus' reasons for rejecting Calypso's offer.  It appears that there are now three clearly 
expressed and distinct doubts that Odysseus simultaneously holds in regard to Calypso.  
They are:
1. Is she really a goddess? (§6, TH13c 6-7)
2. Can she really grant immortality? (§3, TH13a 4-6 and TH13b 8-10)
3. If she can grant immortality, will she grant it? (§2, TH13a 2-4 and TH13b 5-7).
In other words, Odysseus being πολύτροπος (many-mannered) and a consummate 
schemer and swindler himself, suspects Calypso (and everyone else) of being the same as 
himself.  These multiple doubts themselves, simultaneously whirring around Odysseus' 
polytropic mind, are a further direct characterisation of his many-mannered nature.
ἐπεσημήνατο.  Step 2 of the Antisthenic methodology.  Locate a σημεῖον (indication) of 
the solution.  Odysseus goes on to 'indicate' (cf. commentary at §1) that if Penelope had 
only her body and beauty to offer he would ignore her too – but he wants to return to her 
because she is περίφρων (prudent).  Thus the σηµεῖον, or indication, is that Penelope is 
περίφρων, which remains the focus of most of the remainder of this fragment.
266 Noted by Fordyce 1973, 362.
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Evidence of dialogue. In TH13c, the use of µὲν γάρ (4) followed by a µέν (5) and a further 
µὲν γάρ (6) without an answering δέ is peculiar and perhaps unparalleled.  There does not 
appear to be a corresponding example in Denniston.  The best grammatical explanation is 
that the µέν clause is answering to a preceding δέ clause, i.e. in this case ἐπισηµαίνεται δέ 
(2-3).267  The repeated use of µέν seems to signal that the same adversative, contrasting 
thought is being continued,268 until the original thought of the δέ clause is subsequently 
resumed by use of another form of the same verb, i.e. ἐπεσηµήνατο (8).  This free use of 
grammatical structure seems typical of someone speaking in a conversation.  In the middle 
of expressing an explanation he interrupts himself mid-thought to provide a piece of 
information needed to clarify what he wants to say next, before returning to continue with 
his original thought.  This, of course, is highly suggestive of oral discourse and offers 
further evidence that this fragment originally formed part of a dialogue.
TH13c 10-12. περίφρων = ἀρετή.  Step 3 of the Antisthenic methodology.  Reinforce this 
reading with other Homeric passages.  The example of the suitors pursuing Penelope is 
adduced by Antisthenes as confirmation of Homer's meaning.  Just as Odysseus could have 
chosen the goddess, but sought Penelope instead due to her being περίφρων (prudent), the 
suitors similarly claim that they could have fittingly wed other women, but sought 
Penelope instead due to her ἀρετή (excellence).  The implication is, that περίφρων is a 
component of ἀρετή.  Antisthenes' choice of this quote to make his point is yet another 
example of the programmatic place of ἀρετή in his ethics (cf. references in §4 above).
Here Antisthenes is explaining Homer by Homer, that is, he is explaining one passage of 
Homer under discussion (Odysseus' rejection of Calypso and desire for Penelope) by way 
of another separate passage of Homer (the suitors' rejection of other women and desire for 
Penelope).  This was an approach to explicating Homer that became much admired and 
imitated in later centuries (see full discussion in ch. 5 section B).  
267 Cf. GP2, 377-8, esp. Pl. Alc. I 130c also with µὲν γάρ.
268 Cf. GP2, 384, examples mostly from Platonic dialogue and oratory.
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TH13c 13-20. Summary.  Reinforcing his philological method, Antisthenes then 
recapitulates the arguments of Calypso and Odysseus using their own (slightly modified) 
lines from the Odyssey.  After the repeated lines of Calypso, Antisthenes notes that she 
emphasises only her physical attributes.  Following the lines from Odysseus, Antisthenes 
comments that the expression 'prudent Penelope' holds a 'suggestion or indication' 
(ἔµφασις) that Odysseus prefers her because of a desire for her – i.e. reiterating that he 
desired her for being περίφρων, in the same way the suitors desired her for her ἀρετή.  
ἔμφασις. The use of the word ἔµφασις (15) is notable.  It has the meaning 'suggestion', 
'hint', or 'indication' and appears to have been an important technical word for Antisthenes' 
method of literary criticism (cf. TH14e 3 and commentary thereon at Step 2a §8).  As with 
the use of ἐπισηµαίνεσθαι (cf. ἐπεσηµήνατο in §1 above, and ch. 5.ii section D), ἔµφασις 
has the sense of conveying information that is not necessarily obvious, but is available to 
those who understand how to read the 'indications' in the text.269  So Antisthenes is 
revealing here what the text actually indicates to an astute reader.  The same idiom, 
ἔµφασιν ἔχειν + gen., meaning 'holds an indication or suggestion of' is found in Demetrius, 
De Elocutione 57.
 §7  νόστος.  Finally, this scholion reveals that the reason Odysseus told the story in this 
way was because his νόστος (home-coming) was his number one priority and he wanted to 
persuade Alcinoös and the Phaeacians of this in order to be sent on his way more quickly.  
So Odysseus told this story to the Phaeacians, in the manner he did, with the goal of 
impressing upon them what an extraordinary opportunity he had turned down (an 
immortal life with a goddess), in the hope of enlisting their aid in facilitating his home-
coming.270  
Showing further examples of scholiastic compression, in TH13a 8-9 it is only cryptically 
stated that Odysseus 'spoke in this way', and at TH13b 1-2 that he 'told these things'.  The 
text in TH13d, however, makes it clear that Odysseus actually lied to the Phaeacians in 
269 See further Van Ophijsen 1993, 761-2.
270 Cf. Di Benedetto 1966, 227.
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order to convince them.  There it is reported that Odysseus knew lovers make a lot of (false) 
promises and that it was impossible for him to be granted immortality (2-3).  It is then 
explicitly stated  that Odysseus did not tell the Phaeacians that he did not believe Calypso 
(i.e. his real reasons for rejecting her offer), but instead told them that he spurned 
immortality due to his longing for home (3-4).  Thus his actions in this situation were 
motivated purely by expediency (cf. very similar comments by Megaclides on Odysseus' 
motivations in this situation at Ath. 513bc).271
This tendency to say whatever was most expedient, whether true or not, is typical of 
Antisthenes' Odysseus.  It is characteristic of his πολυτροπία (many-manneredness); see 
especially commentary on TH12) and is most completely elucidated in his willing 
admission of his preparedness to do or say whatever it takes to achieve his objectives in the 
Ajax & Odysseus (Appendix A, Od.4.3-4; cf. Kennedy 2011, 40 & 56).
In TH13d this also shows that the character (5, ἦθος) Odysseus strove to convince the 
Phaeacians of was in fact a façade.  The word ἦθος clearly had a special importance for 
Antisthenes in his discussions of character, for further examples of its use in relation to 
Odysseus see TH12 9, 16 & 17.  Likewise notable here is Antisthenes' use of σύστασις 
(structure or constitution), which he also uses at TH12 33 in a context of medical diagnosis.  
Thus the revelation of the 'constitution of his character' offers additional evidence in 
support of the idea that Antisthenes' approach was modelled on a medical methodology (cf. 
commentary on §1 and ch. 5 section D).
271 Noted by Di Benedetto 1966, 226 n.1.
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Cyclopes   TH14a-o
Manuscripts
Sch. T = codex Hamburgensis 56 (13-14th century).
Sch. H = codex British Museum Harleianus 5674.
Sch. Vd = codex Vindobensis Philos. Gr. 133.
Sch. M = codex Venetus Bibliothecae Marcianae 613.
Autograph MSS of Eustathius: 
Venetus Marcianus graecus (Marc. gr.) 460, in Biblioteca Marciana, Venice.
Parisinus graecus (Par. gr.) 2702, in Bibliothèque National de France, Paris.
Introduction
Possibly this work was catalogued by Diogenes Laertius under Κύκλωψ ἢ περὶ Ὀδυσσέως, 
'The Cyclops, or, Concerning Odysseus' (6.17), along with TH12.  The fragments printed 
here as TH14a-e, and TH14k, were printed as a continuous text by Schrader because they 
contain overlapping information.  Originally, however, they were found in several different 
scholia to several different passages of the Odyssey in several different manuscripts.  A 
number of variant readings to these scholia were printed by Schrader as footnotes, or 
appeared in full only in the earlier edition by Dindorf.  Several of them, however, contain 
important additional text or alternative readings so these have been printed here as 
fragments TH14f-j, and TH14l.  Furthermore, two entries from the Lexicon Homericum of 
Apollonius Sophistes preserve comments ascribed to Aristarchus about the Cyclopes that 
are almost identical to the Porphyry scholia and clearly derive from the same source, viz. 
Antisthenes.  They are printed here as TH14m and TH14n.  Finally, an extensive discussion 
of the Cyclopes from Eustathius also closely parallels the thought of Antisthenes, as well as 
adding useful details not found in the other sources, and it is printed here as TH14o.
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Attribution – extent of the scholia attributable to Antisthenes
In these Cyclopes scholia Antisthenes' name only appears once, at line 6 of TH14a (Table 2 
§4).  The contents of the scholia, however, form an overall argument that is internally 
consistent, consistent with Antisthenes' views and methodology from other fragments (i.e. 
TH12, TH13a-d), and expands the argument directly attributed to Antisthenes here – i.e. 
that Polyphemus, who was unjust and wicked, should be considered distinct and separate 
from the other Cyclopes, who were just and good.  Antisthenes is also the only name 
mentioned in the scholia272 and there is a very good case to be made that all these fragments 
should be attributed to him.
As stated above, Schrader had printed the fragments numbered here as TH14a-e and 
TH14k as a continuous text, believing that they formed part of a coherent argument (1890, 
177-8).  By way of an extended analysis of the text, Di Benedetto has more recently made a 
strong case for the Antisthenic nature of the whole argument (1966, 208-23).  In particular, 
Di Benedetto notes (1966, 211-2) that when Antisthenes made his broad statement at TH14a 
6-8 (commentary Step 2d §4) that only Polyphemus was unjust, but the rest of the Cyclopes 
were just, he must have been aware of the need to explain or justify the ethically 
problematic statements about the Cyclopes at Od. 9.106 (that the Cyclopes were hyperphialoi  
and athemistoi and yet received great blessings from the gods) and Od. 9.275-276 (that they 
paid no heed to Zeus or the other gods).  Providing an explanation for those verses is 
exactly what the portion of the scholia preceding the mention of Antisthenes' name does, 
and in a manner that is completely consistent with the rest of Antisthenes' argument here, 
and also with the same style of argument he uses in the other Homeric scholia – especially 
the tendency to pose a problem within the text and then explain Homer by using Homer 
(cf. ch. 5 section B).  There is also further evidence, newly discussed in this commentary, 
that seems to conclusively demonstrate that the all of the fragments are originally from one 
text of Antisthenes'.
272 Though, as noted above, Aristarchus is mentioned in a lexical entry.
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TH14a.  Links between the text of TH14a and Hesiod's Works and Days seem to clearly 
demonstrate that the entirety of the text is the work of one author, viz. Antisthenes.  At line 
2 the Cyclopes are said to receive 'unstinting' (ἄφθονα) blessings from the gods, and at line 
9 the earth is said to yield everything for the Cyclopes 'of her own accord' (αὐτοµάτως).  
This last statement is in the portion of the fragment securely attributed to Antisthenes, and 
is a considerably compressed and paraphrastic version of the actual text of Odyssey 9.107-11 
to which it refers.  Antisthenes here is drawing a comparison between the Cyclopes and the 
men of Hesiod's 'Golden Race',273 for whom the field bore crops 'of its own accord' 
(αὐτοµάτη) and 'unstinting' (ἄφθονον, Op. 118; see further commentary at Step 1 §1 and 
Step 3d §4).  The common Hesiod reference is a strong indication of the unity of the unity of 
the text and thus demonstrating that Antisthenes is the common source of the material 
above and below his name.
TH14b also includes this same use of αὐτοµάτως (13) in a sentence that starts: 'So he says 
(ὥστε … λέγει) that Polyphemus alone is arrogant and unjust' (11).  By comparison with 
the identical language of TH14a 6 the 'he' referred to here is certainly Antisthenes.  That the 
content of the portion of TH14b preceding this (7-9) is also from Antisthenes is further 
confirmed by the use of an additional, extended quote from Hesiod's Works and Days (277-
9).  At line 6 it has the imperative expression σκοπείτω τὸ πρόσωπον (consider the 
character), a line of argument that Antisthenes regularly favours (e.g. for the same style of 
argument see TH13a-d and commentary §3).
TH14c refers to 'such great gifts given by the gods' (τοιαῦτα ἐκ θεῶν δεδωρῆσθαι, 2) 
without specifying what these gifts are.  It assumes, therefore, the Hesiodic unstinting 
provision for the Cyclopes spelled out by Antisthenes in TH14a and TH14b.  The 'such 
great gifts' line is introduced by 'because he says' (ὡς αὐτὸς λέγει), referring back to an 
already mentioned speaker.  This 'he' must be Antisthenes, and the 'they' (of φασί, 7) 
further on are presumably the Antisthenians,274 who in fact go on to quote an extended 
273 West 1978, 177: '[T]he Romans made the Golden race into a Golden time or age (tempus, saecula, aetas)'.
274 I.e. Antisthenes' students or followers of his teachings; cf. οἱ Ἀντισθενέιοι Arist.  Met. 1043b = DC 44A, 
SSR 150; Alexander of Aphrodisias similarly applies 'Antisthenians' to Antisthenes' followers (On Arist. 
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version of the Odyssey passage (9.112-5) that is referred to by Antisthenes in TH14a 5.  It 
uses as proof a passage referencing the suitors (4-6) whom, along with the Phaeacians, 
Antisthenes tends to include in his discussions (cf. TH13c 10-12 & commentary at §6).
TH14d includes the technical terms ἐναντίωµα (5) and ἐναντία (11) which are particularly 
Socratic and Antisthenic (see commentary at Step 2c §6).  The strategy of λύεται εκ 
προσώπου ('it is solved from the character', 7-8) is one Antisthenes has favoured elsewhere, 
e.g. TH13a-d & commentary §3).
TH14e discusses the Cyclopes' reluctance to intrude upon each other.  In TH14k 5-6 this 
same argument is linked to the securely Antisthenic statement that Polyphemus alone is 
unjust (TH14k 3; cf. TH14a 6-7).  It also contains a reference to the same passage of the 
Odyssey (9.115) as TH14a, and the complete Antisthenic three-step methodology is evident 
in the fragment in the same fashion as elsewhere in the TH13 and TH14 groups of 
fragments.
TH14f is inextricably linked by the line of argument in its content to TH14e, including 
containing specific common vocabulary (δικαιοσύνη).
TH14g-h overlap in content with the securely Antisthenic TH14b.
TH14i overlaps in its content completely with TH14a.
TH14j is a succinct version of TH14b.
TH14k has the securely Antisthenic 'Polyphemus alone was unjust' (3; cf. TH14a 6-7).  It 
also has φασί (they say, 1), the 'they' most reasonably being the Antisthenians, particularly 
when the fragment continues with further passages that elaborate on and compliment the 
demonstration of the Cyclopes justness in TH14a (commentary at Step 2d §4 & Step 3d §4).
TH14l has the Antisthenic 'Cyclopes apart from Polyphemus' = 'Polyphemus alone' idea (1-
2; cf. TH14a 6-7), and references the same suitors passage as TH14c.
Met. 1043b = DC 44B, SSR 150).
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TH14n-m.  Two further texts from Apollonius Sophistes' Lexicon Homericum have been 
included here as fragments of Antisthenes.  In Apollonius there is an attribution in one of 
them to Aristarchus.  It is clear, however, that Aristarchus was drawing directly on the prior 
work of Antisthenes, and he reports a couple of important additional details not found in 
the related scholia.  The first, printed here as TH14m is the Lexicon Homericum entry for 
ἀθεµίστων.  This passage contains the securely Antisthenic statement that the Cyclopes are 
just, except for Polyphemus (cf. TH14a 6-8, Table 2 §4).  The remainder of the text 
incorporates arguments directly mirroring other portions of the various TH14 scholia (cf. 
above the TH14 Comparison of Fragments Table).  The second, printed as TH14n is the 
Lexicon Homericum entry for ὑπερφίαλοι.  Though it does not mention Aristarchus, this 
passage is inextricably linked by its content and style to the first passage.  It once again 
contains the Antisthenic notion that only Polyphemus was unjust, but the other Cyclopes 
were just.  This statement occurs directly after a reference to the suitors which contains 
wording closely reflecting the related passage from TH14c:
Lex. Hom: οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἑαυτοὺς κακῶς ἔλεγον
TH14c 4-5: οὐ γὰρ οἱ µνηστῆρες καθ᾽ ἑαυτῶν ἔλεγον ἄν
This similar phrasing further confirms the common origin of these lines. 
TH14o.  The last of this group of fragments is a passage from Eustathius.  It does not name 
Antisthenes, but like the entries from the Lexicon Homericum it contains Antisthenic material 
from the scholia as well as additional valuable material.  Similar to the Antisthenic assertion 
that except for Polyphemus the rest of the Cyclopes were just (TH14a 6-8, Step 2d §4), this 
text contains the statement (22-3) that the rest of the Cyclopes (i.e. other than Polyphemus), 
were god-reverencing – noting in addition the habit wicked people have of accusing good 
people along with themselves.  It also offers as proof of the justness of the Cyclopes the fact 
that the earth puts forth crops for them spontaneously (6, Step 3d §4) mirroring 
Antisthenes' application of Golden Race imagery to the Cyclopes (TH14a 8-9, Step 3d §4).  
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Then it explains the reason for the Phaeacians departing by combining the language used 
by Antisthenes in two other scholia (Step 2 §9):
TH14i 3-4: ἐλύπουν δίκαιοι ὄντες;  διὰ τὸ ἀνόµοιον τῆς πολιτείας.
TH14a 13: ἐγένετο δὲ διὰ τὸ ἀνόµοιον τῆς πολιτείας.
Eustath. 17-8: δίκαιοι ὄντες ἐλύπουν … διὰ τὸ τῆς πολιτείας φασὶν ἀνόµοιον ἐγίνετο.
Eustathius was clearly copying directly from Antisthenes (or someone reporting 
Antisthenes) here, and the 'they' of φασίν (they say) must be either the Antisthenians or 
commentators in the Antisthenic tradition.  There are numerous other direct comparisons of 
the language and content of Eustathius throughout the remainder of the Porphyrian scholia 
demonstrated in the Table 2 – TH14 Comparison of Fragments and the commentary.
Evidence of dialogue
TH14a.  The opening lines have the form of a rhetorical question, πῶς … εἰπών; 'How 
could he say?' (1-2), seeming to sum up a questioner's objections before providing an 
answer (2-6).  Another question adds to the sense of a speaker engaging with an 
interlocutor: οὐκοῦν οἱ λοιποὶ δίκαιοι; 'So are not the rest (of the Cyclopes) just? (7-8).  The 
remainder of the fragment appears to be an actual piece of dialogue, albeit in severely 
compressed form (9-13) and TH14i contains a question πῶς (3-4) and answer (4) that 
appears to reflect a syncopated version of the same dialogue.
TH14b.  There are two questions, one after another starting εἰ γὰρ and εἰ δ᾽ (3-6), and both 
containing πῶς, that look like extracts from dialogue.  The second one, in particular, is 
answered by an imperative σκοπείτω suggesting a speaker responding to an interlocutor.  
This imperative, appearing as it does in the third person, is apparently an adjustment made 
in the process of transmission since the same portion of dialogue in TH14j preserves the 
second person imperative σκόπει (2-3) as if directly quoted from dialogue.
TH14e.  The fragment starts with an objection from a questioner about the Cyclopes (1-2) 
which is then answered by another speaker defending them (3-6).
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Ordering of the fragments
The order in which the problems were discussed in the actual dialogue cannot be known 
with any confidence.  They have been arranged here in what seems a logical sequence, and 
one that adheres where possible to the order of the material as presented in fragment 
TH14a (which names Antisthenes).  Naturally, it is more than likely that the various aspects 
of the argument were woven quite differently in their original form, and that being turned 
into extracts first by Porphyry and then by the scholiasts has given them their current 
shape.
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TH14 Summary of Problems Schema
 PROBLEM 1    Cyclopes are hyperphialoi and athemistoi.
 Step 1  §1    If Cyclopes are hyperphialoi and athemistoi then why are they blessed by the 
gods?
 Step 2a  §2    Hyperphialoi is δίσηµος (double-meaning), and here is an indication of 
greatness (of physique) rather than a term of disapproval.
 Step 3a  §2    The suitors use hyperphialoi of themselves, so it cannot be 
negative.
 Step 2b  §3    Athemistoi means 'unlawful' in the sense that they were not subject to, or 
did not use, laws in common.
 Step 3b  §3    'Each Cyclops lays down themis (law)', for his own household.
 Step 2c  §3    Athemistoi is διττός (double-meaning) – i.e. a man who knows themis but
does not practice it, or a man who has no experience of themis.
 Step 3c  §3    Where there is no themis in common there are naturally no 
'counselling assemblies.'
 Step 2d  §4    Polyphemus alone is unjust, the other Cyclopes are just.
 Step 3d  §4    Cyclopes 'trust in the gods' and the earth yields everything for them 
αὐτοµάτως (of her own accord).
 PROBLEM 2    Polyphemus speaks impiously but the other Cyclopes speak piously.  
 Step 1  §5    Polyphemus says they do not heed Zeus, but the other Cyclopes fear Zeus 
and advise prayer.
 Step 2a  §5    Polyphemus lied, maligning the other Cyclopes with his personal 
impiety.
 Step 2b  §6    Consider the character of the person speaking who said these things, it 
is Polyphemus the savage flesh-eater.
 Step 2c  §6    It is solved again by the character of the person speaking who has the 
most foolish arguments, in this case, Polyphemus.
 Step 3  §7    Polyphemus is not like the rest of the Cyclopes but is a shepherd 
living apart and roaming far away from the others.
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 PROBLEM 3 : The Cyclopes do not heed each other.
 Step 1  §8    The Cyclopes appear unjust and transgressive by not heeding each other.
 Step 2a  §8    Not 'heeding' one another means they are so just and unenvious that 
they mind their own business.
 Step 3a  §8    The Cyclopes' justness is proved by their coming together in answer 
to Polyphemus' shouting.
 Step 2b  §8    Not heeding one another means they are not subject to one another.
 Step 3b  §8    Each Cyclops is his own ruler.
 PROBLEM 4    The Cyclopes were violent and harried the Phaeacians.
 Step 1  §9    The Cyclopes continually plundered and harmed the Phaeacians, who were 
forced to emigrate.
 Step 2  §9    The Phaeacians and Cyclopes did not get along because of the 
dissimilarity of their polities.
 Step 3  §9    The Cyclopes' behaviour was normal.  The Phaeacians also acted 
violently, e.g. towards the Giants.
The preceding schema presents the problems found in fragments TH14a-o by the steps of 
the Antisthenic methodology described in Chapter 5 section B (a summary of which 
appears below) and by the order in the TH14 Comparison of Fragments Table (table 
section numbers indicated by §).   The commentary follows the structure of the TH14 
Summary of Problems Schema.
Summary of the Antisthenic Methodology
Step 1. Problematise the literal meaning of the text.  Identify an inconsistency, 
generally of an ethical nature.  
Step 2. Locate a σηµεῖον (indication) of one or more solutions in the text that can 
be read to give the text consistency.  
Step 3. Reinforce this reading with other Homeric passages, i.e. 'clarify Homer by 
Homer' (Ὃµηρον ἐξ Ὁµήρου σαφηνίζειν). 
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Commentary
PROBLEM 1    Cyclopes are hyperphialoi and athemistoi.
Step 1  §1    If Cyclopes are hyperphialoi and athemistoi then why are they blessed by 
the gods? (Problematise the text).
In TH14a the problem is posed, in the style of a rhetorical question, as to how Odysseus 
could call the Cyclopes hyperphialoi (imperious) and athemistoi (unrighteous) and paranomoi 
(transgressive), but also admit that the Cyclopes receive 'unstinting blessings from the gods' 
(2).  There appears to be an ethical contradiction in the text.  The rhetorical nature of the 
question suggests that this is a speaker in a dialogue defending the Cyclopes and summing 
up a questioner's objections before giving his response.
TH14c similarly notes the inappropriateness of thinking that 'such great gifts' would be 
given to unrighteous beings.  In this fragment there is an author understood from the αὐτὸς 
λέγει (he says, 2), and this must be Antisthenes and, likewise, the they of φασί (they say, 7) 
is, by extension, the Antisthenians (cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias in Arist. Metaph. 1043b23 
DC 44b, SSR 150 where he refers to Antisthenes and the Antisthenians alternately in a 
similar fashion – i.e. εἶπε, 'he said', and λέγουσι, 'they say').  The use of the demonstrative 
pronoun τοιαῦτα makes it clear that there was preceding text describing what 'such great 
gifts' must be referring to, these gifts obviously being the fact that the earth gave the 
Cyclopes everything of her own accord (TH14a 9 cf. Step 3d §4).  
It is clear that Antisthenes had the men of the Golden Race in mind when he wrote 
'unstinting blessings' (ἄφθονα ... ἀγαθά, 2), as Hesiod describes the fields producing 
'unstinting' (ἄφθονον, Op. 118) crops for men of that era and possessing every 'blessing' 
(ἐσθλά, Op. 116; equating to 'everything needed for prosperity,' West 1978, ad loc.).  This 
language is not used by Homer.  Plato similarly uses this Hesiodic vocabulary describing 
the 'unstinting crops' (καρποὺς ἀφθόνους Plt. 272a) provided for the men of the 'Age of 
Cronus', i.e. the Golden Race.  As discussed below, in Step 3d §4, Antisthenes uses another 
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word, αὐτοµάτως (TH14a 9) from the same phrase of Hesiod (Op. 118, αὐτοµάτη), to 
paraphrase five Homeric lines (Od. 107-11).  
 Step 2a  §2    Hyperphialoi is δίσημος (double-meaning), and here is an indication of 
greatness (of physique) rather than a term of disapproval.  (Locate a 
σηµεῖον).
In TH14b 1 and TH14o 29-30 we find Antisthenes' very interesting employment of the 
curious term δίσηµος, 'double-meaning'.  Etymologically, this word contains the same root, 
-σηµ-, as σηµεῖον, σηµαίνειν, ἐπισηµαίνεσθαι, words which Antisthenes was also fond of 
using (cf. ch. 5 section D).  In later times the term δίσηµος (LSJ s.v.) was generally used in 
discussions of music and rhythm to mean 'of two times', 'of four times' or 'of two time 
units'.  Aristoxenus, for example, uses it with this sense several times in his Elementa 
rhythmica, and there are quite a few similar uses by Hellenistic and later authors.  The 
employment of it in the fragments here by Antisthenes, however, make up two of only three 
extant examples of usage referring to 'double-meaning'.  The third example is also from 
Eustathius' commentary (on Odyssey 19.27-8 Stallbaum 2.188.19): 
'χοῖνιξ' δὲ νῦν ἡ τροφή. δίσηµος γὰρ ἡ λέξις, ἐπί τε σκεύους τοῦ µετροῦντος καὶ τοῦ 
µετρουµένου πράγµατος. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὁ µέδιµνος καὶ τὸ τάλαντον καὶ ὁ ξέστης καὶ ἕτερα 
πολλά. 
'Choinix' now means the food.  For the expression is double-meaning, relating both to a vessel for 
measuring and the thing being measured. Thus also is the case for the medimnos the talent the 
xestes and many others.
Another term διττός, is used with a similar sense of 'double-meaning', is found at TH14o 34 
(discussed in the next section of commentary Step 2c §3).
In TH14b there is no indication in the text as to precisely what the 'double-meaning' might 
be referring to.  This has led previous editors of Porphyry to punctuate the text so that the 
phrase 'τῶν δισήµων γὰρ ἡ λέξις' was associated with the following sentence starting with 
'ἀθεµίστων.'  Fortunately, the use of δίσηµος at TH14o 35 makes it clear that the term is 
actually referring to the preceding 'ὑπερφιάλων', because it states that hyperphialoi does not 
seem to be used here as a term of disapproval (making it clear that this was often, or even 
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usually, the case), but in this instance it is referring to the natural greatness (µεγαλοφυές, 
37) of the Cyclopes.  Thus Antisthenes is able to show that there is an ethical solution in the 
immediate text to the problem posed (i.e. the Cyclopes being referred to as hyperphialoi).
TH14c states that 'it is solved from the expression' (λύεται τῇ λέξει; cf. the Antisthenes title 
περὶ λέξεως ἢ περὶ χαρακτήρων, DL 6.15, discussed in ch. 3 section C).  Antisthenes again 
seems to be utilising a problems solving technique that later became standard practice.  In 
his discussion in Poetics 25, Aristotle stated: 'Some problems should be resolved by 
reference to diction' (τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν ὁρῶντα δεῖ διαλύειν, 1461a 9 Halliwell trans.).  
MacPhail records the solution from diction (λύεται δ ἐκ τῆς λέξεως) as being standard 
strategy for Porphyry (2011, 7).
The expression, that they were hyperphialoi, or 'imperious', was purely a function of their 
overbearing physical size.  Three of the fragments make specific mention of the Cyclopes' 
body (σῶµα) and its 'superiority' (ὑπεροχή, TH14a) or 'natural greatness' (µεγαλοφυής, 
TH14b, TH14o).  Di Benedetto suggests that the use of the rare adjective µεγαλοφυής in 
this case is from a desire to use a word with the root φύω that is also found in ὑπερφίαλος 
(1966, 210).  TH14c and TH14i use the adjective µέγας (great, big).  The slightly peculiar 
expression in TH14i – ὑπερφιάλων νῦν µεγάλων – seemingly means that in 'current 
usage' the latter adjective is equivalent to the earlier usage of the former (see Eustathius' 
similar use in his discussion about the Choinix just above in this section).  TH14c contains 
the additional point that hyperphialoi is applied to those who are 'superior' or 'more 
powerful' (κρείττων) – so here it is a positive, rather than negative, attribute.
Step 3a  §2    The suitors use hyperphialoi of themselves, so it cannot be negative. 
(Reinforce this reading using Homer).
In three of the fragments (TH14c, TH14n, TH14o), the text proves that this positive reading 
of hyperphialoi in the Cyclopes passage of Homer is accurate by using another passage of 
Homer.  As Antisthenes did in TH13c (10-12, §6), here he adduces a passage concerning the 
suitors to prove his point.  He notes that the suitors referred to themselves as the 
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hyperphialoi which they would not have done if it were not a positive attribute – 'since they 
would not have spoken ill of themselves' (TH14n 32).  In TH14n Antisthenes makes the 
additional point that hyperphialoi is used of men who are 'surpassing in terms of excellence' 
(οἱ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν διαφέροντες, 30-1), thus o ering yet more evidence of the thematic nature 
of ἀρετή throughout his work (cf. ch. 2.ii section E).
 Step 2b  §3    Athemistoi means 'unlawful' in the sense that they were not subject to, or 
did not use, laws in common. (Locate a σηµεῖον).
Having dealt with hyperphialoi, Antisthenes now moves on to deal with athemistoi by 
employing the same methodology.  Common to nine of the ten scholia in this section 
(excluding only TH14k) is the statement that the Cyclopes were athemistoi, 'unrighteous or 
unlawful', only in so far as they were not subject to 'laws' (TH14a, b, j), or not subject to 
'laws in common' (TH13c, m, n, o), or did not need 'laws' (TH14i, l).  In eight instances, the 
word 'law' is provided by νόµος, though TH14c differs by using θεσµός, and TH14l by 
using both θέµις and νόµος.  TH14a is more precise in stating that they were not subject to 
'written laws' (νόµῳ ἐγγράφῳ).   Note also the use of the technical term σηµεῖον at TH14a 6 
confirming that this 'indication' is the correct ethical solution found in the text to resolve the 
apparent puzzle of the Cyclopes' 'lawlessness'.  
In TH14o this statement is actually phrased three ways in three separate passages: 14 τὸ µὴ 
κοινωνικῶς ἔχειν, 'not holding (laws) in common'; 20 διὰ τὸ µὴ νόµους ἔχειν κοινούς, 
'because they did not use common laws'; and 39 µήτε νόµους µήτε ἔθη κοινὰ ἐχόντων, 
'having neither laws nor character in common'.  Furthermore, it is elaborated in TH14o that 
athemistoi means 'not publicly laying down laws formed by common counsel or discussion, 
but each for his own household' (14-15), and later 'nor did they strive after profit in 
common, because they did not have a government in common, but, as stated, they were 
household-rulers' (οἰκοκρατεῖσθαι, 40-41). 
οἰκοκρατεῖσθαι. The word, οἰκοκρατεῖσθαι, used for 'to be a household-ruler', is a 
fascinating hapax legomenon.  It seems correctly stated by Di Benedetto (1966, 223) that this 
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word should not be attributed to the inventiveness of Eustathius, as his contribution to the 
discussion of the Cyclopes was to compare them to the Anchorites of his own day (cf. 
TH14o 46-52).  It seems, therefore, that this neologism should be considered a piece of the 
text that has been preserved in its original form, and thus should be credited to Antisthenes. 
Antisthenes' apparent fondness for compound words including -κρατεῖσθαι is seen again 
in his use of θαλαττοκρατεῖσθαι, 'to be a ruler of the sea' or 'to be mastered by the sea' 
(ED6 34 and commentary).  
Step 3b  §3    'Each Cyclops lays down themis (law)', for his own household. 
(Reinforce this reading using Homer).
In seven of the nine scholia in this section (TH14a-c, i, k, m & o), a passage of Homer is 
brought to bear to prove that the ethical reading of the text is accurate.  In this case another 
passage specifically referring to the Cyclopes is used, which states that each Cyclops 
θεµιστεύει – 'lays down the themis (law)' – for his own household (Od. 9.115).  Thus, 'while 
they were athemistoi they were also themis givers' (TH14o 18).  Both TH14c 9-12 and TH14o 
11-13 provide an extended quote from the same Odyssey passage that includes the fact that 
the Cyclopes do not have public assemblies nor established laws (themistes) and live on 
mountain peaks in caves (Od. 9.112-5).  Antisthenes appears to have instigated a trend for 
utilising this passage of the Odyssey for explaining certain forms of political governance.  
When Plato discusses the form of government known as 'lordship' (δυναστεία), which he 
says is common up to his day among Greeks and foreigners, he mentions that Homer knew 
of this system as well, and cites Od. 9.112-5 in full (Lg. 680b-c).  Aristotle, similarly, when 
discussing the style of rule where the eldest member of the family governs the household, 
quotes Od. 9.114-5 (Pol. 1252b20), and he does so a second time in an ethical discussion (NE 
1180a28-9).
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 Step 2c  §3    Athemistoi is διττός (double-meaning) – i.e. a man who knows themis but
does not practice it, or a man who has no experience of themis. (Locate a 
σηµεῖον).
Another 'indication' of the solution to the ethical problem is provided in TH14o at line 41, 
where it is noted that athemistos is διττός (double-meaning).  The use of διττός here being 
synonymous with δίσηµος discussed in Step 2a §2, above.  It is then explained (41-3) that 
these two meanings of athemistos (unrighteous) are: a man who knows 'right' but does not 
practice it (therefore effectively being an unjust man); and a man who is unrighteous only 
through having no knowledge or experience of 'right' – the Cyclopes fitting the latter 
category.  That this σηµεῖον, or indication, is correct is confirmed a couple of lines further 
on when it is stated that 'It is clear that a later person being called athemistos signifies 
(σηµαίνει) something other than the Homeric athemistos here.'  A similar contrast between 
later usage and the historical, Homeric meaning is also made a few lines earlier (38-9): 
'Thus also athemistoi does not imply hubris as it does now, but it is an historical meaning.'  
The idea that athemistos (unrighteous), and adikos (unjust) could sometimes almost be 
synonyms (though not in this case) also appears at TH14l 3 (Table 2 §4) where it is stated 
that 'he says they are athemistoi (unrighteous), not because they are adikoi (unjust).'  A 
comparable juxtaposition occurs at TH14b 3-4 (Step 1 §5 below).
 Step 3c  §3    Where there is no themis in common there are naturally no 'counselling 
assemblies'.  (Reinforce this reading using Homer). 
TH14o 36 uses a portion of the same Odyssey passage as Step 3b §3 above to reinforce the 
'double-meaning' reading, noting that where there is no themis there are quite rightly no 
'counselling assemblies' (Od. 9.112), as such assemblies are dependent upon themis.  TH14c 
also contains this idea, with the additional clarification that 'not being subject to thesmoi 
(laws) in common, they have no counselling assemblies.
283
 Step 2d  §4    Polyphemus alone is unjust, the other Cyclopes are just. (Locate a 
σηµεῖον).
Here Antisthenes offers another solution to the problem of the Cyclopes being called 
hyperphialoi and athemistoi and yet receiving blessings from the gods.  TH14a reads: 
'Antisthenes says: Polyphemus alone is unjust, and indeed he is truly contemptuous of 
Zeus.  So are not the rest (of the Cyclopes) just?'  Of the other fourteen fragments in the 
TH14 group, seven of them include this same fact – that the Cyclopes apart from 
Polyphemus are just.  This is one of the clinching pieces of evidence that all of the material 
discussing the Cyclopes in these fragments is derived originally from a dialogue of 
Antisthenes.  Notably, TH14b introduces the statement 'Polyphemus is unjust' with the 
words 'So he says', he clearly pointing to an antecedent speaker whom we know to be 
Antisthenes from TH14a.  The text of TH14b adds that Polyphemus is 'arrogant', in 
addition to being 'unjust' (11). 
There are a couple of other variations in the language and presentation of the fragments 
worthy of note.  In TH14l the rest of the Cyclopes are described as 'noble' or 'good' 
(ἀγαθοί) instead of 'just', and Polyphemus is described as 'their leader' (ἡγεµὼν αὐτῶν, 1-
2).  In TH14m the statement that 'the Cyclopes apart from Polyphemus are just' is credited 
to Aristarchus rather than to Antisthenes, the latter whom we know for certain from TH14a 
to have been the true source.  There are a number of possible explanations for this.  
Aristarchus may have incorporated material from Antisthenes directly into his own work – 
quite likely without recording an attribution – which then was handed down the line of 
scholars.  Or Apollonius Sophistes, when compiling his lexicon (or a copyist before him), 
saw a name starting with 'A', or even just an 'A', in his source and assumed that the credit 
for such a statement should be given to Aristarchus (the famous Alexandrian scholar), 
rather than Antisthenes (by then acquiring a reputation as a Cynic), regardless of what was 
actually written in front of him.
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 Step 3d  §4    Cyclopes 'trust in the gods' and the earth yields everything for them 
αὐτομάτως (of her own accord). (Reinforce this reading using Homer).
In TH14b 3-4 the question was posed that if athemistoi (unrighteous) is standing for adikoi, 
(unjust), how can Odysseus (and by extension Homer) say that the Cyclopes 'trust in the 
gods'?  It is evident from this (as noted in Step 2c §3 above) that adikos (unjust) could 
sometimes be considered a virtual synonym of athemistos (unrighteous).  In answering the 
question, having stated that 'Polyphemus alone is arrogant and unjust', Antisthenes 
continues: 'all the rest of the Cyclopes are pious (εὐσεβεῖς) and just and trusting in the gods 
(πεποιθότας τοῖς θεοῖς), and hence the earth causes crops to spring up for them of her own 
accord' (αὐτοµάτως, TH14b 11-13).  Antisthenes thus provides two confirmations from one 
passage of Homer showing that the Cyclopes being athemistoi does not imply that they are 
unjust. 
The first confirmation, a version of the quote θεοῖσι πεποιθότες (they trust in the gods) 
from Odyssey 9.107, appears in five of the fragments in this section (TH14b, d, j, l, o) and 
TH14o contains it three times (4, 16, 24).  At TH14b 12 we read that the Cyclopes are 'pious' 
(εὐσεβεῖς) as well as 'just', which is comparable to the 'god-reverencing' (θεοσεβεῖς) of 
TH14o, where it is added that 'wicked men accuse good men along with themselves, or 
even present them as like themselves' (26-7.
The second part of the confirmation from TH14b is repeated at TH14a 8-9: 'the earth yields 
everything for them of her own accord' (αὐτοµάτως).  Both variations on the same 
statement are extremely succinct paraphrases, using Hesiodic terminology, of the actual 
relevant text of the Odyssey 9.108-11, which actually appears in full at TH14o 4-6:
They do not plant crops by their own hand, nor plough.  But unsown and unploughed all these 
things spring up, wheat and barley and vines, which bear wine from fine grapes.  And the rain of 
Zeus makes these grow for them.
Golden Race. As discussed above in Step 1 §1, Antisthenes had the men of Golden Race in 
mind here of whom Hesiod used αὐτοµάτη (Op. 118) regarding the way crops were 
produced for them.  Furthermore, πάντα (everything), though a common enough word, is 
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used by Hesiod in the same passage (Op. 116) and also used by Antisthenes in the same 
related sentence of TH14a 8.  Clearly Antisthenes wanted to connect the Cyclopes to the 
men of the Golden Race by linguistic ties, using vocabulary that an educated reader of his 
day might be expected to readily recognise.  Plato seems to have followed Antisthenes lead 
in this regard.  He uses linguistic ties and indirect references in order to refer to the Golden 
Race, writing of the 'Age of Cronus' when men received 'everything unstinting and of its 
own accord' (ἄφθονά τε καὶ αὐτόµατα πάντα, Lg. 713c) and again 'everything sprang up 
of its own accord (πάντα αὐτόµατα γίγνεσθαι) for men' (Plt. 271d; cf. 271e αὐτοµάτου 
περὶ βίου, and 272a αὐτοµάτης ἀναδιδούσης τῆς γῆς).  
Antisthenes may also have wanted to highlight the ethical excellence of the Golden Race in 
order to reposition the discussion about them vis-à-vis the parodies of the comic poets.   
The latter, in like manner to Antisthenes, were able to immediately evoke the age of the 
Golden Race by use of language.  For example, Teleclides wrote 'what they needed 
appeared of its own accord' (αὐτόµατ ἦν τὰ δέοντα, F 17 KA), and Cratinus 'a god puts 
forth spontaneously occurring good things for them' (αὐτόµατα τοῖσι θεὸς ἀνίει τἀγαθά, 
F 172 KA).  In fact, it is clear that the poets of Old Comedy regularly used a super 
abundance of spontaneously occurring luxuries to parody the time of Golden Race (for a 
range of humorous examples see Ath. 267e-270a).275  Eupolis even wrote a comedy titled 
Golden Race (Χρυσοῦν Γένος) and in one fragment (PCG 299) a cheese is found heading for 
water of its own volition, thus seemingly representing this spontaneous nature.
From other material reported by Eustathius in TH14o, it in fact seems fairly clear that 
Antisthenes' discussion of the Cyclopes' virtues prompted an ongoing tradition of scholarly 
discussion in a similar vein, i.e. that the Cyclopes lived in an environment of god-given 
abundance often equated with the Golden Race.  Eustathius quotes 'The Geographer' (i.e. 
Strabo) as writing that the Cyclopes 'harvest spontaneously-growing crops' (αὐτοφυεῖς 
καρπούς, TH14o 7 = Str. 13.1.25.21-2), which is synonymous with Antisthenes' αὐτοµάτως 
καρπούς of TH14b 13.  It seems that Strabo must have drawn this fact, directly or 
275 See further examples and discussion in Ceccarelli 1996 and Pellegrino 2000.
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indirectly, from Antisthenes.  In the passage immediately prior Strabo notes that it was 
Plato who first used the Cyclopes as an example of the initial stage of political organisation 
(13.1.25.20-1, cf. Step 3b §3 above).  But Plato at no point mentions the fact that 'the earth 
provides for the Cyclopes of her own accord', and nor does he ever mention the Cyclopes in 
his various discussions of the Golden Race (cf. Dillon 1992). 
After the mention of Strabo's summary, Eustathius goes on to state that 'the poet', i.e. 
Homer (7-9):
describes the specific character of the country in this way, as if this island too was one of the Isles 
of the Blessed – for the Isle of the Cyclopes is celebrated for its prosperity in proverbs, as is also 
Egypt and Arabia.
A little further on he adds that the Cyclopes (14-15):
have elicited the proverbial saying, that from divine favour the unsown and unploughed earth 
puts forth everything for the blessed.
Thus the Cyclopean mode of living became proverbial.  Leutsch in his collection of Greek 
proverbs actually includes an entry for 'Κυκλώπιος βίος' – 'the Cyclopean way of life' (CPG 
2.182, noted by Di Benedetto 1966, 221 n.2), wherein he lists several other texts that refer to 
the proverbial nature of the Cyclopes' life.  One of these is another passage from Strabo 
describing fertile Albania, where Od. 9.109 is quoted, followed by a reference to 
Κυκλώπειόν τινα … βίον, 'a certain Cyclopean way of life' (11.4.3).  Another, from 
Maximus of Tyre (late 2nd c. AD), also employs the expression Κυκλώπειὸν βίον, 
'Cyclopean life' (15.7 Trapp).
In the most remarkable passage of the collection, Dio Chrysostom provides a rather 
extraordinary list of circumstances that provide the conditions for a life of utter abundance 
(64.7):
τοῦτο ἦν ἄρα καὶ χρυσοῦν γένος καὶ νῆσοι µακάρων τινές, αὐτοµάτας ἔχουσαι τροφάς, καὶ 
Ἡρακλέους κέρας καὶ Κυκλώπων βίος, ὅτι τοῖς πονήσασι τὸν βίον αὐτοµάτη λοιπὸν ἡ τῶν 
ἀγαθῶν ἀφθονία παραγίγνεται. 
This was then, both the Golden Race and the Isles of the Blest, as it were, which have 
spontaneously occurring food, and both the Horn of Heracles and the Life of the Cyclopes, 
because to those who have toiled for their living, an abundance of blessings comes of its own 
accord thereafter.
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The use of αὐτοµάτη (of its own accord) and ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀφθονία (abundance of 
blessings), not found in Homer, but found in Antisthenes (TH14a 2 & 9), points again back 
to Antisthenes' work which first employed these Hesiodic terms and first likened the 
Cyclopes to the men of the Golden Race, exactly as Dio is doing here.  In particular, Dio's 
use of ἀγαθός, used by Antisthenes (TH14a 2), rather than Hesiod's ἐσθλός (Op. 118), 
confirms Antisthenes' work as the conduit by which Dio ultimately obtained his material.  
Certainly Dio was familiar with and admired Antisthenes' writing, as he quotes him several 
times (Or. 53.5 = DC 58, SSR 194, Or. 8.1 = DC 139, SSR 1; and once without naming him Or. 
13.14-28 = SSR 208).
In a final example, Philostratus (c. AD 200), when giving a description of an ancient Greek 
painting he viewed at Naples, described Cyclopes harvesting fields and gathering grapes 
that the earth had sent forth 'of her own accord' (αὐτόµατα, Imagines 369K21-24 Benndorf), 
using this term that was originally applied to the Cyclopes' existence by Antisthenes.  
In TH14k the explanation of the divine provision for the Cyclopes is presented a little 
differently and with another possible rationale. There it is stated: 'they say (φασί) that by 
way of the temperate nature (εὔκρατον) of the climate the gods provide for them' (1-2).  
The 'they' of φασί is most plausibly the Antisthenians, given that the fragment then 
immediately continues with the securely Antisthenic statement that 'Polyphemus alone was 
unjust' (3; cf. Step 2d §4 above).  The temperate climate was evidently considered to be 
another aspect of the life that was provided for the Golden Race and so for the Cyclopes 
here.  When discussing the 'Age of Cronus' (i.e. era of the Golden Race) Plato says 'the 
climate was tempered (τῶν ὡρῶν … ἐκέκρατο) for their comfort' (Plt. 272a).  
The text of TH14k then goes on to offer two possible reasons why the gods provide for the 
Cyclopes.  It is either 'because they are their descendants, “since we are near of kin to them” 
(Od. 7.205)', or because of the Cyclopes' justness (2-3).  
TH14a concludes this section with the fascinating statement that 'the fact that they do not 
work her (the earth) is also a just deed (ἔργον, 9)'.  This, quite interestingly, suggests that 
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Antisthenes considers the very act of working the earth to be perpetrating an injustice upon 
her and to be indicative of a fall from the state of grace in which the men of the Golden 
Race, and hence Cyclopes, lived.
A further intimation of the Cyclopes' blessed state is found in TH14l.  There the Cyclopes 
are said to be 'athemistoi, not because they are unjust, but because they did not have need of 
themis (right) or nomos (law) to discover the noble way of doing things – since they were 
noble' (3-5).  Thus the Cyclopes' inherent nobility and excellence precluded the need for 
formally set down laws.  This accords perfectly with Antisthenes' statement: 'the wise man 
(σοφός) will engage in public life (πολιτεύσεσθαι), not according to the established laws, 
but rather according to the law of excellence' (ἀρετή, DL 6.11 = DC 101, SSR 134).  And also: 
'if a wise man does something, he executes it with all his excellence' (TH6).  In Antisthenes' 
eyes lesser men may need laws to curtail and restrain their inherently base inclinations, but 
for noble men, what is right and honourable comes naturally.  Thus he declares that 'nobly-
born men (εὐγενεῖς) and excellent men (ἐνάρετοι) are one and the same' (MD5).  Recall 
also that in TH14n hyperphialoi (as used of the Cyclopes) was said to mean 'excelling' and 
'men who are surpassing in excellence (ἀρετή) are referred to by these terms' (30-1).  These 
ethical terms and Antisthenes' own philosophy of excellence are discussed in detail in 
chapter 2.ii – especially section B.
So from Antisthenes' point of view the Cyclopes preserved an inherent nobility and 
excellence that mankind had largely lost.  This was proven by the fact that they did not 
require formal laws to guide them – since they were noble in their very nature – and by the 
fact that the earth freely put forth all they needed in the same manner as for the men of the 
Golden Race.
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 PROBLEM 2 :  Polyphemus speaks impiously but the other Cyclopes speak piously.
 Step 1  §5    Polyphemus says they do not heed Zeus, but the other Cyclopes fear Zeus 
and advise prayer. (Problematise the text).
Another apparent inconsistency in the text is put forward in TH14d 1-5: 
How, when the Cyclops (Polyphemus) says earlier
'For the Cyclopes pay no heed to Aegis-bearing Zeus, nor to the blessed gods, since we are much 
better than them' (Od. 9.275-6), 
does he (Homer) conversely make the Cyclopes say 
'Disease which comes from mighty Zeus cannot be avoided; but you (Polyphemus) should indeed 
pray to our Father Poseidon' (Od. 9.411-2)?
So the problem is that on the one hand Homer has Polyphemus claim that the Cyclopes do 
not respect Zeus or any of the other gods (in fact, considering themselves superior to them), 
but on the other Cyclopes seem to contradict this position by fearing Zeus and urging 
prayer.  
The fullest version of this question is recorded in TH14d, but five further fragments 
(TH14b, g, j, m & o) quote or paraphrase the Odyssey line at 9.275 'οὐ γὰρ Κύκλωπες Διὸς 
αἰγιόχοιο ἀλέγουσιν' (for the Cyclopes pay no heed to aegis-bearing Zeus).  
The version of the fragment found in TH14j, was evidently copied from the same source as 
TH14b.  In TH14b there is the question about the Cyclopes trusting in the gods (Od. 9.107, 
discussed above in Step 3d §4), followed by 'How (πῶς) can Polyphemus say “For the 
Cyclopes pay no heed to aegis-bearing Zeus” (Od. 9.275)?', and the response in the 
following line (6) starting σκοπείτω τὸ πρόσωπον (consider the character).  TH14j has the 
statement about trusting in the gods in the same relationship, and though it reduces and 
paraphrases the Od. 9.275 quote to 'οὐκ ἀλέγει' (pays no heed), it retains the πῶς (how) 
and also continues with a near identical response, σκόπει τὸ πρόσωπον 'consider the 
character' (see further discussion of this imperative in Step 2b §6 below).  In TH14o the two 
290
quotes from Od. 9.107 and Od. 9.275 are also printed in the same order, again signalling the 
common source of the material.
Several of the fragments also contain a portion of the second half of the problem posed in 
TH14d, either mentioning 'disease from Zeus' (νοῦσον Διός, TH14g and TH14m), or that 
Polyphemus should pray to Poseidon (TH14k).  TH14o 28 actually contains a reference to 
both points, but in a condensed and paraphrased version, i.e. 'they looked with awe upon 
disease from Zeus and knew how to pray'.   TH14k 6 adds the information, not found 
elsewhere in the fragments, that the Cyclopes '”consult oracles” (Od. 9.510) and honour 
(νοµίζουσι) the gods'.
παρίστησιν. In discussing the contrast between Homer's portrayal of Polyphemus and the 
other Cyclopes, TH14g 2 uses the verb παρίστηµι, seemingly meaning 'show by 
comparison', implying in a fuller sense 'demonstrate by placing alongside for comparison'.  
This is possibly another part of Antisthenes' technical vocabulary of literary criticism.  It 
appears a second time in this fragment two lines further on (4, cf. Step 2c §6).  Seemingly 
Apollonius Dyscolus also uses παράστασις with a technical sense (cf. van Ophuijsen 1993, 
732).
 Step 2a  §5    Polyphemus lied, maligning the other Cyclopes with his personal impiety. 
(Locate a σηµεῖον).
Four of the fragments in this section (TH14g, h, m & o) hint at the ethical solution that is 
fully expounded in Step 2b and Step 2c §6.  The essence of the argument found in these is 
that Polyphemus is speaking falsely when he says that the Cyclopes do not heed Zeus and 
by his personal impiety he maligns the others.  Each of these fragments records different 
elements of this argument, but each of them also has key vocabulary in common with at 
least one of the others in the group, making it clear that they were ultimately drawn from a 
common source.  TH14o states that when Polyphemus said that the Cyclopes do not heed 
Zeus he was 'saying this falsely' (26, ψευδῶς).  Related to this, TH14m has 'this is false' (27, 
ψεῦδος) and also notes that Polyphemus said it as a result of 'his personal impiety' (26, τῆς 
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ἰδίας ἀσεβείας).  In common with this, TH14g states that being 'impious' (1, ἀσεβής) 
Polyphemus maligns the others, and TH14h says that he makes his 'personal' (1, ἴδιον) fault 
common.  Although TH14m has a word in common with each of the other three, it is does 
not necessarily represent the earliest or fullest exemplar, as TH14g in particular continues 
with notably different phrasing and text references.
 Step 2b  §6    Consider the character of the person speaking who said these things, it 
is Polyphemus the savage flesh-eater. (Locate a σηµεῖον).
σκόπει τὸ πρόσωπον.  Responding specifically to a questioner asking 'And what if 
someone should ask “How can Polyphemus say 'For the Cyclopes pay no heed to aegis-
bearing Zeus'?”' (TH14b 4-5; cf. Step 1 §5 above), the interlocutor here responds: 'Consider 
the character (of the person speaking), as it is the character of Polyphemus the raw-flesh-
eater and savage' (6-7).  It is obviously implied, even if it is not spelt out here, that any 
pronouncements by a 'raw-flesh-eater and savage' must be treated with some scepticism.  
Confirming this view the speaker then continues (7-10) with another quote from Hesiod's 
Works and Days (277-9; clearly Antisthenes was fond of using Hesiod in his solutions, as well 
as Homer; cf. Step 1 §1 and Step 3d §4 above) stating 'that fish and beasts and winged 
beasts should devour each other, since there is no justice in them' .  Thus the 'raw-flesh-
eater' Polyphemus is confirmed to have 'no justice', and so his words should not be taken at 
face value.
TH14j preserves the imperative phrase σκόπει τὸ πρόσωπον (consider the character, 2) in 
the second person, apparently directly copied from a dialogue.  The version of the text 
found at TH14b appears in the third person σκοπείτω τὸ πρόσωπον), which is probably a 
natural conversion for a scribe to make when including it in a scholarly commentary. 
 Step 2c  §6    It is solved again by the character of the person speaking who has the most
foolish arguments, in this case, Polyphemus. (Locate a σηµεῖον).
λύεται ἐκ προσώπου.  As TH14d includes the fullest version of the problem (cf. Step 1 §5 
above), so it offers the fullest discussion of the ethical solution (5-13).  It starts out by noting 
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that there 'appears to be a contradiction' (5, ἐναντίωµα γὰρ φαίνεται) and that 'he', i.e. 
Homer, 'is not saying the same things about the same things' (6), or in other words, he is not 
speaking consistently.  The text continues: 'Again it is solved by the character of the people 
speaking' (7-8, λύεται δὲ πάλιν ἐκ προσώπου τῶν λεγόντων), because only Polyphemus 
declared that the Cyclopes were far superior to the gods, but not any of the other Cyclopes 
(9-10).  The use of πάλιν, 'again' or 'once more', suggests that this is not the first time a 
solution 'from the character' has been propounded.  This is most likely referring to the other 
part of the solution to the immediate problem put forward just above in Step 2a §5, that the 
Polyphemus is characterised as a 'raw-flesh-eater' and 'savage'.  Or possibly it is merely 
confirming that this has become a typical strategy employed by Homeric exegetes.  The 
same style of explanation from character was used by Antisthenes in TH13a-d (and see 
commentary thereon at §3).
There is corruption in the text of TH14d 11, however the gist of it definitely seems to be that 
the two cases, where Homer is asserting his own view, and where one of Homer's 
characters is asserting a view, are different or opposed (ἐναντία) cases.  In the situation of 
Polyphemus and the Cyclopes, 'since the speakers are different, one must consider 
(σκεπτέον) to whom he (the poet) assigned the more foolish arguments' (12-13).276  The 
verbal adjective here, σκεπτέον, comes from the same verb pair σκοπεῖν/σκέπτεσθαι277 as 
σκοπείτω and σκόπει discussed in Step 2b §6 immediately above, and so appears to be a 
favoured piece of vocabulary in Antisthenes' dialogic writing.
Antisthenes concludes this passage by stating 'it is clear' ( δῆλον, TH14d 13) that the one to 
whom Homer assigns the most foolish arguments is Polyphemus, 'who was not like-
minded with the others and was not in agreement about the glory of the gods' (13-14).  So 
ultimately, this approach, of resolving inconsistencies in the text by considering the 
character, and to whom the poet had assigned the more foolish arguments (and was ipso 
276 Richardson comments on this strategy (1975, 78).
277 cf. LSJ s.v. Attic writers before Aristotle use σκοπῶ or σκοποῦµαι as present, and take the other tenses 
from σκέπτοµαι.
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facto wrong), reveals another of Antisthenes' strategies for defending Homer's text, and 
Homer himself, from criticism.
παρίσταται.  TH14g (3-5) has almost identical language to TH14d.  Declaring that 
Polyphemus 'was not like-minded with the others', it goes on to say that this is 'shown by 
comparison (παρίσταται) with what the poet says about him'.  This is the second use in this 
fragment of the verb παρίστηµι with the particular technical meaning 'show by 
comparison', or even 'demonstrate by placing alongside for comparison' (discussed above 
in Step 1 §5).  In this case the word specifically introduces the Homeric passage that is Step 
3 of Antisthenes' methodology (Step 3 §7 below) to prove that Antisthenes' reading is 
accurate.
ἐναντίωμα. The vocabulary in this section of TH14d ἐναντίωµα and ἐναντίος (5, 11) 
seems to be employed by Antisthenes with a particular technical sense meaning 'antithesis' 
and 'antithetical'.  Antisthenes believed that actual contradiction was impossible (µὴ εἶναι 
ἀντιλέγειν),278 so he appears here to be deliberately avoiding vocabulary that implies a true 
contradiction.  For example he could have used ἀντιλογία (contradiction), the noun 
directly related to the verb ἀντιλέγειν, instead of ἐναντίωµα (opposition or opposed cases 
or antithesis).  The word is uncommon in the Classical period, and Antisthenes may well 
have been the first to employ it with this special sense.  The fact that he provides a 
definition for the term defining how he is using it suggests that his desired sense was not 
the one he could assume his readers to be familiar with.  Plato also uses it three times, once 
(Alc. 1, 103a) meaning 'opposition', but twice (R. 524e, 603d) seemingly meaning 
'contradiction' or possibly 'antithesis' in the manner of Antisthenes' usage.  Interestingly, in 
some passages of Republic, Plato also uses ἐναντίος in a fashion highly reminiscent of 
Antisthenes' use of ἐναντίωµα (TH14d 5-6):
278 Arist. Metaph. 1024b25-1025a2 = DC 47a, SSR 152; cf. Alex. Aphr. in Metaph. 1024b26 Bonitz = DC 47b, 
SSR 152;  Ascl. in Metaph. 1024b25 = SSR 153;  Arist. Top. 104b19-21 = DC 47c, SSR 153;  Alex. Aphr. in Top.  
104b19 = SSR 153; Proclus in Plato's Cratylus c.37 Pasquali 1908 = DC 49, SSR 155; Isoc. Hel. 1 = SSR 156; 
DL 3.35 = DC 36, SSR 148.
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ἐναντίωµα γὰρ φαίνεται, µὴ τὰ αὐτὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λέγοντος
For it seems to be an antithesis, i.e. he (Homer) is not saying the same things about the same 
things.
cf. R. 602e 5-6, 8-9
τἀναντία φαίνεται ἅµα περὶ ταὐτά.
contrary things appear at the same time about the same things.
οὐκοῦν ἔφαµεν τῷ αὐτῷ ἅµα περὶ ταὐτὰ ἐναντία δοξάζειν ἀδύνατον εἶναι;
So we were saying that it is impossible for the same thing to hold contrary opinions at the same 
time about the same things?
R. 603d 1-2
καὶ ἐναντίας εἶχεν ἐν ἑαυτῷ δόξας ἅµα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν.
and he held contrary opinions within himself at the same time about the same things.
R. 604b 2-3
ἐναντίας δὲ ἀγωγῆς γιγνοµένης ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἅµα, δύο φαµὲν αὐτὼ 
ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι.
And when opposite tendencies arise in a man about the same thing at the same time, we say that 
there are necessarily two things in him.
This seems to suggest that these ἐναντ- root nouns had similar meanings in the writings of 
the two Socratics, and they were almost certainly adopting vocabulary that already had 
currency among the grammatistai.  For example Protagoras is found attacking the poet 
Simonides for contradicting himself (ἐναντία λέγειν αὑτῷ, Pl. Prot. 339b).
Later these terms entered the lexicon of literary criticism and Aristotle, in the Poetics 
declares that 'contradictions (τὰ ὑπεναντίως)' need to be scrutinised 'to see whether the 
same is meant, in the same relation, and in the same respect, so that the poet himself 
contradicts either his own words or what an intelligent person would assume' Poetics 25 
1461b 32  Halliwell trans.).  By the time Porphyry was writing, ἐναντίον was regularly used 
to mean 'contradiction' (MacPhail 2011, 7).
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 Step 3  §7    Polyphemus is not like the rest of the Cyclopes but is a shepherd living 
apart and roaming far away from the others. (Reinforce this reading 
using Homer).  
In his usual fashion, Antisthenes here deploys another passage of Homer to reinforce his 
solution.  In TH14g 4-5 he promises to 'show by comparison with what the poet says about 
him' (cf. Step 2c §6 παρίσταται).  The equivalent introduction in TH14d 15 is 'as the poet 
says.'  The three fragments that provide evidence for this section – TH14d, g & k – all 
provide quotations from the same Odyssey passage, which states that Polyphemus 
'shepherded alone far away, he roamed about not with the others, but living far apart, he 
was unrighteous' (9.188-9).  TH14d continues on with further passages to reinforce this 
reading, stating that because Polyphemus '”was unrighteous” in matters concerning the 
gods he supposed that the other Cyclopes also held the same beliefs as he did, but being 
better than him in respect to their nature, they did not hold the same opinions as him' (17-
19).  So it was his isolation and ignorance, rather than malice, that lead Polyphemus to 
besmirch the other Cyclopes with his own unrighteous views.
This passage, thus, provides confirmation that the solutions discussed in Step 2a §5 and 
Step 2b-c §6 were accurate.  The reason Polyphemus' views on the gods were not like the 
views of the other Cyclopes, and the reason the others were wrongly maligned by his views 
was because though he was himself unrighteous, he lived far away from them and had 
nothing to do with them, and had wrongly supposed that they were like himself.
TH14d concludes with the quote from Homer (used by many of the fragments to frame the 
problem in Step 1 §5 above) that the Cyclopes 'trust in the immortal gods' (20; Od. 9.107).
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PROBLEM 3 : The Cyclopes do not heed each other.
 Step 1  §8    The Cyclopes appear unjust and transgressive by not heeding each other. 
(Problematise the text).
In this section, the questioner raises another problem about the Cyclopes' nature.  TH14e is 
the only fragment that contains the full problem and solution, apparently in the form of a 
dialogue exchange.  The questioner claims that when Homer says the Cyclopes do not give 
thought for each other he is accusing them of being unjust and transgressive (1-2).
 Step 2a  §8    Not 'heeding' one another means they are so just and unenvious that they 
mind their own business. (Locate a σηµεῖον).
Cyclopes have justice (δικαιοσύνη) and are without greed. The defender objects, 
insisting that Homer is implying (ἐµφαίνει, 3) rather that the Cyclopes are actually 
exceedingly just.  They are so just, in fact, that there is no need for them to be concerned 
about each other, because none of them have designs on another's possessions and nor do 
any of them do injustices to another (TH14e 3-5).  
ἐμφαίνει. At line 3 of TH14e, Antisthenes employs the verb ἐµφαίνειν, which appears to 
be another term in his armoury of technical vocabulary for literary criticism (cf. ἔµφασις at 
TH13c 19 & commentary at §6).  It has the sense 'suggest', 'hint at', or 'indicate' and 
similarly to his use of ἐπισηµαίνεσθαι and σηµαίνειν it can be used to 'indicate' or 'hint at' 
hidden meanings and innuendos that are not explicitly stated, but may be revealed to an 
astute reader by a close reading of the text (on ἐπισηµαίνεσθαι cf. TH13c 2-3, 7 and 
commentary thereon at §1 and §6, and ch. 5 section D).
 Step 3a  §8    The Cyclopes' justness is proved by their coming together in answer to 
Polyphemus' shouting. (Reinforce this reading using Homer).
Cyclopes care about each other, but neither envy nor interfere with each other.  The 
defender of the Cyclopes then cites another passage of Homer as evidence that his reading 
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is correct.  When Polyphemus was shouting (after having had his eye put out) all the other 
Cyclopes came together at his cave (6, Od. 9.401).  So this proves that the other Cyclopes did 
have concern for each other (and ergo they were just).
Additional evidence of the uncovetous nature of the Cyclopes and their respect for each 
other is provided by TH14f and TH14k.  The whole of TH14f looks like it originally 
continued on directly from the passage ending at TH14e 6.  In particular the common use of 
δικαιοσύνη (just) at TH14e 3 and TH14f 3 is striking.  This text offers further direct 
refutation of the argument made by the questioner that the Cyclopes were unjust (at TH14e 
2-3 in Step 1 above) and it specifically focusses on their uncovetous nature.  The speaker 
first paraphrases Odysseus from Od. 9.224-5, who said that his companions urged him to 
carry off some of Polyphemus' cheeses (1-2).  The speaker recounts this passage because he 
wants to show how effortlessly the cave was discovered to be full of cheese and livestock (3-
4) thereby emphasising Polyphemus' lack of safeguards.  Polyphemus took no precautions 
because he knew full well that none of the other Cyclopes would rob him (4-5).  The 
defender points out that this clearly demonstrates the justice (δικαιοσύνη) of the Cyclopes 
(3).  The Cyclopes thus possess characteristics praised by Antisthenes in Xenophon's 
Symposion 4: 'And indeed it is quite likely that those who are fixated on thrift are much 
juster than those who are fixated on great wealth.  For those who are most satisfied with 
their present possessions, grasp at the possessions of others the least.'
Because the Cyclopes were respectful of each other, and each was responsible for ruling his 
own household (cf. discussion at Step 2b and 3b §3 above), even once they had run to his 
call and opened his cave, they still did not 'pry into' (πολυπραγµονοῦσι) what had 
happened to Polyphemus (TH14k 5-6).  The use of πολυπραγµονέω with a direct object is 
peculiar this early and Antisthenes may have been the first to try it.  The very negative use 
of a πολυ- root word recalls Antisthenes' discussion of Odysseus' polytropos (TH12).  So 
while the other Cyclopes are concerned for him, they are not busybodies, sticking their 
noses into his private domain.  And this is a further display of their justice.
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 Step 2b  §8    Not heeding one another means they are not subject to one another. 
(Locate a σηµεῖον).
TH14e 6-8 contains a further added explanation for the Cyclopes not paying heed to each 
other – some people explain this as meaning that they are not subject to one another.
Step 3b  §8    Each Cyclops is his own ruler. (Reinforce this reading using Homer).
αὐτοκράτωρ. The Cyclopes are not subject to one another 'because each one is his own 
ruler' (ἕκατος γὰρ αὐτοκράτωρ), thus alluding to Od. 9.115 ('each one lays down the themis 
(law) for his children and wife'), and being another way of saying οἰκοκρατεῖσθαι 
(household-ruler, TH14o 41, Table 2 §3). This is the same passage that was used to confirm 
the proper reading of athemistoi at Step 3b §3.  It is highly likely that the defender of the 
Cyclopes adduced the same passage in his argument to refute more than one objection.  So 
this repeated reference remains compatible with the likelihood that all of this material 
originated from the one Antisthenic dialogue.
 PROBLEM 4 : The Cyclopes were violent and harried the Phaeacians.
 Step 1  §9    The Cyclopes continually plundered and harmed the Phaeacians, who were 
forced to emigrate. (Problematise the text).
In TH14a (9-13) the reporting of Antisthenes' analysis is considerably compressed and it 
appears that what remains was originally drawn from two speakers in a dialogue (the 
translation has been edited to show the apparent divisions).  All the steps of the Antisthenic 
methodology are present, though found slightly jumbled and not according to a strict 
sequence, which is as one would expect for a dialogic work.  
The first speaker poses another notional problem across a couple of lines of dialogue, 
challenging the preceding interpretation that the rest of the Cyclopes are just (7-8).  He 
points out that Homer had said earlier in the Odyssey that the Cyclopes were violent, and he 
quotes a line from Book 6 about the Cyclopes plundering the Phaeacians and being greater 
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in strength than them (10-11).  In his next line (12-13), responding to the second speaker (11-
12), the first speaker ripostes that because the Phaeacians were constantly being harmed, 
they emigrated – thus paraphrasing Od. 6.7-8.
 Step 2  §9    The Phaeacians and Cyclopes did not get along because of the dissimilarity 
of their polities. (Locate a σηµεῖον).
This step is found in the final line of dialogue (TH14a 13), where the second speaker states 
that it was only on account of their dissimilar societies that the Phaeacians departed.  Thus 
suggesting that it was not as a result of the Cyclopes being violent or harming them.  Note 
that this last line does not appear in the text found in the manuscript of TH14a (Sch. T), but 
was added by Schrader from TH14i 4 (Sch. M) and TH14o 22 (Eust.) where discussions of 
the Phaeacians present the material in the same order.  Di Benedetto notes (1966, 220 n. 1) 
that in Eustathius' discussion of Od. 6.6 (1549.23 ff) the Byzantine author specifically 
mentions the τρυφή ('luxury' or 'effeteness') of the Phaeacians in comparison with the 
powerful Cyclopes.  This adds a moral justification to the Cyclopes' actions – they were 
large and strong by nature, while the Phaeacians were inherently weak and effete.  It is 
quite possible that a comment along these lines was originally employed by the second 
speaker in Antisthenes dialogue as part of his defence of the Cyclopes.
Eustathius' text (TH14o 22-23) also elaborates on the nature of the political discrepencies 
between the Cyclopes and Phaeacians.  He writes that 'the Phaeacians co-operated with one 
another either by the custom of aristocracy, or even democratically.  But the Cyclopes were 
not such people.'  Thus the fact that their polities were incompatible is explained as a matter 
of the historical facts of their way of life, rather than as a result of any particularly unethical 
or violent aspect of the Cyclopes nature.
 Step 3  §9    The Cyclopes' behaviour was normal.  The Phaeacians also acted violently, 
e.g. towards the Giants. (Reinforce this reading using Homer).
The second speaker responds to the first speaker's original objection (cf. Step 1 §9) about the 
Cyclopes continually plundering the Phaeacians.  He counters that the Phaeacians did 
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exactly the same thing, and quotes a passage from Book 7 of the Odyssey to show that, when 
he had the chance, the king of the Phaeacians, Eurymedon, ruled in turn over the Giants 
(59).  So the fact that the Cyclopes were violent, and had dominion over others when they 
could, has no ethical bearing on the other points under the discussion, i.e. whether or not 
they were arrogant, lawless and unjust.  
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SYMPOTICA SY1-10
This set of sympotic fragments demonstrates Antisthenes' interest in the pastimes, practices 
and prejudices of the symposion and its participants and they are most likely all from a 
dialogue (or dialogues) set in a symposion.  One fragment, Sy9, has Socrates speaking in a 
sympotic setting.  Plato and Xenophon each wrote a Symposion, and as discussed below, 
both seem to make reference to, or imitate, Antisthenes.  
Fragment Sy1 has Antisthenes, or another symposiast, playing the game of eikones, or 
likenesses.  Symposiastic repartee and possibly abuse are seen in fragments Sy2-3, which 
concern the ungentlemanly pursuit of playing the pipes.  Fragments Sy4-10 are speculated 
here to originate from a game of competitive encomia to the simple objects present in the 
symposion, such as drinking cups and water.  In Sy9 Socrates is found praising the 
bombulios, a type of small drinking cup.  In the commentary below on Sy5-9 it is noted that 
Isocrates criticised writers (who he thought should have known better) for engaging in the 
praise of such frivolous objects as bombulioi and salt – criticism that seems to be squarely 
aimed at Antisthenes.
The final fragment in this group, Sy10, appears to be part of the same cycle of sympotic 
encomia as Sy5-9 and it hints that wine and water were also praised in Antisthenes' version 
of the symposion.  Apparently Antisthenes' symposiasts engaged in a range of sympotic 
games, including a cycle of competitive encomia to the ordinary objects in front of them in 
the symposion – including salt, piss-pots, bombulioi, wine, and water. 
Sy1. In this fragment Antisthenes is engaged in the pastime of 'likenesses' or 'eikones' 
(εἰκόνες).  This was a game popular, especially at symposia (cf. Pl. Symp. 214e-222b), with 
the objective being to liken (εἰκάζειν) a person to someone or something else, generally in a 
way that was amusing, and preferably in a way that was unexpected.  
It appears that Kephisodotos should be identified as Kephisodotos from Keramikos (PA 
8331) mentioned a further four times by Aristotle in the same book of the Rhetoric as the 
fragment under discussion here (3.1411a 5, 8, 23, 28).  Kephisodotos was an Athenian 
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praised by Demosthenes for being an outstanding orator who was exceeded by no one in 
terms of talent, but who ought to have deployed his skill against wicked men rather than 
those who deserved good (Lept. 146, 150).  This obviously implies that Kephisodotos used 
his oratory in an expedient manner instead of for the sake of good men.  Given Antisthenes' 
unambiguous hatred for orators (see e.g. CD1, CD3 and commentary, Ajax & Odysseus, and 
ch. 2.ii section B), the unflattering Antisthenic eikon under examination here is not 
surprising.  Apparently Kephisodotos was skinny and, like incense, the way he gave 
pleasure – in Antisthenes' eyes – was by being destroyed or wasted away.  The phrase ὅτι 
ἀπολλύµενος εὐφραίνει means that he gave pleasure only by being destroyed and not in 
any other way (Cope 1877 ad loc.).
Antisthenes evidently prided himself on his facility for making likenesses.  Here is another 
witty example (Gnom. Vat. 1 = DC 96, SSR 113):
Ἀντισθένης τοὺς πόνους ἔφησεν ὁµοίους εἶναι κυσί· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι τοῦς ἀσυνήθεις 
δάκνουσιν. 
Antisthenes said that hard labours are like dogs.  Since they also bite those who are unfamiliar 
with them.
There are further examples in fragment MD10 (see also commentary) and in his Ajax & 
Odysseus, where Ajax is likened by Odysseus to lazy donkeys and grazing cattle (Od. 
14.5).279  The use of eikon in the following fragment may have also been intended in a similar 
sense (Clem.Al. Strom. 5.14.108 = DC 40a, SSR 181): 
θεὸν οὐδενὶ ἐοικέναι,' φησίν, 'διόπερ αὐτὸν οὐδεὶς ἐκµαθεῖν ἐξ εἰκόνος δύναται.
God is like no one,' he (Antisthenes) said, 'wherefore no one is able to completely comprehend him 
from a likeness.
Sympotic eikones. In Xenophon's Symposion, when the Syracusan who is providing the 
entertainers starts needling Socrates, it is Antisthenes who turns to Philippos, a well-known 
'merry-maker' (ὁ γελωτοποιός 1.11,13, cf. 3.11) and 'wonderful at making likenesses' 
(δεινὸς εἰκάζειν), and urges him to come up with an insulting likeness for the Syracusan 
(5.8).  Philippos is eager to do so, but Socrates talks him out of it (5.8-10).  Among other 
279 The mention of 'lazy donkey' is itself an allusion to Il. 11.555.
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things, this scene demonstrates that Antisthenes was well known by his contemporary, 
Xenophon, as being fond of making eikones.  In Plato's Symposion the game of eikones is also 
employed when Alcibiades states that he will set out to praise Socrates 'by way of 
likenesses' (δι᾽ εἰκόνων, 215a).  Alcibiades says that Socrates might expect him to be using 
likeness 'more so for the laughs' (ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερα, 215a; cf. 214e).  Alcibiades claims, 
however, that he will use 'likeness for the sake of truth not laughs'.  He then likens Socrates 
to the Silenus figures sold in statuary shops, and to the satyr Marsyas, and he goes on to 
justify the likeness in an extended encomion (215b-222b).  In a sympotic example from 
comedy, Xanthius in Aristophanes Wasps relates events from a symposion at which two of 
the guests exchange a pair of amusing and insulting likenesses (1308-18).  Coming up with 
imaginative and entertaining likenesses was not a new invention of the classical period.  
There are a couple of seventh century examples which are also probably sympotic, and 
certainly entertaining (not to mention sexually explicit; Archilochus F 42 and 43 West).
Non Sympotic eikones.  This particular eikon from Antisthenes was included by Aristotle in 
a list of examples (3.1406b.20-1407a.8), which reveals that the likes of Pericles, Plato, and 
Demosthenes were all adept at coming up with eikones.  There are further non-sympotic 
examples of the pastime of likenesses in Plato and comedy.  Meno states that, in appearance 
and in other respects, Socrates is most like a torpedo fish (i.e. electric ray) as he numbs 
anyone who approaches and touches him (Men. 80a).  Socrates says that Meno has only 
made that likeness as he wants Socrates to liken him to something in return, saying that all 
noble people enjoy being likened since their noble attributes invite noble likenesses (80c).  
There are other examples in Plato of a likeness being employed for explanatory purposes at 
Gorgias 517d, Phaedo 87b, Laws 644c, and being recommended at Republic 487e.  At one point 
in Aristophanes' Birds the birds make amusing likenesses of each other (804-6).
Sy2-3. After the anecdote about Antisthenes (Sy2), Plutarch adds this one about Philip and 
Alexander of Macedon: 'Philip said to his son who plucked the strings delightfully and 
skilfully as the wine went around “are you not ashamed to pluck the strings so well?”' (1.5). 
Playing instruments overly skilfully was not considered fitting for a gentleman, and this 
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was particularly so in the case of the pipes, the use of which Aristotle tells us was 'rightly 
rejected for young and free men' (Pol. 1341a26-8).  Aristotle also relates the story that 
Athena found a set of pipes, but when she saw the ugly distortion of her features she threw 
them away in disgust, and he surmised that more probably she discarded them because in 
education pipes-playing has no effect on intelligence, whereas science and art are attributed 
to Athena (Pol. 1341b 3-8).  A similar account of Athena's rejection of the pipes is found in a 
fragment of Melanippides from the second half of the fifth century (PMG 758; cf. Wilson 
1999, 63 and for further sources of the same tale 60, esp. n. 4 & 6).  Plutarch relates an 
account of Alcibiades rejecting the pipes for exactly the same reasons (Alc. 2.4-6; cf. Wilson 
1999, 87-8).  
Such views and tales were doubtless formulated and expressed in reaction to the perceived 
vulgarity of performers (and audiences) participating in the professional entertainment 
industry (Pol. 1341b13-19; cf. Csapo 2004, 210-14).  Pipes-players were in the vanguard of 
the 'New Music' movement, which was characterised by the elites as eroding not only 
traditional musical values but also traditional cultural values.  As such pipes-players were 
roundly insulted as effeminate, corrupting, soft in the head, and worse (Csapo 2004, 236-7).  
Thus in fragment Sy2 Antisthenes reveals that his sympathies regarding music are clearly 
on the side of traditional, conservative values.  Though generally it was professionalism in 
pipes playing, rather than ability, that was disdained, when Antisthenes invites someone to 
accompany him on the pipes (Sy3), this is probably best construed as an insult.
Sy4. Decleva Caizzi notes that the previous Antisthenes fragment-compilers, Winckelmann 
and Mullach, both allocated this fragment to the Protreptikos ('Exhortation') along with the 
fragments about the bombulios (Sy5-8), but she states that there is nothing to allow a precise 
allocation (DC 18a-d, n. ad loc.: 'nulla autorizza ad un'attribuzione precisa'), so places it at 
the end of her long list of unallocated fragments (DC 121).  Giannantoni however does 
place the fragment with the others collected under Protreptikos (SSR 63-67).  This placement 
is surely correct, for although this fragment has nothing to do with exhortation, like the 
bombulios fragments (Sy5-8) it does mention a sympotic vessel.  
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Discussing piss-pots at symposia? The Greeks were noted, as opposed to other peoples 
(e.g. the Persians, Hdt. 1.133, Xen. Cyr. 8.8.10), for relieving themselves (at both ends) in the 
company of fellow guests during the drinking party (for lists of vase images of such see 
Agora 12, 65 n.41 and Mitchell 2009, 48 n.59).  Hence the symposion is the context in which 
piss-pots would naturally arise as a topic of conversation among educated men.  
Antisthenes, and his work now known as Protreptikos, evidently took an interest in a variety 
of sympotic ceramics.
Wording and division of the text.  For this fragment Photius apparently drew on the same 
source as Hesychius did.  Hesychius' Lexicon has: (ο1862 Latte) οὐροδόχην· τὴν ἀµίδα, and 
(ο1856 Latte) οὔριοµ βῖκον· τὴν ἀµίδα. ἢ οὐροδόχην, i.e exactly the same grouping of 
names for piss-pots accorded to Xenophanes and Antisthenes in our fragment.  Latte, 
somewhat oddly, prints οὔριοµ without comment in the apparatus.  Fortunately Schmidt's 
1859 edition of Hesychius (ο1864) reveals that the manuscripts contain the unlikely 
οὐριόµβικον, but that Cobet (1857, 304 = 1858, 398) conjectured οὔρειον βῖκον.   G. Dindorf 
reports that οὔρειον had already been conjectured earlier by Porson (1829, TGL v2, 250D).  
Surely either Photius' οὔριον or Porson's οὔρειον (both meaning 'of or relating to urine') is 
the correct reading for Hesychius' text.
From the division of this fragment under two entries in Hesychius' version, it appears likely 
that the Photius fragment was originally two separate entries, from a common source, in a 
list of synonyms for words meaning 'piss-pot'.  If this is the case, either Photius, or a 
copyist, has drawn the Antisthenes entry onto the same line as Xenophanes' to save space.  
A later copyist has very likely added the δέ in οὔριον δὲ βῖκον Ἀντισθένης to show that 
Antisthenes uses a different expression for a similar item.  So from this reading, the use of 
οὐροδόκην is only attributed to Xenophanes and not to Antisthenes.  
There also are good linguistic grounds for this interpretation.  Whereas Photius writes 
οὐροδόκην, Hesychius manuscripts have οὐροδόχην, which as the following discussion 
will show was almost certainly an Atticizing correction of an original Ionicism.  
Etymologically δοχή is linked to δέχεσθαι 'to receive', just as is the related δοχεῖον 'holder' 
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(LSJ s.v.).  Hesychius has an entry (δ2115 Latte) δοκήν· δόκησιν. δοχήν, demonstrating that 
δοκήν is a variant spelling of δοχήν (LSJ s.v. δοκή thus duly notes 'II. = δοχή, Hsch.').  In 
Ionic, δέκοµαι with unaspirated palatal stop κ (for Attic δέχοµαι with aspirated χ) is 
attested in Herodotus (Powell 1938 s.v., Smyth 1894, §100, 101).  So by analogy (i.e. 
δέχεσθαι → δοχή) we would expect to find δοκή meaning 'receptacle', and in fact in Homer 
we do find the highly analogous Ionic compound δουροδόκη, 'case or stand for spears,' (LSJ 
s.v., Od. 1.128).  
Xenophanes, not Xenophon. Xenophon's connection with this fragment in Photius' text has 
been disputed for some time.  Ludwig Dindorf (1829 ThGL v5, 2413A) stated 'nomen 
vitiosum' ('the name is corrupt').  Later Cobet (1857, 304) asserted that οὐροδόκην was 
attributed in error to Xenophon by showing that in an extant work discussing sympotica 
Xenophon is known to have used a different word, προχοΐδας, for ἀµίς – see Hesychius 
(π4094 Latte) προχοΐδας· τὰς ἀµίδας (= Xen. Cyr. 8.8.10).   
More recently, Bossi has argued persuasively for emending Ξενοφῶν to Ξενοφάνης as part 
of his argument that Xenophanes was actually the author of the Margites (1986, 41-3).  The 
homeland of the author of the Margites is possibly Colophon (F 1 West), whence also came 
Xenophanes.  The Margites is written in Ionic, and Bossi shows metrical similarities between 
securely attributed fragments of Xenophanes and the Margites – both used a peculiar 
combination of hexameters with iambic trimeters.  Bossi also demonstrates the 
compatibility of the Margites' content with Xenophanes' known views and offers comment 
on our Photius fragment.  There is a scene in Margites F 7, in which Margites gets his penis 
stuck in a piss-pot (ἀµίδι).  Bossi argues that Xenophanes likely used οὐροδόκην, as 
attested in our fragment, somewhere in the same episode.  This would also neatly explain 
ἀµίς and οὐροδόκη appearing in the same entry of Photius.  West (2003, 226-7) seemed 
inclined to accept Xenophanes' authorship for similar reasons to those argued by Bossi (i.e. 
dialect, Colophon connection, metre).  
It is easy to imagine how an ancient scribe might have deliberately or inadvertently 
corrected 'Xenophanes' to 'Xenophon' in the context of the Photius fragment, as it includes 
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Antisthenes' name, and Xenophon and Antisthenes were well known associates.  By 
restoring it now to 'Xenophanes' we can easily solve the problem in the spelling of 
οὐροδόκην in Photius' lemma.  As Xenophanes was writing in Ionic it is likely that he 
would have used the non-aspirated κ, in which case the spelling would be correct.  
Therefore the only expression for piss-pot in this fragment securely attributed to 
Antisthenes is 'urine bīkos'.  LSJ s.v. defines βῖκος as 'jar or cask'.  While there is no entry for 
βῖκος in Photius, the Suda has: (β285) βῖκος· τὸ ἀγγεῖον, 'bīkos: a receptacle'; and Hesychius 
has: (β605) βῖκος· στάµνος ὦτα ἔχων, 'bīkos: a jar with handles'.   The regular word for 
'piss-pot' was ἀµίς.  Antisthenes' expression 'urine bīkos' is very similar to the definition for 
the amis, the most common of which is οὐροδόχον ἀγγεῖον 'urine-holding receptacle' (Sch. 
Ar. Thesm. 633.2  Sch. Ar. V. 807a, Sch. Ar. Ach. 82b.1, EM 83.33, Et.Gen.280 α650, Et.Gud.281 
α114.5,  Ps.-Zon. Lex.282 α149.11; cf. Suda α1590 = ο946).  Other definitions of amis in ancient 
lexica add more flavour.  Hesychius offers: (α3679) <ἀµίς>· σταµνίον, 'amis: wine-jar (piss-
jar?)'; and (β1352) <βυτίνη>· λάγυνος, ἢ ἀµίς, 'Butinē: flask/flagon, or amis'.  Photius has 
(α1198) <Ἁµίδας> ... ἰδίως δὲ Δηµοσθένης (54.4) τὰ σταµνίσκια, οἷς ἐνούρουν. λέγεται δὲ 
ἁµὶς καὶ ἡ χύτρα, 'Amidas: … according to Demosthenes, the little wine jars which they 
used to piss into.  And it is called an amis and the chytra (another little pot with handles, see 
LSJ s.v. II)'.  In Aristophanes' Wasps Philokleon mistakes an amis for a klepsydra – a water 
clock (858).  The scholiast explains: κλεψύδρα. ἀµὶς γὰρ αὐτῷ παρέκειτο '(he said) 
'klepsydra', since the amis was lying beside him' (Sch. Ar. V. 858).  The klepsydra was a pot 
with a narrow orifice through which water trickled slowly to measure time (LSJ s.v.).  
These definitions give the impression that the amis (and so probably the urine bīkon) was a 
smallish pot or jar, probably with handles (easily imaginable to be useful), having the shape 
of a flask or flagon, and with a protruding and relatively narrow neck.  One can imagine 
endless possible opportunities for Antisthenes to introduce mention or discussion of such a 
280 Etymologicum Genuinum. 2 vols (α-βώτορες). Lasserre & Livadaras, 1976-92.
281 Etymologicum Gudianum. De Stefani, 1909-20.
282 Iohannis Zonarae Lexicon. Tittmann, 1808.
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vessel into a sympotic dialogue, including being the subject of a speech of praise as part of a 
playful cycle of competitive encomia (see further below).
Sy5-9, προτρεπτικός. This group includes a new Antisthenes fragment, Sy8.  Diogenes 
Laertius gives the full version title of the work as: Περὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας 
προτρεπτικὸς πρῶτος, δεύτερος, τρίτος, Concerning Justice and Courage, an Exhortation, 
first, second and third book (6.16).  Decleva Caizzi (n.17-18) feels that the mention of the three 
books makes it likely that it is an authentic title given by Antisthenes.  This is dubious 
however and is more likely indicative of a later division and designation of Antisthenes' 
works.  All book titles from the period are uncertain and this is an area of ongoing scholarly 
debate (see further ch. 6).
Protreptikos a Socratic dialogue known to Isocrates, Plato, and Xenophon. From 
Athenaeus (Sy9) it is evident that Antisthenes' Protreptikos is a Socratic dialogue.  It features 
direct speech and Socrates is one of the interlocutors.  A passage from Isocrates' Helen 
criticising the choice of bombulios as a topic suggests that this dialogue was well known 
(10.12; pace Giannantoni, a testimonium, not fragment, of Antisthenes – SSR 66):
τῶν µὲν γὰρ τοὺς βοµβυλιοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἅλας καὶ τοιαῦτα βουληθέντων ἐπαινεῖν οὐδεὶς 
πώποτε λόγων ἠπόρησεν, οἱ δὲ περὶ τῶν ὁµολογουµένων ἀγαθῶν ἢ καλῶν ἢ τῶν 
διαφερόντων ἐπ᾽ ἀρετῇ λέγειν ἐπιχειρήσαντες πολὺ καταδεέστερον τῶν ὑπαρχόντων 
ἅπαντες εἰρήκασιν.  
No one who has chosen to praise bombulioi and salt and such topics has ever been at a loss for 
words, but those who have attempted to speak about topics that it is agreed are good or noble or 
that are surpassing in excellence, have all fallen far short of what was possible when they spoke.
LSJ s.v. places Isocrates' mention of βοµβυλιός under the definition 'bumblebee', however 
this cannot be right.  Mentions of βοµβυλιός meaning 'bumblebee' are rare in extant 
literature.  In the Classical period there is one instance found in Aristophanes (V. 107) and a 
further two in Aristotle (HA 623b12, 629a29).  Furthermore, there are no known works 
praising bumblebees, but there is Antisthenes' work discussing and praising the 
eponymous cup.  The scholiast knows that Isocrates is referring to a cup not a bumblebee 
and notes (10.12 – in Dindorf's edition under 10.13): βοµβυλιοὺς· οἱ µὲν λέγουσιν εἶδος 
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καυκαλίου, 'Bombulios: they say it is a type of kaukalion.'  LSJ s.v. states that a καυκάλιον is a 
variant of βαυκάλιον 'narrow-necked vessel, that gurgles when water is poured in or out'.  
It appears to have been a pet habit of Isocrates to criticise other orators for discussing trivial 
topics, see further Panathenaicus 135 and Panegyricus 188.  In imitation of Isocrates, Michael 
Psellos authored an oration in the eleventh century wherein he criticised those who 
preferred to praise τοὺς βοµβυλίους ἢ τοὺς ἅλας, 'bombulioi and salt' (Or. Min. 27.12  
Littlewood).
Isocrates' mention of salt very likely refers to the same work as referred to in Plato's 
Symposion (177b), viz. a work praising salt by an unnamed author.  In his commentary on 
the Symposion Dover (1980, ad. loc.) states, with reference to Isocrates' attack: 'there is strong 
reason to think that he is referring to the early fourth-century sophist Polycrates.'  Dover 
does not say why we should think so, but perhaps because the very next scholion on 
Isocrates' Helen (10.14) mentions Polycrates as being the probable target of Isocrates' 
criticism for writing a defence of Helen's conduct – but this was surely Gorgias being 
criticised rather than Polycrates.  As the following discussion will reveal, the person who 
was really attracting Isocrates' disapproval for praising bombulioi and salt was almost 
certainly Antisthenes.
In the Athenaeus fragment (Sy9), the fact that Socrates was discussing the virtues of a 
drinking vessel strongly suggests that the setting for Antisthenes' dialogue was a 
symposion.  The comments about the bombulios may have been made merely in passing (see 
below for such comments from Socrates about similar cups in Xenophon's Symposion 2.26) 
or they may have been part of a more formal discourse.  An example of such a formal 
discourse is found in Plato's Symposion.  As the banqueters are worse for wear from a heavy 
bout of drinking the night before, Eryximachos proposes that they dismiss the pipe-girl and 
seek entertainment in discussion (176e).  Before suggesting that they make speeches of 
praise in turn from left to right (177d), he makes the following remarks (177bc Burnet):
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ἀλλ' ἔγωγε ἤδη τινὶ ἐνέτυχον βιβλίῳ ἀνδρὸς σοφοῦ, ἐν ᾧ ἐνῆσαν ἅλες ἔπαινον θαυµάσιον 
ἔχοντες πρὸς ὠφελίαν, καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα συχνὰ ἴδοις ἂν ἐγκεκωµιασµένα – τὸ οὖν τοιούτων 
µὲν πέρι πολλὴν σπουδὴν ποιήσασθαι, Ἔρωτα δὲ µηδένα πω ἀνθρώπων τετολµηκέναι εἰς 
ταυτηνὶ τὴν ἡµέραν ἀξίως ὑµνῆσαι.
ἀνδρὸς σοφοῦ T W  :  om.  B
I happened upon a certain book by a wise man, in which salt was wonderfully praised for its 
usefulness, and you could see many other such things extolled therein.  There has been so much 
exertion made over such piffling matters, but not one man to this day has undertaken to make a 
fitting hymn to Eros.
Plato is referring to a work, presumably with a sympotic setting, in which trivial items such 
as salt and 'many other such things' were given speeches of praise by a 'wise man' or a 
'clever man'.  We know from our fragments that Antisthenes wrote a sympotic dialogue in 
which ceramics such as bombulioi, and perhaps also piss-pots, were praised.  Bombulioi and 
salt are connected by Isocrates from just such a context.  It seems, therefore, reasonable to 
suggest that Antisthenes' dialogue represents a light-hearted, and earlier, version of a 
similar sort of discourse to that found in Plato's Symposion.  Apparently the challenge to the 
symposiasts in Antisthenes' work was to give praise in turn to whatever was in front of 
them on the table – drinking cups, salt, possibly piss-pots (see commentary on Sy4 above), 
etc.  A fragment of Critias is similarly found praising the cottabus basin – cottabus being a 
symposion game (fr. B2 West2 = Ath. 28b):
κότταβος ἐκ Σικελῆς ἐστι χθονός, ἐκπρεπὲς ἔργον,
ὃν σκοπὸν ἐς λατάγων τόξα καθιστάµεθα.
The cottabus (basin) is from the land of Sicily, an outstanding creation,
that we set up as a target to fire our wine dregs at.
Plato, in his Symposion, set out to offer a loftier, more 'fitting' version, of such a sympotic 
conversation by having the symposiasts offer encomia to Eros rather than the petty objects 
Antisthenes' symposiasts chose to praise.  If so, his mention of 'so much exertion' made 
about salt and all the other 'piffling matters' should probably be construed as a veiled slight 
against Antisthenes. 
In Xenophon's Symposion, in a similar vein to Plato's work, Socrates says to his fellow 
symposiasts that, as good as the hired entertainers are, it would be a shame if they did not 
give some thought to benefiting each other (3.2).  He then suggests that they each in turn 
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declare what they think is most worth knowing about (3.3).  The symposiasts then proceed 
to do just that.  
It appears that Antisthenes was a very early innovator in the literary genre of speaking in 
turn in a sympotic setting, demonstrating once more his great creativity.  It was a literary 
genre that he experimented with, that was then 'improved' upon by Plato and Xenophon, 
and that was still being used centuries later by Lucian with his Encomion to the House Fly.
Bombulios. In terms of morphology, βοµβυλιός is the most commonly found form, though 
the acute is sometimes found placed on the ί or even on the ύ.  Herodian, however, shows – 
with a long list of examples including his own name ἐρῳδιός – that words of more than 
three syllables terminating in -ος, preceded by the vowel ι, must be accented upon the ο (Gr. 
1.116; cf. 1.123, 1.126, 2.171, 2.444).  βοµβυλός is also extant, though is found much later 
(Lampe s.v.  '= LSJ βοµβυλιός, vessel, jar, Thdt. provid. 4').
The fullest definition and description of the bombulios from the ancient lexica and 
etymologica is found in the Etymologicum Genuinum (β182 = Et.Sym.283 β154, EM 204.54  
Lex.Seg.284 220.7, Phot. β206):
βοµβυλιός· εἶδος ζῴου παραπλήσιον µελίσσῃ· εἴρηται δὲ παρὰ τὸ βοµβεῖν.  ἔστι δὲ καὶ 
ποτηρίου εἶδος, ἀπὸ µεταφορᾶς τοῦ ζῴου· καὶ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸ ποιῶς πως κατεσκευάζετο, ὥστε 
πινόντων βοµβεῖν, καὶ τὸ ἐλαιηρὸν δὲ ἀγγεῖον καθ᾽ ὁµοιότητα τοῦ στενοπόρου ἐκπώµατος 
βοµβυλιὸς λέγεται.  οὕτως εὗρον εἰς τὸ ῥητορικόν.
Bombulios: a kind of creature resembling a bee – and it is said to be from its resonating sound.  It is 
also a kind of cup, by analogy with the creature; and further, from the way it is constructed so that 
it resonates while drinking, and the oil-pot, in the same way as the narrow-apertured cup, is called 
bombulios.  I found the word applied to rhetoric in this way.
That the specific type of vessel referred to is a cup is noted in most sources (ποτήριον, TrGF 
19 F 64 = Poll. 6.99  βησίον in Phot. β205, Suda β375), though Erotian describes it as a kind 
of narrow-apertured jar (βικίου εἶδος στενοστόµου: p.29.10), and a scholion on Lucian also 
states that bombulioi are 'little jars' (πιθάκνια), and that a bombulios is a 'rounded vessel' (τὸ 
στρογγύλον: in Lex. 46.7–10.24 Rabe).  In Athenaeus βοµβυλιός is used to refer to a cocoon, 
confirming its rounded shape (8.352f).  A gloss from Galen (Gloss. p. 89 Kühn) states that it 
283 Das Etymologicum Symeonis (β). Berger 1972.
284 Lexica Segueriana. AG I.  I. Bekker, ed. 1814-21. Anecdota Graeca. 3 vols.  Berlin
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was a cup (ἔκπωµα) with a narrow mouth or lid, and he notes that it was named from its 
resonating sound, as does Hesychius (β802 Latte).  Referring to pipes-players, Aristophanes 
has Dicaeopolis say:  'Whence did these wash-offs vilely fly to my door, these drone-piping 
(βοµβαύλιοι) sons of Chaeris?' (Ar. Ach. 865-6).  A scholion explains that 'drone-piping' is 
used jestingly of the sound of the pipes-playing by adding an α to βοµβυλιός (866 Wilson  
Suda β371; cf. Erot.285 s.v. βοµβυλιοῦ).  A further comment from Galen gives the impression 
that the wine-cup could be prompted to resonate on demand (In Hippocratis librum vi 
epidemiarum commentarii vi ed. C. Kühn, vol. 17a, p.968, l.9):
Σαβῖνος  δὲ ἐκ  βοµβυλίου στενοστόµου πίνοντα κελεύει κινεῖν ἐρυγάς.  
<Sabinos>, orders someone drinking <from> a narrow-mouthed bombulios to make it belch. 
Capturing these various qualities LSJ (s.v.) defines the bombulios as a 'narrow-necked vessel 
that gurgles in pouring'.  In the Antisthenes fragments regarding the bombulios, those from 
Pollux (Sy5-6) and the scholion on Apollonius (Sy7) similarly describe it as 'narrow', 
'narrow-mouthed', or 'narrow-throated'.  Two of these fragments (Sy6-7) also mention its 
quality of resonating.
Thus the impression formed of the bombulios is of a smallish, rounded (almost bulbous) cup, 
with a protruding neck, that somehow makes a resonant sound when drinking.  In 
addition, it appears that due to its design, the bombulios had the capacity to regulate the 
flow of liquid, as implied by this passage from Paul of Aegina (vii AD; Epitomae medicae libri  
septem 3.9.3.28 Heiberg):
συχνότερον δὲ ὑποµνηστέον καὶ τὴν κατάποσιν, τῷ θερµῷ ὕδατι ἐπιρραίνοντάς τι τῶν ἡδέων 
ποµάτων, µάλιστα τοῦ ἀποµέλιτος, διὰ τῶν βοµβυλιῶν.  
And more so we must also remember the deglutition, sprinkling with hot water, by means of the 
bombulioi, one of the sweet draughts, especially of the honeyed sort.                          
This quality of restricting the flow of wine to a sprinkle or drips is confirmed by Socrates' 
comments about the bombulios in Athenaeus (Sy9).  He describes it as dripping only a little 
at a time.  Hesychius seems to have drawn on Athenaeus or a common source as he uses 
285 Erotiani vocum Hippocraticarum collectio. rec. Nachmanson 1918.
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identical language – (β802) βοµβυλιός· … κατὰ µικρὸν ποτὸν στάζοντος, 'bombulios: … 
dripping only a little beverage at a time'.  
Similar vessels in Xenophon's Symposion, Athenaeus, and Cicero.  We find Socrates again 
mentioning similar sorts of cups that sprinkle the wine in Xenophon's Symposion (2.26 = 
Ath. 11.504de, Stob. 3.19.18; pace Giannantoni it is not a fragment of Antisthenes – SSR 67):  
ἂν µὲν ἁθρόον τὸ ποτὸν ἐγχεώµεθα, ταχὺ ἡµῖν καὶ τὰ σώµατα καὶ αἱ γνῶµαι σφαλοῦνται, 
καὶ οὐδὲ ἀναπνεῖν, µὴ ὅτι λέγειν τι δυνησόµεθα: ἂν δὲ ἡµῖν οἱ παῖδες μικραῖς κύλιξι πυκνὰ 
ἐπιψακάζωσιν, ἵνα καὶ ἐγὼ ἐν Γοργιείοις ῥήµασιν εἴπω, οὕτως οὐ βιαζόµενοι µεθύειν ὑπὸ τοῦ 
οἴνου ἀλλ᾽ ἀναπειθόµενοι πρὸς τὸ παιγνιωδέστερον ἀφιξόµεθα.
(Socrates) If we pour in the drink all at once, our bodies and our minds will quickly be stumbling, 
and we will not be able to breathe, let alone converse about anything.  But if our slaves frequently 
sprinkle us with little wine-cups, if I might use the Gorgian expression, we will not be compelled 
to drunkenness from the wine but we will be seduced into a more playful state.
Here Xenophon, in imitation of Antisthenes, puts into Socrates' mouth the praise of small 
wine cups that sprinkle or drip the wine at a moderate rate.  The use of kylix here does not 
necessarily imply the broad, shallow, symposiastic wine cups that it is nowadays usually 
associated with.  Sparkes has commented that modern scholars have applied the names of 
some Greek pottery too precisely to known shapes, and gives the kylix as an example (2006, 
206).  The Suda (κ2665) has κύλιξ· φίαλη, ποτήριον, 'kylix: bowl, cup'.  A passage from 
Cassius Dio (see below) refers to a κύλιξ ῥοπαλωτή, 'club-shaped cup'.  So it seems that 
kylix may be used as a generic term for 'cup'.  Thus when Socrates uses the term µικραῖς 
κύλιξι, he means only 'little cups' without the modern definition of the shape being 
implied.  
There is a passage from Athenaeus (11.484f) discussing wine cups which shows that he had 
in mind the passage from Xenophon where Socrates is speaking about these 'little cups':
λεπαστή … ἀφ' ἧς ἔστι λάψαι, τουτέστιν ἁθρόως πιεῖν, κατεναντίον τῷ λεγοµένῳ βοµβυλιῷ.  
Lepaste is the word from which lapsai ('drink greedily') comes, which is to drink all at once, as 
opposed to what is called a bombulios.  
There is eye-catching similarity in the language used between Xenophontic Socrates' 
ἁθρόον τὸ ποτὸν 'the drink all at once' and Athenaeus' ἁθρόως πιεῖν, 'to drink all at once' 
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and the specific contrast between being sprinkled from little cups or drinking slowly from a 
bombulios.  Cicero also references this passage of Xenophon in de Senectute and adds some 
further detail about the cups (14.46): 
… delectant … et pocula, sicut in Symposio Xenophontis est, minuta atque rorantia, et refrigeratio 
aestate et vicissim aut sol aut ignis hibernus.
… and cups please me, such as those in Xenophon's Symposion, that are small and drip, and have 
both coolness in summer, and in turn warmth from the sun or fire in winter.  
Similarly to Xenophon's Socrates, Cicero states that he likes cups that are small and drip.  
However he is evidently drawing on another source – either his own experience with such 
cups, or information from another work – when he adds that these cups have a capacity to 
regulate temperature (probably in part due their narrow opening).  It appears from this 
passage of Cicero, and the one from Athenaeus just above, that there were parallel passages 
discussing bombulioi in the works of Antisthenes and Xenophon that were well known in 
antiquity.  In the case of Athenaeus, as well as reproducing Socrates' language from 
Xenophon, he also knew from Antisthenes (demonstrated just above and Sy9) that the sort 
of 'sprinkling' or 'dripping' vessel that Socrates was referring to was a bombulios.  In Cicero's 
case, he was probably adding his comments about temperature moderation also from 
material found in Antisthenes.  This suspicion seems to be confirmed by the fact that 
directly following the scholion (Sy7) from Apollonius reporting Antisthenes' definition of 
the bombulios, is the scholion (Sy8) containing the information known to Cicero, that a 
bombulios is also a wine-cooler.
Diaklusterērion, Sy8.  This word is not well attested.  LSJ s.v.  gives us διακλυστήριον = 
ψυκτήρ 'wine-cooler' and offers a reference to the Suda but no examples of usage.  There is, 
however, further evidence about the nature of such vessels in a passage from Cassius Dio 
(73.18.2): 
ἔπιεν ἐν µέσῃ τῇ ἀγωνίᾳ καµών, κύλικι ῥοπαλωτῇ παρὰ γυναικὸς γλυκὺν οἶνον ἐψυγµένον 
λαβών, ἀµυστί.
In the midst of the struggle he (Commodus) became weary, and in a club-shaped cup he took 
chilled sweet wine from a woman, and drained it.  
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This κύλιξ ῥοπαλωτή, 'club-shaped cup' matches the description of a bombulios, i.e.  
bulbous with a projecting, narrow neck, and it contains ἐψυγµένον 'chilled' wine.  In the 
Suda we find an entry for κύλιξ ῥοπαλωτή (κ2666) · τὸ παρὰ πολλοῖς διακλύστηρον.  
'club-shaped cup: in the judgement of many people, a diaklustēron'.  The Suda then relates, 
almost word for word, the same passage about Commodus from Dio.  
So while there is no consistent agreement on how the ending of διακλύστηρον / -ερον / 
-ήριον should be spelled, it seems certain that the word must be directly related to 
διακλύζειν 'to wash out or thoroughly'.  Though how this could also mean 'cool down' is 
not at first obvious, that is apparently its function.  In TGL the entry διακλυστήριον (s.v.) 
states that it was a ψυκτῆρα or ψυκτήριον, i.e.  'wine-cooler'.  It then quotes the Suda (ψ150 
= Sch. in Pl. Sym. 213e) – ψυκτὴρ, σκεῦος, ἔνθα διανίζουσι τὰ ποτήρια, 'psyktēr, vessel, 
where the cups were cooled down'.  Normally διανίζειν, just like διακλύζειν, means 'to 
wash, wash out' (as TGL notes 'Idem est διανίζειν et διακλύζειν'), but here clearly it means 
'to cool down'.  The next entry in Suda implies confirmation of this (ψ151):
<ψυκτῆρα:> κάδδον, ἢ ποτήριον µέγα.  ἀπὸ τοῦ θᾶττον ψύχεσθαι ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν κρᾶσιν.  
psyktēra: wine jar, or large cup.  From the temperature cooling more rapidly in it.
So the cup described by Dio and the Suda is club-shaped (i.e. thick at one end with a 
thinner, projecting handle or neck), and it cools the wine.  The quality of dripping the wine 
is not mentioned, but otherwise the description seems very compatible with the form 
imagined above for the bombulios.  Further evidence that the 'club-shaped cup' probably is 
the bombulios by another name is confirmed by the fact that the bombulios also had a 
tendency to cool the wine, as inferred from a passage from Hippocrates' On Diseases (3.16): 
µετὰ δὲ τὰ λουτρὰ καὶ οἶνον γλυκὺν ὑδαρέα προπίνειν, µὴ ψυχρόν, ὀλίγον ἐκ βοµβυλίου 
εὐροστόµου.  
omitted here is Littré's conj. in error of οὐκ before εὐροστόµου
After bathing, let the patient first drink sweet wine mixed with water, not cold, a small amount 
from a broad-necked bombulios.
In this passage the wine should be served 'not cold', therefore the bombulios that needs to be 
employed is of a broad-necked variety – unlike the normal narrow-mouthed form.  
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Although it is unclear exactly how the wine in a bombulios would have been cooled, it is 
likely that part of keeping it cool was the flow of air being regulated by the narrow 
opening.  Possibly, due to its bottle-like shape, it was also able to be placed or suspended in 
a larger vessel (such as a ψυκτήρ) of iced water.  Sparkes and Talcott list a smallish jug, that 
was found in the bottom of a well, with its cork firmly fixed in place that they presume was 
suspended in the well water to cool it (Agora 12, 353 & pl.77, 1665).  Due to the connection 
of wine-coolers to the verbs διακλύζειν and διανίζειν, probably the bombulios was cooled 
by being placed in water, or perhaps by being placed outside and kept wet so that 
evaporation cooled it.
The bombulios does not seem to have been identified anywhere in the archaeological record.  
An investigation and discussion of likely pot shapes is set out in Appendix C.
τῶν Ἀσιανῶν, Sy6.  Pollux writes that Antisthenes says the cup is called 'bombulios' by τῶν 
Ἀσιανῶν, 'the Asians'.  It is interesting to consider whom he means by this.  Thucydides 
mentions Ἀσιανοί (1.6), where 'Asians' are mentioned as a subset of barbarians but 
otherwise it is unclear who is being referred to.  He only uses this adjective form once more 
in regard to Magnesia (1.138) – to distinguish Magnesia on Maeander in Ionia (i.e. 'Asia') 
from Magnesia in Thessaly (Hornblower ad loc.).  The LSJ Supplement usefully adds to the 
entry for Ἀσία: 'perh. orig. a name for Lydia and then extended to all the hinterland of Ionia 
and eventually over the continent.'  In the time of Croesus (mid sixth century) Lydia 
included most of western Anatolia.  So while Thucydides was probably excluding Eastern 
Greeks of Aeolia, Ionia and Doris by using 'Asians' as a subgroup of barbarians, 
geographically he considered them to be living in 'Asia'.  So Antisthenes may well have 
been including these Greeks and possibly also those living in Rhodes when he referred to 
Asians.  In which case the fact that Athenaeus (18d) reports that the bombulios is Rhodian 
would not conflict with Antisthenes saying that it was called such by the Asians.
Sy10. Influenced by the words περὶ χρήσεως (§33), Decleva Caizzi and Giannantoni 
thought that the title of the work being discussed by Aristides might be better extrapolated 
to read in full, περὶ οἴνου χρήσεως, in order to match part of an entry in Diogenes Laertius' 
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catalogue (6.18), i.e.: περὶ οἴνου χρήσεως ἢ περὶ µέθης ἢ περὶ τοῦ κύκλωπος, Concerning 
the Use of Wine or Concerning Drunkenness or Concerning the Tale of the Cyclops.  Decleva 
Caizzi prints it in her 'Frammenti da opera precisate' category as the sole fragment under 
the sub-heading περὶ οἴνου χρήσεως.  Giannantoni on the other hand prints this as 
Homerica, because of the reference in the extended catalogue title to the Cyclops.  
Neither of these placements tallies altogether well with the actual contents of the work 
under discussion, as recounted by Aristides.  He tells us (§31) that in the work a god gave 
advice to a competitor in a contest on how to win (viz. by drinking water), and, accordingly, 
that the subtitle of the work was 'Lover of Crowns or The Crown Lover'.  In Aristides' account 
there is no reference to either drunkenness or the Cyclops which are mentioned in Diogenes 
Laertius' extended title.  Though Aristides states that the work referred to wine (§33), the 
emphasis of the god's advice was placed just as much on the drinking of water as the 
abstention from wine.
Encomia to sympotic objects.  On the evidence that can be gleaned from Aristides, it seems 
possible, if not likely, that this fragment actually belongs to the same genre as Sy4-9, of 
praising objects present at the symposion.  Speculating along these lines, from the subtitle 
that Aristides mentions, in this case it would be natural to assume that perhaps crowns are 
being praised.  That symposiasts were typically garlanded is well attested (Ath. 15.675d-6c, 
Campbell 2003, 411), and any discourse in praise of wreaths or crowns would be able quite 
naturally to move on to discussing the types of wreaths that were awarded for various 
competitions, ranging from athletic games through to dramatic festivals.  The inclusion 
reference to water and wine when making such a discourse in a sympotic setting would be 
equally natural.
In keeping, however, with the other common objects that were being praised in 
Antisthenes' work – piss-pots, salt, bombulioi – it seems more likely that the object being 
praised here is in fact water.  What greater crescendo could there be to a notional Encomium 
to Water than to show how it facilitates being crowned victor?  It is possible to imagine then, 
that the title περὶ χρήσεως, Concerning Use, was an all-encompassing title attached to 
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Antisthenes' discussions in praise of the use of a range of sympotic objects.  Aristides 
mentions (§33) that the book 'referred to wine' (ἔφερεν ... εἰς οἶνον).  This is pleonastic, 
given that immediately beforehand Aristides had recounted the god's advice concerning 
wine.  So by the logic followed here, that the work was a collection of speeches of praise, it 
seems that water must be added to the list of things being eulogised.  This of course would 
be completely in keeping with the sympotic setting.  It seems an educated guess then to 
assume that the 'tokens of Dionysus' refer to bombulioi, piss-pots, salt, and other 
accoutrements of the symposion. 
Aristides states that the part of the work he is referring to is at the end of the book.  In this 
case, perhaps the sub-title, The Crown Lover, applied to that section only.  Given the scant 
attestation for titling books at the time Antisthenes was writing, this would very likely 
represent a subsequent division and titling of the work.  
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Appendix A – Antisthenes' Ajax & Odysseus286
ΑΙΑΣ Η ΑΙΑΝΤΟΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ
Aj.1.1 Ἐβουλόµην ἂν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἡµῖν δικάζειν οἵπερ καὶ
ἐν τοῖς πράγµασι παρῆσαν· οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ἐµὲ µὲν ἔδει
σιωπᾶν, τούτῳ δ᾽ οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν πλέον λέγοντι· νῦν δὲ οἱ
µὲν παραγενόµενοι τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτοῖς ἄπεισιν, ὑµεῖς δὲ οἱ
1.5 οὐδὲν εἰδότες δικάζετε. καίτοι ποία τις ἂν δίκη δικαστῶν
µὴ εἰδότων γένοιτο, καὶ ταῦτα διὰ λόγων; τὸ δὲ πρᾶγµα
ἐγίγνετο ἔργῳ. 
2.1 τὸ µὲν οὖν σῶµα τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως
ἐκόµισα ἐγὼ φέρων, τὰ δὲ ὅπλα ὅδε, ἐπιστάµενος ὅτι οὐ
τῶν ὅπλων µᾶλλον ἐπεθύµουν οἱ Τρῶες ἀλλὰ τοῦ νεκροῦ
κρατῆσαι. τοῦ µὲν γὰρ εἰ ἐκράτησαν, ᾐκίσαντό τε ἂν
2.5 τὸ σῶµα καὶ τὰ λύτρα τοῦ Ἕκτορος ἐκοµίσαντο· τὰ
δὲ ὅπλα τάδε οὐκ ἂν ἀνέθεσαν τοῖς θεοῖς ἀλλ᾽ ἀπέ-
κρυψαν,
3.1 δεδιότες τόνδε τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα, ὃς καὶ
πρότερον ἱεροσυλήσας αὐτῶν τὸ ἄγαλµα τῆς θεοῦ
νύκτωρ ὥσπερ τι καλὸν ἐργασάµενος ἐπεδείκνυτο τοῖς
Ἀχαιοῖς. κἀγὼ µὲν ἀξιῶ λαβεῖν ἵν᾽ ἀποδῶ τὰ ὅπλα τοῖς
3.5 φίλοις, οὗτος δὲ ἵν᾽ ἀποδῶται, ἐπεὶ χρῆσθαί γε αὐτοῖς
οὐκ ἂν τολµήσειε· δειλὸς γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπισήµοις ὅπλοις
χρήσαιτο, εἰδὼς ὅτι τὴν δειλίαν αὐτοῦ ἐκφαίνει τὰ ὅπλα.
Ajax or Logos of Ajax
Aj.1.1 I wish I was being tried by the very people who were there with us during this venture. 
For I know that while I would only need to be silent, nothing would be gained by this man 
by arguing.  But as it is, those who were there during these deeds are absent, and you 1.5 
ignorant men are judging me.  What sort of justice could one receive from judges who are 
ignorant? And by arguments at that! But the endeavour came about via action.   
2.1 While I picked up and carried the body of Achilles, this man took the arms, knowing that 
the Trojans were not more eager about the arms, but rather to gain control of the body.  For 
if they had gained control of it, they would have ravaged 2.5 his body and gained requital 
for Hector.  But the arms, these they would not have dedicated to their gods, but would 
have | hidden them away 3.1 out of fear of this “brave” man, who had also previously 
robbed their temple of the statue of the goddess by night, and as if he were carrying out 
some noble deed he displayed it to the Achaeans.  And I indeed I think I deserve to receive 
them, so that I can restore 3.5 the arms to his friends.  But this man, so that he can sell them, 
since he surely would not dare to use them.  For no coward uses conspicuous arms – he 
knows that the arms make his cowardice obvious.
286 Found in MS Palatinus (Bekker X) and its relatives = DC 14 & 15, SSR 53 & 54.
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4.1 σχεδὸν µὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἅπαντα ὅµοια. οἵ τε γὰρ διαθέν-
τες τὸν ἀγῶνα φάσκοντες εἶναι βασιλεῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς
κρίνειν ἐπέτρεψαν ἄλλοις, οἵ τε οὐδὲν εἰδότες δικάσειν
ὑπισχνεῖσθε περὶ ὧν οὐκ ἴστε. ἐγὼ δὲ ἐπίσταµαι τοῦτο, 
4.5 ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἂν βασιλεὺς ἱκανὸς ὢν περὶ ἀρετῆς κρίνειν
ἐπιτρέψειεν ἄλλοις µᾶλλον ἤπερ ἀγαθὸς ἰατρὸς διαγνῶναι
νοσήµατα ἄλλῳ παρείη. 
5.1 καὶ εἰ µὲν ἦν µοι πρὸς ἄνδρα ὁµοιότροπον, οὐδ᾽ ἂν
ἡττᾶσθαί µοι διέφερε· νῦν δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν ὃ διαφέρει πλέον
ἐµοῦ καὶ τοῦδε. ὃ µὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅ τι ἂν δράσειε
φανερῶς, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἂν λάθρᾳ τολµήσαιµι πρᾶξαι.
5.5 κἀγὼ µὲν οὐκ ἂν ἀνασχοίµην κακῶς ἀκούων, οὐδὲ γὰρ
κακῶς πάσχων, ὃ δὲ κἂν κρεµάµενος, εἰ κερδαίνειν τι
µέλλοι·
6.1 ὅστις γε µαστιγοῦν παρεῖχε τοῖς δούλοις καὶ
τύπτειν ξύλοις τὰ νῶτα καὶ πυγµαῖς τὸ πρόσωπον, κἄπειτα
περιβαλόµενος ῥάκη, τῆς νυκτὸς εἰς τὸ τεῖχος εἰσδὺς τῶν
πολεµίων, ἱεροσυλήσας ἀπῆλθε. καὶ ταῦτα ὁµολογήσει
6.5 ποιεῖν, ἴσως δὲ καὶ πείσει, λέγων ὡς καλῶς πέπρακται. 
ἔπειτα τῶν Ἀχιλλέως ὅπλων ὅδε ὁ µαστιγίας καὶ ἱερό-
συλος ἀξιοῖ κρατῆσαι;  
4.1 So it is more or less the same all over.  For those men who arranged the contest, though 
they claim to be kings, entrusted the judgement of excellence to others, and you who are 
ignorant have undertaken to judge a matter about which you have no clue.  But I know this: 
4.5 that no king competent to judge about excellence would entrust this to others any more 
than a good doctor would allow the diagnosis of illnesses by another.
5.1 And if I were opposed to a man of similar character to myself, being defeated would not 
matter to me.  But as it is, nothing could be more different than me and him.  For while 
there is no exploit he would do openly, I would not dare to do anything surreptitiously.
5.5 And whereas I could not bear a cowardly reputation, nor to be mistreated, he would 
endure being strung up for flogging if he could derive any profit by it. 6.1 He who in fact did 
submit himself to being flogged by slaves, and being beaten with rods on the back, and 
punched with fists in the face, and then having thrown rags about himself, by night he 
crept inside the walls of the enemy, and having committed temple-robbery, he came back.  
And this he will admit 6.5 to doing.  And perhaps he will be persuasive – arguing that it is a 
splendid achievement.  And then this man – who has been flogged and is a temple-robber – 
thinks he deserves to gain possession of the arms of Achilles?
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7.1 ἐγὼ µὲν οὖν ὑµῖν λέγω τοῖς οὐδὲν εἰδόσι κριταῖς
καὶ δικασταῖς, µὴ εἰς τοὺς λόγους σκοπεῖν περὶ ἀρετῆς
κρίνοντας, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς τὰ ἔργα µᾶλλον. καὶ γὰρ ὁ πόλεµος οὐ
λόγῳ κρίνεται ἀλλ᾽ ἔργῳ· οὐδ᾽ ἀντιλέγειν ἔξεστι πρὸς τοὺς
7.5 πολεµίους, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ µαχοµένους κρατεῖν ἢ δουλεύειν σιωπῇ.
πρὸς ταῦτα ἀθρεῖτε καὶ σκοπεῖτε· ὡς, εἰ µὴ δικάσετε
καλῶς, γνώσεσθε ὅτι οὐδεµίαν ἔχει λόγος πρὸς ἔργον
ἰσχύν, 
8.1 οὐδ᾽ ἔστιν ὑµᾶς ὅ τι λέγων ἀνὴρ ὠφελήσει,
εἴσεσθε δὲ ἀκριβῶς ὅτι δι᾽ ἀπορίαν ἔργων πολλοὶ καὶ
µακροὶ λόγοι287 λέγονται. ἀλλ᾽ ἢ λέγετε ὅτι οὐ ξυνίετε
τὰ λεγόµενα, καὶ ἀνίστασθε, ἢ δικάζετε ὀρθῶς. καὶ ταῦ-
8.5 τα µὴ κρύβδην φέρετε, ἀλλὰ φανερῶς, ἵνα γνῶτε ὅτι
καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς δικάζουσι δοτέα δίκη ἐστίν, ἂν µὴ δικάσω-
σιν ὀρθῶς. κἄπειτ᾽ ἴσως γνώσεσθε ὅτι οὐ κριταὶ τῶν
λεγοµένων ἀλλὰ δοξασταὶ288 κάθησθε.
9.1 ἐγὼ δὲ διαγιγνώσκειν µὲν ὑµῖν περὶ ἐµοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐµῶν ἐπιτρέπω, διαδο-
ξάζειν δὲ ἅπασιν ἀπαγορεύω, καὶ ταῦτα περὶ ἀνδρός,
ὃς οὐχ ἑκὼν ἀλλ᾽ ἄκων ἀφῖκται εἰς Τροίαν, καὶ περὶ
9.5 ἐµοῦ ὃς πρῶτος ἀεὶ καὶ µόνος καὶ ἄνευ τείχους τέταγµαι.
7.1 On the contrary, I enjoin you ignorant men – judges and jurymen – not to consider 
arguments when you are deciding about excellence, but rather to consider deeds.  For 
indeed war is not decided by argument but by action.  It is not possible to gainsay the 
7.5 enemy, but either to fight and conquer, or be enslaved – in silence.  Look at and consider 
this!  That unless you judge well, you will come to realise that argument has no power in 
comparison with action;  8.1 and nor is there any way an arguing man will aid you, but you 
will know to a nicety that because of a dearth of deeds, many and long arguments are 
argued.  But either admit that you do not understand the arguments made, and adjourn;  or 
judge correctly!  And do this 8.5 not secretly, but openly!  So that you may realise that 
there is a penalty that must be paid by the judges themselves, if they do not judge correctly.  
And then perhaps you will also recognise that you are seated here not as judges over the 
arguments but merely as guessers.
9.1 But while I rely upon you to make determination about me and my affairs, I forbid you 
in all areas from making guesses, and this matter is about a man, who not willingly but 
rather unwillingly came to Troy, and about 9.5 me, who am always stationed first, and alone, 
and without walls.
287 µακρὸς λόγος. Denyer 2008, 121, n.329b2: 'used in particular for the rambling and incoherent rigmarole 
in which a slave tries to excuse his misdeeds (Eur. IA 313 “slave that you are, you're telling me µακροὺς 
… λόγους”; Arist. Met. 1091a7-9 “ὁ µακρὸς λόγος, like that of slaves when they have nothing 
wholesome to say”; Simonides (fr. 653 PMG) may have written a whole book of such speeches.'
288 cf. δόξα: LSJ s.v. A.II.2. speaking by guess.
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ΟΔΥΣΣΕΥΣ Η ΟΔΥΣΣΕΩΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ
Od.1.1 οὐ πρὸς σέ µοι µόνον ὁ λόγος, δι᾽ ὃν ἀνέστην, ἀλλὰ
καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας· πλείω γὰρ ἀγαθὰ πεποίηκα
τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐγὼ ἢ ὑµεῖς ἅπαντες. καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ζῶντος
ἂν ἔλεγον Ἀχιλλέως, καὶ νῦν τεθνεῶτος λέγω πρὸς ὑµᾶς.
1.5 ὑµεῖς µὲν γὰρ οὐδεµίαν ἄλλην µάχην µεµάχησθε, ἣν
οὐχὶ καὶ ἐγὼ µεθ᾽ ὑµῶν· ἐµοὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδίων κινδύνων οὐδεὶς
ὑµῶν οὐδὲν ξύνοιδε.
2.1 καίτοι ἐν µὲν ταῖς κοιναῖς µάχαις,
οὐδὲ εἰ καλῶς ἀγωνίζοισθε, πλέον ἐγίγνετο οὐδέν· ἐν δὲ
τοῖς ἐµοῖς κινδύνοις, οὓς ἐγὼ µόνος ἐκινδύνευον, εἰ
µὲν κατορθώσαιµι, ἅπαντα ὑµῖν ἐπετελεῖτο, ὧν ἕνεκα
2.5 δεῦρο ἀφίγµεθα, εἰ δ᾽ ἐσφάλην, ἐµοῦ ἂν ἑνὸς ἀνδρὸς
ἐστέρησθε. οὐ γὰρ ἵνα µαχοίµεθα τοῖς Τρωσὶ δεῦρ᾽
ἀφίγµεθα, ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα τήν τε Ἑλένην ἀπολάβοιµεν καὶ τὴν
Τροίαν ἕλοιµεν.
3.1 ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ἐµοῖς κινδύνοις
ἐνῆν ἅπαντα. ὅπου γὰρ ἦν κεχρηµένον ἀνάλωτον εἶναι
τὴν Τροίαν, εἰ µὴ πρότερον τὸ ἄγαλµα τῆς θεοῦ λάβοιµεν
τὸ κλαπὲν παρ᾽ ἡµῶν, τίς ἐστιν ὁ κοµίσας δεῦρο τὸ ἄγαλ-
3.5 µα ἄλλος ἢ ἐγώ; ὃν σύ γε ἱεροσυλίας κρίνεις. σὺ γὰρ
οὐδὲν οἶσθα, ὅστις τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἀνασώσαντα τὸ
ἄγαλµα τῆς θεοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸν ὑφελόµενον παρ᾽ ἡµῶν 
Ἀλέξανδρον, ἀποκαλεῖς ἱερόσυλον.
Odysseus or the Logos of Odysseus
Od.1.1 My argument – for which I rose to speak – is not to you alone, but also to all the others. 
For I have done the army greater good than all of you.  And these things, that I would have 
said to you even if Achilles were alive, I am saying to you now that he is dead.  1.5 For you 
fought no battle, but those which I also fought with you.  But none of you shares with me 
the knowledge of the risks I took on my own.  
2.1 And indeed, in these shared battles, not even if you had contended honourably, would 
any more have been achieved.  But in respect of my ventures – through which I alone 
hazarded the dangers – if in fact I have executed them successfully, then all the goals for 
which we came to this place have been accomplished 2.5 for you, and if I had failed, you 
would have been deprived of but one man.  For it was not to fight against the Trojans that 
we came here, but to recover Helen and capture Troy.  3.1 And all these depended on my 
ventures.  For example, when the oracle pronounced Troy impregnable unless we had first 
seized the statue of the goddess by our subterfuge; who conveyed the statue here 3.5 other 
than I, the man whom you (Ajax) adjudge guilty of temple-robbery?  For you are ignorant, 
you who call the man who recovered the statue of the goddess 'temple-robber', but not 
Alexander who stole from us!
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4.1 καὶ τὴν Τροίαν
µὲν ἁλῶναι ἅπαντες εὔχεσθε, ἐµὲ δὲ τὸν ἐξευρόντα ὅπως
ἔσται τοῦτο, ἀποκαλεῖς ἱερόσυλον; καίτοι εἴπερ καλόν γε
ἦν ἑλεῖν τὸ Ἴλιον, καλὸν καὶ τὸ εὑρεῖν τὸ τούτου αἴτιον.
4.5 καὶ οἱ µὲν ἄλλοι χάριν ἔχουσι, σὺ δὲ καὶ ὀνειδίζεις ἐµοί.
ὑπὸ γὰρ ἀµαθίας ὧν εὖ πέπονθας οὐδὲν οἶσθα.
5.1 κἀγὼ
µὲν οὐκ ὀνειδίζω σοι τὴν ἀµαθίαν – ἄκων γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ
σὺ καὶ ἄλλοι πεπόνθασιν ἅπαντες – ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι διὰ τὰ ὀνεί-
δη τὰ ἐµὰ σῳζόµενος οὐχ οἷός τε εἶ πείθεσθαι, ἀλλὰ
5.5 καὶ προσαπειλεῖς ὡς κακὸν δράσων τι τούσδε, ἐὰν ἐµοὶ
τὰ ὅπλα ψηφίσωνται. καὶ πολλάκις γε ἀπειλήσεις καὶ
πολλά, πρὶν καὶ σµικρόν τι ἐργάσασθαι· ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ ἐκ
τῶν εἰκότων τι χρὴ τεκµαίρεσθαι, ὑπὸ τῆς κακῆς ὀργῆς
οἴοµαί σε κακόν τι σαυτὸν ἐργάσεσθαι. 
6.1 καὶ ἐµοὶ µέν, ὅτι τοὺς πολεµίους κακῶς ἐποίησα,
δειλίαν ὀνειδίζεις· σὺ δὲ ὅτι φανερῶς ἐµόχθεις καὶ µάτην,
ἠλίθιος ἦσθα. <ἢ> ὅτι µετὰ πάντων τοῦτο ἔδρασας, οἴει
βελτίων εἶναι; ἔπειτα περὶ ἀρετῆς πρὸς ἐµὲ λέγεις; ὃς 
6.5 πρῶτον µὲν οὐκ οἶσθα οὐδ᾽ ὅπως ἔδει µάχεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ
ὗς ἄγριος ὀργῇ φερόµενος τάχ᾽ ἄν ποτε ἀποκτενεῖς σεαυτὸν 
κακῷ περιπεσών τῷ. οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἀγαθὸν
4.1 And while every one of you is praying that Troy be captured, I, who discovered how this 
will come to pass, you brand 'temple-robber'?  And yet if it was really noble to capture Ilios, 
it was also noble to discover the means to do it.  4.5 And while the others are grateful, you go 
so far as to reproach me.  For through stupidity you are ignorant of the benefits you have 
received.
5.1 And I in fact am not reproaching you for your stupidity – for both you and all others who 
suffer this condition do so involuntarily – but rather, the fact that you are incapable of 
believing, due to the slanders which you brought against me, that you were saved by me.  
And 5.5 you are even threatening in addition that you will do some harm against these men, 
if they were to vote the arms to me.  And indeed you will threaten often and much, before 
you will accomplish even the slightest thing.  But if one must form a judgement from 
probability, I think that by your wicked rage you will do some harm to your very self.
6.1 And so you rebuke me for cowardice because I have done harm to the enemy.  But 
because you were toiling openly and in vain, you were foolish.  Or is it because you have 
done this along with everyone, you think you are better?  And then you speak to me about 
excellence? You who 6.5 in the first place don't know even how you ought to fight, but just 
like a wild pig is carried away by anger, perhaps one day you will kill yourself when you 
fall upon something evil.  Do you not know that a brave warrior should not suffer evil in 
any way whatsoever, 
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οὔθ᾽ ὑφ᾽ αὑτοῦ χρὴ οὔθ᾽ ὑφ᾽ ἑταίρου οὔθ᾽ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεµίων
κακὸν οὐδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν πάσχειν;
7.1 σὺ δὲ ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες χαί-
ρεις, ὅτι σέ φασιν οἵδε ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι; ἐγὼ δὲ δειλότατόν
γε ἁπάντων τε καὶ δεδιότα τὸν θάνατον µάλιστα· ὅστις γε
πρῶτον ὅπλα ἔχεις ἄρρηκτα καὶ ἄτρωτα, δι᾽ ἅπερ σέ
7.5 φασιν ἄτρωτον εἶναι. καίτοι τί ἂν δράσεις, εἴ τις σοὶ
τῶν πολεµίων τοιαῦτα ὅπλα ἔχων προσέλθοι; ἦ που κα-
λόν τι καὶ θαυµαστὸν ἂν εἴη, εἰ µηδέτερος ὑµῶν µηδὲν
δρᾶσαι δύναιτο. ἔπειτα οἴει τι διαφέρειν τοιαῦτα ὅπλα
ἔχων ἢ ἐντὸς τείχους καθῆσθαι; καὶ σοὶ µόνῳ δὴ τεῖχος
7.10 οὐκ ἔστιν ὡς σὺ φῄς· µόνος µὲν οὖν σύ γε ἑπταβόειον
περιέρχῃ τεῖχος προβαλλόµενος ἑαυτοῦ·
8.1 ἐγὼ δὲ
ἄοπλος οὐ πρὸς τὰ τείχη τῶν πολεµίων ἀλλ᾽ εἰς αὐτὰ
εἰσέρχοµαι τὰ τείχη, καὶ τῶν πολεµίων τοὺς προφύλακας
ἐγρηγορότας αὐτοῖς ὅπλοισιν αἱρῶ, καὶ εἰµὶ στρατηγὸς
8.5 καὶ φύλαξ καὶ σοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων, καὶ οἶδα τὰ
τ᾽ ἐνθάδε καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς πολεµίοις, οὐχὶ πέµπων κατασκε-
ψόµενον ἄλλον· ἀλλ᾽ αὐτός, ὥσπερ οἱ κυβερνῆται τὴν νύκτα
καὶ τὴν ἡµέραν σκοποῦσιν ὅπως σώσουσι τοὺς ναύτας,
οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἔγωγε καὶ σὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας σῴζω.
not by his own hand, or his companion's nor even at the hands of his enemies?
7.1 But do you delight just as children do, because these men say that you are brave?  But I 
say you are actually the greatest coward of all and fear death exceedingly.   You who firstly 
have arms that are indestructible, on account of which 7.5 they say that you are invulnerable. 
And indeed what would you do, if one of your enemies were to approach you bearing such 
arms?  For surely this would be something fine and marvellous, if neither of you were able 
to do anything!  Secondly, do you think there is any difference between bearing such arms 
and being ensconced within a city-wall?  For you alone 7.10 there is no wall – so you say.  Yet 
in fact it is you alone who go around with a seven-ox-hide wall wrapped around yourself.
8.1 Whereas I go unarmed, not just up to the walls of the enemy, but inside the very walls 
themselves.  And I overpowered the watchful sentries of the enemy with their own 
weapons, and I am the general 8.5 and protector of both you and all of the others,  and I 
know what is going on here and among the enemy, and not because I send another spying; 
but I myself, just as helmsmen keep watch – through the night and through the day, so that 
they save the sailors – so I am the one who saves both you and all the others.
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9.1 οὐδ᾽ ἔστιν ὅντινα κίνδυνον ἔφυγον αἰσχρὸν ἡγησά-
µενος, ἐν ᾧ µέλλοιµι τοὺς πολεµίους κακόν τι δράσειν·
οὐδ᾽ εἰ µὲν ὄψεσθαί µέ τινες ἔµελλον, γλιχόµενος ἂν τοῦ
δοκεῖν ἐτόλµων· ἀλλ᾽ εἴτε δοῦλος εἴτε πτωχὸς καὶ µα-
9.5 στιγίας ὢν µέλλοιµι τοὺς πολεµίους κακόν τι δράσειν, ἐπε-
χείρουν ἄν, καὶ εἰ µηδεὶς ὁρῴη. οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ὁ πόλεµος
ἀλλὰ δρᾶν ἀεὶ καὶ ἐν ἡµέρᾳ καὶ ἐν νυκτὶ φιλεῖ τι. οὐδὲ
ὅπλα ἐστί µοι τεταγµένα, ἐν οἷς προκαλοῦµαι τοὺς
πολεµίους µάχεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ὅντινα ἐθέλει τις τρόπον, καὶ
9.10 πρὸς ἕνα καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς ἕτοιµός εἰµ᾽ ἀεί.
10.1 οὐδ᾽ ἡνίκα
κάµνω µαχόµενος, ὥσπερ σύ, τὰ ὅπλα ἑτέροις παραδί-
δωµι, ἀλλ᾽ ὁπόταν ἀναπαύωνται οἱ πολέµιοι, τότε αὐτοῖς
τῆς νυκτὸς ἐπιτίθεµαι, ἔχων τοιαῦτα ὅπλα ἃ ἐκείνους 
10.5 βλάψει µάλιστα. καὶ οὐδὲ νὺξ πώποτέ µε ἀφείλετο, ὥσπερ
σὲ πολλάκις µαχόµενον ἄσµενον πέπαυκεν· ἀλλ᾽ ἡνίκα ἂν
ῥέγχῃς σύ, τηνικαῦτα ἐγὼ σῴζω σέ, καὶ τοὺς πολεµίους
ἀεὶ κακόν τι ποιῶ, ἔχων τὰ δουλοπρεπῆ ταῦτα ὅπλα καὶ
τὰ ῥάκη καὶ τὰς µάστιγας, δι᾽ ἃς σὺ ἀσφαλῶς καθεύδεις. 
11.1 σὺ δ᾽ ὅτι φέρων ἐκόµισας τὸν νεκρόν, ἀνδρεῖος οἴει
εἶναι; ὃν εἰ µὴ ἠδύνω φέρειν, δύο ἄνδρες ἂν ἐφερέτην,
κἄπειτα κἀκεῖνοι περὶ ἀρετῆς ἴσως ἂν ἡµῖν ἠµφισβήτουν.
9.1 And there is no danger that I shirked, because I thought it shameful, provided I could do 
some damage to the enemy. And not even if some people were likely to witness me, would I 
have undertaken my ventures out of lust for a glorious reputation; but either as a slave, or 
as a beggar and knave, 9.5 intending to do some harm to the enemy, I would make my 
attempt, even if no one was watching.  For war does not lend itself to making glorious 
displays, but to taking action continuously both by day and by night.  I have no prescribed 
armaments in which I challenge the enemy to fight, but by whatever way anyone wants, 
and 9.10 against one or against many, I am always ready.
10.1 When I grow weary I do not, as you do, hand over my arms to another, but whenever 
the enemy rests, then I attack them in the night, bearing such armaments as will 10.5 harm 
them the most.  And nor has the night ever yet hindered me, as it has many times readily 
stopped you fighting.  But when you are snoring, at precisely that time I keep you safe; and 
ever doing some harm to the enemy – bearing these servile weapons, and rags, and lash 
marks – during which you securely sleep.
11.1 And did you think that picking up and carrying the body was brave?  Which if you had 
not been able to pick up, two men would have picked up, and then they would have 
perhaps been disputing with us over the prize of valour.
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κἀµοὶ µὲν ὁ αὐτὸς ἂν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἦν λόγος· σὺ δὲ τί ἂν 
11.5 ἔλεγες ἀµφισβητῶν πρὸς αὐτούς; ἢ δυοῖν µὲν οὐκ ἂν
φροντίσαις, ἑνὸς δ᾽ ἂν αἰσχύνοιο ὁµολογῶν δειλότερος
εἶναι; 
12.1 οὐκ οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι οὐ τοῦ νεκροῦ τοῖς Τρωσὶν ἀλλὰ
τῶν ὅπλων ἔµελεν ὅπως λάβοιεν; τὸν µὲν γὰρ ἀποδώσειν
ἔµελλον, τὰ δὲ ὅπλα ἀναθήσειν εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ τοῖς θεοῖς. τοὺς
γὰρ νεκροὺς οὐ τοῖς οὐκ ἀναιρουµένοις αἰσχρόν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς
12.5 µὴ ἀποδιδοῦσι θάπτειν. σὺ µὲν οὖν τὰ ἕτοιµα ἐκόµισας·
ἐγὼ δὲ τὰ ὀνειδιζόµενα ἀφειλόµην ἐκείνους.
13.1 φθόνον δὲ καὶ ἀµαθίαν νοσεῖς, κακῶν ἐναντι-
ώτατα αὑτοῖς· καὶ ὃ µέν σε ἐπιθυµεῖν ποιεῖ τῶν καλῶν,
ἣ δὲ ἀποτρέπει. ἀνθρώπινον µὲν οὖν τι πέπονθας· διότι
γὰρ ἰσχυρός, οἴει καὶ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι. οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι σοφίᾳ 
13.5 περὶ πόλεµον καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἰσχῦσαι; ἀµαθία
δὲ κακὸν µέγιστον τοῖς ἔχουσιν. | 14.1 οἶµαι δ᾽, ἐάν
ποτέ τις ἄρα σοφὸς ποιητὴς περὶ ἀρετῆς γένηται, ἐµὲ
µὲν ποιήσει πολύτλαντα καὶ πολύµητιν καὶ πολυµήχανον
καὶ πτολίπορθον καὶ µόνον τὴν Τροίαν ἑλόντα, σὲ δέ,
14.5 ὡς ἐγᾦµαι, τὴν φύσιν ἀπεικάζων τοῖς τε νωθέσιν ὄνοις
καὶ βουσὶ τοῖς φορβάσιν, ἄλλοις παρέχουσι δεσµεύειν καὶ | ζευγνύναι αὑτούς.
And I would have been delivering this very argument to them; and what would you 11.5 be 
saying as you disputed against them?  Or would you have given no heed to two, but feel 
shame to admit to being more cowardly than one?
12.1 Are you ignorant that the body was of no concern to the Trojans but it was the arms that 
they were eager to seize?  For they were going to give back the body, but the the arms they 
were going to dedicate at their temples to the gods. For those failing to take up bodies don't 
have shame, but rather those do 12.5 who don't give them up for burial.  So you carried away 
what was easy, while I took from them the things which, by my seizing, brings them 
reproach. 13.1 You are suffering from envy and ignorance, the most antithetical of evils to 
each other: the one makes you desire noble things, the other turns you away from them.  So 
you are the victim of a particularly human frailty – for since you are strong, you suppose 
that you are also brave.  Are you ignorant that 13.5 cleverness and bravery in battle is not the 
same thing as being strong?  Stupidity is the greatest evil to those who have it. 
14.1 But I believe, that if there ever arises a poet who is shrewd concerning excellence, he will 
portray me as much enduring, and much wily, and much scheming, and a sacker of cities – 
the one who alone seized Troy.  But you, 14.5 I believe, he will depict with a nature 
resembling that of lazy donkeys289 and grazing cattle – permitting others to chain and yoke 
them.
289 cf. Il. 11.555ff.
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Appendix B – The Hippias Minor
The genuineness of the Hippias Minor as a dialogue of Plato has frequently been questioned. 
Elements of the style and content have aroused suspicion, but the fact that the work is 
mentioned by Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias, has generally been considered proof 
that the work is Plato's.  Some scholars still remain a little baffled by it though: 
'Philosophically speaking, the Hippias Minor is one of the most puzzling of all Platonic 
dialogues, since it concludes not simply with a paradox but with a moral falsehood: that the 
one who does wrong voluntarily is a better person than the one who does wrong 
unintentionally' (Kahn 1996, 113).  Aristotle himself appears to be fascinated by the puzzles 
presented by the Hippias Minor as made clear by the passage from the Metaphysics that is 
claimed to prove Plato's authorship (1024b32-1025a13 Ross):290 
διὸ Ἀντισθένης ᾤετο εὐήθως µηθὲν ἀξιῶν λέγεσθαι πλὴν τῷ οἰκείῳ λόγῳ, ἓν ἐφ᾽ ἑνός· ἐξ ὧν 
συνέβαινε µὴ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν, σχεδὸν δὲ µηδὲ ψεύδεσθαι. ἔστι δ᾽ ἕκαστον λέγειν οὐ µόνον τῷ 
αὐτοῦ λόγῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ἑτέρου, ψευδῶς µὲν καὶ παντελῶς, ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς καὶ ἀληθῶς, ὥσπερ τὰ 
ὀκτὼ διπλάσια τῷ τῆς δυάδος λόγῳ. τὰ µὲν οὖν οὕτω λέγεται ψευδῆ, ἄνθρωπος δὲ ψευδὴς ὁ 
εὐχερὴς καὶ προαιρετικὸς τῶν τοιούτων λόγων, µὴ δι᾽ ἕτερόν τι ἀλλὰ δι᾽ αὐτό, καὶ ὁ ἄλλοις 
ἐµποιητικὸς τῶν τοιούτων λόγων, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ πράγµατά φαµεν ψευδῆ εἶναι ὅσα ἐµποιεῖ 
φαντασίαν ψευδῆ. διὸ ὁ ἐν τῷ Ἱππίᾳ λόγος παρακρούεται ὡς ὁ αὐτὸς ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθής. τὸν 
δυνάµενον γὰρ ψεύσασθαι λαµβάνει ψευδῆ (οὗτος δ᾽ ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ ὁ φρόνιµος)· ἔτι τὸν ἑκόντα 
φαῦλον βελτίω. τοῦτο δὲ ψεῦδος λαµβάνει διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς—ὁ γὰρ ἑκὼν χωλαίνων τοῦ 
ἄκοντος κρείττων—τὸ χωλαίνειν τὸ µιµεῖσθαι λέγων, ἐπεὶ εἴ γε χωλὸς ἑκών, χείρων ἴσως, 
ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἤθους, καὶ οὗτος. 
Hence Antisthenes sillily believed that nothing could be spoken of except by its own account: one 
account for one thing; from which it followed that contradiction is impossible, and that falsehood 
is nearly impossible.  But it is possible to speak of each thing, not only by its own account, but by 
the account of another thing, and to do so completely falsely on the one hand, but on the other 
hand it is also possible to do so truthfully, as for example eight may be spoken of as double by the 
account of two.  So in these cases this is what is meant by 'false'.  And a man is false who readily 
and deliberately makes such statements, not for some other reason but for the sake of it, and he is a 
man who causes such statements from others, just as we declare things to be false which cause a 
false appearance.  Hence in the Hippias the argument is misleading, that the same man is false and 
true.  For it assumes: that the false man is one who has the ability to deceive (viz. he is 
knowledgeable and in his right mind); further, that the man who is purposely bad is better.  This is 
falsely assumed because of induction – for saying that the man who deliberately limps is better 
than the one who limps unwillingly, he (Antisthenes ?) is saying pretending to limp, for if he is 
purposely lame, he is also worse in the same manner in this case as he is in his character.291
290 = DC 47a, SSR 152; cf. Alex. Aphr. in Metaph. 1024b26 Bonitz = DC 47b, SSR 152;  Ascl. in Metaph. 1024b25 
= SSR 153;  Arist. Top. 104b19-21 = DC 47c, SSR 153;  Alex. Aphr. in Top. 104b19 = SSR 153; Proclus in 
Plato's Cratylus c.37 Pasquali 1908 = DC 49, SSR 155; Isoc. Hel. 1 = SSR 156; DL 3.35 = DC 36, SSR 148.
291 cf. the statement 'the man who errs willingly in art (τέχνη) is preferable, but he who does so in practical 
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From this text it is evident that Aristotle is familiar with one dialogue titled Hippias.  He 
makes no reference to Plato, but by including it in this discussion of Antisthenes' theories 
he appears to show that he thinks the Hippias is by Antisthenes.  Of the other ancient 
authors who are thought to provide proof of Plato's authorship, the first is Cicero – he 
refers obliquely to Hippias, without ever mentioning Plato or implying a connection with 
Plato (Cic. de Orat. 3.32).  The other ancient author supposedly providing proof of Plato's 
authorship is Alexander of Aphrodisias.  Writing around AD 200, and commenting on 
Aristotle's text above, he adds that the Hippias is 'Plato's' (Πλάτωνος, in Metaph. 1024b26 
Bonitz 402.16-17).  So seemingly, in the intervening five centuries from Aristotle to 
Alexander, the notion had arisen that Plato was the author of the Hippias and it had 
somehow entered the 'Platonic corpus'.
In terms of the writing style, there is nothing obvious that distinguishes it from other works 
of Plato.  Socrates is similar in character to other Platonic dialogues where he engages with 
other famous sophists such as Protagoras and Gorgias.  He declines to let Hippias answer 
any question at length, having claimed that he was not able to keep up with what Hippias 
was saying in his exhibition (364b; cf. Prot. 334cd).  Through his accustomed style of 
questioning, Socrates manoeuvres the conversation (and Hippias) so that Hippias 
frequently finds himself in a corner in which he would not naturally choose to stand (e.g. 
369b, 375d, 376b).
In terms of content, however, there is a great deal in common with Antisthenes' works.  The 
use of ethical terms between the argument put forward in the earlier part of the dialogue by 
Hippias is very similar to Antisthenes use of the same terms used in the Ajax & Odysseus 
and particularly in fragment TH12.  In particular Antisthenes is most interested in the field 
of ethical terms accreting to Odysseus' quality of πολυτροπία (many-manneredness), and 
the opposing field of terms associated with Achilles' (and Ajax's, Nestor's) quality of 
ἁπλότης (frankness, sincerity).  This is the same ethical division that Hippias focusses on in 
his discussion with Socrates.  Whereas he labels (364c) Odysseus as πολυτροπώτατον 
wisdom (φρόνησις) is worse' Arist. NE 6 1140b21-4.
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(exceedingly many-mannered), Achilles is described as ἄριστον (most noble, bravest), and 
Nestor as σοφώτατον (cleverest, most-learned).  Hippias then goes on (364e-365b) to term 
Achilles ἁπλούστατος (exceedingly frank) and quotes the passage from the Iliad containing 
exactly the same line that Antisthenes' speaker quotes (i.e. 9.313).  Hippias explains to 
Socrates (365b) that this shows clearly that the character of Achilles is ἀληθής and ἁπλοῦς 
(true and frank) whereas that of Odysseus is πολύτροπός and ψευδής (many-mannered 
and false) – the commentary on TH12 expands on these arguments.
Further suggesting that Antisthenes is actually the author is the logic in Socrates' argument 
in the Hippias Minor, discussed by Aristotle in the passage above, which concludes that the 
same man is both true and false (368e, 369b).  This is rather reminiscent of the kind of 
internal logic in the other argument taken up here by Aristotle that contradiction is 
impossible and falsehood very nearly so.  The preliminary evidence therefore suggests that 
the Hippias Minor, or Hippias, to use Aristotle's name, was written by Antisthenes.  There is 
evidently not space to take this argument further here, and perhaps it would require 
another dissertation in itself.
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Appendix C – Classification of the bombulios
The bombulios does not appear in archaeological records as one of the recognised pot 
shapes.  It seems, however, that some of the small pots known as 'feeders' match the 
description of bombulios in several regards.  They are small, bulbous, and have a protruding 
spout.  They are sometimes described as 'fillers', envisaged in that case to be used to pour 
oil into lamps or similar.  Generally, however, they are imagined to be designed for feeding 
infants, and there is ample evidence to support this conclusion.  They often (but not always) 
have a poor quality of finish (Kern 1957, 18; see also list of 24 similar), there are often small 
teeth marks around the end of the spout (Agora 12, 161), and they have commonly been 
found in infant graves (Corinth 7, 125).  The fact that they were used for feeding infants, 
may not preclude the general shape from being used as a small wine cup.  We know the 
bombulios was used for wine but the following comment from Galen specifically connects 
the bombulios also with infant feeding (De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis 8.8.4.7):
οὕτως δὲ καὶ τὰ παιδία τῇ περιθέσει τῶν χειλέων ἔκ τε τῶν τιτθῶν ἕλκει τὸ γάλα κἀκ τῶν 
βοµβυλιῶν τὸ περιεχόµενον ἐν αὐτοῖς ὑγρόν.
Thus also children, by the application of the lips, draw the milk from the breasts, and from the 
bombulioi, the fluid contained in them.
One problem is that the vessels classed as 'feeders' include a fairly diverse range of shapes.  
In common, they all have a spout, but some have a wide opening at the top (Agora 12, 
pl.39.1197-1198; Corinth 13, pl.78 495-4).  Some have a strainer in the top (Corinth 15.3, pl. 77 
2207 & 2213).  Some are quite flat topped with a strainer on top (Corinth 13, pl.90 336-e), or a 
lid (Corinth 13, pl.71 491-1).  Some are completely enclosed apart from their spout and a 
little air hole (Noble 1972, 437-8, pl.95; Agora 12, 162 1200-1205, pl. 39).  For images of a 
surprising array of the versions described here (and more) see Snijder (1933, Tafel I-IV).  
The examples mentioned, which are completely closed in, often have a much higher quality 
glaze and finish (generally black), suggesting they may be candidates for the label 
'bombulios' as used in symposia.  In the case of the models with open tops it is a little hard to 
imagine how the vessel could 'resonate' during drinking.  The enclosed pots though could 
easily make some sort of noise as the fluid came out and the air escaped either through the 
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same spout or a tiny hole.  This would need to be tested with a similar vessel to be sure.  In 
addition, some of these pots have a glazed pellet sealed inside them, the purpose of which 
is not clear (see x-rays Noble 1972, pl.95).  Perhaps it partially blocked the outlet and 
contributed to the vessel making a noise – and maybe if prompted to do so (as per Sabinos' 
command in Galen above).
One piece of evidence that supports the notion that some of these vessels were wine cups 
comes from Corinth.  Pemberton writes: 'The "feeder" presents problems of date and 
function.  First, this type of vessel seems to appear suddenly in the later 4th century' 
(Corinth 18.1, 63, fig.21 481, pl.48 480-481; Corinth 15.3, pl. 77 2207 & 2213).  She then notes 
that these vessels were all found in a concentrated period from the third quarter of the 4th 
century until the early 3rd, before making another intriguing statement (63; my emphasis):
Yet, one wonders why, if there was a vogue for so many of them in the later 4th century, it would 
last for only 30 to 50 years?  They are usually found in the fills of dining rooms; were they used in 
the meals in those rooms?  They are probably misnamed and should be identified as containers for 
some type of liquid necessitating slow pouring.
So possibly for pouring wine at a slow rate?  Were these a version of the slow dripping 
bombulios that had a period of popularity in the wake of Antisthenes and Socrates 
eulogising them?  The handles are positioned on the body of the vessel at around 90° to the 
spout, so naturally suited for a right handed person to drink from.  They may have made 
their way from Attica to surrounding regions over the following decades, and perhaps fell 
back out of favour due to being awkward to use or because they delivered the wine at a 
frustratingly slow rate.  The lack of high quality finish makes them suspect for a sympotic 
setting, however, that may also be indicative of a vogue for more austere styles in that 
period.
There is another shape that has previously proved slightly baffling that also fits the 
description of the bombulios in many regards.  Discussing the various types of askos, Sharpe 
touches on a new sort – the purpose of which is speculated but unknown (Agora 12, 157, 
fig.11 1194, pl.39 1192-96; cf. Corinth 18.1, 99, fig.18, pl.16; my emphasis): 
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The most startling development is the setting of the mouth on top of the body, 1192-1196, and such 
a violent change has been thought worthy of a new name and is often designated "guttus"; the 
name is here used as a subdivision under the general term.  All the different shapes perhaps 
served the same use, for their form suggests a purpose.  Their small size, their spout, and their 
handle for pouring, indicate a vessel from which small amounts of liquid are to be poured drop by 
drop: oil, perfume or honey.  
Or perhaps wine?  These askoi are quite small, 7.5 – 10cm in height, usually with a matching 
diameter – so they are the size of a small cup.  They are bulbous, with a protruding neck, 
and one could well imagine them resonating or gurgling as the wine 'glugged' out.  
Kohoutková says that experiments with similar askoi have confirmed that the liquid comes 
out in drops or a small trickle (1989, 81).  They also often have a high quality, black finish 
that seems appropriate for use in symposia.  From Corinth a late fifth century oinochoe is 
documented by Pease that has very similar dimensions and profile to these askoi and could 
well be a Corinthian version of a vessel for the same purpose (1937, 298, fig. 30 182).  It is 
hard to tell from the images, and without attempting oneself to drink from one, whether the 
lip on the top of the neck would be comfortable and pleasant to drink from.  It might be 
necessary to ask a talented potter to make one and try it in order to know for certain.  
Nevertheless, at this stage these pots seem to match what is known about bombulioi in many 
respects and so could be examples of such.  It is also possible that the term bombulios was 
applied to more than one shape over time.
In the fragment from Athenaeus, the bombulios is stated to be a Rhodian cup made by 
Thericles.  LSJ s.v. offers Θηρίκλειος 'made by Thericles, a famous Corinthian potter' (c. 455-
385 BC).  A passage from Lucian's Lexiphanes (7) further links Thericles with the bombulios:
ποτήρια δὲ ἔκειτο παντοῖα ἐπὶ τῆς δελφίδος τραπέζης, ὁ κρυψιµέτωπος καὶ τρυήλης 
Μεντορουργὴς εὐλαβῆ ἔχων τὴν κέρκον καὶ βοµβυλιὸς καὶ δειροκύπελλον καὶ γηγενῆ πολλὰ 
οἷα Θηρικλῆς ὤπτα.  
Every sort of cup lay on the dolphin table, the face-hider, and Mentor-crafted ladle with easy-grasp 
handle, and a bombulios and a necked-goblet and many earth-borns such as Thericles baked.
In light of the evidence from Athenaeus, it is reasonable to interpret the 'Thericles baked' 
objects here as including all the vessels mentioned, rather than only the earth-borns.
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Thericlean pottery is discussed at some length in Athenaeus 11.470e-2e.  It is clear from the 
discussion that Thericles made a number of different types of vessels, including a mixing 
bowl (κρατήρ 472a).  The most discussed vessel in these passages, the eponymous 
'Thericlean' (Θηρίκλειον), is an unusually large drinking cup holding up to four kotulai 
(472d; roughly two pints or one litre, see LSJ s.v.  κοτύλη), the use of which rapidly induced 
drunkenness.  So plainly quite different to the bombulios he is also credited with.  
Apparently his pottery was also famous for its black glaze, which was imitated by vessels 
made from the black wood of the terebinth tree (Thphr. HP. 5.3.2) and quite likely by other 
potters.  This may help identify the bombulios from the candidates in the archaeological 
record listed above, as some of the 'feeders' and askoi are notable for their black, glossy 
finish.
336
Bibliography
Journal titles are abbreviated according to the American Journal of Archaeology (AJA) 
conventions, available through their website (www.ajaonline.org).
Editions 
Caizzi, D. F. 1966. Antisthenis Fragmenta. Milan.
Giannantoni, G. 1990, 2nd. Socratis et Socratorum Reliquae , 4 vols. Naples.
Humblé, J. 1932. Antisthenes Fragmenten. Gent.
Mullach, G. 1860-81. Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum , vol. 3 of 3 (1881). Paris.
Prince, S. 2015. Antisthenes of Athens: Texts, Translations, and Commentary. Ann Arbor.
Winckelmann, A. G. 1842. Antisthenis fragmenta. Turici.
General
Bakhtin, M. 1984. Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics. trans. C. Emerson, from Russian 1963 2nd 
ed. Minneapolis.
Baldwin, B. 1984. 'Herodotus and Tactitus: Two Notes on Ancient Book Titles'. QUCC 16: 
31-4.
Barker, A. 2004. 'Transforming the Nightingale: Aspects of Athenian Musical Discourse in 
the Late Fifth Century' in Music and the Muses, ed. P. Murray & P. Wilson, 185-
204. Oxford.  
Barlen, K. 1881. Antisthenes und Plato. Neuwied.
Bekker, I., ed. 1814-21. Lexica Segueriana = Vol. I of Anecdota Graeca, 3 vols.  Berlin.
Berger, G., ed. 1972. Das Etymologicum Symeonis (β). Meisenheim am Glan.
Bietenholz, P. G. & T. B. Deutscher. 2003. Contemporaries of Erasmus: a biographical register of 
the Renaissance and Reformation, 3 vols. Toronto.
Bossi, F. 1986. Studi sul Margite. Ferrara.
Boyarin, D. 2012. 'Deadly Dialogue: Thucydides with Plato.' Representations 117: 59-85.
Boys-Stones, G. 2007. 'Physiognomy and Ancient Psychological Theory' in Seeing the Face, 
Seeing the Soul: Polemon's Physiognomy from Classical Antiquity to Medieval Islam, 
ed. S. Swain, 20-124. Oxford. 
Boys-Stones, G. & Rowe, C. 2013. The Circle of Socrates: Readings in the First-Generation 
Socratics. Indianapolis.
Brancacci, A. 1985-6. 'La théologie d'Antisthène.' Philosophia 15-16: 218-30. 
337
Brancacci, A. 1993. 'Antisthène et la tradition antiplatonicienne au IVe siècle.' Contre Platon, 
Tome I: Le platonisme dévoilé, ed. M. Dixsaut, 31-51. Paris.
Brancacci, A. 1993. 'Érotique et théorie du plaisir chez Antisthène.' Le Cynisme Ancien: et Ses 
Prolongements, ed. M.-O. Goulet-Cazé & R. Goulet, 35-56. Paris.  
Brancacci, A. 2003. 'Zwei verlorene Schriften des Antisthenes.' RhM 146: 259-278. 
Brancacci, A. 2004. 'Il contributo dei papiri alla gnomica di tradizione cinica' in Aspetti di 
Letteratura Gnomica nel Mondo Antico II, ed. M. S. Funghi, 221-48. Florence.
Brancacci, A. 2005. 'Antisthène et le stoicisme' in Les stoïciens, ed. G. Romeyer Dherbey & J.-
B. Gourinat, 55-73. Paris. 
Brancacci, A. 2005. 'Episteme and Phronesis in Antisthenes.' Méthexis 18: 7-28. 
Brancacci, A. 2011. 'Antistene e Socrate in una testimonianza di Filodemo (T 17 Acosta 
Méndez-Angeli).' Cronache Ercolanesi 41: 83-91.  
Brancacci, A. 2013. 'Introduzione al pensiero politico di Antistene' in Socratica III, ed. F. de 
Luise & A. Stavru, 29-40. Sankt Augustin.
Brancacci, A. 2015. 'Philosophie et rhétorique chez Antisthène et dans le Phèdre de Platon' 
in La Rhétorique au miroir de la philosophie. Definitions philosophiques et définitions 
rhétoriques de la rhétorique, ed. B. Cassin, 39-68. Paris. 
Branham, B. & Goulet-Cazé, M.-O., ed. 1996. The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity 
and Its Legacy. Berkeley.
Buffière, F. 1956. Les mythes d'Homère. Paris.
Bywater, I. & Milne, J. G. 1940. ΠΑΡΑΧΑΡΑΞΙΣ. CR 54: 10-12.
Caizzi, F. 1964. 'Antistene.' Studi Urbinati di Storia, Filosofia e Letteratura 38: 48-99.
Camp, J. M. 1986. The Athenian Agora. London.
Campbell, J. B. 2012. 'Crowns and Wreaths' in OCD4, ed. S. Hornblower & A. Spawforth, 
411. Oxford.
Carey, C. ed. 1989. Lysias: Selected Speeches. Cambridge.
Ceccarelli, P. 1996. 'L'Athènes de Périclès: un 'pays de cocagne'? L'idéologie démocratique et 
le thème de l'αὐτόµατος βίος dans la comédie ancienne'. QUCC 54: 109-59.
Celluprica, V. 1987. 'Antistene: Logico o Sofista?' Elenchos 8: 285-328. 
Centre de Recherche Philologique. 1986. 'Antisthène: sophistique et cynisme' in Positions de 
la sophistique. Colloque de Cerisy, ed. B. Cassin, 117-147. Paris.
Chappuis, C. 1854. Antisthène. Paris.  
338
Chrimes, K. 1948. The Respublica Lacedaemoniorum ascribed to Xenophon. Manchester.
Clay, D. 1994. 'The Origins of the Socratic Dialogue' in The Socratic Movement, ed. P. A. 
Vander Waerdt, 23-47. Ithaca.
Cobet, C. G. 1857. 'Variae Lectiones.' Mnemosyne 6: 275-338.
Cobet, C. G. 1858. Novae Lectiones. Leiden.
Comparetti D. & Vitelli G., ed. 1908. Papiri Greco-Egizii: Pubblicati Dalla R. Accademia Dei 
Lincei (Papiri Fiorentini), vol. 2, Fasc. 1, no. 106-117 (papiri letterari). Milan.
Cope, E. M. 1877. The Rhetoric of Aristotle: With a Commentary. Cambridge.  
Crell, L. C. 1728. Programma de Antisthene Cynico. Leipzig.
Crönert, W. 1906. Kolotes und Menedemos. Leipzig.
Crönert, W. 1908. Literarisches Zentralblatt für Deutschland, 59. Leipzig.
Csapo, E. 2004. 'The Politics of the New Music' in Music and the Muses, ed. P. Murray & P. 
Wilson, 207-48. Oxford.
Csapo, E. 2011. 'Economics, Poetics, Politics, Metaphysics & Ethics of the “New Music”' in 
Music and Cultural Politics in Greek and Chinese Societies. Volume 1: Greek Antiquity, 
ed. D. Yatromanolakis, 65-132. Cambridge, MA.
Csapo, E. & Slater, W. 1995. The Context of Ancient Drama. Ann Arbor. 
Decleva Caizzi, F. 1977. 'La tradizione antistenico-cinica in Epitteto' in Scuole socratische 
minori e folosofia ellenistica, ed. G. Giannantoni, 93-113. Bologna. 
Delatte, A. 1951. Essai sur la politique pythagoricienne. Liege.
Denyer, N. ed. 2008. Plato: Protagoras. Cambridge.
Detienne, M. 1962. Homère, Hésiode et Pythagore. Brussels.
Detienne, M. 1996. The Masters of Truth in Archaic Greece. Trans. J. Lloyd from French 1967 
edition. New York.
Devries, W. L. 1892. Ethopoiia: A Rhetorical Study of the Types of Character in the Orations of 
Lysias. Baltimore. 
Deyks, F. 1841. De Antisthenis Socratici vita et doctrina. Koblenz.
Di Benedetto, V. 1966. 'Tracce di Antistene in Alcuni Scoli all' “Odissea”.' StIt, 38: 208-228.
Diggle, J. 2004. Theophrastus: Characters. Cambridge.
Dickey, E. 2007. Ancient Greek Scholarship. Oxford.
Dillon, J. 1992. 'Plato and the Golden Age.' Hermathena, 153: 21-36. 
339
Dittmar, H. 1912. 'Aischines von Sphettos.' Philologische Untersuchungen 21: 299-310. 
Döring, K. 1985. 'Antisthenes: Sophist oder Sokratiker?' Siculorum Gymnasium 38: 229-42.
Döring, K. 2006. 'Pasiphon' in Brill’s New Pauly, Antiquity volumes ed. H. Cancik & H. 
Schneider. Consulted online on 18 July 2015 
<http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy1.library.usyd.edu.au/10.1163/1574-
9347_bnp_e909420> 
Dover, K. J. 1968. Aristophanes: Clouds. Oxford.
Dover, K. J. 1978.  Greek Homosexuality. London.
Dover, K. J. 1980. Plato: Symposium. Cambridge.
Dover, K. J. 2012, 'Epicharmus' in OCD4, ed. S. Hornblower & A. Spawforth, 532. Oxford.
Dubel, S. & Gotteland, S., ed. 2015. Formes et genres du dialogue antique. Paris.
Dudley, D. 1937. A History of Cynicism: From Diogenes to the 6th Century A.D. London.
Dümmler, F. 1881. De Antisthenis logica. Bonn.
Dümmler, F. 1882. Antisthenica. Halle.
Dümmler, F. 1889. Akademika. Giessen.
Dümmler, F. 1891. 'Zum Herakles des Antisthenes.' Philologus 50: 288-296.
Easterling, P. E. 1985. The Cambridge History of Classical Literature. Cambridge.
Engels, J. 1998. '1004 Antisthenes of Athens' in Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker 
(continued), Pt. 4 A: Biography, Fasc. 1, ed. G. Schepens. Leiden.
Eucken, C. 1997. 'Der schwarze und der starke Logos des Antisthenes.' Hyperboreus 3: 251-
73.
Farrar, C. 1989. The origins of democratic thinking: The invention of politics in Classical Athens. 
Cambridge. 
Focardi, G. 1987. 'Antistene Declamatore: L'Aiace e L'Ulisse, alle Origine della Retorica 
Greca.' Sileno 13: 147-73.
Föllinger, S. & Müller, G. M. 2013. Der Dialog in der Antike: Formen und Funktionen einer 
literarischen Gattung zwischen Philosophie, Wissensvermittlung und dramatischer 
Inszenierung. Berlin.
Ford, A. L. 1999. 'Performing Interpretation: Early Allegorical Exegesis of Homer' in Epic 
Traditions in the Contemporary World: The Poetics of Community, ed. M. Bessinger, J. 
Tylus & S. Wofford, 33-53. Berkeley.
340
Ford, A. L. 2002. The Origins of Criticism: Literary Culture and Poetic Theory in Classical Greece. 
Princeton.
Ford, A. L. 2008. 'The Beginnings of Dialogue: Socratic Discourses and Fourth-Century 
Prose' in The End of Dialogue in Antiquity, ed. S. Goldhill, 29-44. Cambridge.
Ford, A. L. 2010. 'ΣΩΚΡΑΤΙΚΟΙ ΛΟΓΟΙ in Aristotle and Fourth-Century Theories of Genre.' 
Classical Philology 105: 221-235.
Fordyce, C. J. 1973 (corr. fr. 1961 ed.). Catullus: A commentary. Oxford.
Francis, D. 1993. 'Brachylogia Laconica: Spartan Speeches in Thucydides.' BICS 38: 198-212.
Gagarin, M. & Woodruff, P. eds. 1995. Early Greek Political Thought from Homer to the Sophists. 
Cambridge.
Gallo, I. 1980. Frammenti biografici da papiri, II. Rome. 
Gildemeister, J. & F. Bücheler. 1872. 'Themistios περὶ ἀρετῆς.' RhM 27: 438–462. 
Gill, C. 2012. 'Character' in OCD4, ed. S. Hornblower & A. Spawforth, 317. Oxford.
Goldhill, S. ed. 2008. The End of Dialogue in Antiquity. Cambridge. 
Gomperz, H. 1924. 'Die sokratische Frage als geschichtliches Problem.' HZ 129: 377-423.
Goulet-Cazé, M.-O. 1992. 'L'Ajax et l'Ulysse d'Antisthene' in Σοφίης Μαιήτορες, Chercherurs  
de sagesse: Hommage à Jean Pépin, ed. M.-O. Goulet-Cazé, et al., 5-36. Paris.
Greene, W. C. 1938. Scholia Platonica. Haverford, PA.
Griffith, M. 1983. Aeschylus: Prometheus Bound. Cambridge. 
Guida, A. 1989. 'Antisthenes: PFlor 113, col. II 26-36' in Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini, 
I.1*, ed. L. S. Olschki, 238-9. Florence. 
Habinek, T. 2005. Ancient Rhetoric and Oratory. Oxford.
Haslam, M. W. 1972. 'Plato, Sophron, and the Dramatic Dialogue.' BICS 19: 17-38.
Hawkins, A. H. 1999. 'Ethical Tragedy and Sophocles' “Philoctetes”.' CW 92: 337-57.
Henderson, J. 1991, 2nd.  The Maculate Muse. Oxford.
Hinds, S. H. 2012. 'Books, Poetic' in OCD4, ed. S. Hornblower, A. Spawforth & E. Eidinow, 
252-3. Oxford.
Hordern, J. H. 2004. Sophron's Mimes: Text, Translation, and Commentary. Oxford.
Hornblower, S. 2012. 'Aspasia' in OCD4, ed. S. Hornblower, A. Spawforth & E. Eidinow, 192. 
Oxford.
341
Irwin, E. 2015a. 'The Platonic Axiochus: the politics of not fearing death in 406 BC 63' in 
Formes et genres du dialogue antique, ed. S. Dubel & S. Gotteland, 63-85. Paris.
Irwin, E. 2015b. ‘The nothoi come of age? Illegitimate sons and political unrest in late fifth-
century Athens’, in Minderheiten und Migration in der griechisch-römischen Welt: 
Politische, rechtliche, religiöse und kulturelle Aspekte, ed. P. Sänger, 75-122. 
Paderborn. 
Jacoby, F. 1949. Atthis. Oxford.
Joël, K. 1893-1901. Der echte und der xenophontische Sokrates, 2 vols. Berlin.
Joël, K. 1921. Geschichte der antiken Philosophie. Tübingen.
Jebb, R. C. 1893, 2nd. The Attic Orators: From Antiphon to Isaeus, 2 vols. London. 
Johnstone, C. L., ed. 1996. Theory, Text, Context: Issues in Greek Rhetoric and Oratory. Albany.
Jost, W. 2004. A Companion to Rhetoric and Rhetorical Criticism. Oxford.
Kahn, C. 1996. Plato and the Socratic Dialogue. Cambridge.
Kennedy, G. 1994. A New History of Classical Rhetoric. Princeton.
Kennedy, G. 1963. The Art of Persuasion in Greece. Princeton.
Kennedy, W. J. 2011. Antisthenes' Ajax and Odysseus. Diss. Sydney.  At: 
http://ses.library.usyd.edu.au/bitstream/2123/7963/1/kennedy_honsthesis_2011.p
df
Kerferd, G. B. 1981. The Sophistic Movement. Cambridge.
Kesters, H. 1935. Antisthène. De la dialectique. Étude critique et exégétique sur le XXVIe Discours  
de Thémistius. Diss. Louvain. 
Kesters, H. 1959. Plaidoyer d'un Socratique inconnu contre le Phèdre de Platon. Löwen. 
Kesters, H. 1965. Kérygmes de Socrate. Löwen.
Kern, J. H. C. 1957. 'Attic Feeding bottle of the 4th Century.' Mnemosyne 10: 16-21.
Kohoutková, J. 1989. 'An Apulian Askos in Prague.' Listy filologické 112.2: 81-2 I-IV. 
Körte, A. 1920. Archiv f. Papyrusforsch, 6. Berlin.
Kühn, C. G., ed. 1830. 'Galeni linguarum seu dictionum exoletarum Hippocratis explicatio', 
in Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia vol. 19., 62-157. Leipzig.
Lang, M. 1984. Herodotean Narrative and Discourse. Cambridge, MA. 
Lasserre, F. & Livadaras, N., eds. 1976-92. Etymologicum Genuinum. 2 vols (α-βώτορες). 
Rome.
342
Laurenti, R. 1962. 'L'iponoia di Antisthene.' Rivista critica di Storia della Filosofia 17: 123-32.
Lockwood, J. F., Browning, R., Wilson, N.G. 2012. 'Aristarchus (2)' in OCD4, ed. S. 
Hornblower & A. Spawforth, 159. Oxford. 
Long, A. 2008. 'Plato’s dialogues and a common rationale for dialogue form' in The End of 
Dialogue in Antiquity, ed. S. Goldhill, 45-59. Cambridge.
Luz, L. 2015. 'Socrates, Alcibiades and Antisthenes in PFlor 113' in From the Socratics to the 
Socratic Schools, ed. U. Zilioli, 192-210. London.
MacDowell, D. M. 1971.  Aristophanes' Wasps: edited with Introduction and Commentary. 
Oxford.
MacLeod, C. 1974. 'Form and Meaning in the Melian Dialogue.' Historia 23: 385-400.
MacPhail, J. A. 2011. Porphyry's Homeric Questions on the Iliad: Text, Translation, 
Commentary. Berlin.
Maehler, H. 2012. 'Books, Greek and Roman' in OCD4, ed. S. Hornblower & A. Spawforth, 
249-52. Oxford.
Mansfeld, J. 1981. 'Protagoras on Epistemological Obstacles and Person' in
 The Sophists and their Legacy, ed. G. B. Kerferd, 38-53, Wiesbaden.
Mársico, C. 2011. Los Filósofos Socráticos, Testimonios y Fragmentos II: Antístenes, Fedón, 
Esquines y Simón. Buenos Aires.
Matthews, E. 2012. 'Greek Personal Names' in OCD4, ed. S. Hornblower & A. Spawforth, 
1022-4. Oxford.
Mazzara, G. 2014. 'La logica di Antistene nell' Aiace e nell'Odisseo' in Antisthenica Cynica 
Socratica. Mathésis 9, ed. Vladislav Suvák, 121-167. Prague.
Moles, J. L. 2012. 'Bion (1)' in OCD4, ed. S. Hornblower & A. Spawforth, 243. Oxford.
Moreno, A. 2007. Feeding the Democracy: The Athenian Grain Supply in the Fifth and Fourth 
Centuries B.C. Oxford.  
Müller, A. 1860. De Antisthenis Cynici vita et scriptis. Marburg. 
Nachmanson, E., ed. 1918. Erotiani vocum Hippocraticarum collectio. rec. Uppsala.
Natorp, P. 1892. 'Aischines' Aspasia.' Philologus 51: 489-500.
Navia, L. E. 1995. The Philosophy of Cynicism. Westport.
Navia, L. E. 1996. Classical Cynicism. Westport.
Navia, L. E. 1998. Diogenes of Sinope: The Man in the Tub. Westport.
Navia, L. E. 2001. Antisthenes of Athens: Setting the World Aright. Westport.
343
Nervegna, S. .2014. 'Performing Classics: The Tragic Canon in the Fourth Century and 
Beyond' in Greek Theatre in the Fourth Century B.C, ed. E. Csapo, et al., 157-187. 
Berlin.
Noble, J. V. 1972. 'Unusual Attic Baby Feeder.' AJA 76: 437-8. 
Norden, E. 1893. 'Über einige Schriften des Antisthenes'. Beiträge zur Geschichte der 
Griechischen Philosophie, Jahrbücher für classische Philologie Suppl. 19: 368-385.
Nussbaum, M. 1986, revised 2001. The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy 
and Philosophy. Cambridge.
Patterson, C. 1981. Pericles' Citizenship Law of 451-50 B.C. New York.
Patzer, A. 1970. Antisthenes der sokratiker: Das literarische Werk und die Philosophie dargestellt 
am Katalog der Schriften. Marburg.
Pease, M. Z. 1937. 'A Well of the Late Fifth Century at Corinth.' Hesperia 6: 257-316. 
Pellegrino, Matteo. 2000. Utopie e immagini gastronomiche nei frammenti dell'Archaia. Bologna.
Pelling, C. B. R., ed. 1990. Characterization and individuality in Greek literature. Oxford.
Poulakos, J. 1995. Sophistical Rhetoric in Classical Greece. Columbia.
Prince, S. 2006. 'Socrates, Antisthenes and the Cynics' in A Companion to Socrates, ed. S. 
Ahbel-Rappe & R. Kamtekar, 75-92. Oxford. 
Prince, S. 2014. 'Words of Representation and Words of Action in the Speech of Antisthenes’ 
Ajax' in Antisthenica Cynica Socratica. Mathésis 9, ed. Vladislav Suvák, 168–199. 
Prague.  
Rankin, H. D. 1970. 'Antisthenes a “Near-Logician”?' AntCl 39: 522-7. 
Rankin, H. D. 1974. 'Irony and Logic: The ἀντιλέγειν paradox and Antisthenes' purpose.' 
AntCl 43: 316-20. 
Rankin, H. D. 1981. 'Ouk estin antilegein' in The Sophists and Their Legacy, ed. G. B. Kerferd, 
25-37. Wiesbaden.
Rankin, H. D. 1983. Sophists, Socratics, and Cynics. London.
Rankin, H. D. 1986. Anthisthenes [sic.] Sokratikos. Amsterdam.
Reis, B. 1999. Der Platoniker Albinos und sein sogenannter Prologos: Prolegomena, 
Überlieferungsgeschichte, kritische Edition und Überse ung. Wiesbaden.
Richard, M. 1962-4. 'Florilèges spirituels grecs' in Dictionnaire de spiritualité, v.5 col. 488-92, 
Paris; (reprinted in M. Richard. 1976. Opera minora I. Turnhout-Leuven: no. 1).
Richardson, N. J. 1975. 'Homeric professors in the age of the Sophists'. PCPS 21: 65-81.
344
Richardson, N. J. 1980. 'Literary Criticism in the Exegetical Scholia to the Iliad: A Sketch'. 
CQ 30: 265-87.
Richter, G. L. 1724. Dissertatio historico-philosophica de vita, moribus ac placitis Antisthenis 
Cynici.  Jena. 
Ritter, H. 1830. Die Philosophie der Griechen. Leipzig.
Rostagni, A. 1922. 'Un Nuovo Capitolo Nella Storia Della Retorica e Della Sofistica'. SIFC 2: 
148-201 [= Scritti minori, 1 (1955), 1-59].
Russell, D. A. 1983. Greek Declamation. Cambridge.
Rutherford, R.B. 1995. The Art of Plato. London.
Sayre, F. 1948. 'Antisthenes the Socratic.' CJ 43: 237-244. 
Sbordone, F. 1935. 'Sentenze di filosofi e detti celebri d’ antichi spartani' (excerpta e codd. 
Neapol. gr. II D 22; Neapol. gr. II C 37). Rivista Indo-Greco-Italica di Filologia e 
Antichità Classiche 19-20: 1-18; = F. Sbordone. 1971. Scritti di varia filologia, 164-181. 
Napoli. 
Schiappa, E. 1994. Landmark Essays on Greek Rhetoric. Davis.  
Schibli, H. S. 1990. Pherekydes of Syros. Oxford. 
Schleiermacher, F. 1804-1828, 3rd 1856-61. Platons Werke, 3 vols. Berlin.
Schleiermacher, F. 1839. Geschichte der Philosophie. Berlin.
Schrader, H. L. 1880. Porphyrii Quaestionum homericarum ad Iliadem pertinentium reliquias. 
Leipzig.
Schrader, H. L. 1890. Porphyrii Quaestionum homericarum ad Odysseam pertinentium reliquias. 
Leipzig.
Sears, M. A. 2013. Athens, Thrace, and the Shaping of Athenian Leadership. Cambridge.
Sellars, J. 2003. 'Simon the Shoemaker and the Problem of Socrates' in CP 98: 207-16.
Seltman, C.T. 1938. 'Diogenes of Sinope, Son of the Banker Hikesias' in Transactions of the 
International Numismatic Congress 1936, ed. J. Allan et al., 121. London. 
Shorey, P. 1937. Plato: The Republic. Cambridge, MA.
Sier, K. 1996. 'Aias' und Odysseus' Streit um die Waffen des Achilleus: Mythisches Exempel 
und Philosophie der Sprache bei Antisthenes' in  ΛΗΝΑΙΚΑ: Festschrift für Carl 
Werner Müller, ed. C. Mueller-Goldingen & K. Sier, 53-80. Stuttgart.
Slings, S. R. 1996. 'Review of Giannantoni's “Socratis et Socraticorum Reliqiae”.' Mnemosyne 
4th series, 49: 467-9.
345
Smyth, H. W. 1894. The Sounds and Inflections of the Greek Dialects: Ionic. Oxford.
Sommerstein, A. H. 1982. Aristophanes: Clouds. Warminster.
Sparkes, B. A. 2006. 'Pottery and Metalwork' in Edinburgh Companion to Ancient Greece and 
Rome. Edinburgh.
Stanford, W. B. 1968. The Ulysses Theme: A Study in the Adaptability of a Traditional Hero 2nd. 
New York. 
De Stefani, E., ed. 1909-20. Etymologicum Gudianum. Leipzig.
Susemihl, F. 1887. 'Der Idealstaat des Antisthenes und die Dialoge Archelaos, Kyros und 
Herakles'. Jahrbücher für classische Philologie 33: 207-214. 
Susemihl, F. 1900. 'Die Aspasia des Antisthenes.' Philologus 59: 148-151, 469-471. 
Suvák, V. ed. 2014. Antisthenica Cynica Socratica. Mathésis 9. Prague. 
Tate, J. 1927. 'The Beginnings of Greek Allegory.' CR 41: 214-5.
Tate, J. 1934. 'On the History of Allegorism.' CQ 28: 105-114.
Tennemann, W. G. 1799. Geschichte der Philosophie. Leipzig. 
Thimme, O. 1935. Physis, Tropos, Ēthos. Diss. Göttingen.
Thomas, R. 2000. Herodotus in Context. Cambridge.
Thomas, R. R. 1979. 'The Hoplite as Citizen: Athenian Military Institutions in their Social 
Context' in L'antiquité classique 48: 508-48.
Thompson, D. B. 1960. 'The House of Simon the Shoemaker' in Archaeology 13: 234-40.
Tittmann, J. A. H. 1808. Iohannis Zonarae Lexicon. Leipzig.
Todd, S. C., trans. 2000. Lysias. Austin.
Todorov, T. 1982. Symbolism and Interpretation. Trans. C. Porter from French 1973 ed. Ithaca.
Trapp, M. B. 2012. 'allegory, Greek' in OCD4, ed. S. Hornblower & A. Spawforth, 64. Oxford.
Tsouna McKirahan, V. 1994. 'The Socratic Origins of the Cynics and the Cyrenaics' in The 
Socratic Movement, ed. P. A. Vander Waerdt, 367-91. Ithaca.
Tsouna, V. 1998. 'Doubts about Other Minds and the Science of Physiognomics'. CQ 48: 175-
186. 
Überweg, F. 1863. Grundiß der Geschichte der Philosophie. Berlin.  
Urban. K. 1882. Über die Erwähnungen der Philosophie des Antisthenes in den Platonischen 
Schriften. Königsberg.
Usher, S. 1999. Greek Oratory: Tradition and Originality. Oxford.
346
Usher, S. 1965. 'Individual Characterisation in Lysias.' Eranos 63: 99-119.
Ussher, R. G. 1977. 'Old Comedy and “Character”: Some Comments.' G&R 24: 71-79.
Van Ophuijsen, J. M. 1993. 'Semantics of a Syntactician. Things meant by verbs according to 
Apollonius Dycolus “Περὶ συντάξεως”' in ANRW II.34.1: 731-770.
Vickers, M. 1999. 'Alcibiades and Melos: Thucydides 5.84-116.' Historia 48: 265-81.
Waddington, W.H., et al. 1904. Recueil général des monnaies grecques d'Asie Mineure, Vol. 1, Pt. 
1. Paris.
West, M.L. 1978. Hesiod: Works and Days. Edited with Prolegomena and Commentary. Oxford.
West, M. L. 2003. Greek Epic Fragments: From the Seventh to the Fifth Centuries BC. Cambridge, 
MA. 
Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, U. v. 1919. Platon, 2 vols. Berlin. 
Wilson, P. 1999. 'The aulos in Athens' in S. Goldhill & R. Osborn, eds. Performance culture and  
Athenian democracy. Cambridge. 
Yunis, H. 1996. Taming Democracy: Models of Political Rhetoric in Classical Athens. Ithaca.
347
